00103484



Digitized with financial assistance from
Government of Maharashtra
on 15 March, 2016

LIFE

OF THE

DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

VOL. II.

LONDON
PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO.
NEW-STREET SQUARE

Nacqu. pinx.t Heliographie A. Réffaut sculp.

MARMONT

Imp. Lemercier et Cie à Paris

HISTORY OF THE LIFE

OF

ARTHUR

DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

FROM THE FRENCH OF M. BRIALMONT

CAPTAIN ON THE STAFF OF THE BELGIAN ARMY.

103484 al

WITH EMENDATIONS AND ADDITIONS

BY THE

REV. G. R. GLEIG, M.A.

CHAPLAIN-GENERAL TO THE FORCES AND PREBENDARY OF ST. PAUL'S.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON
LONGMAN, GREEN, LONGMAN, AND ROBERTS
1858

923.242
Wel/Bri/His
103484

CONTENTS

OF

THE SECOND VOLUME.

CHAPTER I.

The allied Troops move on Salamanca. — Capture of the Forts. — Battle of Salamanca. — Passage of the Guadarama. — Wellington enters Madrid. — His Embarrassments. — Situation of the Belligerents. — Siege of Cadiz raised. — Soult evacuates Andalusia. — Siege of Burgos. — Not successful. — Retreat of the Allies. — Junction of Wellington and Hill. — The Armies of the Centre, the South, and of Portugal move upon Tormès. — Critical Position of Wellington. — He escapes. — Winter Quarters on the Aguilar. — Disorders of the Retreat. — Dissatisfaction of the Commander-in-Chief. — Review of the Campaign of 1812 - - - - Page 1

CHAP. II.

Effect of the Retreat from Burgos in England and Spain. — Wellington treats with the Cortès. — His Journey to Cadiz. — Reception there, and in Lisbon. — Condition of the hostile Armies. — Offensive Movements. — Wellington baffles the Plans of Joseph. — The Defects of the latter. — Battle of Vittoria. — Its Consequences. — Blockade of Pampeluna. — The British Army in the Pyrenees. — The Siege of St. Sebastian begun - - - - - - - 73

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

IN

THE SECOND VOLUME.

PORTRAITS.

Marshal Marmont	*to face*	*Title-page*
Marshal Soult	„	Page 124
General Hill	„	„ 180
Marshal Blucher	„	„ 412

MAPS AND PLANS.

Battle of Salamanca	„	„ 34
Siege of Burgos	„	„ 52
Battle of Vittoria	„	„ 104
Siege of St. Sebastian	„	„ 118
Map of the Western Pyrenees	„	„ 128
Battle of Orthes	„	„ 198
„ Toulouse	„	„ 222
Map of Spain and Portugal (large map)	„	„ 232
Map illustrating the Campaign of 1815 in the Netherlands	„	400
Battle of Waterloo	„	„ 468

ERRATA. Vol. II.

Page 113, line 15 from bottom, for "combination," read "conception."
„ 134 „ 16, for "its pivot," read "his pivot."

ADDITIONAL ERRATA. VOL. II.

Page 6, line 12 from bottom, for "its exhausting influence" read "their exhausting influence."
„ 97, „ 1, for "fixed" read "attended."
„ 155, „ 2, for "above Bidassoa" read "above the bridge."
„ 156, „ 10 from bottom, for "their reserves" read "his reserves."
„ 157, „ 4 from bottom, before "Bidassoa" insert "the."
„ 192, „ 11, for "invincible" read "insurmountable."
„ „ „ 5 from bottom, for "probable" read "improbable."

MEMOIR

OF THE

DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

CHAPTER I.

THE ALLIED TROOPS MOVE ON SALAMANCA.—CAPTURE OF THE FORTS.—BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.—PASSAGE OF THE GUADARAMA.—WELLINGTON ENTERS MADRID.—HIS EMBARRASSMENTS.—SITUATION OF THE BELLIGERENTS.—SIEGE OF CADIZ RAISED.—SOULT EVACUATES ANDALUSIA.—SIEGE OF BURGOS.—NOT SUCCESSFUL.—RETREAT OF THE ALLIES.—JUNCTION OF WELLINGTON AND HILL.—THE ARMIES OF THE CENTRE, THE SOUTH, AND OF PORTUGAL MOVE UPON TORMES.—CRITICAL POSITION OF WELLINGTON.—HE ESCAPES.—WINTER QUARTERS ON THE AGUILAR.—DISORDERS OF THE RETREAT.—DISSATISFACTION OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.—REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812.

The fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos left the allied army free to threaten at will the north, centre, and south of Spain. Living from their own magazines, they were able to operate at all seasons; whereas the French, who depended on the resources of the country, could seldom move till the corn was ripe. Of his superiority in this respect Wellington made excellent use in arranging the movements which marked the opening of the campaign

of Salamanca. He entertained at one time the idea of invading Andalusia; but when his army was prepared to move, in the beginning of June, the corn was ripe throughout the whole of the south of Spain. In Estremadura fifteen days would yet be required to ripen it, while in the provinces of Castile and Leon it could not come to maturity till after a still wider interval. It was, therefore, possible to achieve some success in the north before the harvest could be got in. This circumstance determined Wellington how to act. He considered, besides, that by striking a decisive blow against Marmont, he would deliver Andalusia as surely as if he moved into that province, because Madrid would thus fall into the hands of the Allies, and Soult's communications with France being thereby threatened, he would feel himself in danger of being surrounded, and withdraw.

General Jomini, whose opinion on such subjects is of great weight, delivers himself concerning Wellington's plan in the following terms:—"The commander of the Allies might advance against Soult on the right, or debouch by the centre upon Madrid, or operate to the left against Marmont. By the first of these arrangements he would draw the French masses towards the south, and Spain would be more completely overrun than ever. By moving towards the north, on the contrary, he had a right to expect that Soult would be compelled to hasten thither also, and thus all the south of Spain, as far as the Tagus, would, in point of fact, be brought under the authority of the Junta of Cadiz. If the French should act so unwisely as to guard Seville instead of supporting Marmont, he would beat the latter by himself; and, forasmuch as the line of retreat to Bayonne

ran in that direction, it was certain that a victory upon the Douro would cause one half of the Peninsula, and the capital itself, to be evacuated. The matter was too evident to escape the penetration of Napoleon. But he hoped, on the one hand, that the English would not venture to commit their troops at any distance from Portugal; and, on the other, he entertained a mistaken idea of the character and talents of their commander."

The views entertained by the Duke of Ragusa were precisely similar. He saw that by making their offensive movement towards the south, and carrying thither the bulk of their forces, the Allies must expose Lisbon to the incursions of the army of the north; that the French, by evacuating Andalusia, would only become the more concentrated; and that, weakened by the occupation of so much additional territory, the allies would be cautious not to force on further changes till they should have obtained some decisive advantages elsewhere.

If, on the other hand, they made the attack on the north, Lisbon, which stands upon the right bank of the Tagus, would not be uncovered; while the defeat of the army of Portugal would insure not only the conquest of the country which it occupied, but the evacuation of Madrid and of the south also. Finally, he argued, that an army acting in Old Castile would be cut off from the resources which Portugal, the province of Galicia, the Spanish army which held that province, and the sea-ports along its shores, were all able to supply.*

The moment chosen by Wellington for commencing a war of offence was most favourable. The army of Portugal had sent a large portion of its cavalry to

* Mém. Duc. de Ragus. vol. ix. pp. 109, 110.

Russia. The greater part of its guns were badly equipped, and the *morale* of the troops had not recovered from the disastrous influence of recent events. The English army, on the other hand, was in excellent order, strong in cavalry, provided with admirable equipments, and animated with the very best spirit. There had occurred besides, in the policy of Great Britain, a change favourable to the general state of affairs in Spain. Subsequently to the assassination of Perceval, which occurred on the 11th May, in the lobby of the House of Commons, Lord Liverpool had been placed at the head of a Tory cabinet. The Marquis of Wellesley, it is true, did not form part of the new cabinet, and the army, which trusted much to his support, looked upon the circumstance as a misfortune. But, as has been observed by an English author, "Lord Castlereagh, who succeeded Wellesley in the Foreign Office, did less mischief in the Peninsula than any of the ministers who preceded him. There was no longer any personal interest opposed to Lord Wellington, and the military policy of the cabinet became gradually influenced by his genius, till in the end it was entirely overruled by it."

The internal condition of Spain, however, underwent little change for the better. The Princess Charlotte, supported by a party in the Cortes, resisted with greater earnestness than ever the diplomacy of England. The mediation proposed by Wellesley for arranging the affairs of the colonies was not accepted, and the insane determination of the Peninsular statesmen, to reduce the insurgents by force of arms, more and more detracted from the defensive resources of the country. The Spanish army was in a deplorable condition. Its

regular cavalry had ceased to exist, almost all the field artillery had been taken, the arsenals at Cadiz were entirely exhausted, and the greater part of the heavy cannon in the isle of Leon had become unserviceable. Stores diminished in the most alarming manner, and no money had been set apart for the maintenance of the foundries. The succours furnished by Great Britain continued to be squandered. The English officers, who had been thwarted in their hope of levying Spanish corps, scarcely succeeded in collecting some hundreds of good soldiers by scattering them through the British regiments. Finally, the Cortes maintained secret communications with King Joseph, and seemed only to await an opportunity of going over to him. In this manner the policy of England was on the eve of sustaining a check, when the genius of Wellington gave new strength to the tottering destinies of Europe.

Nor was the condition of Portugal much more favourable. The hostility of the regency, the inertness of its chief agents, the indifference of the people, the bad organisation of the militia, the intrigues of the hidalgoes, and the duplicity of the Brazilian cabinet, continued to manifest themselves in every case where promptitude and energy were especially needed. Nevertheless, Wellesley, supported by Lord Castlereagh, so far prevailed with the Prince Regent as to obtain authority for introducing such changes as he thought necessary into the system of administration. And yet, though Souza and the Bishop of Oporto were his personal enemies, he never made use of that authority: because a judgment sound and always calm rendered him indifferent to the indulgence of mere feeling. Having satisfied himself that the evil arose less from the restless activity of these

agitators than from the support afforded to them at Rio Janeiro, he was justly apprehensive of increasing their importance if he should make them appear to be the victims of a stranger. We mention the fact, because it proves that Wellington was endowed, not only with the talents, but with the character of a truly great statesman.

The most serious difficulties which the commander-in-chief had to encounter arose from the supineness of the Portuguese government, which, trusting altogether to the supplies and subsidies furnished by England, made no effort to render the resources of the country available for the wants of the army. In the same spirit of indifference, the civil officers either eluded military regulations altogether, or carried them into effect in the most vexatious manner. It was to no purpose that Wellington endeavoured to obtain from the Prince Regent some reform of these lamentable abuses, which, after having introduced the greatest confusion into the collection and management of the taxes, and into the general expenditure and administration of the government, brought its exhausting influence to bear upon the physical force, and paralysed the resources, of the nation. The consequence was, that in spite of the multiplicity of affairs in which he was engaged, and the personal part which he took in the most minute of them, he was driven to find time for the preparation of memoranda upon the nature of these evils, and the remedial measures which they rendered necessary. Happily, his memoranda remain to testify to posterity the vigour and extent of that great man's judgment.

These efforts on his part, seconded by the suspension of subsidies, produced at length some partial improve-

ments. But the weakness and obstinacy of the Prince Regent presented insurmountable obstacles to anything like a general or permanent reform. Hence it came about that, till the very last, Wellington was called upon to combat perpetually recurring difficulties, the most inconsiderable of which would have sufficed to discourage a general less able, less firm, less resolute than himself. To such an extent, indeed, was the carelessness of the government at Lisbon carried, that instead of drawing from Portugal the means of subsisting his army, he was obliged, in some sort, to find subsistence for the whole Portuguese nation.

To provide for such enormous wants, he found himself under the necessity of undertaking a trade in grain upon a large scale; an operation which the war between Spain and its colonies, the capricious temper of the people of Africa, the quarrels of England with the United States, the want of specie, the depreciation in the value of English goods, and the impossibility of effecting loans, combined to render extremely difficult. Nevertheless he succeeded, with the assistance of Mr. Charles Stuart, the English minister, in preserving the neutrality of Portugal, and obtaining by that means, under the protection of licences, corn from America up to the end of the war. It was at once a valuable resource and a wise act of administration, because the corn paid for in English merchandise was resold at considerable profit, the whole of which he transferred to the military chest.

Such were the difficulties—political, administrative, and financial—in the midst of which Wellington was called upon to pursue the course of his operations.

We have seen that, at the termination of the expedition

into Beira, Wellington had determined to isolate Marmont, and to crush him before the arrival of the supports on which he counted. In order to obtain this result, it would be necessary to take the field after the rains should cease, and before the gathering in of the harvest would permit the French to move in masses. It would be necessary also to prevent Suchet from strengthening the army of Portugal with a portion of his troops; and, lastly, to hinder Soult, in concert with the army of the centre, from invading Portugal by the valley of the Tagus, and turning the right flank of the Allies in Castile.

To keep Suchet at a distance, 10,000 English from Sicily, with 6000 Spaniards, enrolled in Majorca at the expense of Great Britain, received orders to land on the east coast of the Peninsula, and, forming a junction with O'Donnel's corps, to excite an insurrection in Catalonia and Valencia, and to hinder Soult from detaching a part of his force into Portugal. At the same time General Hill, who occupied Almandralejos with 17,000 men, received orders to remove the bridge of boats at Almaraz, the only means of passage for the army of Andalusia between Toledo and the Portuguese frontier. This proceeding has been regarded as rash by the majority of French authors, and not without reason; for the tête-du-pont at Almaraz was, in point of fact, well guarded from afar by Foy, who, with his division, occupied the valley of the Tagus; by D'Armagnac, who was in Talavera with a portion of the army of the centre; and by Drouet, who had 8000 infantry of the army of the south at Hinojosa de Cordoba, and 1000 sabres on the Medellin road. The latter general was therefore considerably nearer to Merida than Hill was

to Almaraz; so that the retreat of the latter might have been seriously compromised. Wellington, however, took his measures so well, and deceived his enemy so cleverly by making a demonstration towards Andalusia, that 6000 English were able to surprise and carry by assault the forts of Almaraz. The circumstances were these:— On the 18th of May, Hill arrived almost unobserved on the high ground of Mirabete. He soon satisfied himself that the work which crowned that height was too strong to be taken by assault, and conceived the idea of storming it, by scaling the rocks at Manaderos. The same night a column of infantry descended by a cross road to the base, and at daybreak next morning 2000 men escaladed Fort Napoleon, which was carried, while the artillery and the rest of the English troops were making a furious demonstration against Fort Mirabete on the hill. The immediate consequence of this success was, that a foreign battalion, which had charge of the tête-du-pont of Lugar Nuevo, became panicstricken before it was attacked, and, in spite of the heroic example of Major Aubert, who mounted the ramparts and was there slain, fled without firing a shot.*

The bridge of boats being cut too soon by the detachments on the farther bank, the garrison of Fort Napoleon, pushed at the point of the bayonet over the different intrenchments of that work, and through the tête-du-pont, was driven in great numbers into the river. "This disaster," says General Hill, "produced such an

* See Belmas, the Duc de Ragusa, and Hill's report. Marmont seeks to justify himself by throwing the blame on this Prussian battalion. But he had been warned of the importance of keeping the bridge; he ought therefore to have intrusted it to troops on whom he could fully depend.

effect, that the panic communicated itself to the troops on the right bank, and the garrison of Fort Ragusa, suddenly abandoning their posts, fled in the greatest disorder to Naval-Moral." The English made haste to destroy the fortifications, the magazines, stores, workshops, and bridge equipments; after which they returned to Merida, without sustaining any loss, through the midst of the French divisions, which were round them on every side.

This expedition, so disastrous to the armies of the south and of Portugal, enabled Wellington to prepare for the execution of his greater enterprise, without in the slightest degree revealing his plan.

Misled by the movements of Hill's corps, Soult firmly believed that the Allies were about to invade the southern provinces. The king also, worked upon by the reports of the Duke of Dalmatia, gave himself up at first to the same false impression; but by and by he adopted the wiser views of Marmont, who considered the invasion of Old Castile as a settled thing, because it offered to Wellington many more advantages than an irruption into Andalusia. Moreover, apart from the general reasons, of the weight of which we have elsewhere spoken, there were particular incidents which satisfied him that a steady inroad by the English into the north of Spain might be looked for. Among these may be specified the arrival of five English divisions at Fuente Guenaldo; the presence of Wellington himself at the same point; the movement of troops towards Beira, Tras-os-montes, and Leon; the formation of large magazines at Corunna, and the assembly of numerous carriages and mules in Galicia. Soult, however, was not to be convinced. He disregarded or spoke lightly

of all these tokens, and held to his opinion that the enemy was preparing to carry the war into Andalusia.*

Made aware, by intercepted letters, of the differences of opinion between the French marshals, and not doubting that it would have the effect of delaying the concentration of their troops, Wellington entertained the hope that he would be able to take them unprepared. By the middle of June all his dispositions were complete. We shall explain, in few words, of what nature they were, in order that some idea may be formed of the care with which Wellington, so often described as a general more fortunate than gifted, provided beforehand for the success of his operations, leaving nothing to the arbitrement of chance.†

With a view to diminish the extent of his land carriage, Wellington had rendered the Tagus navigable as far as Malpica near Alcantara, and the Douro up to Barca di Alba. For the attainment of the same object, he had established magazines upon both lines, but

* It is curious to observe how M. Thiers, in the face of such evidence as is presented by the letters both of Marshal Soult and Marmont, endeavours to falsify history. He would have us believe that Jourdan, Joseph's Major-General, was never deceived as to Wellington's intentions. Compare his statements with Marmont's Letter, 3d May, 1812, in the Memoirs of Joseph.

† Lord Wellington's letter of the 26th of May, 1812, to Lord Liverpool, fully explains under what circumstances he had proposed, earlier in the year, to invade Andalusia. It therefore justifies, to a certain extent, Joseph's fears for that province, while it places in a prominent point of view the sagacity of Marmont, who alone, of all the French generals then in Spain, appears to have foreseen pretty accurately how Wellington would proceed. It is right to give the credit which is his due to a man whom his own countrymen take every opportunity of decrying.

principally at the mouth of the Douro; and to facilitate his junction with Hill, who was detached to the left of the Tagus, he had repaired the bridge of Alcantara, securing thereby an interior line of communication at once more rapid and more convenient than that to which the enemy, since the destruction of the bridge at Almaraz, were obliged to have recourse. In consequence of this latter advantage, the concentration of the allied troops could be effected in less time than that of the armies of the south and of Portugal.

The right of Wellington's army was rendered secure by the destruction of the bridge and the tête-du-pont at Almaraz,—by the exhausted state of the valley of the Tagus, and the loss of Soult's bridge-equipment; the left had nothing to fear. Meanwhile Sylviera and Urban, from their position at Tras-os-montes, were directed to threaten the right flank and rear of the enemy. Castaños, at the head of the Galician army, received orders to lay siege to Astorga, while the allied armies should make their appearance upon the Tormès, and the seventh Spanish army should act in concert with Sir Home Popham against the coast of Biscay, with a view to draw thither Caffarelli's divisions, which Marmont might otherwise call in to his own support. At the same time an expedition, equipped in Sicily, was to menace Catalonia and Valencia, and to co-operate with the army of Murcia in hindering the Duke of Albufera from sending assistance to the king. With respect to Soult, it was hoped that the garrison of Cadiz, the troops in the isle of Leon, the insurrection of the kingdom of Cordova, and Ballestero's army, would effectually prevent his advancing against General Hill. It is impossible to bestow too much praise upon these arrange-

ments, which were laid down with as much of foresight as of talent. They were favoured by circumstances, and still more by the genius of the English general and the bravery of his troops, and they resulted in effecting the triumph of the Spanish cause. Still Wellington experienced great uneasiness on the subject of supplies; he had grain, but no meat; he was without credit, and his military chest was empty. "In spite of all these chances in my favour," he says, "I cannot think without shuddering of the probability of our soon being destitute of everything, and of the consequences which must follow the entire want of money in the heart of Spain."

The Anglo-Portuguese force actually present with Wellington amounted to 56,000 men.* Marmont had 52,000 under his orders, Soult 56,000, Suchet 60,000, Caffarelli (the army of the north) 38,000, besides which there was in the field the army of the centre, under Joseph and Jourdan, amounting to 17,000 only. But the health of many of the English soldiers had been so seriously affected by the fever contracted in Walcheren, that a full third of its effective force encumbered the hospitals. Discipline also had become relaxed, in consequence of the commander-in-chief's inability to punish, as they deserved, the pillage and other excesses committed by his troops; for in spite of his pressing entreaties, the English government could never be brought to approve of the energetic measures which he

* This does not include 6000 men in garrison at Cadiz, but takes in 24,000 Portuguese. Hill's corps, amounting to 18,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 24 guns, was, however, detached. The total strength at head-quarters was therefore 36,000 infantry, 3500 cavalry, and 54 guns; 3500 Spaniards, under D'España and Sanchez, should be added, making in all 42,500, not, as M. Thiers says, 55,000.

suggested, in order to establish discipline and subordination before the enemy.*

The repair of the bridge of Alcantara, and the establishment of a dépôt of provisions at Cacerès, having at length removed all doubts as to Wellington's intentions, Marshal Marmont renewed with greater earnestness than ever his applications for support. The king and Jourdan seconded his efforts with all their influence; but they failed to obtain the desired result. It was neither good will nor a right understanding of the true nature of his position which was wanting in the commander-in-chief of the armies of Spain; it was the power to enforce obedience to his orders by his lieutenants. There were troops more than enough within reach to stop Wellington or to beat him; but Caffarelli held to the letter of the instructions which he had received from Napoleon, and positively refused, by withdrawing his troops, to leave the communications with France, even for fifteen days, in the power of Mina, Porlier, and Merino. In like manner Soult exaggerated the dangers to which he was himself exposed, and, being unaware of the powers conferred by the Emperor on Joseph, declared that he could not send a man to the army of Portugal, except by evacuating Anda-

* [Once for all, we must take the liberty of stating that M. Brialmont a good deal exaggerates the vices of the British soldier. He takes his views, naturally enough, from the orders and letters of the great Duke. But he did not know, as everybody who possessed any share of the Duke's confidence knew, that his Grace was apt to express himself on paper more strongly than he felt; that he was very impatient, and properly so, of irregularity or forgetfulness of duty; and was more liberal, after the manner of his country, of censure than of praise. Never let it be forgotten that, of the very army which, in the despatches, is so often held up to public odium as a band of ruffians,

lusia.* As to Suchet, his hands were full; he was unable to assist the king in any way except by the transmission of money.

On the 7th of May the king informed Marmont that he had directed the Duke of Dalmatia to detach General Drouet, with a third of the army of the south, to cover Almaraz, to watch Hill, to prevent his passing the Tagus, and, in the event of his doing so, to hang upon his rear. The order was received on the 26th of the same month.

On the 18th, Jourdan wrote to Dorsenne, desiring him to hold himself in readiness, agreeably with Berthier's instructions, to support the Duke of Ragusa with all the troops which he could collect, and to place these troops at the Duke of Ragusa's disposal, whenever he might require them.

It also appears that, in order the more effectually to support the army of Portugal, he intended at this time to abandon Andalusia, but that he was prevented from doing so by the peremptory orders of Napoleon, who charged him not only to keep such conquests as he had already achieved, but to extend them wider and wider.

We shall see by and by that this recommendation, too rigidly adhered to by Soult, as well as the too literal acceptance by Caffarelli, of the order never to let go his hold upon the communications with France, were

he said, after the war, that it was the best mounted machine the world ever produced; that with it he could have gone anywhere and done anything.]

* This is shown by a letter from Joseph to Marmont, dated the 4th of May. M. Thiers, however, attributes Soult's disinclination to help the king to his indignation that Jourdan, and not himself, had been appointed chief of the staff in Spain.

the principal causes of the disasters which befel the French army during the campaign of 1812.*

It was Marmont's purpose to guard the Tormès as long as possible, to concentrate his troops upon the Douro, and to protract the defence of the forts of Salamanca, till the arrival of the army of the north should enable him to push back the Allies within the Portuguese territory.

The rains had no sooner ceased than Wellington passed the Aqueda. After four days' march, he found himself on the 17th of June upon the Tormès, which he forded above and below Salamanca; a division of light cavalry, in observation upon the left bank, vainly endeavouring to impede his progress. He was received by the inhabitants of Salamanca with every demonstration of joy; all the houses were illuminated, and the streets and public places resounded with songs of gladness; Salamanca had suffered so much, during three years of French occupation, that this enthusiasm was little to be wondered at.

The works thrown up about the place consisted of an irregular fort, in the centre of which stood the convent of St. Vincent — and of two redoubts, one of which enclosed the convent of San Gaëtano, and the other the Convent Mercede. The convent of St. Vincent stood upon a steep rock, about 430 yards below the bridge of the Tormès; the two others occupied a plateau, from which St. Vincent could be battered in breach. In obedience to the orders of Napoleon, Marshal Marmont had constructed these several works, with inadequate

* See "Memoir of Joseph," particularly his letter of the 3rd of June to Marmont; also his letter to Caffarelli.

resources, and within the short space of three months only. As posts to resist guerillas, or an advanced guard of light infantry, they might be well arranged, and of sufficient strength, but against an enemy provided with heavy guns, they could not hold out beyond two or three days.

The Duke of Ragusa seeing that it would be necessary to collect all his forces, which were scattered over a space of forty leagues in extent, gave orders, on the 14th, for his army to concentrate. The point of assembly was fixed at Bleines, in rear of Salamanca. He directed the eighth division to withdraw from Asturias, and to join him by forced marches. On the 18th he wrote to Caffarelli, to the king, and to all who, according to the tenor of the Emperor's instructions, were bound to furnish such supplies to the army of Portugal as would place it in a condition to give battle to the English.

It was a little after noon on the 16th that Wellington arrived before Salamanca. In the evening Marmont withdrew his troops from the town, leaving Lieut.-Colonel Duchemin with 600 infantry, a company of artillery, and 25 sappers to hold Fort St. Vincent. On the 17th the French army took up its position at Bleines. The same day Wellington passed the Tormès at the ford of Santa Martha, about 1850 yards above the town, and at the ford of Canto, about a league below it. Clinton's division immediately invested the forts and redoubts, while the rest of the army, in order to cover the siege, was posted upon the heights of St. Christoval, about a league and a half from the city.

Wellington had not expected to find the forts of Salamanca in so respectable a condition. "The information regarding them when the march began," says Jones,

"had been only to the extent that some convents had been fortified, of which a confused sketch was sent in by a Spaniard, not a military man." It was owing to this mistake that the siege was begun with very inadequate means,—the artillery amounted to no more than four 18-pounders, and as many 24-pound iron howitzers, supplied respectively with 100 rounds of ammunition, while the engineers' park contained only 400 intrenching tools. Taking into account these feeble appliances, it was determined to breach the main wall of St. Vincent, and to deliver the assault immediately afterwards. A battery, commenced on the 17th, opened its fire upon the building on the 19th. It was supported by two 6-pounders planted upon the upper story of the convent of St. Bernardo, which fired round and grape shot against the artillery of the fort. A third battery, consisting of two howitzers, threw red-hot shot, for the purpose of setting fire to the monastery. On the 20th, a portion of the front wall and of the roof fell with a frightful noise; but almost at the same moment Wellington found himself obliged, through lack of ammunition, to suspend the attack, and to defer the continuance of his works till the arrival of a convoy from Almeida.

Meanwhile the Duke of Ragusa, having assembled the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Divisions, in all about 25,000 men, advanced on the 20th to the relief of the forts. Wellington ascertained this march in good time, and withdrawing a brigade of the 6th Division from Salamanca, caused the batteries to be disarmed, and, as a measure of precaution, sent the guns to the other side of the Tormès. These dispositions were so skilfully made, that Marmont, after closely reconnoitring the English position, considered it prudent not to deliver a

battle. Nothing was attempted on either side, except some skirmishing; but, on the termination of a sharp cannonade, the Duke of Ragusa drove in the advanced posts, and occupied the village of Moresco, about cannon-shot from the English army.

Believing that he would be attacked next morning, Wellington passed the night in bivouac, but the 21st passed as the previous day had done. It was marked only by a partial engagement undertaken towards evening, in order to dislodge the French from the village which they had seized the day before.

If Wellington, instead of making this attack towards the close of the day, had taken advantage of Marmont's ill-timed movement upon Moresco, to bring on a battle, it is probable that a brilliant victory would have crowned his efforts — for he had, on that day, a decided superiority in numbers over his adversary. Next morning, however, Marmont received reinforcements, which raised his army to about 36,000 men, and enabled him to take up a much stronger position. Still conceiving that the ground which he had occupied with a view to act on the offensive, could not be advantageously held, he fell back in the morning of the 23rd, two miles to the rear,— to the heights of Aldea Rubia, which command the ford of Huerta on the Tormès. It was here that a letter, dated the 10th, reached him, which announced that Caffarelli was in full march to join him, with all his cavalry, 7000 infantry, and twenty-two pieces of cannon.

The two armies retained their respective positions during the 23rd; on the 24th, at daybreak, a body of French troops passed the Tormès and began an attack, which the prompt arrangements of Wellington immediately frustrated. Its object apparently was to open a

communication with the forts; and by cutting in upon the English, to obtain some advantage over them. Be this, however, as it may, it is probable that if Wellington had fallen with the main body of his troops upon the French divisions on the right of their position at Aldea Rubia, while Graham with Bock's German cavalry kept those on the left engaged, a decisive result would have been obtained. Certainly such a movement held out better chances of success, and would have involved fewer risks, than the attack of the French in a strong position behind the Douro, on which the Allies were eager, a few days subsequently, to adventure.

Wellington took advantage of his partial success to resume the siege of the forts of Salamanca, which had been suspended since the 20th; but as he had not yet received his stores from Almeida, he began by attacking the redoubt of St. Gaëtano, which covered the approaches to Fort St. Vincent. The artillery discharged, during the 23rd, against the walls of that redoubt, the last rounds which remained, viz.: sixty 18-pound balls, and a hundred 24's. Though the distance and obliquity of the fire prevented a practical breach from being effected, Wellington, at ten in the evening, gave orders to carry St. Gaëtano and La Mercede by assault. Nothing was neglected which could be done by General Bowes to insure the success of the operation which he had been appointed to conduct, but his column was assailed by such superior numbers that it was obliged to retreat with the loss of 120 men. The general himself was among the slain.

In the morning of the 25th, Wellington received from Almeida, 600 rounds for his 24, and 400 for his 18-pounders, with a supply of powder. Upon this the fire

of the batteries against the walls of the redoubt and Fort St. Vincent was immediately resumed. At ten in the morning of the 27th, flames burst out among the buildings of the fort with such violence that the besieged despaired of being able to extinguish them. At the same moment the breach in the redoubt was declared practicable, and the assault was about to be given, when the garrison requested a respite of two hours, with a view to surrender. A like proposal was made by the defenders of St. Vincent; but fearing lest they should employ the time in extinguishing the fire and repairing the breaches, Wellington would not grant to either more than five minutes. This interval having expired without any appearance of surrender, hostilities were renewed on both sides. One English column moved upon St. Gaëtano, attacked it by the gorge and carried it, at the instant when another made itself master of St. Vincent by surprise. The following are the terms in which Belmas describes the latter episode. "It was still a season of truce, when some Portuguese light infantry advanced to the foot of the breach to chat in a friendly manner with our soldiers, who, distrusting nothing, allowed them to approach; but no sooner did they find themselves in sufficient numbers than they mounted the breach and forced their way into the convent." Lieutenant-Colonel Duchemin received a bayonet wound, and was obliged to surrender at discretion. There were found in the fort an extensive dépôt of clothing and stores of every description.

This little siege, which cost the Allies about 600 men, delayed for ten days the execution of their plans, and enabled Marmont to collect the whole of his forces. Meanwhile the armies of the king and of Soult ought to

have come to the succour of the marshal, and beaten Wellington; but each worked for himself, and Joseph was not possessed of authority enough to compel unity in their operations. The consequences of this state of things were clearly indicated to the minister of war by Marshal Jourdan. "The Duke of Ragusa," he says, "announces in the most positive manner that Lord Wellington is about to undertake the offensive against him. Yet the Duke of Dalmatia, who, in such an event, ought to send Count d'Erlon to the support of the army of Portugal, does nothing. The Duke of Albufera, who has been ordered to move a division upon Madrid, refuses, and Count Caffarelli pretends that he cannot send any succour without exposing the northern provinces to danger. If, then, Wellington march with the whole of his forces united, the army of Portugal must fight him single handed. It is possible that the enemy may be beaten, but if he should not, the most serious consequences must follow; and all this because the orders of the king are not carried into execution."

It was the expectation of Marmont that the forts of Salamanca would hold out fifteen days at least; he was therefore exceedingly surprised, in the night between the 26th and 27th, to receive intelligence by telegraph that the governor would be obliged, before the expiration of five days, to capitulate. The tidings determined him to make preparations for passing the Tormès in the night between the 28th and 29th; but on the 27th he was apprized of the premature surrender of the forts. Apprehensive, not without reason, that the Emperor would blame him for this, the marshal wrote on the 28th to Jourdan, and on the 1st of July to the king, that the fall of Salamanca must be attributed to the

bad spirit of Caffarelli, who had deceived him by announcing, on the 10th of June, that he was on the march with succours. "I waited for him three days," says he, "before commencing my march, and when I arrived it was too late." This is not exactly the fact; the marshal was still in his camp when he received intelligence of the surrender of the forts, and, according to his own confession, he made no arrangements for moving till the 28th or 29th, though tidings of the distress to which the garrison was reduced reached him on the evening of the 26th.

The capture of the forts changed completely the situation of the French army. Marmont was obliged to retreat during the night of the 27th, in order to post himself where, in comparative safety, he might wait for the promised succours. He took the direction of the Douro by the Tordesillas and Toro roads, withdrawing, as he proceeded, the garrison from Alba de Tormès.

Having ordered the destruction of the works at the latter place, and of the forts at Salamanca, Wellington departed on the 28th, and on the following day overtook his army, which was following the enemy by short marches, in the direction of Valladolid. He soon halted, however, under the conviction that it would be impossible to pass the Douro in face of the fortified positions of the French. Prudence, it is said, suggested the propriety of waiting to be attacked. We believe, on the contrary, that if he had assembled his troops on the 2nd of July, instead of dispersing them upon the false information that Marmont had passed the Douro, the retreat of the enemy's army, by the bridge of Tordesillas, would not have been accomplished without great loss.

Before continuing our narrative of events, let us cast

our eyes over the respective situations of the belligerent armies.

Wellington had seen many essential parts of his plan of campaign ruined, by want of forethought in his English agents, and by the incapacity of the Spanish generals. Ballesteros had been beaten at Bornos, and Slade's cavalry dispersed at Lera. Castaños, by his tardiness, had lost the opportunity of putting himself in communication with Sylviera, so as to restrain the enemy's foragers, as had been agreed upon, and compel them to subsist at the expense of their magazines. Echevaria had done nothing in the kingdom of Cordova. At Cadiz, English influence had received a decided check, by the rejection of the proposed mediation in favour of the colonies. Finally, the Cortes showed itself every day more and more favourable to the French. The defeats of Mina, on the other hand, had produced an unfortunate effect upon the partidas in the north of Spain. The activity of those of Castile, instead of being increased, became sensibly diminished after the passage of the Tormès by the allied army. The Sicilian troops, on which he had counted for keeping the whole army of Arragon, in the east of Spain, employed, and even for drawing thither the attention of the king, had proceeded, under the orders of Lord William Bentinck, to make war in Italy, and to carry with them for their own use 2,000,000 of dollars, which Wellington was on the point of borrowing from the merchants at Gibraltar.* Four months' pay were due to the troops, six to the

* On the repeated remonstrances of Wellington, Lord W. Bentinck was sent at last to Catalonia, but too late to prevent serious inconvenience.

staff, and the muleteers had received nothing for almost a year. "We have bread enough," says Beresford, on the 8th of July, "for one day only, and the commissary has not a shilling in his possession. I do not know how we are to move."

On the 15th Wellington expresses himself to the same effect: "I was never in such distress as *now*; some great disaster will certainly follow, unless the Government looks more seriously at my position, and takes steps for sending me regular remittances of money." Desertion from the Portuguese army grew more frequent, in spite of very rigorous measures adopted to repress it. Finally, Wellington ascertained from intercepted letters, that reinforcements were moving from all quarters towards the Duke of Ragusa.

These reinforcements, however, were not so considerable as might have been expected, and the misunderstandings which prevailed among the French generals hindered them for the most part from arriving in time. Caffarelli held back the divisions which had been promised to the army of Portugal. Soult would not allow Drouet to leave him, and the Duke of Albufera refused to send to Madrid more than one brigade.* Bonnet alone obeyed orders, but his departure from the Asturias exercised an influence more injurious than useful, by confirming Caffarelli's determination to withhold the division intended for the army of Portugal. It

* We are not writing a history of the war in the Peninsula, and must therefore content ourselves with referring the reader generally to the Duke's despatches, and to the correspondence of Joseph, Marmont, and Soult, for proof that the very worst understanding prevailed among the French marshals at this time, and that the nominal king was quite incapable of reconciling them.

is, moreover, necessary to observe, that all the despatches of the French generals were intercepted by the guerillas, and that it was difficult, under the circumstances, rightly to combine their operations. "In such a state of affairs," says Napier, "neither Wellington nor Marmont had any inducement to fight upon the Douro,—Marmont, because his position was so strong that he could wait there in safety for the arrival of Bonnet's and Caffarelli's troops, while the king operated upon the communication of the Allies,—Wellington, because he could attack the French only at great disadvantage—the fords being little known, and that of Pollos very deep."

Under these circumstances, the English general proposed to wait till the fords should become more practicable; or till the combined operations of the Galicians and the guerillas should compel the enemy to detach; or till the want of provisions should force the Duke of Ragusa either to scatter his troops or retreat. Meanwhile he caused the siege of Astorga to be pressed, and the whole of the disposable Spanish force to be assembled on the Esla, with a view to disquiet Marmont's right flank. Thus, the two armies remained several days in presence of each other, and the weather being beautiful and the country rich, the troops on both sides fared well.

Prudential considerations were entirely in favour of Marmont's maintaining the defensive, in the strong position which he had chosen; but there were other causes which urged him to assume the initiative without waiting for further reinforcements. In the first place, he received a letter from the king, dated June 18th, in which Joseph said, "If General Hill remain on the left of the Tagus with 18,000 men, you will be strong enough to

beat the English army, particularly if you receive any support from the army of the north." Next, General Caffarelli wrote, on the 26th of June, to say that he could not send a single infantry soldier to reinforce the Duke of Ragusa. And lastly, there was a despatch from Jourdan, bearing date 30th of June, which among other passages contained the following: "It is reported here that the enemy's army consists of about 50,000 men, of whom 18,000 only are English. If this be so, the king is of opinion that you are strong enough to beat such an army, and is very desirous of being informed of the motives which induce you to remain inactive." The same letter (received on the 12th of July) announced that Marmont had nothing to expect either from the army of the north or from Suchet; that the king had reiterated his order to Soult to move General Drouet upon the valley of the Tagus, in the event of General Hill being called in by Lord Wellington; that this order might possibly fail to be executed in good time; and that, therefore, the king was anxious that the marshal should take advantage of the moment when as yet Wellington had not collected his whole force to give battle.

Marmont was aware, when he received this letter, that the cavalry of the army of the north was under orders to return to France; he knew also that Caffarelli retained with him only the 15th Regiment of Chasseurs à Cheval, and that the succours so solemnly promised would amount only to 600 horse and eight guns, which since the 15th of June had been stationed at Burgos. He knew also that the castle of Astorga was provisioned up to the 1st of August, and no more. Looking to all the circumstances of the case; taking into account the king's orders, and his own conviction that he had none

except the most inconsiderable succours to expect; acted upon by the apprehension that in order to revictual Astorga, he might be obliged to weaken himself in the presence of the enemy; being assured, too, that he would soon have upon his hands the army of Galicia—about 15,000 strong, which would compel him to detach 6000 or 7000 men to observe them, and anticipating the probable arrival of Hill, who would bring 12,000 good troops to Wellington's support; finally, being convinced that Soult could not send the five corps for which the king had applied to reinforce the army of Portugal (which by the by did come up, twelve or thirteen days after Hill arrived), the Duke of Ragusa made up his mind to act on the offensive. He did not, however, carry this resolution into effect till positive information reached him that the advanced guard of the army of Galicia had arrived at Rio Seco.

His plan was to cut off the English from their communications with Ciudad Rodrigo; a bold project,—capable, no doubt, of being realised, but demanding a vigour of execution which was not possessed by the Duke of Ragusa.

In the evening of the 16th of July, two French divisions, with a view to deceive the enemy, passed the river at Toro; but scarcely were they established on the other side when they were recalled and directed by forced marches upon Tordesillas, where the whole army effected its passage on the morning of the 17th. The same day the French, after having pushed back the advanced posts of English cavalry, found themselves concentrated at Nava del Rey. At this time Wellington, misled by the movement of the previous evening, remained still about Toro; nor did he discover his false position till

the night of the 17th. The Duke of Ragusa, seeing himself in presence of only a part of the Allies, turned their left and marched upon the Guarena; a good line of defence, which he hoped to seize during the first confusion of the passage. The English general avoided with great dexterity that critical step, and was so fortunate as to gain without fighting the plateau of Vallesa, on the right bank of the Guarena, which Marmont had been anxious to reach before him.

The marshal's plan, as we have seen, was to menace the communications between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, to force the Allies to retire upon Almeida, or else to strike a decisive blow, which should uncover their first line. He might have attained that object, had he continued the movement beyond the Toro, which had been arranged during the evening of the 16th; for his army was nearer to Salamanca than that of the Allies.

On the 18th, Wellington repulsed with great vigour an attempt upon his left by General Clausel, who commanded the right of the French. The cavalry brigade of General Alton made in that affair 240 prisoners, among whom was General Carrie. In the afternoon of the 19th, the Duke of Ragusa withdrew all his troops from his right, and moved to the left, in the direction of Tarazona, with a view either to turn the right of the Allies, or by a rapid movement to recover the position which the enemy must abandon if he marched in force toward the heights of Guarena. In the evening and during the night, Wellington's army passed the Upper Guarena, at Vallesa and El Olmo, and made preparations for an affair, which they expected to come off on the morning of the 20th, upon the plain of Vallesa. But

the Duke of Ragusa disappointed this expectation, by making, soon after daylight, a judicious movement by the left, which enabled him to traverse the heights of Guarena, to cross the river below Cantalapiedra, and to turn the right flank of the Allies, who retained their position at Vallesa.

Wellington did not expect this movement, of which besides he was little apprehensive, because he had taken the precaution to place a Spanish garrison in the castle of Alba de Tormès. But the Duke of Ragusa, better informed, knew that the garrison had been withdrawn by España, without the cognisance of the commander-in-chief.

As soon as the English army became aware that the Duke of Ragusa was moving to the left, it made a corresponding movement to the right; but rapid as this movement was, it did not prevent the enemy from attaining his object. During the whole of the 20th the two armies accordingly moved along parallel plateaux, at cannon-shot distance from each other; and the simplest converging movement would have brought on a battle, for each plateau presented an excellent defensive position.

Wellington endeavoured to anticipate the French in the village of Cantalpino, and directed a column towards it in the hope of being able to occupy the plateau which looks down upon it. But his attempt was thwarted by the rapidity of the light cavalry of the eighth French division. That night the army of Portugal bivouacked upon the heights of Aldea Rubia, having its advanced posts upon the Tormès, while Wellington resumed his old position of St. Christoval.

Secure, from that moment, in the command of the

Tormès, Marmont had three courses open to him,—either to fight a battle, or to give time for his reinforcements to join him, or to pursue the operations which had been begun since the 16th. In such a juncture, there remained for the English general no alternative except to retreat; and, following the guidance rather of his calm good sense than of the desire to distinguish himself, he took his measures at once, determined, however, to cover Salamanca, and to keep open his communications with Ciudad Rodrigo at all hazards.

A letter in which Wellington had communicated this intention to Castaños was intercepted by Marmont, who, without taking further notice of Junot's movements, immediately resumed the initiative. Accordingly, having thrown a detachment into the castle of Alba de Tormès, he passed the river, in two columns, at a ford between Huerta and Alba de Tormès on the 21st, and proceeded to establish himself in the space which is comprised between the latter town and Salamanca. The Allies, who till now had retained their old position of St. Christoval, passed the Tormès by the bridge of Salamanca and the neighbouring fords. Before the close of the day, they occupied a strong position on the other bank; their right resting upon one of two heights, called the *Arapilés*, and their left upon the Tormès below the ford of Santa Martha.*

At midnight the English general received intelligence, that on the morrow or the day after, a detachment of cavalry and artillery, detached from Caffarelli's corps,

* Wellington was closely followed by Marmont, insomuch that the two armies marched in parallel lines, sometimes within half cannon-shot. Jourdan justly observes, that it was Marmont's business to make the first attack.

would join the enemy's army. He took at once the resolution to retire upon Ciudad Rodrigo at daybreak, provided the enemy did not attack him or commit any other gross mistake. But this was exactly what occurred.

In the morning of the 22nd, a general stir in the French camp gave notice of an approaching battle. The division forming the advanced guard under the command of General Bonnet, began to move at daybreak, and marched in the direction of Ciudad Rodrigo. Presently, however, it changed its course, and threw itself upon one of the Arapilés, at a moment when a portion of the Portuguese army was endeavouring to form a lodgment there. A battery was constructed upon that point, and the Duke of Ragusa took post not far off with his staff, so as to command a view of the whole field of operations.

This first advantage upon the part of the French would have proved fatal to Wellington had he lost the battle, for his troops must have defiled under the fire of the Arapilé, which commanded at a short range the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. Fortunately, the bold countenance assumed by the Allies deterred the French from attacking the second Arapilé, which was still more important than the first. The position of the French army was as follows.

Foy's and Ferey's divisions, supported by Boyer's division of dragoons, held the right, leaning upon the plateau of Calvarasa, and covered by a wide ravine. The divisions of Clausel, Sarrut, Maucune, and Brenier were assembled *en masse* upon the centre, in rear of the hill of the Arapilés, where Bonnet was posted. On the left, Thomière's division, flanked by Curto's division of light cavalry, occupied another plateau, which was de-

fended by twenty pieces of cannon. The Duke of Ragusa, in pursuance of his plan of cutting off the Allies from Ciudad Rodrigo, determined to seize the height of Miranda, half a league from his extreme left, and then to occupy Santa-Tomé de Rosados, on the road to Tamames. Thomière's division was directed, about two in the afternoon, to effect this object, in which it was supported by fifty guns, besides the light cavalry of Curto and the divisions of Maucune and Brenier. Nevertheless, these two latter divisions were not yet in line when Thomière's had already taken possession of the height in question.

The English general, who from the brow of a hill watched these evolutions, which were too complicated to be safe, observed that they tended to separate entirely the left of the French from their centre; and, with admirable correctness of vision and promptitude of action, took instant steps to turn the movement to account. His first division and the light division, under the orders of Generals Campbell and Alten, were posted to the left of the Arapilés, forming the extreme left of the order of battle. Cole's and Leith's divisions placed themselves in two lines to the right of that point. The divisions of Clinton and Hope, with a corps of Spaniards under the command of Don Carlos d'España, formed column in rear of the village of the Arapilés. Finally, Pakenham's division, with a strong body of cavalry, took post on the extreme right.

This latter division, with two batteries of artillery, and some squadrons under the orders of General D'Urban, Wellington instantly launched against the left of the French. Cole and Leith, supported by Clinton and Hope, received orders at the same time to attack their

front; and Pack's Portuguese brigade was directed to retake that Arapilé which had been occupied in the morning by Bonnet's division.

Marmont no sooner beheld these masses of troops advancing simultaneously to surprise him in the midst of his evolutions, than he perceived the consequences of his mistake, and endeavoured to avert them by directing his left to double back immediately upon the centre. It was too late; for Wellington, remembering the beautiful manœuvres of Frederick at Rosbach, and those of Napoleon at Austerlitz, had already thrown one half of his troops upon the enemy's left, while the other half assailed the centre. Already Pakenham's division had taken post across the road which Thomière's was following. The Duke of Ragusa perceived that his left was compromised, and galloped up to hasten the march of the troops which had been ordered to support it. But he had scarcely arrived when a cannon-shot broke his right arm, and compelled him to quit the field.

While this was going on, the English troops debouched from the village of Arapilés, and cut to pieces a portion of Brenier's division, which, after having imprudently engaged some troops at the entrance of the village, had halted to support them. They next overthrew Thomière's division, and, pursuing it from height to height, made about 3000 prisoners; finally driving back with the bayonet Maucune's division, which had great difficulty in disengaging itself, they established themselves upon the flank of the position, which was at the same time assailed in front by the rest of the army. A vigorous charge of Cotton's cavalry completed the success, though the life of General Le Marchant paid the price.

BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

22 July 1812

Thomière, wounded at the same moment, fell gloriously at the head of his division, and the confusion which that event produced was soon communicated to the troops in the centre. Moreover, by a strange fatality, General Bonnet, who by right of seniority succeeded to the command, was placed *hors de combat* a few minutes after Marmont had been removed from the field. The command now devolved upon Clausel; but the rout was becoming general. Fortunately, the new chief was equal to the occasion, and took at once the only steps which offered any chance of saving the army. After having doubled back the left and centre upon the right, he reached in succession the heights in rear of Arriba; yet such is the effect of a first error in war, that the skill of the general and the courage of the French soldier could accomplish nothing more than to enable the army of Portugal to retire in good order. For one moment, however, victory appeared to hang evenly in the scale between the two parties. This was on the left, near the Grand Arapilé, of which the French were still in possession. The troops, Bonnet's division, charged with the defence of that post, had repulsed Pack's Portuguese brigade and the fourth division, which Cole led simultaneously against them. Beresford hastened to support Cole with a Portuguese brigade of the fifth division; but he was again retiring when Wellington sent the sixth division (Clinton's) to relieve the fourth. A fierce struggle ensued which, though indecisive for a time, ended at last in favour of the English, who gradually carried all before them at the point of the bayonet.

Meanwhile the right of the French army stood fast, and gradually reinforced itself by the arrival of troops

from the left. Its front was covered by a formidable artillery, and its flanks protected by strong detachments of cavalry. Wellington sent the first and light divisions, with two brigades of the fourth, to turn the right of this new position; while Clinton with the sixth division, supported by the third and fifth, attacked it in front. This offensive movement, vigorously executed, put the French entirely to the rout.

The day was declining. It was a circumstance very favourable to Clausel, who rallied his troops under cover of the darkness, and moved them off with great ability. General Foy, who had made a movement by his left, and whose troops had been little engaged, was directed to form the rear-guard. He stopped the enemy at the beginning of the wood, and the retreat was thenceforth conducted without embarrassment or loss. Wellington, though worn out with fatigue, and even slightly wounded, took personal command of the troops appointed to follow, and pushed straight for the fords of Huerta, where he expected to find the enemy in broken and disorganised masses. But España having withdrawn the garrison from Alba de Tormès, unknown to the commander-in-chief, the French army was enabled to pass the river at that point, and to direct its march towards Peneranda without being disturbed. The English right wing might, indeed, have followed the enemy in that direction, but it was wearied with the day's fighting, and did not quit the field of battle. It was only next morning that the pursuit was continued in the direction of the Tormès. At a height called La Terna, a body of German cavalry charged the rear-guard of the French, and made prisoners of all the infantry, consisting of three battalions. Next day the columns in retreat

were moved in the direction of Valladolid. It would appear, however, and English authors are obliged to admit it, that the pursuit was not remarkable for the promptitude with which it was conducted.

The battle of Salamanca was, beyond all question, the most decisive which the Allies had yet delivered in the Peninsula. It established the reputation of the English army, and brought especially into light the brilliant qualities of their general: a sound judgment, a *coup d'œil* prompt and unerring, a vigorous execution, and a rare ability in moving his troops. Thibaudeau may well say that "the battle of the Arapilés settled the question of the French occupation of Spain."

The Duke of Ragusa had at Salamanca 42,000 men, his opponent 46,400, of whom 3,500 were Spaniards. The cavalry of the French army was inferior in number to that of the Allies; to make up for this, Marmont's artillery amounted to 74 pieces, that of Wellington to 60 only, and these of inferior calibre. The action was brief and murderous. About 6,000 French and 5,224 of the Allies remained upon the field. The English general Le Marchant was killed; Cole, Beresford, Cotton, Leith, and Alten were wounded. The French lost Ferey, Thomières, Desgravières, and four other generals were *wounded*. Indeed, so fierce was the struggle on some points, that the 11th and 61st English regiments did not muster more at the close of the day than 160 effective men between them. Eleven pieces of cannon, many waggons, from 6000 to 7000 prisoners, two eagles, and six standards, fell into the hands of the victors. On the suggestion of the regency, the Cortes invested Wellington with the insignia of the golden fleece. The English parliament voted him its thanks, and the Prince

Regent advanced him in the peerage, by conferring upon him the title of Marquis of Wellington.

The results of the battle of Salamanca, though most important, would have been still more striking had the expedition from Sicily been accomplished in time and with a sufficient number of troops. In this case the French would have been obliged to retire behind the Ebro, and to confine themselves thenceforth to the defensive. There would have been no occasion for a new campaign, and Spain would have been freed one year sooner.

Intelligence of the disaster at Salamanca reached Napoleon in the heart of Russia. He appeared to be the more affected by the tidings, that America had just declared war against Great Britain, a circumstance which might have changed the state of affairs in the Peninsula, had Marmont and Joseph known how to take advantage of it. The Emperor was very severe upon the Duke of Ragusa, and exceedingly angry with Joseph, whom he accused of being too slow in marching to the support of the army of Portugal. That movement, he says, ought to have been made a month earlier. After the battle, the army of the centre ought to have advanced upon the Douro, and rallied the beaten troops. Why did Marmont assume the offensive before Joseph's arrival? Why did he give battle without orders? and why did he not wait two days for Chauvel's cavalry, which he knew to be close to Salamanca; and for the 15,000 infantry which the king was bringing up to him? "Putting all these circumstances together," adds the Emperor, "one is forced to believe, that the Duke of Ragusa was afraid lest the king should participate in the success of the battle, and that he sacrificed to

vanity the glory of the country and the good of my service."

The facts stated above prove, beyond the power of contradiction, the injustice of the Emperor, under the circumstances, towards the chief of the army of Portugal. Had he been better informed, there is no doubt that he would have pronounced a very different judgment upon the conduct of that officer, whose single fault was that he made a false movement at the beginning of the battle of Salamanca. It was brought against him also as a charge, that he did not wait for the succours promised by Caffarelli; but since the receipt of the letter of the 26th of June, Marmont knew that he had not a single infantry soldier to expect. On the other hand, the commander of the army of the north had shown himself so little scrupulous in adhering to his engagements, that the Duke of Ragusa could not venture to hope that he would be speedily joined by Caffarelli's artillery and cavalry. It was not, indeed, till the evening of the 21st of July, at which time the whole of his army had crossed the Tormès, that he was made aware of these troops having been put in motion. Marmont declares that if he had received this intelligence five hours earlier, he would have undoubtedly suspended his movement till the promised reinforcements should have reached him; but that to withdraw the army after having effected the passage, would have been a mistake, and could have served no purpose, because the country on the left bank of the Tormès is not favourable to cavalry.

As to blaming him for not waiting for Joseph, that is refuted by the simple fact that Marshal Jourdan, in his letter of the 30th of June, which was received on the

12th of July, informed the Duke of Ragusa that he had no support to expect from the army of the centre. It is true that Joseph, a few days afterwards, collected a corps of 14,000 men and 20 pieces of cannon, and that he began his march on the 21st; but, by inconceivable negligence, he halted the very same day, in order to inform Marmont of the new determination at which he had arrived. While the staff were sending out couriers (the first of whom did not arrive till the 23rd at mid-day), by six different roads, to convey this intelligence, Marmont writes in his journal, "I knew nothing about him at all. I was completely ignorant of his march, and was suffering from the blindness of Joseph, who refused to support my operations, on the success of which his safety depended. If I had received this support, my chances of success would have been much greater;-and had I succeeded, even though Joseph were present, I do not think that my glory would have been diminished thereby."*

The defeat of the army of Portugal put an end to the secret negotiations of the Cortes, with Joseph. It deprived the king's partisans of all influence, reawakened the energies of the Catalans, and put a stop to the clamours of the English opposition. It alarmed the provisional government of France, and appeared to Napoleon like a dark presage amidst the snows of Russia. And it was hailed throughout all Germany, and over a great portion of Europe, as the dawn of a new era.

The reign of Joseph was drawing to an end, and already, with tolerable certainty, the approaching deliverance of the Peninsula could be announced.

* Mem. of the Duke of Ragusa, vol. iv. pp. 142 and 473.

Little pressed in the pursuit, Clausel retired in perfect order upon Arevalo, which he reached on the 24th, at a moment when Joseph had halted at Blasco Sancho. Next day he was joined upon the march by Caffarelli's detachment, which served to strengthen his rear-guard. Neither armyknew that the other was near it, though an interval of a few miles only divided them. The king, indeed, was ignorant of the determination at which Marmont had arrived, to fight single-handed; but on the morrow, a letter from the marshal made him acquainted with the result of the battle, and informed him that the beaten army would be obliged to cross the Douro, in order to save the dépôt at Valladolid, and establish fresh communications with the army of the north.

As Wellington halted during the whole of the 25th, Joseph might have easily effected a junction with the army of Portugal, but believing that it would be better for the latter to join the army of the centre, than that he should connect himself with the army of Portugal, he effected his retreat towards the Guadarama. If he had been gifted, under the circumstances, with more of perspicacity and less of self-love, he would have remembered, "that a beaten and pursued army has no liberty of action whatever." But the real cause of these distractions, and blunders, and errors, was the entire want of good understanding among the French generals. Clausel was desirous of drawing the king behind the Douro; and the king, on the other hand, resolved that Clausel should march upon Madrid. Each plan offered its advantages, and the adoption of either might have changed the face of affairs; but Joseph was too wrong-headed to yield, and too weak to make himself obeyed.

He directed his steps towards the Guadarama, and arrived on the 27th at Segovia, where he halted till the 31st, in the hope of being joined by Clausel, who, on his part, awaited, in the neighbourhood of Tudela, the result of what he had done. Finally, on the night of the 29th, the army of Portugal crossed the Douro, and moved towards Burgos. It suffered much from the guerillas of Old Castile, who clustered round the British army.

On the 31st, Joseph continued his retrograde movement upon Madrid. Meanwhile Wellington made himself master of Valladolid and Cuellar, so that the armies of the centre and of Portugal found themselves entirely separated. This result, achieved under circumstances of so great difficulty, did honour to the talents of the English general.

As there was nothing to fear from Caffarelli, Suchet, Clausel, and Soult, at least for the moment, Wellington determined to follow the king in the direction of Madrid, with a view to make himself master of the capital, and so to force the armies of the north and of the south to take up a line of communication longer and less secure than that at present in use. He has been blamed for preferring this course of action to the chance of destroying, by a vigorous pursuit, the wreck of the army of Portugal; but a celebrated critic has successfully refuted this objection. "No doubt," says Jomini, "a second triumph obtained over Clausel might have driven the French back upon the Pyrenees, and Soult and Joseph would have been much embarrassed in the south. But the English general desired to accomplish the deliverance of the Peninsula by a more direct process, while the moral effect of the capture of Madrid could not fail to reani-

mate the courage of the Spaniards, who were beginning to relax their efforts, as was seen by the negotiations which they had opened with Joseph." Besides, the pursuit of Clausel could not have been undertaken without exposing Salamanca and the Galicians to the attacks of Joseph, while the occupation of the capital, while it compromised nothing, assured to Wellington the advantage of taking possession of the Retiro, and of effectually supporting Hill's corps, now threatened by Soult. He would thus also give his army some rest, for it had suffered much from the heat, and its sanitary state was beginning again to be unsatisfactory.

Having left 18,000 men upon the Douro to keep the army of Portugal in check, Wellington advanced on the 6th of August against the king, with 28,000 Anglo-Portuguese, and the national troops of España. Though Joseph had not received from Madrid the 10,000 men whom he had demanded from Soult, he still retained force enough with him to defend with vigour the passes of the Guadarama. But instead of making this attempt, he sent only 8000 men to watch the English, while he made arrangements to proceed to the Sierra Morena with the 12,000 which remained to him, and with his baggage and court, and the persons attached to his political fortunes. This plan, arranged at Segovia, was not of a nature greatly to embarrass the English general. He passed the defiles of the Guadarama on the 10th of August, and a mere affair of the advanced guard, fought next day at Majalahonda, opened for him the road to the capital.

After *this affair*, Joseph retired to Valdemoro, where he collected his convoy together. Nothing could have been more easy than to drive into the river that mass

of carriages and fugitives, mixed up in frightful confusion together; but whether through pity, or as a matter of calculation (for indeed the convoy was a heavy burden upon Joseph), Wellington allowed it to pass freely. He committed a graver error, however, in omitting to surprise the king on one side of the Tagus or the other, and preventing, thereby, the junction of the army of the centre with that of Andalusia by the pass of d'Espeña-Perros. Fortunately for him, circumstances interfered to prevent that junction, which might have been attended with serious consequences.

The king had scarcely gained the other bank, when he learned that Suchet was threatened by the Sicilian expedition, which had recently landed at Alicante, and that Soult refused, in spite of his positive orders, to evacuate Andalusia. Uneasy about the fate of one of his lieutenants, and keenly irritated against the other, he suspended his march upon the Sierra Morena, and moved in the direction of Valencia. At the same time he changed the orders which he had previously given to the Duke of Dalmatia, and directed him to fall back, as speedily as possible, by Murcia and Arrera, upon Valencia.

Wellington, on the 12th, entered without opposition the capital of Spain. The population, which had come out in a body to meet him, received him with marks of the liveliest and most sincere enthusiasm. The streets were strewed with flowers, the fronts of the houses were covered with pictures and ornaments. The bells rang merrily, and the ladies, in gala dresses, graced the windows and the balconies. Shawls and mantles were spread upon the pavements of the streets through which

the Duke must pass, and when he dismounted, the women vied with each other in embracing him. For some days the city pressed upon him fêtes and magnificent *spectacles*, to which, having his mind filled with more important thoughts, he could give but a divided attention. On the first day of his arrival, he undertook the siege of the Retiro, a sort of fortress which commands Madrid, strong by position, but not then in a state to offer a protracted resistance. The fortifications were far too extensive for a garrison of which the effective strength did not exceed 1700 men.

In the night of the 13th, the English made themselves masters of the outer enceinte, and their first care was to destroy the aqueduct which supplied the troops with water. Next day they made preparations to escalade the second enceinte, and to open fire from a battery of eighteen guns, upon the porcelain manufactory which stood in the middle of the third enceinte, and served the purpose of a redoubt. But the governor, in order to escape the consequences of that double attack, demanded a capitulation.

There were found in the fortress 180 pieces of cannon, 20,000 muskets, a large number of carriages, the eagles of two regiments, and valuable military stores. The French prisoners were sent to Portugal, under an escort of Spanish soldiers, who had the baseness to plunder and massacre these defenceless unfortunates by the way. However noble, however sacred may be the cause of a war, acts like these, in which cupidity and cruelty combine, cannot but bring disgrace upon those who are guilty of them. The national troops, by all accounts, more than once dishonoured the cause in which they were engaged.

Meanwhile, Wellington never lost sight of what was going on elsewhere, and made at Madrid all the arrangements necessary for continuing his operations. Though victorious, he had yet many dangers to encounter and many difficulties to overcome. His troops were in a state of great destitution, and the country round the capital could furnish no supplies. The Spanish people, indeed, shouted *viva*, and appeared to be full of enthusiasm; but their government allowed the English army to be in want of everything. This is clearly shown in a letter addressed by Wellington, on the 28th July, to Lord Bathurst:—"I entreat you," he writes, "don't forget to send horses for the cavalry and artillery, as well as money: we are absolutely bankrupt." To this want of money other perplexities not less serious were added. Thus the commander-in-chief received, in succession, the following pieces of intelligence: that Clausel's army was considerably reinforced in the north; that the junction of the king's forces with those of Soult and Suchet was on the point of being effected; that the expedition from Sicily had failed; that the Galician army, under Santocildes, had been driven back by Foy; that Ballesteros, commanding the army of Andalusia, refused to take orders from the English staff; that O'Donnel was beaten by Suchet at Valencia; and, finally, that Castaños remained inactive, though he had promised to join the allied army after Salamanca.

Several of these blots were fortunately not hit, through the mistakes of the French generals, who persisted in thwarting one another. Thus, Marshal Soult positively refused to obey the orders of the king, and to evacuate Andalusia. To sacrifice that province, with all its resources, for the mere purpose of re-occu-

pying Madrid, appeared to him an act of folly. "Why withdraw?" he writes to the king. "What harm can arise from the occupation of the centre of Spain by the Allies? Your majesty ought to unite the army of the centre, the army of Arragon, and, if it be possible, that of Portugal, and come with the whole into Andalusia, even if the kingdom of Valencia itself should be evacuated. I will take care that the army shall find in Andalusia magazines of provisions and ammunition, as well as places of strength. The moment 80,000 French troops are collected in that province, the theatre of war will be changed. The English general must retire in order to save Lisbon. The army of Portugal will follow him to the Tagus, the line of communication with France will be re-established by the east coast, and the campaign will end in our favour. Evacuate Andalusia, on the other hand, and you will lose Spain."

Struck by the vigour and fitness of this project, Napoleon, from the heart of Russia, pronounced Soult's to be the only military head in the Peninsula; but the king was incapable of comprehending the lofty plans of his general. Caring for nothing but Madrid, he renewed his orders, and at last prevailed upon the Duke of Dalmatia to march upon Valencia, in co-operation with Drouet, who, up to that moment, with an inferior force, had kept Hill at bay. This movement began on the 25th of August, by the raising of the blockade of Cadiz, which was preceded by the destruction of 1000 pieces of cannon, as well as of an enormous quantity of stores, and all the works at Chiclana, Santa Maria, and the Trocadero. By Wellington's orders, the whole of the allied troops from Andalusia and Estremadura pursued and harassed the French column. The season of the

year, the state of the country, and the multitude of people and effects which they carried with them, rendered that retreat a distressing and melancholy affair. It was marked throughout with much suffering, yet Soult, with rare good fortune, succeeded in surmounting all his difficulties. He met the advanced guard of the army of Arragon at Hellin, and on the 3rd of October the whole of the French forces were united. At this time, five weeks had elapsed since Wellington had quitted Madrid.

When we consider that Soult's noble army effected nothing throughout the campaign of 1812, we naturally ask ourselves the question whether the invasion of Andalusia were not a mistake or a misfortune, and whether it would not have been better to have established the army of the south in Estremadura, keeping only a partial hold upon Andalusia by detached corps? In Castile, Soult would have covered Madrid, he would have been in surer communication with the army of the centre, and, by his powerful co-operation with Massena in 1810, would have probably obliged Wellington to abandon Portugal. At all events, it is certain that the invasion of the south, effected under the Emperor's orders, and not, as some critics pretend, by the wish of Joseph, was not only a cause of weakness to the French army, but an element of discord among the generals. Napoleon probably came to the conclusion at which he arrived because, in order to subsist and supply the army, it was necessary that it should be extended, and the whole of Spain, so to speak, laid under contribution. Perhaps, also, he considered it of importance to hinder the English from establishing themselves at Seville, the great arsenal of the Peninsula, and at Cadiz, the

occupation of which would have compensated eventually for the loss of Lisbon, had it fallen.

If, at the moment of the king's flight, Wellington's military chest had been full, and if the yellow fever had not raged with great violence in Murcia, he might have followed steadily the army of the centre, rallied round him the wreck of the Spanish forces, and endeavoured, in concert with the Sicilian expedition, to beat the Duke of Albufera before the arrival of Soult; or, at all events, after forming a junction with Hill at D'Espeña-Perros, he might have thrown himself on the army of Andalusia while in march, even if by this movement he exposed his communications with the Douro. But for lack of means to follow one or other of these plans, he saw himself obliged, before acting against Suchet, to wait till the Duke of Dalmatia should have evacuated Cordova.

The invasion of Catalonia must have been attended with great difficulties, because the extreme distance of the Anglo-Portuguese army from its base would have rendered the lines of communication weak and insecure. Hence the commander-in-chief conceived the idea of lessening this danger by finding occupation for a part of the enemy's troops by means of the Anglo-Sicilian army. He proposed also to employ that army in the siege of Tarragona, and orders to that effect had already been given to General Maitland; but, conceiving that he was not in force enough to undertake the enterprise, General Maitland had abandoned it, and embarked for Alicant, where he arrived on the 11th of August.

While Wellington was engaged in drawing up fresh instructions, he received intelligence that General Clausel had resumed the offensive. This circumstance induced him immediately to return to the Douro, and to form

the siege of Burgos; for that place was indispensable to secure his line of operations towards the north, and to facilitate the execution of the movements which he meditated against the army of the south. Nevertheless, he so arranged matters as to leave round Madrid 30,000 Anglo-Portuguese and as many Spanish soldiers, to hold the enemy in check in the event of his endeavouring to retake the city.

According to Wellington's calculations, the French could not move upon Madrid more than 50,000 men without exposing themselves to the risk of losing Valencia. This force was probably enough, and more than enough, to defeat in the open field the heterogeneous force which covered the capital. But Wellington hoped that before the French armies could be united, and their operations begun, the rivers would have swollen, and that General Hill would in consequence be able to hold his ground till the main body should have time to return to Burgos.

On the 1st of September Wellington quitted Madrid and directed his march toward Arevalo, at the head of 21,000 Anglo-Portuguese. Sickness had made such ravages in the English ranks, that nearly one third of its effective force was in hospital; the equipment of the Portuguese was in a very bad state, and the regency paid no attention to their wants. Moreover, the means of transport were inadequate and defective beyond all power of expression. On the 7th the allied army entered Valladolid, which had been evacuated by Clausel the previous night. The French effected their retreat with remarkable ability, offering battle every day. On the 16th, they took up a position so as to cover Burgos.

Having been joined at Valencia by the Galician army,

about 11,300 strong, Wellington thought of attacking Clausel on the morrow; but he, observing that his enemy had increased in number, retired the same day. He passed through Burgos, gathering in upon his march 9500 men, 1300 horse, and 16 pieces of cannon, forwarded by Caffarelli; as well as 10,500 recruits and 1300 horses for the cavalry and artillery, drawn from the dépôts established along the Pyrenees, and the small garrisons off the frontier. These reinforcements raised his effective strength to 41,000 men.

The pursuit was neither very lively nor otherwise striking. If, instead of moving in the first instance towards Arevalo, in order to put himself in communication with the Galicians, Wellington had marched rapidly upon Segovia, Foy's division would have been separated from Clausel; and if he had then taken the road from Arandah to Lerma, he might have fallen upon Clausel's troops during their march, and perhaps have forced them to accept battle with Clinton and the Galician army upon their rear.

On the 18th, the English general took possession of Burgos, and gave immediate orders to commence the siege of the castle, the great object of the campaign. This fortress, in which was laid up the principal dépôt for the French army in the north of Spain, had been recently strengthened by accessory works. It exhibited three enceintes, of no great strength, but defended by 2000 brave soldiers, at the head of whom was General Dubreton, a man of rare courage and remarkable ability. The French artillery consisted of nine large guns, eleven field pieces, six mortars and howitzers. Their military stores were considerable, but wood and siege *matériel* were wanting, and there was not a bomb-proof in the

place, nor any reservoir of drinkable water. One battalion was posted in the hornwork of St. Michael, which dominated at half cannon-shot over the first and second enceintes. A second battalion occupied the church of St. Roman, an important post adjoining the castle on the side of the town. The remaining battalion was distributed among the various intrenchments.

The first and second enceintes, with the exception of a rather extended space, were reveted; the third, which inclosed the town and the church of La Blanca, consisted of a mere embankment. No doubt Wellington counted upon carrying this position by assault, for he had brought no siege train with him, and rejected the proposal to have one carried from Santander or Madrid. All that he had were three 18-pounder guns, and five 24-pounder howitzers, with a supply of barely 300 rounds per gun. The engineers, only five in number, including Colonel Burgoyne, the director of the attack, were destitute of the means necessary to undertake a regular siege. They had not one miner or sapper at their disposal, and the engineer park contained only 900 intrenching tools. It was necessary to keep this dearth of means in view while settling the plan of attack.

Wellington determined upon storming the hornwork of St. Michael, and then attacking that part of the castle which was situated on the south side of the church of La Blanca. The front was narrow there, and the intrenchments weak, besides being defective in their construction; and it was thought that a battery planted upon Mount St. Michael would in a few hours render an assault in that quarter, if not easy, at all events possible.

On the 19th, two divisions invested the castle, while

SIÈGE OF BURGOS.

Sept. and Oct. 1812.



the rest of the army took post at Monasterio, to cover the siege. The same day a strong detachment, sent out to reconnoitre, carried three lunettes, which had been thrown up upon Mount St. Michael. Emboldened by this first success, Wellington gave orders to escalade the hornwork, at half-past six in the evening, and at the hour appointed, four columns, one of which was directed against the gorge, put themselves in motion. In spite of some faults of execution, the attempt was crowned with success. The garrison, taken in reverse by the column at the gorge, cut its way through and regained the castle, leaving 139 killed or prisoners, and 59 wounded in the hands of the Allies. The loss of the latter amounted to 80 killed, and 334 wounded or missing.

Subsequently to this exploit, Wellington wrote to Lord Bathurst: "I am afraid that the means at my disposal are insufficient to take the castle; but the enemy are ill provided with water, and his magazine of provisions is exposed to be set on fire. It is this which leads me to hope that I shall force him to surrender, though I have not the means of carrying the place by assault."

On the 20th the trenches were opened, and breaching batteries begun close to the hornwork. Nevertheless, *with a view to* save his troops from useless fatigue, Wellington modified his plan of attack, and determined to assault the first enceinte before he should have breached it. The consequence was, that at 11 o'clock in the night of the 22nd, a column of 300 men, carrying ladders, attempted the escalade. But the garrison put on such a bold front, and caused such heavy loss to the assailants by their fire, that they drove them back, and

compelled them to revert to the slow process of a regular attack.

During the night of the 24th, the saps were pushed so close to the place, that a gallery, intended to breach the first enceinte, was begun, and eight and forty hours afterwards, a second gallery was opened to the right of the first. Unfortunately, the means were insufficient to complete these works in good time. It was necessary to employ upon them inexperienced men, to whom, instead of tools, husbandmen's ordinary pickaxes and shovels were supplied. Hence, it was only during the night of the 29th that the first mine could be sprung. The escarpe was thrown down by the explosion, but the chamber having been placed too near to the face of the wall, no slope was produced, and the parapet remained uninjured. Hence the 300 men, told off for the assault, found it necessary to withdraw.

On the 4th of October, a battery, opening fire upon the top of the breach, knocked *down* earth enough to form a practicable ramp of about twenty-two yards in width. The same day, about five in the afternoon, the second mine produced an opening of about thirty-three yards, and several columns immediately assaulted both breaches. After having driven away the enemy at the point of the bayonet, the English lodged themselves upon the slope, under cover of filled gabions. But next day, at five in the evening, 300 men made a sortie and destroyed a portion of the works. This disaster having been repaired, the assailants proceeded to attack the second enceinte; their success would have been easy, if they had had practised sappers and miners; but the men of the line, who acted as such, were unable to advance except by the flying sap, being entirely igno-

rant of the mechanism of the full sap. Hence the Allies suffered considerable loss and made little progress. The rains besides gave them great annoyance, by causing the earth to crumble down, and filling the trenches with muddy water.

At two in the morning of the 8th, 400 men made a sortie from the place, surprised the guard of the trenches, carried away all the tools, and completely levelled the sap-work between the two enceintes. From that moment the Allies made scarcely any progress; nevertheless Wellington succeeded in effecting a breach with one of the batteries on Mount St. Michael, at a point in the second enceinte which was imperfectly covered. This breach became practicable in the evening of the 8th; but for want of infantry cartridges, the assault could not be given at the moment. That unfortunate accident enabled the besieged to scarp the breach, by removing the fragments which lay at the foot of the wall.

On the 9th, Wellington caused red-hot shot to be fired on the convent of La Blanca; yet this attempt, though renewed at different intervals, was not attended with success. The same day the miners, penetrating into a house near the church of St. Roman, drove a gallery in order to blow up that building and take the enemy in reverse. On the 14th, a convoy of ammunition arrived from Santander which had been expected for some days. Wellington immediately directed a counter-fire against the guns of the keep; but such was the superiority of the latter, that in less than an hour they silenced the enemy's artillery. Thenceforth, the besiegers limited their efforts to making the breach of the second enceinte practicable, and to lower the slope of the third

enceinte, so as that it might be carried without too much difficulty.

On the 18th, Wellington dictated the order of assault upon the very ground where it was to be delivered, and at half-past four in the afternoon, the mine under the church of St. Roman was sprung. The explosion produced a considerable breach in the crenolated wall forming the enclosure, and at the signal, eight battalions, divided into three columns, sprang forward at a run. The first carried the breach of the second enceinte, forced the defenders to retire, threw themselves at once upon the uneven slope of the third enceinte, and penetrated to the *terre pleine* of the redoubt, where it was attacked in front and at the same time in flank, by the defenders of the redans, numbers 14, 15, and 16, of the second enceinte. This double attack drove the assailants down the breaches with considerable loss.

The second column, after having attempted an escalade of the second enceinte, in rear of the first breach opened by the mine, was in like manner obliged to retire from the murderous fire of the enemy.

Meanwhile, the third column, under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, had advanced against the church of St. Roman by the breach in the crenolated wall, and driven the defenders of that post behind the second enceinte; but scarcely had it penetrated into that building with a view to shelter itself from a brisk fire, when Lieutenant-Colonel Pinot, of the Engineers, exploded mines prepared for the purpose, and blew up, amid a heap of ruins, more than 300 men. The remains of the column fled panic-stricken.

On the 19th, the besieged re-occupied the church,

but the Allies retook it the same day. Next morning it was ascertained that the French army had made an offensive movement during the 18th, upon Monasterio, which indicated a settled purpose of raising the siege of Badajos. Still Wellington made no preparations to withdraw, although the enemy's scouts were already within view of the place; but on the 20th, he received a letter from Hill, which informed him that the king was preparing to march with all his force upon the Tagus, for the purpose of retaking Madrid. Upon this, distinct orders were given to commence the retreat at daybreak next morning.

During this siege, the English sprang four mines and fired away 4062 cannon-shots, of which 903 were with French balls. They had opened five breaches, and delivered five assaults, of which one alone was attended with success. Their loss amounted to 24 officers, and 485 men killed, 68 officers, and 1487 men wounded. The garrison had made five sorties, all of them successful; it reckoned 193 men killed, and 443 wounded. At the moment when the siege was raised, it could still show 1200 men under arms. The excellent defence of Burgos lost to Wellington some of the results which he had achieved by the battle of Salamanca, and it produced a stir in England, which forthwith found vent in violent attacks upon the army in the Peninsula. General Dubreton, on the other hand, received great praise for his brilliant feat of arms, and Wellington himself took occasion, at a subsequent period, to congratulate him upon the exploit.

The facts which we have stated in perfect good faith, supply a sufficient answer to the attacks which have been made upon Wellington and the English engineers,

in reference to this unfortunate siege. In the condition in which the Allies found themselves, it would have been difficult to accomplish more, and impossible, at all events, to observe strictly the rules of art. Vauban himself, without tools, without cannon, without projectiles, or sappers and miners, with an insufficient number of engineer officers, and of soldiers trained to siege operations, could not have achieved any better results. The only blame with which Wellington is chargeable is, that he undertook the siege with resources which he himself, on arriving at the ground, considered to be insufficient. His information proved to be so defective, that he was misled in regard to the real condition of the works, and when he discovered his mistake, he committed the fault of refusing to send to Santander for cannon. Nor did he, while waiting their arrival, push back Clausel's army to the other side of the Ebro; an operation which was in agreement with the general principles of war, and which, in his particular circumstances, would have secured the advantage of retarding the organisation of the French army.

With respect to the raising of the siege itself, the measure was unavoidable, in consequence of the movements of the different French armies, of which it is time that we should give some account.

While Joseph, in conjunction with Suchet, was waiting with impatience for the arrival of Soult, the master of a merchant vessel, which was carrying despatches from Soult, put in at Grao, a harbour of Valencia, on the 12th of September. The master, desiring to be relieved of the trust which had been confided to him, delivered to the king the letters, which were dated the 12th of August, and in which he naturally expected to

find some news about Andalusia. Great was his surprise, therefore, on reading them, to find himself denounced by Soult as a traitor to the Emperor and his country. Whether this was the result of a conviction on the mind of the Duke of Dalmatia, or whether by such means he desired to account for his own disobedience, it is evident both from the letter itself, and from the explanations which followed, that he believed Joseph to be in collusion with Bernadotte, his relative, and with the English and the Russians, whose accomplice he had become. The reasons which induced the marshal to entertain this suspicion, were that, according to the English newspapers, Bernadotte had taken certain Spaniards into his service, — that Joseph's ambassador remained in Russia, — and that Moreau had arrived in Sweden from America.

Starting from this point, Soult believed himself justified in assuming that Joseph was engaged in a conspiracy against France; that his object was to abandon Spain, and that the first step in that criminal direction would be the evacuation of Andalusia.

Indignant at such a groundless charge, the king sent Col. Desprez to Moscow, to demand of the Emperor that he might be freed from the presence of the commander of the army of Andalusia, and that the latter should be punished.

The interview between Joseph and Soult was very stormy. It took place on the frontiers of Murcia, at Fuente di Higura. Marshals Jourdan and Suchet were invited to attend, that they might arrange with Soult the best plan of campaign. Their opinions, as might be expected, were much at variance. Soult was desirous, with the army of Andalusia, that of the centre,

and a part of that of Arragon, of marching across La Mancha upon the Tagus, and upon Madrid. Suchet adhered to his opinion, that it was a matter of the first importance to hold the kingdom of Valencia. He therefore proposed to carry the armies of Andalusia and of the centre into the province of Guadalaxara; to force there the passage of the Tagus; then to divide the two armies, to leave that of the centre at Cuenca, where it could at all times give the hand to the army of Arragon, upon the frontier of the kingdom of Valencia; and to establish that of Andalusia in the province of Guadalaxara, with its base at Catalayud, its head at Madrid, and its right in constant communication, through the province of Soria, with the army of Portugal.

Marshal Jourdan, persuaded that it was necessary above all things to give the hand to the army of Portugal, and to bring as large a force as possible against the English, proposed to unite together the armies of the south and of the centre, and to march upon the Tagus with 56,000 men, and 100 guns. This force was to be divided into two columns, one of which, about 39,000 or 40,000 strong, was to follow the road by La Mancha, passing through Chincella, Ocana, and Aranjuez; while the other, composed of 16,000 or 17,000 men, should take the Cuenca road, traversing Cuenca and Fuente Duena. The columns were so to move that they should always be in communication, and arrive together upon the Tagus at the point where it might be considered advisable to force a passage.

The latter plan, which was undoubtedly the best of the three, was adopted, in spite of a lively opposition from Soult, who was very unwilling to have his army broken up, and to place himself under the direct orders of the

king. The two columns, well provided with stores and provisions, began their march on the 18th and 20th of October.

This movement, communicated by Hill to Wellington, at a moment when he was threatened directly by the army of Portugal, could not fail of arresting his attention; more especially as Souham, who had succeeded Clausel, had it in his power at any moment to come to the relief of the castle; and because the allied troops did not exceed 20,000 Anglo-Portuguese, with 11,000 Galicians who were as little to be depended upon in line of battle as the guerillas. The disposable force in the rear amounted to 3000 men only. Now this was not enough to encounter 40,000 Frenchmen; while Hill, on his side, was in no condition to make head against the king's armies, more especially as the 30,000 Spaniards charged with menacing the enemy's flank and retarding his march upon Madrid, had, in consequence of the insubordination of Ballesteros, halted at Grenada. In order to meet the difficulties of the case, the commander-in-chief directed Hill to abandon the defence of the Tagus, and to form a junction with the main army on the Adaja.

Meanwhile General Souham was impressed with the conviction that the enemy had in hand more than 60,000 men, and could bring up besides three divisions from Madrid. He therefore not only never dreamed of attacking, but was himself afraid of being attacked. And in truth his situation required the greatest caution; for the defeat of the army of Portugal would have opened to the Allies the road to France. By and by, however, being informed through the English newspapers (the habitual indiscretion of which rendered the greatest service to

the French armies) of the real state of Wellington's forces, he called in Caffarelli's troops from Vittoria, concentrated his own at Briviesca, and made preparations to raise the siege of Burgos.

The English general, with fewer men than Souham, and above all, with an inferior artillery, occupied a dangerous position in the event of a reverse, and was supported by lieutenants who were far inferior to those in the French service.* He could not, therefore, consistently with reason accept a battle, and he took the resolution to retire, in order to effect his junction with Hill, which a longer delay at Burgos might have compromised.

The allied army quitted its lines on the 21st, at nightfall, and reached in profound silence the road to Valladolid, which passes under the guns of the castle. Wellington caused the wheels of the carriages to be wrapped up in straw, and took his measures so effectually, that the first division crossed the river without being perceived. The others would have done the same, but that some guerillas, by galloping over the bridge, attracted the attention of the garrison. The loss, however, which these divisions sustained, was inconsiderable, and had no effect in delaying the march.

It was only in the evening of the 22nd, that Souham became apprised of these events. He began his pursuit when the Allies were already safe; yet the operation may be cited throughout for the tenacity and talent which the French general displayed in conducting it. On the 23rd, at Venta de Pozo, the rear guard of the Allies was

* The French generals included Foy, Clausel, Maucune, Caffarelli, &c. If we except Hill and Paget, there were none in the English army to compare with them.

so hard pressed, that the army itself would have been charged by the French cavalry, had not Wellington, by a few admirable dispositions, stopped it at the last moment. The same day Wellington passed Pisuerga, and next evening established himself in a good position behind the Carrion, where he was joined almost immediately by a brigade of guards, lately landed at Corunna, under the orders of the Earl of Dalhousie.

On the 25th, Wellington made preparations to receive a battle; it was a bold act, worthy of all praise, but unfortunately the bridges at Palencia and Tariego had been forgotten to be destroyed, and Foy was thereby enabled to turn the left of the Allies. Almost at the same time the French cavalry passed the bridge of Banos, and threatened their right. As the strength of the position was by these means destroyed, and the retreat might have been compromised by further delay, Wellington retired in the early morning of the 26th upon Cabezon. He gave orders at the same time to guard the bridges of Tudela, Valladolid, Simancas, and Tordesillas, which secured his march beyond the Douro. Finally, in order to gain time, he proposed to hold the position of Cabezon as long as possible;—but Souham, who had been directed to avoid a battle, extended more and more to the right, and aimed at dislodging him, by surprising the bridges of Valladolid, Simancas, and Tordesillas. Fortunately for Wellington, the first of these bridges held out, and the others were destroyed in time. Nevertheless, at Tordesillas, there was suddenly formed, in the ranks of the baffled French army, a chosen band, consisting of sixty officers and non-commissioned officers. These brave men, under the command of the gallant Captain Guingret, constructed a raft on which

they placed their clothes and arms; then throwing themselves into the cold water of the Douro, at that moment overflowing its banks, and holding their swords between their teeth, they pushed the raft before them while they swam. They thus gained, under the protection of the artillery, the foot of an old tower in which the enemy had established a post. To attack that post naked as they were, to seize it and open the passage of the bridge, was the affair of a moment. When Wellington, who in the interval had destroyed the bridges of Valladolid and Cabezon on the 28th, and passed the Douro at Tudela and Puente de Douro on the 29th, became aware of this gallant act, he suddenly altered his plans; he marched by his left, and concentrated his army at Rueda, in rear of Tordesillas, where on the 30th he made preparations to dispute the passage of the river. That prompt decision with the destruction of the bridges of Toro and Zamora at last rendered certain the junction of his troops with those of Hill.

In communicating this result to Lord Bathurst on the 31st of October, Wellington writes: "When I consider the strength of the enemy, the condition of the Spanish troops, the large number of foreigners whom I have in my infantry divisions, and the weakness of my cavalry, I think that I have escaped from the worst military situation that ever man was in." Wellington maintained his position up to the 6th of November. The bridges of Toro and Tordesillas having been restored on that day, he was able, on the 7th, to reach Torrecilla de la Orden, and next day to take up his old ground at San Christoval, near Salamanca. On the same day Sir Rowland Hill, who since the 3rd had been in communication with Wellington, and whose junction was

effected on the 5th, passed the Tormès, leaving at Alba an English corps with one Portuguese division.

It has been seen that Hill had been menaced by the united forces of the king and of Soult, who were marching towards the Tagus with a view to operate against Wellington, in case he should continue the siege of Burgos; or, if he should abandon that siege and Madrid together, to drive him back into Portugal in concert with Souham's army. With great good sense, Hill had preferred the line of retreat by the Guadarama to that through the valley of the Tagus, though the latter offered the advantage of covering Lisbon. After destroying his stores and burning his pontoons, he had traversed Madrid, and on the 31st of October concentrated his troops at Majadahonda. Soult followed him in the direction of Arevalo, but with such caution as indicated no particular desire to bring on a battle. Meanwhile Joseph had entered Madrid, where, however, his sojourn was brief, for, on the 4th of November, he effected his junction with Marshal Soult upon the Guadarama.

Hill continued his movement with good fortune enough. He was well nigh out of danger when Wellington learned that, in the course of the 4th, Souham had restored the bridge at Toro. This circumstance would not permit him, without compromising his rear, to remain longer at Adaja; he therefore sent orders to Hill to move upon Alba de Tormès, while he himself should retire from Tordesillas upon San Christoval.*

* M. Brialmont says, "We must here observe, that if Wellington had possessed the enterprising genius of the Emperor, or his troops been endowed with the qualities which distinguish French soldiers, he would have availed himself of his central position to

There no longer remained to Joseph any hope of being able to separate these two generals; he therefore marched from Segovia upon Arevalo, and on the 8th fell in with Souham's scouts at Medina del Campo. The united French force amounted at this moment to 90,000 men, of whom 12,000 were cavalry, supported by 120 pieces of cannon.

The allied army consisted only of 64,000 infantry, of whom 8000 were Spaniards, 4000 cavalry, and 70 pieces of cannon, and it required, besides, rest and attention. The men were without shoes, their appointments were dilapidated, the cavalry had lost its consistency, the horses could scarcely do their work, and discipline was relaxed throughout. In spite of these disadvantages, Wellington was anxious to be attacked upon the right bank of the Tormès, because his position was very strong, and recalled to the minds of his soldiers glorious recollections. The king, on his part, considered the opportunity favourable for fighting a battle, and avenging the disaster of Salamanca; still, not having sufficient confidence in his own military capacity, he gave the command of the troops to Soult, in spite of the many and just causes of complaint which he had against that officer.

For some time there was hesitation regarding the proper point of attack. Jourdan, taking notice that

fall successively upon the armies of Portugal, of the centre, and of the south." Our able critic forgets that even victory could have been purchased by Wellington at this time too dearly; that Hill being still detached, he was scarcely superior to any one of these armies; and that their lines of communication were quite as direct as his own. Wellington had only one course to pursue, and he adopted it. Observe how M. Brialmont describes the army which he proposes to employ on so desperate an enterprise.

Wellington's position covered full five leagues, from Alba to San Christoval, where the bulk of his army lay, proposed to ford the Tormès at night, and to fall upon the English centre, which was well nigh denuded of troops, at Calvariza de Ariba. Soult, on the contrary, considering the position to be too strong, proposed to turn the right of the Allies by passing the river two leagues above Alba, an operation analogous to that which Marmont had previously attempted upon the same theatre, but less dangerous, because of the extensive radius by which it might be accomplished. This plan would have for its object to compel Wellington to fight upon disadvantageous ground; but it was subject to the serious defect of throwing Hill back upon the main army, and affording to the Allies the means of getting the start of the French upon the line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. Marshal Jourdan's plan, on the other hand, which the state of the river in front of Calvariza di Ariba greatly favoured, offered the advantage of surrounding Hill, and taking Wellington by surprise. The king and all the generals were of opinion that it deserved to be adopted; yet Joseph, by the advice of Jourdan (who gave way out of regard to the character and situation of Marshal Soult), yielded by consenting to turn the enemy's position. He gave to Soult the command of the armies of the south and of the centre, and to Count d'Erlon that of the army of Portugal.

Early in the morning of the 14th, the Duke of Dalmatia commenced operations by passing the Tormès, at the ford of Galisancho, above Alba. Too great confidence on the part of Wellington rendered the passage less difficult than it ought to have been. The English

posts of observation were carried, and the defenders of Alba de Tormès, turned by the right, found themselves in an awkward predicament. When the English general arrived upon the spot, the evil was beyond remedy; he therefore withdrew the garrison from Alba, and caused the position of the Arapilés to be occupied during the night. Wellington expected to be attacked in that position on the morrow; but Soult would not permit himself to be tempted by the desire to avenge the defeat of Salamanca. He therefore strengthened his position of Mozarbes, and extended his left so as to approach the road to Ciudad Rodrigo.

Perceiving this movement, Wellington adopted the bold determination to defile his army in full daylight, at two in the afternoon, in three columns parallel with Soult's line of battle, and, so to speak, within cannon-shot of him. The operation, which ought to have produced disastrous consequences, completely succeeded, because no attempt was made to interrupt it, and because there suddenly came on a storm of heavy mist and rain, which rendered the paths and fields almost impassable.

Wellington cannot escape blame for having remained so long upon the Arapilés as to render such a movement necessary for the safety of his army. But Soult committed a still greater fault, in either not profiting at all, or profiting so badly, by the opportunity which was afforded him of destroying, with three armies united, that English force which he had so often promised to drive into the sea.

The Allies encamped that night at Valmusa, in rear of the left of the French army, which a few hours previously had threatened them in front. They then

reached the town of Ciudad Rodrigo without being harassed. But their retreat on this occasion, like that from Burgos, was marked by disorders and acts of indiscipline, of which the best troops unfortunately offer a sad example when they are destitute of necessaries. After the battle of Salamanca, the French army, by all accounts, did not find itself in a better state; such at least is the inference which we draw from the following extract of a letter addressed by General Clausel to the minister of war. "It is common enough to find armies discouraged after a check; it would be difficult to find one in which the discouragement could be greater; nor can I conceal from your excellency that for some time back a very bad spirit has prevailed in this army. Disorder and excesses the most disgusting have marked the whole course of our retreat. I will use all the means in my power to change the tempers of the soldiers, and to put a stop to the disgraceful acts which are committed daily under the very eyes of officers of all ranks, and which they do not even attempt to repress."

It is not surprising that similar acts should have taken place in Wellington's army, for it had vast difficulties to surmount in consequence of the nature of the country, the continued rains, the want of provisions, and the insufficiency of means of transport. At some points the troops were obliged to pass watercourses, man by man, upon trunks of trees. Fortunately Soult did not exhibit great activity in the pursuit; indeed he was himself obliged to halt at Huebra, through the failure of supplies. But for that circumstance, Wellington would have arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo in a condition not unlike to that in which Sir John Moore found him-

self when he fought the battle of Corunna. For these two memorable retreats present many striking features of resemblance; nor can it be doubted that envy would have assailed the victor of Salamanca, if, like his illustrious colleague at the close of his disastrous but honourable expedition of 1809, he had had the misfortune to be slain.

The French army established itself between Valladolid and Toledo. Wellington took up his winter quarters upon the Aguada, and Hill moved towards the Tagus, with orders to occupy Coria, Palencia, and Bejar.

Neither Wellington nor the king had any desire to prolong the campaign; the one because the third part of his troops were in hospital, and the moral condition of his regiments was as little satisfactory as their equipment and organisation,—the other because he was destitute of provisions, and had lost his artillery and magazines at Seville, Grenada, Madrid, Almaraz, Salamanca, and Valladolid.

If the issues of the campaign of 1812 were not such as Wellington had hoped for,—that is to say, if circumstances compelled him to remain in the north instead of terminating his operations by a great battle upon the Guadalquivir, the campaign itself was in the highest degree useful to the Spanish cause, glorious to the allied army, and honourable to the general who commanded it. The enemy, indeed, had been obliged to raise the siege of Cadiz, to evacuate Andalusia, and to abandon his dépôts in the north, the east, and the south. He had lost to the Allies since the month of January, 20,000 prisoners, and nearly 3000 pieces of cannon. In a word, he found himself, as it were, invested in the heart of Spain; having the Anglo-Portuguese in his front, their

fleets upon his flanks, and the *levée en masse*, with clouds of guerillas upon his rear, from the Pyrenees up to Gibraltar.

This unlooked-for result was the work of England. She had achieved it by Popham's expedition to the coast of Biscay, by the descent of Maitland on Catalonia, by the generous support rendered to the defenders of Cadiz, and, above all, by the gallantry of her army, and the energy, perseverance, and lofty genius of her commander-in-chief. Wellington was not free from faults, and his retreat was perhaps less remarkable than that of Sir John Moore. Yet he distinguished himself throughout the campaign by rare sagacity, infinite coolness, and singular aptitude in taking advantage of circumstances the most varied. "Waterloo," says an English author, "may appear to be a more glorious exploit, because of the extraordinary man who was beaten on that day. Assaye may perhaps be considered a more wonderful action. But the battle of Salamanca will always be quoted as that in which Wellington displayed the greatest amount of talent and ability."

Many of the military writers of France protest against this judgment, but in terms which cause us to doubt their impartiality. Less exclusive and more just, the author of the "Précis de l'Art de la Guerre," is convinced that the campaign of 1812 delivered the south of Spain, and established a marked ascendency by the English arms over those of the marshals of the empire. "Though slow and measured," he says, "this campaign does honour to Wellington. His selection of a strategic line was wise; his dispositions for battle were able." Nevertheless, M. Jomini blames the English general for having lost thirty days at Burgos, and given Clausel

time to refit his army, which had been beaten at Salamanca.

But for the great error committed by the Emperor in declaring war against Russia at a time when hostilities were yet raging on the other side of the Pyrenees, Spain would not have been so speedily delivered.

It has been said that Napoleon was not deceived with respect to the advantages which Wellington secured by the occupation of Portugal, and of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, upon the flank of a line of operations 200 leagues in length; and that his first plan was to concentrate behind the Ebro, during the Russian campaign, all the forces which remained in Spain. But it must be added, that subsequently to the success of the Duke of Albufera in the kingdom of Valencia, and after the destruction of Blake's army, the Emperor changed his mind, and determined to guard the whole of the Peninsula with 231,000 men, of whom 128,000 were present under arms. It was not thus that decisive blows could be struck; but at least the troops could be more easily subsisted, and Napoleon thought more of that gain than of the hazard of a too wide dissemination; doubtless because he entertained no very high opinion of Wellington, who still passed in the councils of the French army as a general fit only for defensive warfare.

CHAP. II.

EFFECT OF THE RETREAT FROM BURGOS IN ENGLAND AND SPAIN. — WELLINGTON TREATS WITH THE CORTES. — HIS JOURNEY TO CADIZ. — RECEPTION THERE, AND IN LISBON. — CONDITION OF THE HOSTILE ARMIES. — OFFENSIVE MOVEMENTS. — WELLINGTON BAFFLES THE PLANS OF JOSEPH. — THE DEFECTS OF THE LATTER. — BATTLE OF VITTORIA. — ITS CONSEQUENCES. — BLOCKADE OF PAMPELUNA. — THE BRITISH ARMY IN THE PYRENÉES. — THE SIEGE OF ST. SEBASTIAN BEGUN.

The retreat from Burgos, misrepresented in England and in the Peninsula, gave rise to fresh political difficulties. The unbounded confidence created by the victory of Salamanca was immediately succeeded by such recriminations as usually follow the overthrow of an illusion or of a hope long cherished. The Marquis Wellesley, in the House of Lords, reproached the Cabinet with having compromised the attack upon Burgos, by neglecting to supply the commander-in-chief with resources adequate to such an undertaking. He demanded, at the same time, a committee of inquiry, and delivered an eloquent eulogium upon his brother, whom he emphatically pronounced to be "a general accepted by the whole world as unsurpassed in ancient or modern times, — the pride of his country, and the refuge of the hope of Europe."

This motion was supported by Earl Grey and Lord Ponsonby, more out of hostility to the Cabinet than from any special regard for Lord Wellesley. But

Lords Bathurst and Liverpool defeated it; and by a majority of 115 votes to 39, succeeded in obtaining a declaration that the Government had done its best; that Wellington made no complaint; that Spain besides was not the only point to which the attention of the Cabinet was turned; that they were bound to support Germany and Russia against Napoleon; that the failure of the attack upon Burgos was occasioned rather by adverse circumstances than individual mistakes; that the want of money by which Wellington had suffered was owing to the enormous depreciation of bullion in the Peninsula; that, after all, it ill became Parliament to complain, since England had never before obtained upon the continent successes worthy to be compared with those of the campaigns of 1811 and 1812.

Encouraged by this success, the Government adopted a new mode of augmenting the regular army. They invited 25,000 men to volunteer from the militia, by the offer of from twelve to fourteen guineas of bounty, and this expedient, rendered necessary by the failure of voluntary enlistment, enabled Great Britain to bring into the field during the latter years of the war a really imposing force. But in proportion as her physical resources grew greater in the Peninsula, her moral influence diminished. The Spanish democrats and Portuguese nobles left no means untried to render the English nation odious to the people. It seemed, indeed, that from day to day the general state of affairs was growing worse, for no just account can be taken of the extent of Wellington's labours, unless we bear in mind the perpetual struggle which he was called upon to maintain. He was opposed by the Cortes; he was thwarted by the regency at Lisbon; the court of Rio Janeiro was

against him, and the English Government itself never knew how to give a vigorous impulse to the war. The Cortes, by suppressing the Inquisition, excited violent discontent among the clergy, the most influential members of whom were arrested or obliged to flee into Portugal. It was to no purpose that the commander-in-chief and Henry Wellesley resisted that measure, which threw a powerful party into the opposition. The regency, by endeavouring to support that party, lost all influence. It was suppressed and replaced by a provisional government, which consisted of three very old councillors of state, an old archbishop, and two mutes. Thus it was that the constitution worked; a machine shapeless and absurd, with which the Spaniards deceived themselves, and to which Wellington attributed no small share of his embarrassments.

The Princess Charlotte, who had gained ground in the Cortes, prevailed upon her political friends to take steps for placing her at the head of the regency. But the opposition of the people, who detested her, and the violent criticisms of the Whigs, who regarded her as the personification of the old régime, once more defeated the ambitious project.

All these dissensions told so mischievously upon the authority and prestige of England, that the secret negotiations between the Cortes and Joseph, which the battle of Salamanca had suspended, were gradually renewed. It is even affirmed that a large portion of the nation showed itself ready to acknowledge the king, provided he would conform in his civil government to the general policy of the Cortes. It is at all events certain that many Spanish generals were inclined to treat with the French, and that the French had already raised several

Spanish corps, as well as some thousands of seamen, with whom to man their privateers.

Meanwhile, the Cortes agreed to the measures proposed by Wellington for the reorganisation of the national forces, which a recent decree of assembly had placed under his command. Upon this the Duke proceeded to Cadiz, that he might arrange, in concurrence with the Spanish authorities, the means of organising and maintaining these forces. His reception by the people was brilliant in the extreme. A deputation from the legislature went out to compliment him, and the authorities gave in his honour balls and magnificent parties. In like manner the Cortes, receiving him in full assembly, conferred upon him every mark of honour which it could bestow. The ceremony took place on the 30th of December. "Lord Wellington," says an eye-witness, "delivered a speech in Spanish, simple but energetic, of which the force was rather increased than otherwise by the slightly uncouth accent of the speaker. The president replied to him in a harangue as able as it was grandiloquent." *

At the expiration of a few days Wellington quitted Cadiz, and took the road to Lisbon. All the towns through which he passed, from Elvas to the Tagus, welcomed him enthusiastically, and the capital was illuminated for two successive nights after his arrival. On the 25th of January he returned to head-quarters, satisfied with the promises which had been made to him, and full of hope as to the campaign which he was about to open.

By a decree of the Cortes, 50,000 men, paid out of subsidies granted by England, were placed under the

* Count Toreno.

command of the English general. This arrangement, which was excellent in itself, and which had but one defect, namely, that it was somewhat late in being settled, produced extreme discontent in some of the Spanish chiefs. Ballesteros, among others, Captain-General of Andalusia, openly declared that he would not submit to it. In a letter, addressed on the 23rd of October to the war minister, he maligned the English people, and asserted that to give the command of the Spanish troops to Wellington would be to disgrace the national character. Justly offended by this unbecoming protest, the regency degraded Ballesteros, and even caused him to be arrested.

Wellington, however, soon found reason to regret that he had taken upon himself a responsibility so heavy as was involved in the organisation and command of the Spanish army. "I did not know till very lately," he writes to the minister at war, "the real condition of that army. Had I known it, I should have hesitated before I undertook a command which is, indeed, a herculean labour. Still, having accepted, I will not give it up, though the charge be difficult and success little to be hoped for. I will do my duty as long as I retain the confidence of the authorities who have committed it to me."

The object which the general strove to attain, was to place the Spanish armies, in regard to command and discipline, upon the same footing with other European troops, and to put an end to the intrigues and solicitations which had reduced them to such a deplorable condition. To accomplish this, he required that nothing should be done without his authority; or, at all events, that he should be informed of everything which affected the corps that had been placed under his orders. Now this

was exactly what he could never bring about, in spite of all his own remonstrances and the written promises of the government. "I am sorry to inform you," he writes to a member of the Cortes, "that my intentions are entirely thwarted by the government, which has broken all its engagements entered into with me, and ratified in its letter of the 1st of January." In fact, the war minister took it upon him to recall and nominate officers, to change the destination of corps, and to suspend the orders of the commander-in-chief, without asking his leave, or even informing him of what was intended. He adopted no single measure as it had been settled for the maintenance and payment of the troops; indeed, affairs arrived at such a pass that Wellington, before entering upon the campaign, experienced the most lively apprehensions upon the subject of the indigenous armies. Fortunately for him, he had so arranged his plans that the co-operation of these armies, however desirable, was not absolutely necessary to insure success.

The situation of Portugal had undergone no material change. The same hostile influences, the same apathy, made themselves felt here also. The people alone, when left to their proper instincts, fairly appreciated the importance of the services rendered to their country by the English general and his gallant army. The regency and the court at Rio Janeiro, on the contrary, influenced by the Souzas, and the nobles, and richer classes, threatened with the loss of their iniquitous privileges in the matter of taxation, harassed Wellington the more, that entertaining no further fear for the safety of Portugal, and never having troubled themselves about the danger that threatened Spain, they believed that it was no longer necessary to maintain the slightest reserve.

These hostile feelings were everywhere noticed, and were attended by serious consequences when Wellington placed himself at the head of the army.

During his sojourn in Spain, the regency at Lisbon had undertaken the military administration of the country, and had revived old abuses. The army in the field received no more supplies, and became as thoroughly disorganised as it had ever been; the artillery ceased to exist; the cavalry was in a deplorable condition; the numbers of the infantry fell off from day to day; their equipment was defective, almost useless; the transport service was neglected; there was no more money in the chest; there were no more recruits at the dépôts,—lastly, the enthusiasm of the soldiers themselves had died out, and been succeeded by despondency.

It was no easy matter to overcome difficulties like these; yet Wellington, with admirable perseverance, determined to make the attempt. Feeling that all his strength, as well as every means of influence, would be required to strike a decisive blow; and, despairing of being able to overcome the resistance which the government opposed to his plans of financial reform, he addressed to the prince regent a memorandum, lucid and firm, in which he demanded from him the redress of abuses, and the adoption of certain useful practical measures, which the minister of finance refused to discuss. "Pay is due to the army in the field," he says, "since the end of last September; to the troops of the line in garrison, since the month of June; and to the militia, since the month of February. The transport service has never been regularly paid, and I perceive that I shall be obliged to open a new campaign with troops to whom more arrears are due than at the close of the last campaign; though

the subsidy from Great Britain, granted chiefly for the payment and maintenance of a certain number of Portuguese, has been regularly paid; and though the revenue of the state has been more considerable within the last three months than during any previous quarters. The honour of your Highness's arms and the cause of the Allies are thus painfully compromised. The unanimous refusal of the administrators of the kingdom to adopt any of the measures recommended by me, whether for temporary relief or permanent improvement, and my inability to counterbalance the influence of the chief of the treasury, M. Borda, compel me at last to submit this disclosure to your Royal Highness."

"I have recommended a complete reform in the customs, trifling modifications in which have alone been attempted. I have suggested a means of effectually and speedily realising taxes, and of making the rich merchants and capitalists pay the tenth of their annual profits, as a contribution to the extraordinary expenses of the war. It is not denied that the payment of the regular taxes, and those especially exacted from the profit of trade, are eluded; neither is it denied that the measures which I propose, if they were vigorously acted upon, would supply the government with financial resources; but the government is afraid of rendering itself unpopular. It under-estimates the good sense and loyalty of your Royal Highness's subjects. I am ready, not only to take upon myself all the responsibility of the measures which I have advised, but also to brave the ill-will which they may possibly produce. Besides, forasmuch as all the measures heretofore taken by my advice have proved successful, such as the reform of the customs, of the arsenal, and of the marine, and the

payment of the national debt in paper money, as well as the formation of a military chest, I have the best reason to assume that these other arrangements will produce the same happy results. It is possible, however, that I may deceive myself. In this case, the determination at which I have arrived, of bringing charges against the chief of the treasury, must be attributed *only* to my desire of rendering service to the national cause."

Wellington concluded his memorandum by suggesting that the prince regent should come and place himself at the head of the government. No notice was however taken of the suggestion, and the proposed reforms failed for lack of support. The regency adopted only half measures, and the evil remained as it had previously been, or was very little ameliorated.

The inspiration under which the English government acted was not much more happy. It listened to every humanitarian who had a proposal to make for ameliorating the condition of the army in the Peninsula, and submitted to Wellington a mass of projects unworthy of his notice, which he was called upon to refute in detail, at a time when military affairs demanded the whole of his attention. It was thus that, in the midst of his preparations for the campaign of 1812, he delivered an elaborate opinion on the fitness of an English loan; an old project which Funchal, the brother of Souza, had renewed. It was thus that, at San Christoval, upon the field of battle itself, he demonstrated the impossibility of establishing a Portuguese bank; that in the trenches before Burgos, he examined a proposal to sell the property of the crown and of the church; and that at the termination of the long retreat which followed, he pointed out the inconveniences of a system of

forced requisitions, conceived and proposed by the minister.

From Mr. Stuart, who entered fully into his views, the commander-in-chief received great assistance amidst the labour and annoyance incident to such discussions, in which the ignorance and weakness of the cabinet of St. James so inopportunely involved him. It was Mr. Stuart also who directed the commercial operations, by means of which Wellington, up to the end of the war, recruited his military chest; and without which it would have been almost always empty. We allude to these circumstances because they afford proof of Lord Wellington's untiring activity, and of his ability to deal with the most delicate questions of administration, policy, and finance.

In spite of all the hindrances to which they were exposed, the English officers succeeded so well in filling up the ranks of the Portuguese army, in re-establishing its discipline and restoring its moral confidence, that before the opening of the campaign 27,000 excellent troops were got together. The Spaniards likewise, under Wellington's command, made considerable progress. But that which above all favoured the projected enterprise, was the enthusiasm excited by the news of the retreat from Moscow, and the defection of Prussia. Of this Wellington hastened to take advantage. He was anxious to withdraw himself, by a bold irruption into Spain, from the intrigues by which he was surrounded; and circumstances greatly favoured him.

While the condition of the allied troops thus improved from day to day, that of the French armies, as Wellington had foreseen, grew more and more alarming. Their veteran regiments were recalled to Germany, and re-

placed by young soldiers; while the quarrels of the generals among themselves, and the disagreement of the king with his principal chiefs, continued to produce the most disastrous consequences. Marshal Soult was openly opposed to Joseph's plans; while Joseph, giving free vent to his anger against the old commander of the army of Andalusia, wrote thus to the Emperor: "Either the Duke of Dalmatia must quit Spain or I will." He even spoke of treason, and forgot himself so far as to insinuate that the Marshal's conduct was probably connected with the conspiracy of Mallet, at Paris. Napoleon, for the good of the service, recalled Soult; but, at the same time, and with a confidence which did him honour, he placed the brave soldier, so unworthily calumniated, at the head of the imperial guard, in Germany.

While the king's army thus fell off in numbers, in the quality of its troops, and in the talents of its generals, Wellington received very effective reinforcements, particularly in cavalry, and found himself in other respects admirably supported by circumstances. The combined action of the English fleet, and of corps of partisans, had reawakened the spirit of insurrection throughout the whole of Spain; particularly in Biscay and Navarre. The guerillas became stronger, bolder, better organised, better disciplined, than they had ever previously been. Their bands, greatly increased, almost deserved the name of armies. They intercepted the communications of the French troops, and cut off all their supplies. In order to obtain subsistence, the invaders found it necessary to scatter their corps, and to fight constant battles. Finally, the letters from

Paris intended for the king did not arrive often till after the lapse of two months.

Informed by Caffarelli of this state of things, the Emperor wrote to his brother, "Hold Madrid only as a point of observation. Fix your head-quarters at Valladolid, not as king, but as general of the French forces. Concentrate round you the armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal. The Allies will not and cannot make any offensive movement for some months to come; you ought therefore to take advantage of their forced inactivity, to put down the insurrection in the northern provinces, to recover your communications with France, and to establish a good base before the commencement of another campaign; so that the French army may be in a condition to fight the Allies if they should advance upon France." These instructions, bearing the stamp of genius and foresight, Joseph was neither able to comprehend, nor had time to execute. He underrated the importance of the insurrection of the northern provinces, which the English cleverly fed, and which soon extended into Arragon and Catalonia. He busied himself with administrative arrangements, when he ought to have been entirely occupied with the war. He arrived at no decision for reassembling his troops, which lay scattered from Valencia as far as the foot of the mountains of Galicia. He even maintained, as long as he could shut his eyes to the truth, that Madrid was a better centre of operations than Valladolid.

Had it been possible for Wellington to call in Hill from Bejar, and, crossing the Upper Tormès to march upon Avila, he might have taken advantage of these contingencies, and beaten the French in detail. But his troops were not yet sufficiently recovered from their

fatigues, nor were his arrangements so far advanced as to justify, at that moment, his assuming the initiative. Besides, the hope of achieving a prompt and brilliant success offered less temptation to his self-love than the certainty of arriving, by slow but sure steps, at the desired object. He was anxious, having once taken the field, not to be stopped, till he should have delivered the Peninsula; and to accomplish that, it was necessary that his army should be in the best possible condition.

Though the instructions communicated by Napoleon reached Madrid so early as the middle of February, and though Marshal Jourdan was urgent for the prompt evacuation of that city, the king could not be brought to withdraw from it earlier than the 18th of March. Such, too, was the enormous amount of wounded (about 9000) to be cared for — of stores to be placed in security, and of the families of officials to be carried away, that more than a month elapsed ere the evacuation could be completed; nor was it till the beginning of April that the king found himself established, with his ministers and court, at Valladolid.

Meanwhile the army of Portugal removed from Salamanca to Burgos. The eight divisions of which it originally consisted were now reduced by casualties in the regiments to six. Three of these, in conformity with the Emperor's orders, were sent to Clausel (Caffarelli's successor) that they might aid him in dispersing the bands which interrupted the communications with France. One was kept at Burgos, while the remaining two were placed in echellon in front of Valencia, to observe the army of Galicia.

The army of Andalusia, abandoning the valley of the Tagus, posted itself upon the Douro and the Tormès,

and communicated by its right with the army of Portugal. Its special duty was to watch the Anglo-Portuguese army in its position at Beira.

Laval's division remained in Madrid, in order to keep up the appearance of a continued occupation of the capital, and to superintend the collection of the taxes.

The remaining divisions of the army of the south were at Zamora, Toro, Salamanca, and Avila. Finally, with a view to connect Laval's division with the main body, one division of the army of the centre was posted at Valladolid, and another at Segovia.

The sum total of these troops had amounted in January to 86,000 men; of whom 12,000 were magnificent cavalry; but the withdrawal of dépôt-battalions, and of bodies of picked men whom Napoleon called away to strengthen him in Saxony, reduced them, in the month of April, to less than 76,000.

A little later in the year, Reille was obliged to send a fourth division to Clausel, and to transfer a fifth to Briviesca; so that there remained to him no more than a single division, of which part lay at Burgos, and part at Palencia.

Notwithstanding these sacrifices, which weakened the king beyond measure, and hindered him from making any use of the concentration of the armies of the centre, of the south, and of Portugal, the successes obtained by Clausel in the north were of the smallest possible moment. The king had predicted the result, and always spoke of the bands of guerillas as a force against which moral means would effect much more than physical. There was much reason in the view which he took of the case; at the same time it cannot be doubted, that had the Emperor's instructions arrived a little earlier, and had more

activity been displayed in carrying them into effect, Clausel might have accomplished his object, previously to the commencement of hostilities, and thus been at hand to support the king, with the force of which he was at the head.

Be this, however, as it may, the fact is indisputable, that the French army, when about to be assailed, lay scattered over an immense extent of country. Its communications also with France were cut off by a formidable insurrection, which the junta had organised and the English fleet supported. It was forced to abandon, one after another, all the magazines which it had established along the north coast of the Peninsula. And to crown its misfortunes, though sore pressed for the means of feeding the men, not only was the transport of convoys by land rendered insecure, but the weather proved so favourable that British cruisers were enabled to intercept at sea every vessel which endeavoured to carry corn or other stores from France.

To all this must be added, that the army had no confidence whatever in Joseph, that perfect discord prevailed among the generals, that they not only disputed with each other, but called in question the orders of the commander-in-chief; and that the Emperor's instructions, misinterpreted by Clausel, and never arriving except too late by some weeks, were the source rather of embarrassment than of assistance to the king. Finally, the morale of the troops had given way under the combined influences of the disasters in Russia, the defection of Prussia, and the continued successes of the English army in the Peninsula.

While matters were assuming for Joseph this uncomfortable shape, the Allies became more and more

confident in their general, and in the issues of the campaign. Their discipline and organisation were well-nigh perfect, and Wellington had taken advantage of the winter season to effect several changes in his *matériel* for the better. Thus a pontoon train had been constructed, and carts, fit for the difficult country which the army was about to cross, were built for the use of the divisions. Light camp kettles took the place of the old iron pots, and the mules which used to carry these pots were employed to transport three tents per company,—a striking improvement so far as the health of the soldier was concerned. Finally, the hospitals and ambulances were placed upon a better footing, thanks to the practical arrangements which Marshal Marmont had established in the army under his command, and which the English general adopted and applied to the utmost extent of his limited means.

In March, 1813, the total strength of the French armies in Spain did not exceed 230,000 men, and 29,000 horses, of which only 197,000, including the reserve at Bayonne, were present with their colours. These numbers were still further reduced in April and May; so much so, that, exclusive of the reserves at Bayonne, the total strength of bayonets and sabres did not, in June, exceed 116,000, of whom 110,000 were on the northern line. On the side of the Allies, 200,000 soldiers were ready to enter upon the campaign, and that army had upon each flank a squadron capable of acting with effect, because the enemy's lines of retreat ran parallel with the sea, and were near to the coast.

Several considerations induced Wellington to direct his attack against the northern provinces. If he invaded the centre, in order to reach Madrid by one or other of

the roads through Salamanca or Talavera, he would find greater difficulty in feeding his troops, would abandon the advantage of communication with the fleet, would hinder the Galicians and the partisans in the north from affording him effectual support, and would arrive after all at a result less decisive than if he acted by the great line of communication with France. He had fully considered, that the slightest success on that side would enable him to threaten Joseph's retreat, and that a victory like that of Salamanca would infallibly drive back the French on the Pyrenees. Yet Joseph at first believed that the main point of the English general was Madrid, and this it was which induced him to place his principal corps upon the southern bank of the Douro, and to take steps for debouching by the têtes-du-pont of Toro and Zamora, in the event of the enemy directing himself upon Salamanca.

Wellington exhibited great ability in profiting by this mistake, and in bending all the chances to his own favour. While, by the disposition of his troops in their winter quarters, and by false reports and false movements, he made the French believe that he intended to pass the Upper Tormès towards the mountains, in the direction of the higher Douro, and to turn their left,—he made his arrangements in secret for attacking and turning their right, by crossing through the Tras-os-montes. His plan was to pass the Douro with a part of the army, within the Portuguese frontier, to advance along the right bank towards Zamora, and, crossing the Esla, to form a junction with the Galician troops, while the rest of the army, coming from the Agueda, should force the passage of the Tormès. By this great movement, which he hoped to effect before the king should be able to con-

centrate the French corps, the Douro and the Pisuerga would both be turned; and the enemy driven in confusion behind the Carrion. Then, having his whole army well together, he would be able to advance with the greater security, that bodies of irregular troops would join him, and that, giving the hand to the insurgents of Biscay, he would not fail to find in every harbour a dépôt and magazines. The main difficulties in the execution of this plan were—to gain, by crossing the broken country of Tras-os-montes, some marches upon the central corps, and to keep the French dispersed and occupied in secondary combinations long enough to render it impossible for them to collect in time to profit by their central position. It would be necessary, also, to hinder the Duke of Albufera from uniting his troops with the French army upon the Ebro.

The former of these objects Wellington attained by a series of able arrangements, which we shall presently describe; the latter, by throwing upon the right flank and rear of the army of Catalonia the Anglo-Sicilian troops, reinforced by those of Copons, Elio, Del Parque, and other partisans, to the amount of about 50,000 men.

The campaign would have been opened in the first days of May, had not heavy rains so injured the roads as to render them impracticable for cavalry, and even for infantry. But the weather cleared up towards the end of the month, whereupon 70,000 Anglo-Portuguese, 8000 Spaniards of Estremadura, and 12,000 Galicians moved forward. Their confidence was unbounded, and it is reported of their leader, that foreseeing that the tide of war would no more turn against him, he exclaimed with emotion, while passing the rivulet which marks the Spanish frontier, "Farewell, Portugal, *farewell!*"

While Wellington was accomplishing with so much skill this concentration of his force upon the Douro, the army of Joseph continued still in a scattered state. Despising the counsels and explicit orders of the Emperor, the king had neglected to form magazines at Santona and Burgos and to open with Suchet a line of communication shorter than that by Saragossa. Neither had he taken any steps to strengthen the works at Burgos; and, instead of sending his baggage, provisions, and other impedimenta to that place, to Pampeluna, Tolosa, and St. Sebastian, had caused it all to follow his own line of march. Finally, he had neglected to keep his troops in hand upon the Tormès in such an offensive position as would menace the enemy's communications. The consequence of all this negligence was, that when hostilities began, the army of Andalusia was dispersed from Madrid to Salamanca; that of the centre from Segovia to Valladolid; and that of Portugal from Burgos to Pampeluna.

It was only on the 25th that directions were given for the closing up of Laval's division from Madrid. Orders were at the same time sent to all the troops established on the lines of the Tormès, the Douro, and the Esla, to fall back slowly, and so to regulate their movements as to keep pace with those of Laval's division. A part of the army of the centre was then echelloned towards Segovia with a view to cover that division; while the army of Andalusia received instructions to return by Salamanca upon Tordesillas, and to give ground so gradually that the rest of the troops might find time to assemble. Finally General Clausel, being informed of the advance of the English, was instructed to send back

the five divisions of the army of Portugal, and to hasten himself with a portion of the army of the north to the support of the king.

The movement of the Allies began upon the left. On the 15th of May, about 40,000 men, under the orders of Graham, passed the Douro between Lamego and the mouth of the Agueda, and moved by Tras-os-montes towards the lower Esla. On the 22nd they were sufficiently advanced to enable Wellington to remove his head-quarters from Frenada, and to put his right wing, about 28,000 strong, in movement towards the Tormès, in the direction of Alba and Salamanca. This river, defended by General Villatte, having been forced, the Allies pushed, during the 27th and 28th, upon Miranda, Zamora, and Toro. The right of Wellington's force covered the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo, while its left was in a condition to throw a bridge across the mouth of the Esla, and to give the hand to Graham's corps.

A little uneasy about the fate of that general, Wellington gave the command of the right wing to Hill, and, during the 29th, crossed the Douro at Miranda by means of a basket and cord extended between two rocks. He found Graham's troops on the 30th, between Carvajales and Tobara, their march having been considerably retarded by the obstacles of every description which are presented by a country so broken as the Tras-os-montes.

There was considerable difficulty in fording the Esla, but the movement was effected successfully enough during the 31st. Next day, the advanced guard of the Allies entered Zamora, from which moment the junction of the two wings upon the Douro was rendered per-

fectly safe. This delicate operation was conducted with equal prudence and celerity. Meanwhile, the French columns having been reunited, Wellington halted on the 3rd at Toro, to give time for the Galicians to arrive by Benavente upon his left, and that he might be joined by his rear-guard, which the difficulty of crossing the Esla had retarded. Next day he resumed his march with perfect confidence as to the issue of the campaign. His force now amounted to 70,000 Anglo-Portuguese, 20,000 Spaniards, and upwards of 100 pieces of cannon, and the flanks of his army were covered by corps of irregular troops.

The king, whose arrangements had been badly planned, could oppose to this torrent only 35,000 infantry, 9000 or 10,000 horse, and 100 guns. It is even probable that if Graham had been less delayed in the Tras-os-montes, or if Wellington, instead of halting at Toro, had advanced rapidly upon Placencia and Valladolid, while Hill moved upon Rueda, the French army might have been completely surprised and destroyed.

Once collected in the neighbourhood of Valladolid, the French had three courses open to them: 1st, They might stand fast, and fight a battle—which would have been imprudent, and, seeing that as yet none of the divisions of the army of Portugal had joined them, premature; 2nd, They could retire first upon Burgos, and then upon Miranda and Vittoria, where they might form a junction with the army of the north: this was a simple and safe plan. 3rd, and last, They might hold the line of the Douro, manœuvring along the river as high up as Aranda, and even to Soria; whence, by a road that Marshal Ney had followed in 1808, they might penetrate beween Tudela and Logrono, into Navarre, at the very point where

they would be assured of meeting General Clausel, and where Suchet himself might form a junction with them, should circumstances render a general concentration of the French forces desirable. In appearance this plan was bold; in reality, little risk could have attended it.

The three plans being taken into consideration, the first was at once rejected. The third appeared to be rash, as well as complicated, and it presented this defect, that it would involve the loss of the great road to Bayonne, as well as the abandonment of the communications with France, about which the Emperor showed himself so anxious. As if an English army could have ventured to penetrate into France, leaving 80,000 French in its rear, or, if Suchet's force be included, 150,000! Joseph, therefore, pronounced in favour of the second plan, which consisted in quietly retiring upon Burgos.

Wellington marched in close order upon the Carrion, having the Galicians upon his extreme left, Morillo and Sanchez on his extreme right. As the enemy were now in full retreat upon Burgos, the passage of that stream was effected without any difficulty.

Meanwhile Joseph, having got together 55,000 men, and believing the allied force to be inferior to what it really was, entertained the idea of accepting a battle behind the Pisuerga. He accordingly directed Foy and Sarrut to march without delay upon Burgos, and sent instructions to Suchet to move in the direction of Saragossa. But besides that these orders arrived too late, the Duke of Albufera was so fully occupied in Catalonia, that he found himself unable to act in accordance with them. At this moment the king was informed by Jourdan, that the castle of Burgos was untenable. This unlooked-for intelligence induced Joseph to retire behind the

Ebro, though the ground which he held was extremely favourable for defensive war, besides that the junction of Lamoricière's division added 6000 men to his effective strength. The morale of the army had been greatly restored by the announcement of the victory at Bautzen.

Wellington followed the French closely, directing the Galicians and his left column to move at the same time by cross roads. He passed the Carrion and the upper Pisuerga on the 8th, 9th and 10th, by which movement he at once turned the river and exposed Reille. A trifling skirmish then made him master of Burgos.

In retiring from the town, the French caused the castle to be blown up; but the explosion occurred too soon, and the fire having communicated with a pile of shells and grenades, several hundred men of the rear-guard were struck by pieces of stone and projectiles. If all the mines had exploded, the whole town would have been destroyed; a result which was certainly not contemplated by the French officers of engineers.*

And here, for the second time, the question was mooted whether, in obedience to the orders from Paris, they should continue to follow the great road to Bayonne, or whether they should make a transverse movement, so as to debouch upon the Ebro at Logrono, and thus render certain their junction with Clausel. Generals Reille and D'Essling strongly supported the latter project; but Jourdan and Joseph, sensitively alive to the risk of exposing their communications, persisted in directing the march towards Miranda and Vittoria. At the

* Such was the effect of a strategic movement, skilfully planned and ably executed. A few demonstrations against his right induced Joseph to abandon precipitately a town which in the late campaign had stopped the whole British army.

same time an officer was sent, escorted by 1500 men, to inform Clausel of the resolution which had been taken; for neither of him nor of his movements had they received any intelligence, since their former letters had been despatched to him.

Arrived behind the Ebro, the king halted to wait for reinforcements, and extended his line of cantonments at the same time, with a view to the more easy subsistence of his troops. He had been joined on the march by Sarrut's division, which Clausel, at the first tidings of the advance of the English, had sent on to meet him. Foy also was by this time on the other side of the Pyrenees, between Mondragon and Tolosa; while it was known that Clausel himself had moved forward by Logrono, and was ascending the Ebro with the two remaining divisions of the army of Portugal, and with two divisions of the army of the north.* His staff hoped that Wellington would debouch upon the front of the strong position which the French army at that moment occupied; but Wellington, by an extremely bold march, disappointed that expectation. Observing how difficult it would be to cross the Pancorbo, and to force the passage of the Ebro in presence of the enemy, he suddenly carried his left, and by and by the whole of his army, by an unfrequented route, which had heretofore been regarded as impracticable for wheeled carriages, towards the bridges of San Martin, Rocamunda, and Puente de Arenas, and on the 14th and 15th crossed them without encountering the smallest opposition. Yet the obstacles opposed to the march were at least as great as those

* Joseph ought instantly to have marched down the Ebro, to meet Clausel. But the fear of losing the great road, and the hope that Clausel would reach him before Wellington attacked, kept him stationary.

which fixed the movement through Tras-os-montes. Its first result was to cut off the communications of the French with the coast, and to force them to abandon all the harbours except Santona and Bilbao. The English fleet entered Santander, and the Commissariat immediately established in that town a dépôt and a hospital. From that moment direct communication between the Allies and Portugal was no longer necessary. Assured of a new base, Wellington could continue his operations, and act energetically without compromising anything. His plan was, to turn Joseph's right, to penetrate into Guipuscoa, then to establish his army upon the great road of communication with France, while the fleet moving in concert with him should form new dépôts at Bilbao, and other points. He executed this plan with a precision and vigour which were the more remarkable that rugged torrents, deep ravines, perilous declivities, and countless natural obstacles, interrupted the march of his columns across that wild and savage district of the Peninsula. During six days the soldiers made the greatest efforts to open a passage through these defiles and mountain gorges, where 100 men were sometimes required to drag a single piece of cannon.

On the evening of the 18th, it was known at the French head-quarters, that Wellington had passed the Ebro, and was marching upon the flank of the king's army. The staff was struck with amazement, and carried the army the same night to the rear, by a forced march, which created great alarm and confusion in the French ranks.

On the 19th the Allies reached the village of Bayas, situated upon a river of the same name. If they had immediately forced the passage of the river, the armies of

the centre and of the south would have been cut off from Vittoria, and probably destroyed. But Reille prevented that disaster by occupying a strong position on the other side of the Bayas. The king's letters inform us that the commander of the army of Portugal proposed on the 18th to withdraw the French army into Navarre, by marching along the right bank of the Ebro; but that Joseph rejected the suggestion because he was afraid that the English would take possession of his *matériel*, and capture the crowd of Spaniards which had followed him to Vittoria. The king argued, moreover, that by retiring into Navarre he would give up the great line of communication with France, and expose Clausel, who was marching upon Vittoria, to the risk of finding that town in the possession of the English instead of in the occupation of his countrymen. The consequence was, that Joseph determined to fight a battle in his present position, nothing doubting but that he should be joined in time by Clausel, whose columns were advancing by forced marches, upon Logrono.

During the night between the 19th and 20th, the French army drew up behind the Zadora, a small stream, with a narrow channel, and difficult banks, which empties itself into the basin of Vittoria. Their centre extended along the left bank, their right stretched along the other bank in advance of the village of Abechucho; and their left lay between Arinez and La Puebla de Arganzon, having a weak corps detached to the high ground above La Puebla. Thus posted, the French army covered each of the three roads which meet at Vittoria; the Logrono road with its left, the Madrid road with its centre, and the Bilbao road with its right. It defended besides, by its position taken as a whole, the great road to Bayonne,

which, after quitting Vittoria, stretches for a certain extent in a direction parallel with the course of the river. There were immense convoys on the march along that road towards France. Others, collected about the town, where they occasioned great inconvenience, were ready to follow in the same direction.

It would be difficult to imagine a worse position than that in which the king determined to receive Wellington's attack. In point of fact, the front of his line of battle stretched away to an extent of two leagues and a half parallel with the Bayonne road; the only one by which an army encumbered like his could conveniently effect its retreat. Now, since the Allies occupied a similar position, but less extended, in rear of the mountains which closed in the basin on the right bank of the Zadora, there needed only a movement to their left to cut off the French from Bayonne; and the operation was the more easy, that Joseph's right was too far removed from the centre to afford it any effectual support, and that Vittoria was girdled in by a belt of lofty mountains, the prolongation of which fell exactly in the direction of the English left, and on the side by which the road could be reached. Besides, the ground, intersected with ravines and watercourses, was most unfavourable for the brilliant and numerous cavalry of the French army. We may add to this, that the king had committed the great mistake of accumulating behind the town his baggage, his convoy and his park; everything, in short, which could cumber the ground, block up the road, and inconvenience the movements of the different arms.

In this defective position Joseph remained some days without attempting anything. Several of his generals

again proposed to him to abandon the Bayonne road, and to retire parallel with the Ebro, as far as Saragossa; where he might call in Souchet and fall upon Wellington, when he should be 150 leagues from his ships and magazines. Jourdan advised him to base his operations upon Bayonne, to avoid a battle, or at all events to receive it upon the heights of Salinas. Other projects besides were brought forward, but nothing could rouse the king from his grievous indolence. He might have sent away, towards Tolosa, in the evening of the 19th, an immense convoy of wounded, of exiles, and of stores. The troops that escorted it might have gone as far as the other side of Mount Salinas, where they would have fallen in with Foy, and possibly returned with him in time for the battle. But Joseph did nothing of the sort. He put his carriages in motion only on the 20th, and then sent away, in charge of them, a division of about 4000 men. In consequence of this fresh blunder, the king's army, when the action began, did not exceed, in all, 55,000 infantry and cavalry.

A still more blamable act of negligence on Joseph's part was this: that he failed on the 20th to examine his own position and to adopt the necessary measures for defending the Zadora. It is true that on that day Jourdan suffered severely from fever; so much so, that he was unable to mount a horse. But this circumstance affords no justification of the king, who ought to have broken down the bridges on the Zadora, and covered the fords with his artillery. A slight reconnoissance of the ground might have shown him, also, how necessary it was to block the defile of La Puebla, by which the Zadora passes into the basin of Vittoria. The nature of the country was extremely favourable to this species

of defence, to which his numerous artillery afforded ready means. But of that the king made no use.

Wellington mustered 83,500 men, of whom 23,000 were Spanish auxiliaries. He halted during the 20th, to give time for his columns to close up from the rear, and that he might reconnoitre the enemy's position. Toreno pretends, that at this moment Wellington hesitated whether he should give battle; but that he immediately decided, when, on the heights of Nanclares de la Oca, he received intelligence from the Alcalde of St. Vincent, that General Clausel had arrived in that neighbourhood and seemed desirous of resting there all day.

The allied army was divided into three columns. *That on the left*, under the orders of Graham, was directed to attack Reille, who, covering the upper Zadora, could alone hinder Joseph's right from being turned and cut off from the centre. That on the right, commanded by Hill, was to attack the heights of La Puebla, where the other wing of the enemy was posted. Finally, the centre column, under Wellington in person, had it in charge to force the enemy's centre, at the time when the two flank columns were debouching upon his position.

In spite of the great extent of the line of battle, Joseph's centre was defended by so many troops, and such powerful batteries, that an extraordinary effort would be required to pierce it. Hence Wellington combined four chosen divisions for that attack. Moreover, the ground was so broken, and the communications between the different columns so difficult, that finding it hopeless to expect perfect unity of action, each general was of necessity left, in some sort, to direct his own movements.

In spite of these drawbacks, the troops crossed the

103484

abrupt defiles which separate the plains of La Bayas from the basin of Vittoria, in such good order, that the left and right of the Allies were able to make their attacks at the same time. The task was not an easy one, and probably would not have been accomplished at all, but for the unaccountable neglect of Joseph, in failing to destroy the bridges of the Zadora, to intercept the defile of Puebla, and occupy, in force, the high grounds which overlook it.

General Hill, having under his orders the 2nd English division, the Portuguese division of Count Amaranthe, Morillo's Spanish brigade, Victor Alten's light brigade, and the cavalry which was not employed in the attacks upon the centre and the left, began his march at the appointed time. He became engaged almost immediately with the troops that defended the advanced posts of the Puebla. These mountain posts were easily carried, but reinforcements arriving to their support, the battle was renewed with great obstinacy. It terminated, however, to the advantage of the Allies, who crossed the Zadora, and made themselves masters, in succession, of the villages of Subijana and Alba.

General Gazan, chief of the army of the south, who commanded Joseph's left wing, states that this bold initiation of Hill, preceding the other attacks, convinced him that Wellington was desirous of drawing to that side the king's troops, in order to weaken the French right, where the real blow was to be struck. He communicated this opinion to Joseph, who did not approve of it, because Marshal Jourdan had pronounced the movements of the enemy, upon the right of the French army, to be mere demonstrations, which ought to give him no uneasiness. Gazan received, in consequence,

orders to maintain himself, with the whole of his troops, as long as possible, on the mountain to the left of Subijana, and to make every effort to retake the village of that name which had fallen into Hill's hands.

The fall of Subijana weakened the centre of the French army, and facilitated the central offensive movement of the Allies. Cole's division passed first by the bridges which had been left entire, and vigorously attacked the enemy. Lord Dalhousie's division, which followed, next entered into the battle, and forced Joseph's centre to fall back upon Vittoria. Behind these two divisions moved that of Picton and Alten's light division.

Meanwhile Villatte, belonging to Gazan's corps, had retaken Subijana, a position, which, in the opinion of Jourdan and his staff, ought to have insured the success of the day; but scarcely was this advantage gained, ere Joseph, informed of the passage of the Zadora, at Trespuentes and Villados, ordered the army of the south to fall back to a position somewhat further in the rear. On receiving this vague order, Gazan moved back Leval's division on Arinez, for the purpose of checking the enemy's column, which moved along the great road, as well as that which was debouching by the bridge of Villados. He advanced, at the same time, the main body of his corps, in echelon, towards the mountain, while General Terlet, with a view to favour the movement, endeavoured to stop the English columns of the centre and the right, by turning upon them the fire of forty-five pieces of cannon. But before Gazan could collect his masses, his right was turned by the troops which had passed the Zadora; and he was forced, in

consequence, to fall back upon the heights behind the village of Margarita, which was already occupied by the army of the centre, and was already fiercely assaulted by the enemy. Under cover of the artillery, which formed again to protect him, he executed this movement. But as the enemy continued to get more and more round him, and no orders came from Joseph, and as he saw that Hill was by this time at the gates of Vittoria, Gazan felt himself compelled to move on towards the town, upon which the English cavalry presently fell, creating irremediable confusion.

Graham's attack was not less successful. With the 1st and 5th English divisions, Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese brigades, the cavalry of Beck and Anson, and Longo's guerillas, he had pushed on from Murguia upon Vittoria, by the Bilbao road, and had driven Joseph's right wing from the heights above Abechuco. Seeing his communications with Bayonne seriously threatened by that movement, the king detached a portion of his troops towards the right, to take possession of Gamara Major and Gamara Minor. The occupation of these posts was, indeed, necessary to dispute the passage of the Zadora, and to cover the retreat of the baggage and troops upon Bayonne; but scarcely were the French established there, when Graham by a vigorous attack compelled them to abandon the prize. In vain the king massed large bodies of troops, in rear of Gamara Major; the only result which he could obtain was to hold the English left in check, till their centre penetrated into Vittoria. Thus the road to Bayonne became intercepted at the very moment when Wellington passed through Vittoria in pursuit of the centre and left of the French army. "Henceforth," says

BATTLE OF VITTORIA.

General Jomini, "a panic spread through the line, and all rushed in confusion, towards the Pampeluna road — the only one by which the Pyrenees could be reached. The entire mass of carriages thrown together about Vittoria, had no means of escape, and became the prey of the victor; guns, baggage, waggons, everything in short, was abandoned, and Joseph arrived at Bayonne in a condition as wretched as Napoleon's when he reached the Beresina."

The nature of the country would not permit the Anglo-Portuguese cavalry to take part in the battle, — it could be useful only in the pursuit. Nevertheless it has been justly observed, that Wellington would have obtained a more decisive result, had he launched a part of it upon Joseph's left wing, at the time when Picton's and Kemp's brigades, in possession of the village of Arinez, had broken the French centre, and gained the great road to Bayonne. That wing, attacked at the moment by Hill and Cole in front, found itself, in point of fact, further removed from Vittoria than Picton; insomuch, that the enemy's retreat in that direction might have been easily cut off. It has also been assumed, that Wellington ought to have avoided the combats of Subijana and Gamara Major, his real object being the destruction of the left wing. "To attain that object, false attacks upon the two wings would have sufficed, while the *élite* of the army might have crossed the Zadora, by the bridges of Villados and Tres-puentes, and taken up a position between the French left and centre. A bold movement like this, which the nature of the ground invited, would have compelled the enemy's troops, posted in Subijana, to lay down their arms. By passing the Zadora, opposite Yruno, with 50,000

men, Lord Wellington would have repeated Marlborough's brilliant manœuvre at Blenheim in 1704." *

It was a fortunate circumstance for the French army, that Reille defended with such obstinacy, upon the Upper Zadora, the positions which he took up, one after another, with a view to cover the retreat. Without doubt he alone prevented the French army from being surrounded, like that of Mack at Ulm. To Joseph, on the other hand, no such merit is due; indeed the battle of Vittoria was to him pregnant both with disgrace and misfortune. "The most scandalous disorder," writes a celebrated critic, "tarnished the laurels of the army of Spain on that day, for which there was no other reason than a panic not unlike to that which fell upon the Austrians at Marengo. The French, who ought to have obstinately resisted the passage of the Zadora, stood as if they had been frozen at the beginning of the battle. Their cavalry exhibited little vigour, their generals (with the exception of Reille) little determination, and their commander-in-chief little courage and less talent."

The king continued to the last moment undecided in his choice of a line of retreat. He added to the irreparable error of having selected a bad position, the grave fault of causing his troops to retire when he saw that their flanks were in danger. Joseph has endeavoured to justify his conduct in this respect by pleading, first, the necessity under which he lay of making strong detachments to the north to resist Mina, and next, the slowness with which General Clausel moved. But we have seen that the first of these reasons cannot be received, because

* General Sarrazin is scarcely a competent critic when either Wellington or Napoleon is called up for judgment.

the king, if he had attended to the Emperor's instructions, would have called in to himself the army of Portugal, and so handled it as to stop Graham's corps. As to the other reason, it is still less admissible, because Clausel did all that he could to rejoin the main army, and in spite of the difficulties which he encountered would have reached Vittoria on the 21st, if he had found at Logrono the king's orders, which had been sent to him on the evening of the 19th. Why did not Joseph, in transmitting these orders, follow up the plan on which at one moment he had determined, of having them escorted by one or two regiments of cavalry? So much for hesitation and half measures. The king's ideas were often excellent; but he did not know how to carry them into effect. Now, in war promptitude of execution is the first guarantee of success.

In giving an account of this victory to Lord Bathurst, Wellington expresses himself in the following terms:— "We have driven the enemy from all his positions. We have taken from him 150 pieces of cannon—his ammunition waggons, all his baggage, his provisions, his animals, his treasure, as well as a great many prisoners." The French carried off but one howitzer, and abandoned that before they arrived at Pampeluna. They lost in the battle many standards, all the *matériel*, which had been laid up in the dépôts at Madrid, Burgos, and Valladolid; the archives of the Staff; a sum of money estimated on the spot at five millions and a half of dollars; and an immense booty which they had collected during four years in the Peninsula. The field of battle strewed with articles of all kinds, which had been carried in 200 baggage waggons belonging to the court, to the generals and to private persons, resembled the field

of Issus, as described by Plutarch. Actresses, nuns, women of loose character, wandered among deserted waggons; and paniers of champagne were mixed up with chests of ammunition. Amid the furniture of that houseless court were found pictures, plate, theatrical decorations, jewelry, and a heap of articles of luxury and taste. The king himself narrowly escaped falling into the hands of a squadron of hussars, which surprised and surrounded his carriage on the road to Pampeluna. He had barely time to open the door and save himself upon a troop horse; leaving in the enemy's hands his private papers, his sword, a superb picture by Correggio, and Marshal Jourdan's bâton, which may still be seen at Apsley House in London.*

The loss of the French amounted to 6960 men, of whom 1904 were prisoners—that of the Allies to 5176 men. Since the battle of Blenheim, France had sustained no such overthrow. "The campaigns of Marlborough," says Alison, "present no example of so remarkable a triumph: the campaigns of Cressy and Agincourt were fruitless in comparison."

The battle of Vittoria put an end to the doubt, and overcame the last repugnance of Austria. It brought about the dissolution of the Congress of Prague, which had been inclined to treat with the Emperor; and prepared the way for the battle of Leipsic, by which the deliverance of Germany and the fall of the French empire were achieved.

Many French writers have accounted for the triumph

* The bâton was sent by the Duke to the Prince Regent, who gave him, in exchange, the bâton of a Field Marshal in the British army.

of Wellington by referring it to chance, or to the bad dispositions made by the king; but impartial history will not accept that decision. Marshal Soult has shown himself more just by attributing the success of the Allies to the talents of their commander-in-chief. In his proclamation of the 23rd of July, 1813, in which he speaks so contemptuously of the king and of Jourdan, he says, "Let us not deny to the enemy the praise which is his due. The dispositions and arrangements of the English general were prompt, able, and well connected. The courage and firmness of his troops are worthy of admiration."

On the 22nd the French army continued its retreat, covered by a strong force of cavalry. On the 24th it reached Pampeluna, but in such a state of confusion that the governor would not admit into the place more troops than were required for its defence. On the 25th the pursuit of the Allies was, as usual, slow, and by no means energetic. We have more than once taken occasion to point out that this was owing rather to some defect in the nature and habits of English soldiers, than to any want of energy or determination in the commander-in-chief.

The king had despatched, by the hands of peasants, letter after letter, to Clausel and Foy, calling upon them to join *him* at Vittoria; but few of these despatches reached their destination, so that Joseph was obliged to fight a battle without the support of 27,000 men, the opportune arrival of whom would have exercised great influence upon the fate of the day. Even General Foy, though separated from him only by the mountain of Salinas, was not aware till the 21st, when the arrival of the first convoy communicated the intelligence, where

the French army was. As to Clausel, every effort which he made after reaching Logrono (where he arrived on the 20th) to obtain exact information respecting the king, proved fruitless: indeed, he had advanced as far as Penacurada, on the south side of the Sierra de Andia, ere he learned on the 21st that there had been fighting all day. Next morning he beheld from the top of the Sierra the victorious English, in full march, to interpose between him and Joseph's army. There was no further room for hesitation. With equal intelligence and self-possession he extricated himself from a very critical situation by retiring to the Ebro, and marching back, along its banks, to Logrono.

After detaching Hill to form the blockade of Pampeluna, Wellington moved in person towards Taffala and Olite, with the intention of intercepting Clausel's corps, which he believed to be at Tudela, but which in reality had returned to Logrono, where it arrived on the evening of the 25th. Made aware the same day of Clausel's real situation, he continued his march, while Durban's Portuguese cavalry moved from Salvatierra and Vittoria upon Logrono; and Mina, supported by the cavalry of Don Julian de Sanchez, pressed vigorously upon the rear of the French corps. Clausel withdrew himself from the danger which threatened, by making a forced march of twenty leagues in forty hours to Tudela, and thence gaining Saragossa. It was a bold determination, and did honour to the military capacity of the young general.

Those who would detract from Wellington's reputation, pretend that if he had exhibited greater boldness and determination, Clausel's troops must have laid down their arms. There is no doubt that Wellington was

informed of the march of these troops in sufficient time to cut off the line of their communications; but Colonel Murray (the quarter-master-general of the English army) draws attention to the fact, that the bad state of the roads, and the heavy rains which fell during the 24th and 25th, retarded the march of the Allies. It is a circumstance which should not be lost sight of, yet it cannot be altogether pleaded as an excuse for Wellington. The rain and the bad state of the roads indeed, as they exercised the same influence over the march of both armies, so they cannot be quoted by one, as presenting an insuperable obstacle to the pursuit of the *other*. More to the purpose, in truth, will be the explanation which is based upon the difference between the English and the French soldier, in the matters of bodily powers, facility of being subsisted, general habits, and so forth. Be this as it may, General Clausel succeeded in delivering himself safe and sound from his difficulties.

Meanwhile General Foy had given proof on his side of talent and determination. After gathering in the Italian division of Palombini and the scattered garrisons of a few little frontier posts, he moved on the 22nd from Bergara to Mondragon, where he found Maucune's division, charged with the escort of the second convoy, which had set out from Vittoria. Pressed hard by Graham, Longa, Mendizabal, and Giron, he pushed for Villa Franca, where his rear-guard was engaged; and from that to Tolosa, which he evacuated on the evening of the 25th, after a sharp combat. During the 26th and 27th he halted in a good position between Tolosa and Ernani, till he should receive certain intelligence of Wellington's march. It was during this interval that

the convoy with Joseph gained the French frontier, and that Foy's corps, reinforced by the garrisons from the neighbourhood, reached the number of 16,000 bayonets, 400 sabres, and 10 guns. This corps threw a detachment of good troops into St. Sebastian on the 27th, and crossing the Urumea immediately succeeded in forming a junction with the army of Portugal about the 1st of July on the right bank of the Bidassoa.

So ends the memorable campaign of 1813, which carried the Allies to the tops of the Pyrenees, overthrew for ever the unstable throne of Joseph, deprived Napoleon of his readiest means of negotiating with England, enabled Austria to accumulate her demands, inspired the Emperor's enemies with fresh confidence, and rendered the conclusion of a peace more difficult than ever. In less than six months the English had marched 200 leagues through a broken country, crossed six great rivers, invested two fortresses, and driven out of Spain 120,000 Frenchmen. A prodigious result, which they probably could not have obtained, had Joseph more carefully followed the instructions of the Emperor, or halted behind the Carrion and the Pisuerga long enough to enable Foy and Clausel to join him.

In quitting Madrid and concentrating all his forces at Burgos, the king acted in conformity with the principles of strategy; but he committed an unpardonable error by accepting battle in the basin of Vittoria, after having abandoned many excellent positions, with Foy and Clausel both absent. It would have been better for the French army to have retired at once upon Bayonne, and, as Jourdan had advised, to make that city the base of its operations, or else to march parallel with the Ebro as far as Saragossa, so as to communicate with

Suchet, and fall upon the Allies as soon as they should be 150 leagues from their dépôts. This latter plan was suggested by the most distinguished officers of Joseph's staff. They were all convinced that Wellington would not dare to advance into the Pyrenees, leaving such a considerable force behind him; and in truth the importance which he attached to keeping Foy and Clausel at a distance seems to justify that opinion. The king and Jourdan, however, did not believe that under these circumstances a retreat to Saragossa could be effected. They were afraid, moreover, to lose the main communication with France, and to leave Foy by himself in the insurgent provinces of the north. There was some foundation for this fear; yet the king would have done well to pay no attention to it, because the plan actually followed led to the most disastrous consequences. Besides, the military incapacity of Joseph was more conspicuous in the execution than in the combination of his movements.

Very different, in all respects, was the conduct of Wellington. His march of concentration upon the Douro; the movements by which he turned the Ebro; and the care which he took to form a new base of operations on the coast of Spain, must be considered among the most remarkable specimens on record of the application of the principles of strategy to actual war. He has been blamed, however, because he made a retrograde movement, in order to drive away Clausel and Foy from his flanks, instead of marching upon Bayonne, which was not then in a state of defence. But this criticism falls to the ground when we consider that the allied army was not in a condition to continue the campaign, particularly in the Pyrenees, where they

would be exposed to much fatigue and to many dangers and privations. "My soldiers," writes Wellington, "instead of cooking their food and resting, after the battle of Vittoria, dispersed themselves at night in search of plunder: they were so fatigued that they could not bear a difficult march, and it follows that the victorious army has a greater number of stragglers than the vanquished. Eighteen days after the battle 12,500 men, almost all English, were still absent, the greater part of them marauding in the mountains."

On the other hand, the system of war adopted by Wellington would not admit of an operation so bold as the invasion of France, till the affairs of Germany should be more settled. An armistice had just been concluded, and it was by no means impossible that it might be followed by a peace, to which England would not adhere; in which case the Emperor would be able to direct the whole of his forces against the army of the Peninsula. It was judicious, therefore, to establish the English army firmly in the Pyrenees, and to ensure to it a good harbour. For what in truth would have been the situation of Wellington beyond the frontier, had the king retired by Jacca upon Suchet's army, and Foy and Clausel carried off the trophies of Vittoria, guarded by a single English division only? We shall see by and by, that, with all his sagacity, Wellington must have been beaten, either if the Duke of Albufera and Clausel had fallen in concert upon his right flank, while Soult attacked him in front, or if, on invading France, in June or July, he had encountered, not Soult with the wreck of Joseph's army, but perhaps the Emperor himself with the army of Bautzen. This consideration alone was sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the Duke's

slowness after the battle of the 22nd. Besides, he had not counted upon advancing so far; it was the French who, by their blunders, tempted him on,—his preparations were made only with a view to the siege of Burgos.

In order to secure a new base, Wellington resolved to make himself master of St. Sebastian; and with a view to secure his right flank, he sent O'Donnel with a corps of Spanish and Portuguese troops to blockade Pampeluna. The partisan corps, not engaged in that service, were placed in observation to cover the blockade, and to hinder the junction of the Duke of Albufera with Clausel at Saragossa. Finally, Sir John Murray was directed to keep Suchet employed in Catalonia.

On the 21st of May, Murray had quitted Alicant to lay siege to Tarragona; but, whether through weakness or incapacity, he had abandoned his siege equipment on the approach of Suchet's army, and re-embarked his troops on the 12th of June in the greatest confusion. General Copons was left, by this retreat, in a very uncomfortable situation. Lord William Bentinck, however, who succeeded to the command of the Anglo-Sicilian army, exhibited, if not greater intelligence, at all events more resolution and energy. He invested Tortosa; forced the Duke of Albufera to destroy the works of Tarragona, and succeeded in keeping the army of Arragon at a distance from Navarre. Before his arrival, the Duke del Parque, contrary to Wellington's orders, had made an offensive movement in concert with Elio; and on the 9th of June, 1813, had been defeated by General Harispe at Alcira, upon the Xucar. Suchet would have completed this success, had not the news of the battle of Vittoria arrived to derange his plans. He abandoned Valencia on the 5th of July, and marched

with 20,000 excellent troops to form a junction with Clausel at Saragossa. Before reaching that town, however, he ascertained that Clausel had removed unnecessarily to Jacca, and that Mina's partisans were besieging the castle of Saragossa. Instead of relieving the place at once, and making a demonstration upon Wellington's right flank, Suchet, on the 12th of July, concentrated all his forces between Caspe and Tortosa—a serious error, of which the consequences soon made themselves felt. The castle surrendered on the 30th and the fort of Daroca on the 11th of the following month. From that moment it became necessary to abandon the project of forming a junction with Clausel, with all the hopes which were excited by it. The army of Arragon crossed the Ebro on the 14th and 15th at Tortosa, and proceeded to establish itself in the neighbourhood of Tarragona. "It is astonishing," says Napier, "that a general of Suchet's high reputation should have kept, under such critical circumstances, a force so imposing unemployed."

It is true that Suchet had more than 27,000 men shut up in the fortresses; but there still remained to him 32,000 disposable when the war in Navarre came to a close. If, then, in the end of July, he had marched upon that province by Arragon, the Anglo-Portuguese army would infallibly have been destroyed. Meanwhile the Allies were busily engaged transporting their military establishments and stores from Portugal to Bilbao, Santander, and Corunna. St. Sebastian was wanted to complete their line of dépôts, and this it was which induced Wellington to lay immediate siege to the town.

San Sebastian is built upon a peninsula at the foot of Mount Orgullo, on the summit of which stands the

castle of La Mota, serving the purpose of a citadel. On the north the town is covered by the Urumea, and on the south by the sea. The fortifications consist of a double enceinte, a covered way and glacis, except along the length of the peninsula, where there is but one enceinte, which is rendered inaccessible by the waters. On this side the escarp is exposed to the bottom, and is distinctly seen from a chain of rocks, situated on the right bank of the Urumea, at a distance of 600 or 700 yards. The defect of the ground in covering the enceinte on this side is the more inconvenient, that the Urumea becomes fordable during some hours every tide, and that the waters on retiring leave a considerable space dry on the left bank of the river, by which troops can advance to the assault. The garrison, consisting at first of about 2300 men, was raised on the 27th of June to 3000, by a detachment from Foy's division. It was without shelter for the sick, without stores, without wood for palisading, without drinkable water. The aqueduct which used to feed the public reservoirs had been cut the first day by the Allies, and the wells which ought to have supplied it were choked up, or produced only brackish water. The greatest confusion prevailed in the place, and so many fugitives had taken shelter there, that the Governor General Rey was obliged to expel all useless *mouths*. The fortifications were in a bad state; the stores and matériel inadequate; the personnel also was insufficient, indeed there were but 100 artillery-men to serve 76 pieces of cannon. As some compensation, the inhabitants were well disposed, — "they showed themselves devotedly attached to the French." *

* Belmas.

The place was invested on the 28th from the land, by 7000 or 8000 Spaniards,. under Mendizabal, who were followed shortly afterwards by 10,000 Anglo-Portuguese, commanded by General Graham. At this moment the artillery intended for the siege was still on board of ship in the harbour of Passages. It consisted of 34 guns, furnished with between 500 and 1500 rounds per gun.

General Rey placed a battalion in the Convent of St. Bartholomew at the entrance of the Peninsula; forty men in the tête de pont of Santa Catalina and in the Convent of San Francisco on the right of the Urumea, and twenty-five men in the Island of Santa Clara, the chapel of which was converted into a block-house. On the 28th he caused the faubourgs of St. Martin and St. Catherine to be burned, for he had not time to destroy them. Finally, all disposable hands were set to work to strengthen the fortifications of the Castle of La Mota, and other points in the place.

At seven in the evening of the 29th, the besiegers made an unsuccessful attempt to storm the Convent of St. Bartholomew. On the 3rd of July, the English fleet established a blockade of the harbour; but it had not boats enough to prevent the light craft of San Jean de Luz, from frequently entering the place under cover of night. On the 7th the Spaniards opened a battery, which fired red-hot shot without effect at the Convent of St. Bartholomew. The arrival of Graham's troops enabled them, on the 9th, to draw closer the lines of investment. Whereupon, Wellington quitted Ernani, to reconnoitre the place and make choice of a front of attack. He adopted, under the advice of Major Smith, the plan followed by Marshal Berwick in the siege of

SIEGE OF St SEBASTIAN.

1719, which was based upon the possibility of approaching at low water the north-east side of the enceinte, and of breaching the escarp from a chain of heights situated on the right bank of the Urumea. Napier considers this plan to be extremely defective. He is certain that a regular attack along the Peninsula would have effected the desired object more surely; but, we cannot too often repeat that, the English engineers did not possess the means of taking a town according to Vauban's method. They were therefore absolutely compelled to commit much to hazard, and to prefer prompt attacks, always murderous, to methodical approaches, which are practicable only with a sufficient supply of matériel and personnel at command.

As soon as the English developed their plan, the garrison threw up a retrenchment behind the wall, and opened loop-holes in all the houses commanding a view of the site of the anticipated breach. On the 14th, Wellington returned to Ernani, having entrusted the direction of the siege to Graham, who, the same day, by a well-sustained fire, succeeded in breaching the Convent of St. Bartholomew. At one o'clock next day, three columns endeavoured to carry the Convent, as well as the small posts which supported it; but being received with great determination, they were driven back. A sortie from the garrison completed this check, which cost the Allies upwards of 150 men. On the 16th the attacking batteries succeeded in setting fire to the Convent, and the fire burned so rapidly, that by evening scarcely half of the building remained, which the garrison was on the very point of abandoning.

A new attempt was made on the 17th by three columns, under the command of Generals Oswald, Hay,

and Bradford. The right column attacked the lunette of the cemetery; that of the centre the Convent, and that of the left the small loop-holed houses. The French offered a vigorous resistance, but were obliged to retreat without having been able to explode the mines which they had prepared under the Convent walls. The struggle lasted four hours, and was supported on both sides by the fire of sixty pieces of cannon.

After carrying St. Bartholomew, Graham opened fire upon the land front of the place, without, however, discontinuing his main attack, which was on the right bank of the Urumea.

In the morning of the 20th, thirty pieces opened their fire upon the uncovered wall, and next day the place was summoned; but, faithful to his duty, the governor firmly rejected all proposals.

By the evening of the 22nd the wall was breached and thrown down to the extent of fifty or sixty yards. Meanwhile Wellington had returned from Ernani, and visited the works in detail; and by his orders a new breach, to the extent of ten or twelve yards, was opened on the 23rd, between the tower of Los Hornos and the bastion of St. Elmo. Almost at the same instant the loop-holed houses in rear of the great breach took fire. As there was very little water in the place, the fire spread rapidly. It was a distressing occurrence for the defenders, who had calculated upon occupying these houses during the assault.

Meanwhile the English engineers had taken advantage of an aqueduct to run a mine under the terre pleine of the covered way. This mine was exploded early in the morning of the 25th, and threw down the counterscarp into the ditch. Immediately the English columns de-

bouched from the parallel and advanced briskly to attack the breaches. It was necessary, in order to reach them, to cross a space of more than 210 yards in extent, intersected by pools of water, and strewn with rocks, covered by seaweed, which rendered them extremely slippery. The men, too, were obliged to pass along the faussebraie of the left shoulder of the hornwork, from which they were exposed to a perfect storm of projectiles.

The French permitted the column, about 2000 men, to advance till it had reached the foot of the breach, when, at a signal given, they poured upon its front and flanks an enormous quantity of shells, rockets, and grenades, which told with murderous effect, in combination with the case-shot which was vomited from a bastion, two towers, and a cavalier. Surprised and crushed by that storm, the column *halted*, straggled, and got confused. The bravest men mounted the breach, where they died; the others hesitated and fled. So great became now the confusion, that Graham found it impossible to push on the columns which he held in reserve. The dead, the dying, the wounded, and the fugitives, fell huddled together over the slippery rocks which the sea had scarcely left. A great many English threw themselves into the pools, in order to escape the iron shower, and thus found the death which they sought to avoid. At last Graham, having lost the *élite* of his troops, determined on beating a retreat, and the carnage ceased.

And now scenes of destruction gave place to a new spectacle, as touching as it was admirable. The soldiers of the garrison threw themselves eagerly down the breaches and the faussebraie, to carry succour to the wounded. Friends and enemies were equally accosted and relieved. These very English, whom but a

few instants previously they had driven back with all the intrepidity of despair, were now attended to by their victors with the solicitude which men display towards their companions in arms. They exerted themselves to withdraw them from among the dead; their wounds were first tied up, and then, by a singular coincidence, they were carried in by the very ladders which they had prepared for the assault of the place. General Rey, from the breach, directed and encouraged this burst of humanity; while the English general, with many of his officers, placing themselves upon a shoulder of the trench, loudly expressed their surprise and admiration at such conduct.

This affair cost the English 400 wounded, and 100 killed; among whom was the chief engineer, Colonel Fletcher. The French lost but 18 killed, and 49 wounded. General Rey granted to the assailants an armistice of some hours to remove their wounded and bury their dead, whom the advancing sea would have swept away.

Napier attributes Graham's repulse to the faulty dispositions made for the attack. "Neither Wellington's instructions," he says, "nor Major Smith's plan were followed. The execution was wanting in vigour and consistency, the arrangement in intelligence. The officers of engineers exposed themselves to be killed; but not a single general nor any officer of the staff quitted the trenches to put himself at the head of the columns. Besides, the greater number of them condemned the irregular mode of attack which had been adopted, and this opinion, well known to the soldiers, exercised considerable influence upon their morale."

Lord Wellington arrived from Lazaca at two in the

morning of the 26th. He would have ordered a fresh assault, but that the want of ammunition compelled him to wait for a fresh supply of powder and of artillery, which he had applied for to the English Government a month previously; and that the French army of the Pyrenees, under its new leader, after executing various movements which shall be described by and by, had driven away the army of observation, and was in full march towards St. Jean-Pied-de-Port. This news obliged Wellington to convert the siege at once into a blockade, in order that he might have at his disposal a part of Graham's force.

The besieged took advantage of this delay to extinguish the fire which had broken out in the town; to improve the defences of the breach and of the ramparts contiguous to it; to repair their matériel, and to construct barricades. With the exception of a sortie, which resulted in the capture of 189 men of the Allies, and the destruction of a part of the advanced works, nothing worthy of note occurred during three weeks. Only from time to time there arrived light vessels from San Jean de Luz, which brought to the besieged tools, provisions, and reinforcements.

On the 15th of August, Napoleon's birthday was celebrated in the place with extraordinary *éclat*. Throughout the whole of the day, the sound of bells was mixed with the joyous shouts of the garrison, and at night the Castle was illuminated. There could be seen from the camp of the Allies, glittering above the ramparts in huge flaming letters, the words, "Vive l'Empereur!" Graham thought the moment favourable for attempting a surprise, but it totally failed.

CHAP. III.

SOULT IS APPOINTED TO COMMAND THE ARMY IN SPAIN. — HIS ACTIVITY. — HIS MOVEMENT TO RELIEVE PAMPELUNA AND ST. SEBASTIAN. — COMBATS OF RONCESVALLES AND MAYA. — BATTLE OF SAUROREN. — RETREAT OF SOULT. — WELLINGTON DEFERS THE INVASION OF FRANCE TILL NEXT SPRING. — SOULT AGAIN ON THE OFFENSIVE. — ATTACK OF SAN MARTIAL. — ITS FAILURE. — CAPTURE OF ST. SEBASTIAN. — PASSAGE OF THE BIDASSOA. — PREPARATIONS TO PENETRATE INTO FRANCE. — GENERAL STATE OF THE PENINSULA.

NAPOLEON, as soon as he became acquainted with the fresh disaster at Vittoria, deprived Joseph and Jourdan of their functions, and appointed Soult Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Peninsula.* The Duke of Dalmatia arrived at his post on the 13th of July, and ten days afterwards published an elaborate order, in which the king is described as an incapable general, and his retreat as a disgraceful flight. By this time Paris's division was at Jacca, and Clausel had rejoined Soult. The force immediately opposed to Wellington, therefore, consisted of nine divisions of infantry with a reserve, and two divisions of cavalry, in all of about 77,500 men, of whom 7000 were cavalry. There were attached to it eighty-five pieces of cannon; but the adminis-

* M. Thibaudeau states, that Napoleon provided against the chance of Joseph's refusal to obey, by giving instructions to the Arch-Chancellor, the Ministers of War and Police, to secure him by force. M. Thiers confirms this testimony, and adds, that Joseph was advised to remove to Montfontaine, and to live there like a private person.

Mr. SOULT.

trative staff of that army was disorganised, its morale was weakened, and its discipline relaxed. Scarcely had Soult arrived, however, ere he gave to it a vigorous impulse, and succeeded so far as to inspire it with a certain amount of confidence in the success of his operations. Never in his long and brilliant career did he exhibit greater talent, determination, and patriotism.

The Duke of Dalmatia could have wished to have had before him some weeks, in which completely to establish order, make good his matériel, and secure his base of operations. But the Emperor required that he should act immediately on the offensive. All things were, therefore, got ready to commence a general movement in the course of the 16th of July.

Clausel, who commanded the left wing, was posted at St. Jean-Pied-de-Port. Drouet, with the centre, occupied the heights near Espelette and Ainhoe. Reille, with the left wing, held the mountains which overhang Vera. Lastly, the reserve, under the orders of Villatte, guarded the Bidassoa from the sea, as far as Irun.

The allied army appointed to cover the blockade of Pampeluna and the siege of St. Sebastian, occupied the gorges of mountains to an extent of twenty leagues. The ground was so unfavourable, that there could not be found in rear of the gorges a single central position capable of being defended by a strong body of troops. The communications between the English divisions were besides remote and difficult; whereas those between the French corps, running along the front of the passes, were rapid and easy.

Byng's brigade and Morillo's Spanish division formed the extreme right of the Allies, and held the pass of

Roncesvalles. Cole's division was stationed at Biscaret, to support these troops, and Picton's division was in reserve at Olaque. Sir Rowland Hill occupied the valley of Bastan, having Walker's brigade of the second division, and the light companies of Pringles in the Puerto de Maya. The rest of the second division (Stewart's) was in reserve in the valley; Sylviera's Portuguese division, also forming part of Hill's corps, was posted at a distance of five leagues on the left of Roncesvalles. Campbell's Portuguese brigade was detached at Los Alduides, a post situated in the French territory. The light division (Alten's) and the seventh division (Dalhousie's) occupied Vera, and the heights of Santa Barbara, situated upon the right of that town, as well as the Puerto del Echallar. Lastly, the sixth division (Packenham's) was in reserve at San Esteban. Longa's troops, established at Vera, communicated by their right with the Spanish division of Giron, encamped upon the great road, and by their left with Graham's corps, which was occupied with the siege of St. Sebastian.

After having attentively examined the position of the Allies, Marshal Soult determined to operate by his left for the relief of Pampeluna, and then to move along the Irurzun road, so as to fall *en masse* upon the divisions of the centre while they were descending the mountains; or else to menace the rear of the army engaged in the siege of St. Sebastian, while a corps of observation, pushing across the lower Bidassoa, should attack it in front. "This manœuvre was intended to result in raising the siege of St. Sebastian, the blockade of Pampeluna, and probably that of Santona. The French army, concentrated in a rich country, and having its com-

munications with Suchet secured, might then take part in the operations of that marshal, or follow up its own."*

Wellington had at this time under his command 57,566 Anglo-Portuguese, and 25,000 Spanish regulars, present under arms. The partisans occupied the country about Saragossa and Daroca. Had Suchet come up at such a moment, the chances would have been against the Allies, but he was quietly effecting his retreat into Catalonia. The consequence was, that Soult found himself obliged to assume the offensive against an enemy stronger than himself, who had made excellent arrangements to receive him. He made his first effort to deceive the Allies, by effecting some demonstrations on their right. These Wellington regarded as a feint, because he believed that the real object of the enemy would be to raise the siege of St. Sebastian. The marshal determined to take advantage of this error, by forcing the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya; and in all probability he would have succeeded had Reille and the Count d'Erlon followed his instructions more vigorously; and, above all, if a thick fog, always dangerous in mountain countries, had not for some days prevented the advance of his troops. On the morning of the 25th, however, Soult, putting himself at the head of Reille's and Clausel's divisions, *turned* Cole's position at Roncesvalles, and compelled him to retire to *Zubiri*. In the afternoon of the same day, Count d'Erlon forced Hill's troops to abandon Puerto de Maya at the mouth of the valley of the Bastan, and to fall back in the direction of Irurita. At this latter point the struggle was very fierce; it cost the English general 2000 men, and four pieces of cannon.

* Napier.

Following up his first success, Marshal Soult moved upon Pampeluna, by a road which commanded all its strong defensive positions. The town was at that time blockaded by 11,000 men, under the command of O'Donnel, who, in the course of the 26th, were joined by Cole's and Picton's troops, which had been so fortunate as to escape from the French.

Wellington received intelligence of these events in the night between the 25th and 26th. He gave immediate orders to concentrate his army upon the right, so as to maintain the blockade of Pampeluna, without, however, abandoning the works at St. Sebastian. All his disposable force was in fact directed towards Pampeluna, and that no mistake might arise, the valley of Lanz was specified as the line of general movement.

The situation of the Allies was at this moment perilous in the extreme.

Accompanied by a single officer of his staff, Lord Fitzroy Somerset, Wellington arrived on the 27th at Sauroren. As he entered the village, he observed Clausel's division advancing along the brow of the hill from Zabaldica. Satisfied from what he saw that the allied troops were cut off from the valley of Lanz, he alighted from his horse, and wrote upon the parapet of the bridge of Sauroren new instructions for all the corps then entangled in the defiles to turn to their right. After this, without losing a moment, he galloped alone across the mountain to rejoin his troops. One of the Portuguese battalions, recognising the commander-in-chief, raised a cry of joy. These acclamations, repeated from regiment to regiment, were carried along the whole line, and soon became that terrible shout which the English are accustomed to raise before charging, and which no

enemy has ever yet heard without emotion. Lord Wellington halted upon a high ground, desirous that both armies should be aware of his arrival, and saw from that point Soult so near to him that he was perfectly able to distinguish his features. "The English general," says Napier, "fixed his eyes attentively upon his illustrious enemy, and said, as if speaking to himself, 'We have a great general before us, but he is as cautious as he is able, and will certainly defer his attack till he ascertains the reason of these shouts. This delay will give time for the sixth division to come up, and the chances will be in my favour.'"

Everything fell out as he had anticipated. On the morning of the 28th, when the Duke of Dalmatia gave orders for the attack, the sixth division had arrived and Hill was in communication with its left. On the previous evening Soult had endeavoured, without success, to carry an important height, occupied by the Spaniards, in advance of the centre of the enemy's line. He would have given battle that day, had he not been in expectation of D'Erlon's division, which still remained in observation near Elizondo. This division was still absent on the 28th, and as Wellington was receiving constant reinforcements, it became necessary to act with promptitude, either by giving battle, or by retiring. Soult wisely determined that the former was the only course to be taken. He therefore gave orders to attack the English, whose position was strong and well occupied. Clausel rapidly turned their left, and endeavoured to surround it, but was himself surrounded in his turn, and compelled to retire; in fact, the movement had been made too soon, nor was there any consistency in the general operations. Nevertheless,

the French boldly clambered up the steep rocks, behind which the Allies were posted, and made some magnificent charges which struck their adversaries with astonishment. But these heroic efforts availed nothing against the unconquerable obstinacy of the English troops. "All my regiments," says Wellington, "charged with the bayonet, several of them on four different occasions. Two of them lost in three charges, at the decisive moment of the battle, more than half their numbers."

This battle, which the Duke describes as "bludgeon-work," was fought on the anniversary of Talavera, and was called after the name of a village near the scene of action, the battle of Sauroren. There were engaged on the side of the French, towards the end of the affair, 20,000 men, on that of the Allies, 16,000 only. The former lost 1800 killed and wounded; the latter, 2600.

The two armies faced each other during the 29th, without firing a shot. Towards the close of that day the Allies, who on the previous evening mustered only 16,000 men, had 30,000 in line, and fresh troops were continually arriving. From that moment, Wellington ceased to be in danger. This circumstance, and the fear that provisions might fail him, induced Soult to retire. Nevertheless, the French army, which received a reinforcement of nearly 18,000 men, under Count d'Erlon, had something else to do than merely retrace its steps. While he disengaged his troops, Soult proposed to employ them in raising the siege of St. Sebastian. To accomplish this, it was necessary to defeat Hill, and to gain the road from Irurzun to St. Sebastian, which passes through Tolosa; or else if this should prove impossible, to make use of the concentration of his whole army, and to give to his retreat the appearance of an

offensive movement. It was an able but perilous operation, inasmuch as it forced the Duke of Dalmatia to offer his flank to the Allies.

With his usual sagacity, Wellington penetrated the marshal's design. He directed Sir Rowland Hill, in consequence, to turn the enemy's right; but Clausel, who commanded in that direction, attacked Sir Rowland at Buenza, dislodged him from his position, and gained the rear of his left flank. This success secured to the Duke of Dalmatia a new line of retreat, more rapid communication with Villatte by the defile of Donna Maria, and the free use of the great road from Irurzun to Tolosa, from which he was distant a league and a half.

Wellington discovered at once the weak point in this operation, and took effectual measures to interrupt it. He sent Picton into the valley of Zubiri to turn the French left by the road of Roncesvalles, while the 7th division should carry a height which covered their right. Cole received orders to attack them in front as soon as the effects of these flank movements should begin to make themselves felt, while the 6th division, reinforced by Byng's brigade, one battery, and some squadrons, was directed to attack Sauroren.

These various dispositions, ably and vigorously executed, obliged Soult to abandon a position which Wellington describes as one of the strongest he had ever seen.

In consequence of this retrograde movement, General Foy's division, 8000 strong, found itself separated from the rest of the army. This reduced Soult's force to 35,000 combatants, of whom 15,000, under Reille and Clausel, were extremely discouraged by the check which they had received. His situation was thus becoming exceedingly critical, for Hill's corps, increased by the

junction of Morillo and Campbell to 15,000 men, was in his front, and 30,000 men were in his rear. Indeed, the only means of disengaging himself which remained, was to retreat upon San-Esteban by the gorge of Donna Maria, a difficult operation, which, in the event of failure, might involve him in a terrible catastrophe.

Conceiving that this movement would afford him a chance of cutting off the line of Soult's retreat, Wellington directed a manœuvre, the success of which was such, that on the 31st he occupied, unknown to the enemy, the mountains which cross the road from Elizondo to San-Esteban. The French army found itself, near this latter point, crowded into a narrow and deep valley, and on the eve of being surrounded by a superior force. A few hours more and the Allies would have achieved a decisive result. Unfortunately for them, however, three English marauders spoilt the whole arrangement by their imprudence. Nevertheless, the retreat of the French army was conducted from that moment over rough and broken roads with more or less of disorder and precipitation. A great portion of its baggage fell into the hands of the Allies, and the artillery could not have been saved, had not Soult, after the battle of the 28th, taken the precaution to send away almost the whole of his guns by Roncesvalles, to St. Jean-Pied-de-Port.

After detaching two divisions and Hill's corps to reoccupy the defiles of Roncesvalles, the Aldudes, and the hill of Maya, Wellington, with the rest of his troops, drove back General Clausel on the 2nd of August from the positions of Echallar and Ivantelli. The same day Wellington narrowly escaped being taken by a French detachment which surprised him at a moment when he was examining his maps.

After these various combats, in one of which Barnes's brigade, 1500 English, drove from a formidable post 6000 French (exhausted with fatigue, no doubt, and ill supplied with ammunition), the allied army abandoned the pursuit.

In the opinion of French authors, and among them we may quote General Vaudoncourt, who is, however, too severe upon Soult, Lord Wellington exhibited in this first phase of the war of the Pyrenees more of vigour and talent than his illustrious adversary. The result, moreover, exceeded all expectation, for after ten battles, fought in nine days, the allied army succeeded in maintaining its position in a country which appeared in all respects favourable to the assailants. The total loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners amounted on the side of the Allies to 7300 officers and men, and on the side of the French to upwards of 13,000.

It was at this epoch that the Duke de Berry wrote to Wellington, urging him to penetrate into France, and offering him the support of 20,000 partisans who, according to the statement of his royal highness, were already armed and organised. On the 8th of August Wellington sent a copy of that letter to Lord Bathurst, and explained to him the many reasons which induced him not immediately to invade the French territory. They were the same which had determined him to halt after gaining the battle of Vittoria.

The Cabinet of London and the allied sovereigns did not approve of these reasons. But Wellington persevered in them, and did well, because the armistice in Germany continued, and the negotiations of Prague had brought to light a want of good understanding which might operate to the prejudice of the Allies. "There appears,"

writes Wellington to Lord Bathurst, "no concert or common cause in the negotiations for peace, and as for the operations of the war, there may be something better, as Lord Cathcart has not gone into detail at all; but there does not appear to exist anything in writing, or anywhere excepting in loose conversations among princes. For my part, I would not march even a corporal's guard upon such a system." Wellington was above all apprehensive lest Napoleon should make to Austria, Russia, and Prussia concessions which would induce these states to conclude a peace from which England and the Peninsula would be excluded. In this case Marshal Soult might be re-inforced by all the detachments disposable from Germany, and would acquire thereby great superiority in numbers. Besides, the allied army, so long as the enemy should have its pivot at St. Jean-Pied-de-Port, could not advance into France without exposing its right flank and losing its communications with the coast of Spain, which were threatened by the French garrisons of places commanding the great roads. Moreover, the Anglo-Portuguese army was in want of light troops and stores, and stood in need of a little repose, before assuming the offensive. These reasons fully justified Wellington's determination to remain on the Spanish territory; nevertheless, there were those who still urged him to go on. "Some even here," he writes, "expect that we shall be at Paris in a month * * * but observe that this new operation is the invasion of France, in which country everybody is a soldier, where the whole population is armed and organised under persons not as in other countries inexperienced in arms, but men who in the course of the last twenty-five years, in which France has been engaged in war with all Europe, must, the majority of them at least, have served

somewhere. I entertain no doubt that I could to-morrow enter France and establish the army upon the Adour, but I could go no farther certainly. If peace should be made by the powers of the North, I must necessarily retire into Spain." This is the language of reason and good sense. The single blame which can be attached to Wellington is that he did not complete the success of his able manœuvres by continuing the pursuit of Soult after the affair of the 2nd. In the state of disorder into which the French army had fallen, it would probably have been destroyed, or if the Duke of Dalmatia had succeeded in rejoining his reserves,—his cavalry and artillery,—Wellington on his part would have been re-enforced by Graham, and must have found himself upon the whole in a better condition than his enemy.

While Soult was restoring order to his troops, putting in a state of defence St. Jean-Pied-de-Port, Navarreins, and Bayonne, while he was fortifying his line of defence from the mouth of the Bidassoa as far as the Nive, Suchet, kept employed by Lord William Bentinck, had lost the means of communicating with the Duke of Dalmatia otherwise than through France. Wellington determined to avail himself of the opportunity of renewing the siege of St. Sebastian, which had been interrupted since the 28th of July. On the 6th of August the siege train was landed, and immediately afterwards the works of attack were resumed. But the stores and ammunition which for some months past had been expected from England, had not yet arrived. It followed that for several days, the attack was so little vigorous that the garrison found itself able to repair the works of the place, and construct new defences. On the other hand,

the want of an adequate naval force permitted St. Sebastian to keep up constant intercourse with St. Jean de Luz and Bayonne, and deprived Wellington of the advantage of attacking the town simultaneously by land and sea. This absence of naval protection occasioned also the loss of many transports laden with provisions and clothing for the troops; indeed the coasts were so insecure, that it was found necessary, for lack of convoy, to keep their stores and provisions in harbour. Finally, the Spanish authorities, as if to aggravate the state of things, refused to furnish carts for the transport of siege materials. "Never since Great Britain became a maritime power," says Wellington, "has an English army been left in such a plight amidst circumstances so important."

On the 18th a convoy of siege artillery arrived, which raised the number of pieces to 117. But, by a new act of negligence on the part of the Government, the guns quitted the English harbours supplied with shot enough for barely one day's consumption. Between the 22nd and 24th the old batteries were re-armed, and new ones constructed upon the height of St. Bartholomew, in order to breach the demi-bastion on the left of the hornwork. The garrison amounted at this time to 2619 effective men; the number of pieces in battery were sixty-seven, of which four were mortars, and three howitzers. On the 26th, sixty-three pieces of cannon opened fire at once upon St. Sebastian. Those from St. Bartholomew produced little effect, because of their distance; but, on the other hand, the rest soon produced large gaps in the towers of Los Hornos and Las Mezquitas on the left face of the bastion St. Jacques and in the head of the upper curtain. The artillery of the place was in a great

measure damaged, and the town took fire again in many quarters.

On the 26th, Wellington arrived, and caused the little island of Santa Clara, by which alone the place could communicate with the sea, to be stormed by 200 men. On the 30th, almost all the artillery of the defence was destroyed, and the town resembled at that moment a heap of ruins. The right face of the demi bastion on the left of the hornwork was open along half of its extent. The two old breaches were beaten into one, and still further enlarged by all the space covered by the bastion St. Jacques, of which the parapet was completely destroyed; the portion of the curtain situated in rear of the hornwork was likewise demolished. This mass of ruins presented a front of 255 yards, which the garrison vainly endeavoured to retrench.

On the 31st, at two in the morning, the English exploded three mines, in order to uncover the wall of the quay and form a ramp by which they might descend into the ditch. Thenceforth the assault might be given with considerable chance of success. Between ten and eleven o'clock, the columns debouched from the trenches, neglecting the hornwork, which was a great mistake. They then moved towards the breaches of the bastion St. Jacques and the great curtain, in order to turn the interior retrenchment and the traverses which the French had thrown up within the town.

The governor, who had foreseen this attack, was perfectly prepared to receive it. He exploded two mines, which destroyed in the very heart of the column a portion of the wall of the quay, and at the same instant unmasked several pieces, of the existence of which the Allies were ignorant. The defenders of the demi

bastion on the left of the hornwork rushed towards the shoulder and the faussebraie, where they took the assailing column in reverse. Then began a frightful slaughter. "Three columns," says Belmas, "were destroyed in succession, and their dead choked up that narrow passage."

Meanwhile 500 Portuguese forded the Urumea near its mouth, for the purpose of assaulting unnoticed the breach which had been effected between the tower of Los Hornos and St. Elmo bastion. But this enterprise failed, and occasioned considerable loss to the besiegers.

The struggle at the great breach was obstinate in the extreme. It lasted three hours; four assaults had been repulsed, and the Allies were beginning to despair of success, when Sir Thomas Graham determined to make a last effort. He turned the fire of all his batteries upon the top of the ramparts, and formed his troops in column for a fresh assault. After a cannonade of twenty minutes, a shell set fire to a mass of hollow shot and cartridges which had been heaped up in rear of the breach, and which by their explosion placed *hors de combat* a large number of the defenders. That explosion produced a momentary panic, of which Graham took advantage to launch his columns against the breaches. After a brief resistance, the governor gave orders to retreat, not being now in sufficient force to defend the town from street to street. Nevertheless, the garrison halted for some time behind its barricades at the foot of the redoubt Orgullo, to give time for its outposts to come in.

The loss sustained by the Allies on that bloody day, amounted, according to Graham's calculation, to 2573 killed and wounded. Among the number of the former was Colonel Fletcher. In the number of the latter were

Generals Leith, Oswald, and Robinson. On the side of the French there were about 250 men killed, and 270 taken prisoners. At the moment when the place fell, the garrison did not exceed 1280 men, and it had 400 prisoners and 366 wounded to guard.

The castle on Mount Orgullo was small, and its casemates scarcely sufficed to give cover to the ammunition and provisions. There were but ten serviceable pieces of cannon, of which three looked in the direction of the sea. Water was wanting, and the troops were obliged to sleep upon the bare rock, exposed to the fire of the besiegers, or protected only by the inequalities of the ground. Yet the brave Rey endeavoured to defend himself in that redoubt, which however soon became uninhabitable.

Between these two episodes however,—the capture of the town and the surrender of the castle,—events occurred of which it is lamentable to speak. No sooner had the leading column penetrated into St. Sebastian than the English soldiers, maddened by the murderous combat, rushed upon everything which came in their way, destroying, plundering, burning, and revelling in crime with a barbarism which has never been equalled. The companions of Attila could not have committed greater atrocities. The officers who endeavoured to put a stop to these *frightful* scenes were insulted, pursued, and some of them even killed by their own men. Nor was the rage of the plunderers satiated till the whole town was reduced to ashes.

Meanwhile the officers of engineers and artillery took all the necessary steps to reduce the castle. On the 1st of September they opened upon Mount *Orgullo* a tremendous fire, to which the garrison could make no reply.

Shells and rockets, poured upon the terre pleine of the work, wrought unspeakable mischief to the defenders, who had no means whatever of covering themselves from its violence. During the night between the 2nd and 3rd, General Rey was summoned to surrender, but he refused. Three new batteries were immediately begun, and at nine in the morning of the 8th they opened their fire. At last, seeing his troops overwhelmed by fifty-nine pieces of cannon, his defences ruined, his artillery disabled, and all his officers of engineers, except one*, killed or wounded, his bakehouse knocked down, a powder magazine destroyed, the town in ashes, the garrison exhausted, the interior of the castle crowded with dead and wounded, — the intrepid governor, despairing of being able to hold out much longer, called a council of war to deliberate about the measures which should be taken. The council unanimously recommended a capitulation. The white flag was in consequence hung out at the very moment when the Allies were preparing to deliver the assault. Sir Thomas Graham, astonished at so much heroism, embraced the officer who came to treat with him about a capitulation, and said to him with great emotion, "Sir, when people defend themselves as your troops have done, they are not conquered, they have a right to dictate their own terms; write what you will." Colonel Songeon, such was the name of the negotiator, asked for the honours of war and the removal of the wounded to France, which were granted to him without a remark.

The garrison marched out with arms and baggage.

* Lieutenant Goblet, now Inspector-General of Fortifications in Belgium.

"At their head," says an eye-witness, "advanced the gallant General Rey, sword in hand, and with a firm step. As a mark of respect, we saluted him when he passed. The old general dropped his sword in reply to the civility of the English officers, and led the remains of his battalions to the glacis, where they laid down their arms with the proud air of men who had nobly done their duty."

The siege had lasted seventy-three days, thirty-six of which were with open trenches, and thirty-seven with a breach. Nine assaults had been delivered, six upon the body of the place. Two honourable capitulations had been rejected, and the garrison was reduced to two thirds of its numbers. Jones calculates the loss of the English at 3810 men; but General Graham, in his report of the 1st of September, admits that he lost between the 21st of June and the 1st of September 5069 men.

The siege of St. Sebastian is more remarkable for the defence than for the attack. The English engineers had very inaccurately calculated the resources of the place, and committed some grave mistakes in pushing forward their works. On the other hand, the commander-in-chief was to blame for giving the assault before the breaches were practicable. But the most serious reproaches ought to be cast upon the English Government and upon the Admiralty, which left Wellington without ammunition, without equipments, without matériel, and neglected to the last to supply him with a naval force adequate to maintain the blockade of the town and the security of the coast.

The plunder and destruction of St. Sebastian were blazened abroad at Cadiz by the faction which was

hostile to England. The journals of that party accused Wellington of having set fire to the town and encouraged the massacre of the inhabitants. The same charge was reproduced by the junta of St. Sebastian, which in its manifesto of the 16th of January, 1814, dared to assert, "that the English had replied by volleys of musketry to the friendly demonstrations of the inhabitants; that the fire did not break out at the entrance of the town till after the retreat of the French; that these excesses appeared to be authorised by the chiefs, and that the goods stolen in the town were publicly sold in the neighbourhood of head-quarters; that when the plundering was over, the English and Portuguese, finding that the flames did not make sufficient progress, threw a quantity of fireworks into the houses, in consequence of which the fire spread with frightful rapidity," &c.

The Spanish minister of war received these disgraceful calumnies without checking them, and reproduced them in a pamphlet which the English general considered himself bound to refute. In a letter addressed to his brother Henry, Wellington proved that the town was set fire to by the French on the 22nd, with a view to render the rear of the breaches defensible; that on the 30th the fire had greatly increased; that the besieged had thrown up in the streets barricades composed of combustible materials, to which they set fire, and that many of the barricades exploded during the combat which followed the capture of the ramparts; that the English army had been the first to suffer by that fire; and that, for himself personally, he had done all that he could to extinguish it; that so far from being hostile to the inhabitants, he had, out of pity to them, refused to bombard the town, as, under similar circumstances,

he had refused to bombard Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos; finally, that it was neither in his power nor in the power of the officers to prevent plunder and massacres. "All the soldiers guilty of these excesses," he says, "were punished; and it is disgraceful to attack with infamous libels brave and honourable men, who are incapable of burning a town to gratify either commercial rivalry or any other kind of rivalry."

The movement of Marshal Soult upon Pampeluna had interrupted the siege of St. Sebastian; but apart from that success, the operation had served only to demonstrate the superiority of the Allies. Despairing of being able to drive Wellington from his positions with his own means only, yet anxious to strike a great blow by other combinations, the Duke of Dalmatia had proposed to Marshal Suchet to move upon the right flank of the Allies, with the army of Aragon, and the disposable troops of the army of Catalonia. The minister of war approved of this suggestion, as is shown by his letter of the 13th of August, in which he urges Marshal Suchet to make every effort to defeat the army which was opposed to him, and then to see whether the army of Aragon might not be able to attempt a diversion in favour of the Duke of Dalmatia's operations. The minister added, "that it was for him (Suchet) to judge upon the spot whether this were practicable, and above all, whether it would conduce to the service of the Emperor."

The marshal had formed the blockade of Tarragona, and driven back the Anglo-Spaniards into the defiles of the Hospitalet. Instead of profiting by that favourable occurrence, and the junction of the army of Aragon with that of Catalonia, to effect the proposed movement,

Suchet maintained that the movement would involve the loss of his army, which was too feeble to venture upon any such enterprise. The reasons which he gave to the minister of war and to Marshal Soult were clearly inaccurate, because he stated that, in the event of an attack, the armies of Aragon and Catalonia would not be able to assemble more than from 16,000 to 17,000 men, whereas from his memoirs it appears that after the junction of these two armies in November, 1813, they presented a total of 32,518 men, and 3287 horse, disposable for active operations. Besides, Suchet advanced a statement which he knew to be incorrect, when he wrote that if 11,000 men (read 18,427 men and 2411 horse) were to attempt a movement by Saragossa, they would inevitably suffer the fate of Baylen. Indeed, the marshal himself informs us in his memoirs, that, holding the line of the Llobregat, "he at once kept open his communications with Lerida and covered Barcelona,"—a sufficient guarantee against any misfortune similar to that which Dupont had suffered at Baylen.

It is worthy of remark, that the Duke of Albufera, while exaggerating the strength of the enemy, and underrating his own, in order to deceive Soult, never pretended to deny that the operation recommended by the latter was likely to produce a great effect. On the contrary, in a letter addressed to Soult on the 28th of October, 1813, he says in distinct terms, "I regret exceedingly that I am not able to put 40,000 men immediately in march; the movement would inevitably succeed, it would at once compel Wellington to quit that portion of our territory in which he is established." This letter proves two facts; first, that Suchet could have sent to Soult, if not 40,000, at all events 32,500 men,

and next that the minister at war had given to him a *carte blanche*. It therefore condemns the Duke of Albufera, and casts upon him the responsibility of the events which ensued.

As Marshal Suchet had received Marshal Soult's proposals so early as the 21st of August, he might have commenced his movement before the 25th, entered into line previous to the fall of St. Sebastian, and saved, in consequence, both that place and Pampeluna. Misled by the inaccuracy of his colleague's statements, the Duke of Dalmatia attributed his refusal to cooperate with him, to the inadequacy of the means which were at the disposal of the army of Aragon. He therefore proposed another arrangement, which consisted in joining his own troops to those of Aragon and Catalonia, at Tarbes and Pau, on *this side the* Pyrenees, so that they might penetrate together into Aragon by Oleron and Jacca, and then, heading Wellington, march upon Navarre.

Great difficulties would have attended this new combination, because the road from Oleron to Jacca was impracticable for artillery. Still it was by no means impossible to overcome such an obstacle, by means similar to those which had been employed in the passage of St. Bernard. And these means had the better chance of succeeding that the enemy, not anticipating so bold a movement had taken no steps to prevent it. Marshal Suchet declined this second proposal of Soult as he had done the first, but at length, on the 16th of September, after more than a month spent in tergiversation, he offered a counter project,—a sort of amalgamation of the other two, which consisted in his marching with 100 pieces of cannon to meet Soult, whose army, mean-

while leaving its own guns on the other side of the Pyrenees, should debouch from Jacca. In order to make his project feasible, the Duke of Albufera demanded that by the addition of recruits, his effective strength might be raised to 30,000 men.

Though this combination presented greater inconveniences than either of the others, it might still have led to good results had it been immediately carried into effect. Hence Marshal Soult, in an excellent spirit, closed with it, announcing, however, that he still hoped to be able to carry his own artillery across by Jacca. The Duke of Albufera, however, in spite of the success which he had obtained at Ordal, on the 3rd September, over the Anglo-Spanish army, continued to represent the state of his force in an unfavourable light. He scattered his regiments without any necessity for so doing, and refused to make any movement till he should have received the conscripts. It was a mere act of perverseness, for he could not be ignorant that the expected reinforcement had very little chance of reaching him in time to be of use. Besides, he could have dispensed with it altogether, because he had the means of assembling 32,000 men, provided he kept his hold only upon important places, such as Figueras, Barcelona, and Girona, and abandoned for the moment a multitude of small posts, which were necessary only for communication when the army was in advance, and which he could easily retake on his return from the proposed expedition.

We have considered it necessary to dwell upon these equivocal relations between the two marshals, because they exercised a marked influence upon the events of which we now resume the narrative.

Soult, who on a former occasion had succeeded in relieving St. Sebastian, imagined that a new offensive movement might lead to the same results. He advanced, in consequence, on the 30th August with two strong columns upon the Lower Bidassoa. One, under the command of Clausel, consisted of 20,000 men and twenty guns; the other, of which Reille was at the head, numbered 18,000 men, including Vilatte's reserve. Foy's division, however, which followed this movement with a portion of the light cavalry, raised the actual strength of that column to 25,000 men and thirty-six pieces of cannon. Soult carried with him, besides, two complete bridge equipments. His object was to surprise, with Reille's column, the steep heights of San Martial, from which Wellington covered the siege; while Clausel, with the other column, forced the pass above Vera, that he might fall upon the rear of the position of San Martial, in case it should be obstinately defended; or else join Reille in the neighbourhood of Oyarzun, and march at once to the relief of St. Sebastian.

The height of San Martial was held by 6000 Spanish troops, under the orders of General Freyre. On their right were the fourth English division and Longa's Spaniards; while in rear of the left lay the first division, commanded by Howard, and Lord Aylmer's brigade. Some field-works had converted that position into an intrenched camp, strong and easy to be defended. Its front and left flank were covered by the river, its right was protected by the hill of Pena de Haya and the village of San Antonio.

Soult's movements during the night of the 29th had

not escaped Wellington's observation. He was, therefore, quite upon his guard. Anticipating that a part of the French army would endeavour to force the pass of Vera, he had established the light division upon the height of Santa Barbara, and the 9th Portuguese brigade upon an eminence between the convent of Vera and Lazaca. On the 30th General Inglis, with a brigade of the 7th division, proceeded to occupy the extremity of the Pena de Haya, and next day, when the strength and direction of Clausel's columns became known, General Lord Dalhousie received orders to bring up to Lazaca the rest of the 7th division in order to support him.

Early in the morning of the same day Reille forded the river, with two divisions and two pieces of artillery, to attack Freyre at the same time that Clausel, leaving a division in observation at Vera, with a view to hold the English light division in check, should pass the stream lower down by two fords, and force the Pena de Haya, defended by Inglis's brigade.

The attack of San Martial was made with an inadequate force and without sufficient consistency. Reille's columns were repulsed by the Spanish infantry, in spite of the support rendered by a part of Vilatte's reserve. Nor was Freyre obliged, in order to obtain this result, to ask for the assistance of the English troops.

Warned by this failure of the defects in his original dispositions, Soult prepared to renew the attack in better order, as soon as Clausel should be sufficiently advanced to support him. The first accounts from that general were favourable enough. He had driven before him the Portuguese and Inglis's brigade; but presently, being informed of Reille's repulse, and seeing Inglis doubled

back upon a strong position in front of the convent of St. Antonio, where he was supported by Kemp's brigade of the light division, and was about to be still further reinforced by Lord Dalhousie,—uneasy, besides, as to the fate of Drouet and Erlon, and not fully understanding the true object of the movements ordered by Wellington, Clausel considered it prudent to suspend his attack, and to inform Soult of what was going on.

With a view to deceive the Duke of Dalmatia, who had weakened the centre and right of his line of defence, Wellington had given orders upon the 30th for three simultaneous attacks upon Drouet, one by the defile of Echallar, another by Zugaro-Murdi, and the third by Maya. He had besides instructed Hill to show the heads of his columns in the direction of St. Jean-Pied-de-Port, in order to disconcert Soult's plan and render his own operations uncertain. The stratagem completely succeeded, for the French generals believed that the Allies were executing an aggressive march upon Bayonne. Clausel accordingly halted in the midst of his attack, and Count D'Erlon, whose post was at Maya, became paralysed by a like serious apprehension. Soult received the reports of these two chiefs when he was preparing to deliver a decisive attack upon San Martial. But the fall of St. Sebastian and Hill's movement upon St. Jean-Pied-de-Port announced to him one after the other, as well as the coming on of a thick mist soon after mid-day, induced him to relinquish that intention. There remained for him then no alternative, except to fall back; for in order to save the garrison of St. Sebastian, now shut up in the castle, he must necessarily sacrifice, in a useless battle, many thousand brave men, and expose the whole of his army to disaster. For

it was in Wellington's power, while the action was going on, to throw his right and centre, about 35,000 men, upon the left of the French, and to reach Bayonne before them. This risk could not but attend Soult's plan of attack, and the marshal, in consequence, restrained himself and took up his old position. From that moment he acted no more except upon the defensive.

The operations, of which we have given this summary account, indicate, no doubt, considerable hesitation on the part of the Allies. But the fact must not be lost sight of that, amid mountain defiles, and exposed to heavy mists, troops cannot be manœuvred as on a parade ground. It ought not, therefore, to be quoted as reflecting blame upon Wellington, who, on the contrary, made all his arrangements with the greatest forethought and ability. Still it must be acknowledged that he would have profited better by Soult's mistake had he turned the French left and thrown himself on the line of their communications with Bayonne. But not desiring, at that period, to penetrate into France, there were excellent reasons why he should abstain from following this course. The truth, indeed, is, that notwithstanding the rupture of the congress of Prague, the accession of Austria to the coalition, the capture of St. Sebastian, and other favourable circumstances, the invasion of the French territory was an enterprise beset with no common dangers. It was not merely that he must leave strong fortresses, garrisoned by the enemy, in his rear*, but that which weighed with him still more

* Pampeluna, Santona, Jacca, Venasque, Monzon, Fraga, Lerida, Mequinenza, Figueras, Girona, Ostalrich, Barcelona, Tortosa, Morella, Penisicola, Sagunta, and Denia, were all at that time garrisoned by the French.

was, that he had no confidence in the military system of the Allies. He thought, with reason, that a single victory obtained by the Emperor in Germany would disturb the coalition, and give fresh energy to the war in Spain. "I must presently decide," he writes to Lord Liverpool on the 25th of July, 1813, "whether we shall direct our efforts towards France or in Catalonia. That will depend a great deal upon what is passing in the north of Europe;" and four months subsequently, when announcing to General Dumouriez that he was at last upon the French territory, he says, "Perhaps if I looked only to Spain, or considered matters in a military point of view alone, I should feel myself bound to retire, because Bonaparte retains in Catalonia, and will continue to retain, ample facilities for re-entering Spain."

The hazard of leaving Catalonia upon his right flank deserved serious attention; and Wellington at one time entertained the idea of reducing that province before he should pass the frontier. Moreover, Catalonia opened the most advantageous road for the invasion of France; for, by advancing on that side, he should turn Soult's strong positions, hinder the junction of that marshal with the Duke of Albufera, escape the difficulties which must beset the Allies on the other side of the Bidassoa through the want of provisions and means of transport, and finally escape the dangers of a general rising, which the brigandage of the Spaniards would inevitably provoke if he should carry them at once across the Pyrenees. Believing these advantages to be more than commensurate to the dangerous honour of crossing the frontier a few months earlier, Wellington preferred maintaining his actual position till the surrender of Pampeluna should enable

him to operate by Aragon and Catalonia. He would have undoubtedly persevered in that resolution had not the allied sovereigns insisted on the immediate invasion of France, and the affairs of Germany taken a turn decidedly favourable to the European coalition. But, looking to all the circumstances, he felt that wishes so strongly expressed ought at least to be partially gratified. He accordingly made up his mind to pass the Bidassoa, to make himself master of the Great Rhune and the strong places near, and to establish his left upon the French territory. It was on his part a mere act of conciliation, to which, in a military point of view, he attached no value, and which could not fail of exposing him to considerable difficulties.

Marshal Soult having devoted all his time and resources to fortify the banks of the Bidassoa and the heights which command them, the passage of the river was an enterprise which demanded exceeding prudence in the execution. Now, Wellington was singularly skilful in operations of this sort, and took his measures with such caution that he completely surprised his illustrious adversary, who did not expect, and had no right to expect, that the Allies would abandon an excellent post, in order to cross the Bidassoa near its mouth. Soult was, therefore, quite at his ease on that head, and anxious only about the fate of Pampeluna, when Wellington put his columns in motion. The plan laid down was as follows:—

General Giron was directed to advance from Yrantilly, to assail the heights which intervene between Mount Commissaire, on the one hand, and the Great Rhune on the other; to occupy the latter point, and menace the rear of the French troops posted behind the

Puerto de Vera; though, to secure his right flank from a counter-attack through Sarre, he was to leave one of his brigades between the Great Rhune and Yrantilly.

The light division, acting on the left of Giron, was to attack Mount Baionette and the Puerto de Vera. Louga, moving out of Salinas, was to cross the Bidassoa in two columns; one, taking the ford of Salinas, so as to secure the left of the light division, the other by the bridge at Vera, in order to support the attack of Mount Baionette. Meanwhile, Cole, with the fourth division, was to occupy the heights of Saint Barbara, in rear of the light division, and to send out detachments to secure the commanding points of which the assailants might possess themselves. Finally, the sixth division was to make a demonstration towards the right, by Urdax and Zugaramurdi, against D'Erlon's advanced posts.

By these arrangements, Wellington was able, without weakening his line between Roncesvalles and Echallar, to direct about 20,000 men upon La Rhune and the posts dependent upon it, and to keep, at the same time, 24,000 disposable for forcing the passage of the Bidassoa.

The right of the French army extended at this time in rear of Andaya. It occupied in force the elevated heights which confront San Martial, and observed from them the fords by which Reille, on the 31st of August, had crossed to attack Freyre. Apart from these there were, for a space of three miles, no means of crossing, higher up the stream, either by fords or bridges; but below, in the direction of Fontarabia, there were fords of which the fishermen were accustomed to make use [but of which two were impracticable, except at certain times of the tide].

The orders given by Wellington to the Spanish general (Freyre) were, that he should descend from San Martial, assail the heights in his front, and turn the left of that portion of the French army which was in position behind Andaya. The commander-in-chief was, at the same time, to cross by the fords at the mouth of the river.

At an early hour in the morning of the 7th of October the operations began. A dark and rainy night, with frequent peals of thunder, had enabled the Allies to complete their preparations unobserved. The troops and guns were skilfully concealed amid the broken ground which interposes between San Martial and Fontarabia. The tents had all been left standing, so that when day broke the enemy were kept in ignorance that anything was going on; indeed, so satisfied was Soult that Wellington would never think of giving up the excellent position which he held for the mere sake of passing the Bidassoa near its mouth, that he took no steps whatever to guard against the enterprise. At seven o'clock, however, two columns, composed of the fifth division and of Lord Aylmer's brigade, crossed the river near Fontarabia, and advanced, the one against the camp of *Sans-culottes*, the other against the heights of Andaya. No sooner had they gained the opposite bank than the bells of Fontarabia gave out a signal to the artillery, which from the heights of San Martial immediately opened fire upon the camp of Biriater and the others, which guarded the fords. It was under cover of this fire that the troops who had been concealed in Irun (one brigade of Guards and the Germans attached to the first English division) forded the river, just below the broken bridge of Bidassoa; while General Freyre's Spanish division,

the other brigade of Guards, and Wilson's Portuguese, crossed, at the same time, by three fords above Bidassoa, and in front of San Martial.

Thus, within the space of five miles, seven different columns passed the Bidassoa at the same time; and the arrangements were all so skilfully planned, that no serious check was interposed to the onward march of any one of them.

Soult was at Espalette when the sound of the cannonade from San Martial startled him. He had been drawn thither by the demonstration of the sixth division against D'Erlon's position, between Urdax and Zugaramurdi; but he was not slow in discovering that the real point of attack was upon his own right. He hurried off in that direction, but did not reach the field till Reille had withdrawn from it, leaving eight pieces of cannon in the enemy's hands. There was, therefore, nothing left for the marshal, except to render the retreat as little precipitate and disorderly as possible.

While the left of the Allies, under Graham, and the centre, under Freyre, were thus accomplishing the object which the commander-in-chief had in view, the right, under Generals Alten and Giron, moved upon the Rhune and the strong places near it, Mounts Baionette and Commissaire, where Clausel's troops were posted. This attack proved equally successful with the others; but it was much more murderous, as well as more obstinately resisted. The Great Rhune, assailed by the Spaniards, under Giron, proved almost impregnable, so that, in spite of their bravery, these troops were obliged to halt at the bottom of the rock, where stood the important post of the Hermitage.

Next day, observing that the mountain on which that

rock stood, as well as a second, nearer to Sarre, also occupied by the enemy, were more accessible from the country to the right of the Spaniards, Wellington instructed Giron to concentrate in that direction, to carry the second rock, and assault at the same time the advanced works of the camp at Sarre. Both operations were executed in a brilliant manner. After making themselves masters of the rock on the left of the Hermitage, the Spanish troops followed up their successes by carrying several intrenchments upon the hill which covered the right of the camp. Upon this the enemy evacuated his advanced works, of which a portion of Dalhousie's division, sent across the Puerto d'Echallar took possession. Next night he abandoned in like manner the Hermitage, and the whole of the intrenched camp. It is marvellous that the French should have been so easily driven from a position of such commanding strength.

In the course of these two days, Wellington exhibited at once remarkable ability and great boldness. He so combined his movements as to take the enemy by surprise. Finding it impossible to offer a protracted resistance on any of the points assailed, neither Reille nor Clausel succeeded in bringing up their reserves with sufficient rapidity into action. The passage of the river itself was an operation delicate and dangerous in the extreme. Not only must it have been attended with great difficulties if Soult had found time to get his troops together in any force, but the ascending tide, which came in two hours afterwards, would have interposed in the event of a check, an insurmountable obstacle to the retreat of the English army. Here, however, as at the Douro, the Duke of Dalmatia was deceived by the

unforeseen manœuvres and perfect coolness of his adversary. According to some accounts, the passage of the former river was a more difficult operation than that of the latter.

We said a little while ago that, after the affair of San Martial, Soult, considering a defensive war to be more suitable than an offensive one to the moral state of his army, had agreed to join Suchet through the defile of Jacca, and to render Saragossa the base of his ulterior operations.

He hoped, by these means, to relieve Pampeluna, with several places besides, and to force Wellington, either to repass the Ebro, or to fight a great battle under circumstances favourable to the French. The Duke of Albufera, however, continued to misrepresent the real state of his force. He exhibited a childish uneasiness about Penisicola, Sagunta, Morella, Denia, and Tortosa, the garrisons of which might have been easily left to themselves; and declared that he was without the means of co-operating in the execution of Soult's plan. This conduct might make us call in question the talent and patriotism of Suchet, if it were possible to entertain doubts after all that he had done; and if he had not, in some measure, proved that he yielded, under the circumstances, to a sentiment wretched in itself, but to which the loftiest spirits are sometimes subject, that of envy and personal ill-will.

While the two marshals were thus wasting time in idle discussion, the approach of winter, together with the passage of Bidassoa, rendered the execution of Soult's second scheme impossible. Nothing, therefore, remained for him except to follow up his first idea, which consisted in operating on Wellington's right

flank with the united armies of Spain and Aragon. This plan, as Soult himself observes in his letter of the 26th October, addressed to the Duke of Albufera, still offered every chance of success. And indeed, if instead of busying himself with the administration of Catalonia, and devising means to disengage his little garrisons, the Duke of Albufera had put himself in motion with the 32,000 whom he had at his disposal, his junction with Soult might have taken place on the 25th or the 30th October at the latest. This done, it was quite within the reach of probability that the English would have been driven back to the left bank of the Bidassoa, Pampeluna might have been relieved in time, and the French remained masters of the Pyrenees.

It was because this wise determination was not acted upon, that the brave garrison of Pampeluna, reduced by a four months' blockade to the last extremity, found itself in a melancholy plight. The soldiers, forced to eat garbage, had become a prey to famine and scurvy. General Cassan proposed a negotiation, but not obtaining the terms which he required, he declared that he would blow up the works, and open a passage for himself, sword in hand. When this determination was communicated to Wellington, he pronounced it to be contrary to the laws of war, and gave orders to Don Carlos de España, who commanded the blockade, to shoot the governor, when the place should be taken, with all his officers, and every tenth soldier, if the slightest damage should have been done to the works. Posterity would have severely blamed the execution of that order, which, indeed, never could have been issued, except with a view to intimidate General Cassan, and save an important fortress. But either in

consequence of that threat, or because the proposal to blow up the works was a mere *ruse* devised to obtain better terms, the governor, after continuing the defence a few days longer, surrendered, at last, on the 31st of October, with all the garrison.

It is worthy of remark, that the French exhibited greater courage and determination in defending the fortresses in the Peninsula, than the Spaniards themselves; though the latter sustained two or three sieges which deserve universal admiration. Meanwhile, Wellington had laid three bridges across the Bidassoa. He was firmly established on that line, and had at his disposal all the corps heretofore employed in the blockade of Pampeluna. The moment was, therefore, come, when he might seriously employ himself in preparing for an irruption into the French territory. But before following him in that memorable enterprise, we will take a last survey of the affairs of the Peninsula, in order to make manifest the political difficulties amid which the English general was constrained to pursue his operations.

In Portugal Souza's faction became, after the departure of the allied troops, all-powerful. The Regency, delivered over into his hands, showed itself more and more arrogant in proportion as it believed that nothing further was to be apprehended from the enemy. The English were openly cried down, both in Lisbon and at Rio Janeiro; and, amid the exuberance of odious passions, Wellington was no more spared than the rest. They accused him, especially, of injustice towards the Portuguese troops, in not having made mention of their good conduct in the battles of 1813. The fact was, partly, as they represented it to be: yet it was very excusable, because the Portuguese were mixed up in the same

divisions with the English. Nevertheless, in order to avoid a repetition of that assumed injustice, the Regency demanded that the Portuguese troops should be formed into a separate army. The commander-in-chief formally resisted that assumption, which nothing could justify, and in his turn complained that the government of Lisbon, so sensitive about the reputation of its soldiers, had neglected their subsistence to such an extent, that they would have perished with hunger had not the English commissariat provided for their wants by deducting the necessary amount from the British subsidy. He maintained, besides, that the recruiting never went on as it ought to have done, and this was true; for in 1813, out of a contingent of 9000 men, the Duke, notwithstanding his earnest remonstrances, was on no occasion joined by more than 3000; and in March, 1814, Portugal, which was bound by treaty to maintain an army of 30,000 men, and was able, according to Stuart, to supply 100,000, had only 20,000 combatants present with their colours.

Instead of putting a stop to these abuses, the Prince Regent, far removed from the country, continued to reward intriguers, and to overlook the services of true patriots. With respect to the Regency, it became, day by day, more oligarchical in its spirit, and exhibited increased hostility to Spain, where liberal opinions were beginning to gain the ascendant. To this mutual estrangement of the governments there was added the instinctive animosity of the populations, which neither common danger, nor a common cause, had succeeded for one moment in softening down. Indeed, these sentiments were at one time so lively, that the slightest accident might have lighted up a terrible war between

the two countries. Such a sad state of things drew from Wellington the following severe and melancholy reflections:—"I declare," he writes, on the 20th of July, 1813, to Sir Charles Stuart, "that the English army, which I have the honour to command, has experienced nothing but ingratitude from the Portuguese government and authorities. The civil functionaries have, of late, done all that they could to oppress the officers and soldiers whenever an opportunity presented itself. I therefore hope that we have done with that country."

In Spain, public opinion was not more favourable to the English. Their influence indeed had been so openly attacked, and the nation itself was so little respected, that the word "*Anglesimo*" had become a term of reproach. At the opening of the campaign of 1813, Wellington experienced the greatest difficulty in preventing the Cortès from passing a law to exclude the troops of his Britannic majesty from Spanish fortresses; though these were, for the most part, the very places which they had conquered with the bayonet, and watered with their blood. Of such ingratitude and stupidity anarchical governments alone are capable. It was still more disgraceful, that while Wellington was devoting himself so nobly to the defence of the nation, these fiery tribunes of the Cortès accused him of a design to usurp the crown, and went so far in their infamy as to make proposals for the return of Joseph. Not one of the engagements entered into by that assembly with the commander-in-chief was fulfilled. "You know," writes Wellington to the Spanish minister of war, "my disposition and desire to serve the Spanish nation as far as it is in my power; there are limits, however, to forbearance and submission to injury, and I confess that I feel

that I have been most unworthily treated in these transactions by the Spanish government, even as a gentleman." The Cortès, given up to republican ideas, laboured only to embroil the different classes of society with one another by projects of inopportune reform. It especially applied itself with vigour to abolish the Inquisition—an abominable institution, without doubt, but one which had the support of the clergy and of the country people, the two great props of the national insurrection.

This angry feeling assumed at one moment such dimensions, that Wellington expressed to his government the fear that a civil war might break out, in which case, he said, the clergy and country people would take part with the French. "The relations which exist between us and the Spaniards," he writes to Lord Bathurst, "are such, that I consider it necessary to call your serious attention to that point. You are aware of the libels published after the capture of St. Sebastian, which I know to have been drawn up by an officer of the War Department, and, as I have reason to believe, at the dictation of the minister of war himself. Every effort is made to excite an angry spirit against the garrisons of Cadiz, Carthagena, and Ceuta. The slightest misconduct by a master of a ship in a Spanish port is described as an attack upon the sovereignty of the nation. Meanwhile the Spanish troops signalise their presence everywhere by plunder. They spare neither their own magazines nor ours; their officers shut their eyes to these culpable acts, nor are they so much as reproved, until I interfere with my authority as commander-in-chief of the Spanish army.

"The civil functionaries of the country not only refuse to help us, but they go so far as to desire the in-

habitants to act in the same manner. An occurrence has lately taken place at Fontarabia, which is most extraordinary and almost incredible. It was arranged that the English and Portuguese hospitals should be established in that town. A building which had served as a hospital for the Spaniards was given over to us for a similar purpose by the local authorities; but instead of giving it up, they caused all the wooden bedsteads to be taken away and burned, in order that our soldiers might not have the benefit of them. It is thus that the Spaniards act towards us, who have been prodigal of our care towards their soldiers, — who have furnished surgical instruments, and all sorts of supplies for their hospitals, — who have treated their sick and wounded like our own, and have, in fine, rendered to them all the assistance in our power, besides freeing their country from invasion." Wellington attributes this disagreeable conduct to the influence of the government, and ends his letter by saying, "Our relations with Spain are threatened with an imminent crisis: indeed, if you do not bring the government and people to reason before they have gone too far, you will inevitably lose the advantages which you might derive from the services rendered to them."

So completely had the Cortès fallen under the influence of a demagogue press, that the partisans of England, so long opposed to the return of the Princess Charlotte, decided on supporting her pretensions, solely because she was hostile to the democrats. The agents of the Foreign Office gave way for the same reason. Wellington, however, held aloof, "not wishing," as he says, "to have to reproach himself with having brought into power the wickedest woman that ever lived." His opinion

was, that they should avoid touching upon the question of the Regency, and confine themselves to neutralising, by every means in their power, the principles of democracy, and the measures of the Cortès. Perceiving that many of the Spanish notables, Ballasteros, O'Donnell, and Castaños himself, inclined to overthrow the government, Wellington entreated Lord Bathurst to say, "whether in the event of his finding an opportunity to strike a decisive blow at the Spanish democracy, the government would support him." * It does not appear that the cabinet of London ever received that overture, because matters remained as they were, and in the future correspondence of the Duke no further allusion is made to it.

In consequence of the breaking out of the yellow fever in the Isle of Leon, the Cortès had determined to meet in Madrid, and held its last sitting in Cadiz on the 29th of November, 1813. The new elections served only to strengthen, in that assembly, the influence of the Jacobins and the lowest of the people. Their hatred to Wellington went so far, that after the battle of Vittoria, in open contempt of his rights and prerogatives as chief of the Spanish army, they gave direct orders to the generals; and without so much as consulting him, effected important changes in the command and destination of the troops. Indeed, if these troops, after 1812, rendered any service at all, it was because they were paid, clothed, and armed by England, and commanded, and held in check by a general whose firmness was equal to his talent. The Spanish government, though merely required to supply them with provisions, left them, as it did the Allies, in the greatest distress. "The

* Letter of 5th September, 1813.

most abundant harvest," Wellington writes to the minister of war at Madrid, "has been reaped in all parts of the country. Millions of money spent by the contending armies in the Peninsula, are circulating everywhere, and yet your armies, however weak in numbers, are literally starving. The allied British and Portuguese army, under my command, have been subsisted, particularly latterly, almost exclusively by the magazines imported by sea, and I am concerned to inform your Excellency, that besides money for the pay of all the armies, which has been given from the military chest of the British army, and has been received from no other quarter, the British magazines have supplied quantities of provisions to all the Spanish armies, in order to enable them to remain in the field at all; and notwithstanding this assistance, I have had the mortification of seeing the Spanish troops on the outposts obliged to plunder the nut and apple trees for subsistence."

The English Government, after all the sacrifices which it had made, exercised no influence whatever over the affairs of Spain, and the internal administration of the country was in the same state of anarchy and confusion as at the beginning of the war. There had not arisen a single Spanish general capable of commanding an army, nor even of training or forming troops. There did not exist in the native corps a single staff officer, a single administrator, worthy of the name, and to crown the evil, nobody was ashamed of such a state of things. Wellington and his army sustained alone the whole weight of the war, insomuch that the highest praise conferred by posterity upon that army and its illustrious chief will be, that it delivered Spain without the help of the Spaniards, and, so to speak, in spite of them.

The excesses committed at St. Sebastian served as a

pretext for still more violent declamation against Wellington; a design was even entertained by the Regency of removing him from the command of the army. English soldiers were daily insulted, indeed some of them fell under the hands of assassins, so bitter was the hatred, in certain classes, against the deliverers of Spain.

With respect to the English Government, it did not exhibit a much larger share of intelligence than those of the Peninsula. Wellington had constant reason to complain of it. He reproached it especially with having deprived his army of the vessels which were necessary to carry on its communications with Lisbon, to give security to the coasts, and to maintain the blockade of the maritime towns in the north of Spain. It was curious, too, that at the most critical moment of the war in the Peninsula, the cabinet announced its intention of sending him at the head of an army into Germany. "Such," says Alison, "were then the financial difficulties of England, that in order to get rid of the enormous expenditure which the war in the south of France required, the government satisfied, on the one hand, that Spain was safe, and persuaded, on the other, that the decisive point for the war would be nearer Paris, accepted and transmitted to Wellington a plan suggested by the Emperor Alexander, according to which Wellington should transport his army by sea into the Low Countries, and form the right wing of the grand army preparing to invade France." The Duke, however, pointed out in the clearest manner the defects of this scheme, and the danger that would result upon his quitting a theatre of war where, with 35,000 English, he kept 100,000 French in check; who, set free by the departure of that little army, would be able to co-operate

in Napoleon's plans, to form a junction with the reserve then in process of formation in the southern provinces, to advance against the Allies with all the advantages of interior lines, and enter into action before the English troops, obliged to make a long *détour* by sea and land, would be able to reach the seat of war. Still Wellington concluded his letter in the following terms, remarkably indicative of his respectful submission and the modesty, simplicity, and good sense of his character: —"I am at the command of the Prince Regent, and will do whatever he and his government desire; but I entreat him to recollect that the great advantage which I possess here arises from the confidence which every one reposes in me, let me do what I will; an advantage which I cannot secure elsewhere, at least for some time. No one else could acquire this ascendency here, and in Germany I could do no more than another; if, therefore, an English army be left in the Peninsula, it is better that I should remain with it."

These arguments produced such a strong impression on the English minister that he abandoned his project. Nevertheless the greater portion of the reinforcements intended for the army in the Peninsula disembarked in Holland, where they served to make up the unfortunate corps which, a short time afterwards, was destroyed upon the ramparts of Bergen-op-Zoom.

Wellington alone believed at this period that he could play a more important part in the south of France than in the north of Europe, and contribute more effectually to bring about a general peace by descending from the Pyrenees than the allied sovereigns could do by passing the Meuse and the Marne. On this head events were not slow in verifying his anticipations.

CHAP. IV.

SURRENDER OF PAMPELUNA.—PASSAGE OF THE NIVELLE.—RETREAT OF SOULT BEHIND THE NIVE.—PASSAGE OF THAT RIVER.—BATTLE OF ST. PIERRE.—RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE HOSTILE ARMIES.—PASSAGE OF THE ADOUR.—BATTLE OF ORTHES.—INVESTMENT OF BAYONNE.—COMBAT AT AIRE.—BERESFORD'S MARCH TO BORDEAUX.—LEGITIMIST MOVEMENTS.—AFFAIRS AT PIC DE BIGORRE AND TARBES.—RETREAT OF SOULT TO TOULOUSE.—BATTLE OF TOULOUSE.—REFLECTIONS ON THE BATTLE.

THE Allies having suspended their offensive movement after the passage of the Bidassoa, Soult employed his army in completing the works of the entrenched camp at St. Jean-pied-de-port, and in fortifying the approaches to St. Jean de Luz, as well as all the points that were open to attack between the sea and the Nive. He had all along determined to carry the war into Aragon, but was obliged to abandon the project because the winter set in this year earlier than usual. His situation in other respects had become difficult in the extreme. If the English fleet had interrupted the navigation between Bordeaux and Bayonne, he would even have been obliged to retire behind the Adour; for his troops were in such want of provisions and money that, in a report to the minister of war, he describes the sufferings of both officers and men as disgraceful. The marshal

was deeply affected by this state of things, altogether new in an army which was defending its own soil.

Similar privations were making equal ravages in the allied army. Desertion had begun in its ranks, and a certain amount of discontent exhibited itself daily.

On the 20th of October Wellington learnt from an intercepted letter that the governor of Pampeluna was unable to hold out beyond a single week. This circumstance, and the news from Germany, decided him to invade France, agreeably to the wish of the allied sovereigns, more and more earnestly expressed. He did not, however, consent to make this movement except for political reasons, and upon a solemn promise that he should receive considerable reinforcements. Such want of confidence appeared exaggerated to certain temperaments, who regarded the occupation of the southern provinces as an easy matter. But Wellington, who was on the spot, appreciated the chances of the enterprise more correctly, and it must be acknowledged that he was right; for if the Duke of Dalmatia had retained the 30,000 men who had been raised for him in January, 1813, and if the Duke of Albufera had joined his colleague, and if the population had made common cause with the French army, it is extremely probable that the English would have been driven across the Pyrenees.

The rains had so destroyed the roads, that Wellington was obliged to put off till the 8th of November, and ultimately till the 10th, the commencement of his operations against Soult's lines. The strength of the allied army amounted to about 100,000 men, of whom upwards of 77,000 were Anglo-Portuguese, with ninety-five pieces of cannon. It was distributed into three columns, or corps. The right, which included Murillo's and

Mina's Spaniards, was under the command of Hill; and extended from Roncesvalles to the valley of Bastan. The centre, under Beresford, occupied Maya, the mountains of Echallar, of the Rhune, and of Baionette; while the left, of which Hope was at the head, stretched from Mount Mandale to the sea. The head-quarters were at Vera.

The French army numbered only 66,000 old troops; and its position described a semicircle, from Urogne to Espalette and Cambo. The salient point of the semicircle was at Sarre; and the entire front was covered with several lines of redoubts and retrenchments, all capable of a good defence. But the salient in front of Sarre was necessarily its weak point; and the fact did not escape the practised eye of Wellington. He saw that if he made himself master of that village, he would be able to march by St. Pé and Amotz direct upon Bayonne, and cut in two the French army, which could not act, except upon a front of five leagues between Urogne and Cambo. Hence, immediately after the passage of the Bidassoa, he caused a road, practicable for artillery, to be begun in the low ground which stretched from Vera to the lines in front of Sarre. And lastly, with a view to withdraw Soult's attention from the important points which adjoin the latter village, he moved upon Mondarin some fresh troops belonging to the corps of observation which he had posted at Maya. Wellington's plan was to hold the right in check, to turn that wing by forcing the centre and the left, and then to advance along the Nivelle as far as St. Pé. The arrangements made for accomplishing this purpose were as follows: —

The right, under Hill, consisting of the second and

sixth English divisions, Hamilton's Portuguese brigade, Murillo's Spanish division, Grant's brigade of light cavalry, a battery of Portuguese artillery, with two field-pieces, in all, about 26,000 men, was to assail Clausel's position in rear of Ainhoe. The right centre, under Beresford, composed of the third, fourth, and seventh English divisions, was to storm the redoubts in front of Sarre, as well as Sarre itself, and the high grounds behind it. It was to be supported on its left by the army of Andalusia, with which Giron was to attack the works on the right of Sarre, and to turn the mountain of the little Rhune. Finally, Baron Alten, with the light division, and Longa's Spanish division, was to attack the little Rhune, and co-operate, with Giron, in the assault of the heights in rear of Sarre.

The movements of the centre were to be supported by a brigade of cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, by three batteries of artillery, and six mountain pieces; which would raise the force employed, in this part of the line of battle, to 36,000 men, and twenty-four guns.

General Freyre, with 9000 Spaniards, and six guns, was to advance, in two columns, from the heights of Mandale towards Ascain, in order to restrain any movements which the enemy might attempt from his right to his centre.

Lastly, the left, under General Hope, consisting of the fifth and first English divisions; of the brigades of Wilson, Bradford, and Aylmer; of Vandeleur's light dragoons, and the mass of the heavy German cavalry; in all, about 19,000 men, and fifty-four guns; was to drive in the outposts in front of the lower Nivelle, to carry the redoubts above Urogne, and to establish itself on the heights facing Siboure; and to take advantage

of any movements which might be made by the enemy's right.*

These dispositions, skilfully arranged, and vigorously carried into effect, were attended with perfect success. D'Erlon's right, and Clausel's left, were both forced, and the two corps separated, the one from the other. Hope, at the same time, covered by the English squadron, compelled Reille, with the corps on the right, to abandon his camp of *Sans culottes*, and the works at Urogne. But as his was only a false attack, he halted on effecting this object, that he might conform to the movements of the allied centre and right, where the struggle still went on.

Clausel defended every foot of ground, and did not retire till the loss of the redoubts of St. Barbe and La Rhune (too soon abandoned by Conroux's troops) had exposed his left flank, and turned the whole line from Sarre to the sea. He proceeded to take up a position, beyond Ascain and Sarre, a little above St. Pé. At this moment Soult arrived from St. Jean de Luz at the camp of Serres with his reserve artillery and all his disposable troops, to menace the left flank of the Allies, by Ascain. But Wellington's dispositions, and the approach of night, hindered that movement from producing any effect. The result was, that the fifth, sixth, and seventh English divisions passed the Nivelle at St. Pé, and established themselves firmly in rear of Soult's right, upon the heights of Lormenthoa. The works of the second line, overlapped on all sides by superior numbers, had fallen, to a great extent, into the hands of the English. It was in obstinately defending these that

* Hope reached the army on the 7th of October, and took the command of the left column from Graham on the morning of the 8th.

the brave General Conroux received a wound, of which he died a few days afterwards.

That night the French army found itself in a somewhat more concentrated position than in the morning. Its left rested on the Nive and the village of Larressore; its centre was on the road from St. Pé to Bayonne, near Abancen-Borda; and its right stretched along the Nivelle from Serres to St. Jean de Luz.

The consequences of the battle to the Allies were, the occupation of the villages of Urogne, Sarre, Ascain, St. Pé, Ainhoe, Espalette, and Sourante; all situated within the French territory. The French lost on that day 4265 men, including 1400 prisoners, fifty-one pieces of cannon, six ammunition waggons, and their magazines at St. Jean de Luz and Espalette. The loss on the side of the Allies amounted only to 2694 men.

According to Clausel's account, the troops of his division did not accomplish all that they ought to have done in the strong positions which they were appointed to defend.

If the force in hand had been more numerous than it was, or had daylight lasted a little longer, Wellington would have completely attained his object by cutting off the right of the French army. Nor can we sufficiently admire the admirable conduct of his troops, and the extraordinary vigour which they displayed in attacking redoubts, forts, abattis, and intrenchments, some in earth, some faced with stone, which the French had thrown up upon two or three successive lines in the heart of a rocky country, and amid high mountains and precipices.

The conduct of Marshal Soult is not free from blame; he was guilty of a great error, especially in this respect,

that he never brought into action the two excellent divisions of Daricau and Foy. At the critical moment of the battle, he was able to oppose to 50,000 men, concentrated by Wellington, only 18,000 French, discouraged by many checks, and by the contemplation of the treachery of their fellow-citizens.

Apprehensive lest Beresford might interpose between St. Jean de Luz and Bayonne, the French troops abandoned, during the night, their works and positions; and after having destroyed all the bridges on the Nivelle between St. Jean de Luz and Ascain, retired to Bedart.

At ten in the morning of the 11th, Soult's army extended from the sea to the Nive, having its right at Bedart, and its left posted on the little hill of St. Barbe, in advance of the village of Araunts. The tête-de-pont at Cambo was guarded by General Foy. On the morning of the 11th, Hope passed the Nivelle at a ford above St. Jean de Luz. The same day, the rest of the allied army put itself in motion, Beresford in the centre, Hill and Morillo on the right. But the heavy rains which fell during the 10th, and a dense mist on the 11th, interrupted the march of the columns. In spite of this circumstance in his favour, Marshal Soult did not consider that his troops were in a condition to sustain a second battle in the extended position which they occupied. He therefore continued his retreat, and established himself next day on a new line between Anglet and the intrenched camp of Bayonne, to which the waters of the Nive, at that time swollen, formed an excellent front of defence. The Duke of Dalmatia had not anticipated so rapid an expulsion from a series of works on which the most brilliant expectations were rested. Following the example set by Welling-

ton in 1810, he had employed the whole of his army, during three months, in the construction of a camp, which, from the nature and position of its works, as well as on account of the physical features of the country, and the natural defences which they supplied, presented a considerable resemblance to the camp at Torres Vedras. But time was not afforded to the French general to give to the elements of that enormous camp the needful consistency, and the numbers of his troops were, in addition, unequal to the defence of a line so extended. Besides, the French soldiers placed no great confidence in such lines, and their *morale* had become shaken by circumstances which it was not in the power of Soult to control. Nevertheless, the marshal considered that they ought to have displayed greater determination. "It is scarcely credible," he writes to the minister of war, "that intrenchments such as those defended by Clausel and D'Erlon could have been taken."

After the loss of the position of the Nivelle, the Duke of Dalmatia employed six divisions, and Villatte's reserve, in strengthening the intrenched camp at Bayonne; and sent three others, under D'Erlon, to reinforce General Foy at Cambo. Wellington would not have afforded him leisure to adopt these precautionary measures had not the rugged country, in which he found himself at the foot of the Pyrenees rendered it next to impossible to move either his artillery or cavalry. Moreover, he required time to re-establish in his army the subordination and discipline which a want of provisions, and the bad example of the Spaniards, had a good deal shaken. These latter, indeed, committed such excesses in the enemy's territory, that Wellington, preferring a diminution of material strength to the loss of that

moral influence which could be secured only by respecting the lives and properties of French citizens, caused every marauder taken in the act to be put to death; and when even these severe examples failed to produce the desired result, he did not hesitate to send an entire Spanish corps to the rear. Nothing could be more honourable than this determination; nor more worthy of praise, than the severity with which he treated marauders, and the pains which he took to avoid having recourse to requisitions; though the laws of war, and the example of the French, would have alike authorised his doing so.

All his proclamations had for their object to excite confidence among the people. "I beg of you," he says, in that of the 1st of November, "to arrest and bring to head-quarters all who do you an injury." And in his communication to General Freyre: "I have not come into France to pillage the French people; on the contrary, it is my duty, and the duty of every one, to prevent pillage." The same sentiments are expressed in many other letters. Indeed, the object which he sought to attain by conduct so entirely opposed to that of conquerors in general, is stated in the following, which he addressed to the British Government:—"I must tell your lordship that our success, and everything, depends upon our moderation and justice, and upon the good conduct and discipline of our troops." This object, as it appears, was completely accomplished; for on the 21st November, 1813, Wellington wrote to Lord Bathurst, "I am happy to add, that the conduct of the Portuguese and British troops has been exactly what I wished; and that the natives of this part of the country are not only reconciled to the invasion, but wish us

success, afford us all the supplies in their power, and exert themselves to get intelligence for us." Again, on the 1st January, 1814, addressing the same minister, he says: "It is a curious circumstance that we are the protectors of the property of the inhabitants against the plunder of their own armies; and their cattle, property, &c., are driven into our lines." This moderation, unexampled in history, greatly favoured the restoration of the Bourbons, and contributed, in no slight degree, to the success of the campaign of 1814 in France.

As soon as the weather began to improve, Wellington thought of following up the course of his victories. He knew how difficult it would be to attack Soult in the strong position which that marshal had taken up in front of Bayonne, and considered that the best means of dislodging him, or at all events, of so weakening him, that the Allies might find an opportunity of beating him, would be to pass the Nive, and establish his own right upon the Adour. By this means the French army, which already experienced great difficulty in supplying its wants, would lose its communications with the interior by the Adour; while the allied army would be enabled to draw subsistence and refreshment from the provinces of the centre. Besides, an operation of this sort would encourage the malcontents to establish relations with the invaders. On this point, however, Wellington maintained great reserve; and we shall see, by and by, that he had excellent reasons for doing so. Had he put himself too soon at the head of a Bourbon movement in the south of France, he would have exposed the partisans of the legitimate cause, and the cause itself, to imminent peril. His prudence enabled him, in the happiest manner, to avoid that danger.

All this while the right of Soult's army, consisting of two divisions under Reille, and Villatte's reserve, defended the course of the Adour from Bayonne to the sea. It was protected by a flotilla of gun-boats on the river, and by an artificial inundation; and its advanced posts occupied field-works in front of Anglette, in the direction of Biaritz. The left, under Clausel, consisting of three divisions, was posted between Anglette and the Nive. This wing, covered in part by an inundation, which extended from Urdains to the Nive, communicated with Paris's division of the army of Catalonia, which was in position at St. Jean-pied-de-port. With the residue of the army, Soult himself took post within the intrenched camp at Bayonne.

On the 9th December the allied troops moved from their cantonments to effect the passage of the Nive. The right, under Hill, received orders to cross that river by a ford between Cambo and Itsassu, while Beresford supported and favoured the operation by passing his troops over a pontoon bridge at Ustaritz. Hope, meanwhile, at the head of 24,000 men, and twelve guns, was directed to drive in the advanced posts along the whole front of the intrenched camp between the Nive and the sea, and to keep Soult in check, while Hill and Beresford crossed the river. All these attempts were crowned with perfect success. The enemy was driven from the right bank of the Nive, and obliged to retire upon Bayonne, by the great road from St. Jean-pied-de-port.

These several movements had been so well arranged, and were carried into effect with such vigour, that the French suffered a complete surprise. When Soult arrived about one o'clock at Bayonne, Wellington was already

in possession of the field of operations on the left of the French. The bad state of the roads, however, prevented Hill from coming up in time to occupy the heights of St. Pierre, and the night rendered darker by heavy rains put an end to the combat. That affair made the Allies masters of the Nive from Cambo as far as Villafranca, and assured to them a *point d'appui* upon the St. Jean-pied-de-port road, two leagues from Bayonne.

One consequence of the operation of the 9th was to extend the wings of the allied army over nearly three leagues, and to place the Nive between them. Soult determined to profit by that circumstance, and to fall next day with the whole of his united force upon that portion of the allied army which lay upon the left bank of the river. So confident was he also in the success of the operation that, late in the evening, he wrote to the Duke of Feltre, "I hope that I shall have a victory to announce to you." Nor, in truth, is there any reason to doubt that the proposed attack, had it been properly conducted, might have proved fatal to the Allies; for Wellington by taking up a false position had lost the advantage of his superiority in numbers.

Instead, however, of marching upon the decisive point of Arcangues, as in arranging his plan he proposed to do, Soult directed his principal movement upon Barouilhet; and the attack, partly in consequence of the bad state of the roads, which the rains had rendered well nigh impassable, partly through the irresolution of Foy and Villatte, lacked both vigour and unity.* Hope's

* It seems almost certain, that in the affair which followed, Hope's corps would have been destroyed, had Villatte and Foy, instead of resting idle in front of Arcangues, taken part in the battle. [On the other hand, the light division, which faced these corps, could have

corps maintained on that point a desperate struggle with Reille's two divisions, and though not more than 10,000 men were engaged, and these in detail, it compelled the assailants about two in the afternoon to retire. It was at this time that, his whole disposable army having come up, Soult gave the order to renew the battle. But Clausel having sent to inform him that a fresh corps had crossed the river, and was threatening Armagnac on the heights of Urdains, he suspended the order, and finally withdrew it. The night came on, and the two armies bivouacked in presence of each other.

In this affair the Allies had 1200 killed and wounded, and 300 taken prisoners; the French lost about 2000 men, and at the close of the battle three German regiments passed over to the enemy.

Next day the combat was renewed. The French again directed the whole of their force, with the exception of D'Armagnac's division, which remained at Urdains, against Hope; but, in spite of their great superiority in numbers, they were obliged to return to their position of the previous evening, about 800 men on either side being placed *hors de combat.*

On the 12th a mistake or accident brought on a third collision, which was equally without object and result, and in which the main body of the French army took no part.

It was now evident to Soult that success on this part of the English line was no longer to be expected. Hope's corps and the light division had been reinforced successively by the 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 7th divisions, the whole of which had been withdrawn from the farther

easily fallen upon the flank of the supposed attack; and with Hope before him and that division on his left, Soult would have found it no easy matter to destroy either.]

C. Sauvé pinx.t Lithographie A. Tiffaut sculp.

GALL.

Typ. Lemercier, rue Bonaparte, 44, Paris.

side of the Nive, and were in rear of Arcangues and Biaritz. Accordingly, having watched the arrival of these troops from one height, while Wellington was personally observing him from another, the Duke of Dalmatia suddenly changed his plan. He left two divisions and the reserve to hold the entrenched camp, and in the night between the 12th and 13th passed through Bayonne with seven divisions, in all 35,000 men and 22 guns, to attack the heights in front of St. Pierre, which were occupied by Hill with 13,000 men and 14 guns only, and whose rear was at the same time threatened by 8000 men under Paris, and by the light cavalry of Pierre Soult. The roads, however, were in such a state that only five out of the seven divisions could be brought up; and of these only three, in consequence of the confined nature of the ground, succeeded in taking part in the action.

The battle began about half-past eight in the morning; at noon, Hill having heard that Wellington was coming with the sixth division, brought his reserve into action; and compelled Marshal Soult to make a retrograde movement just as a brigade of D'Armagnac's division, and the divisions of Foy and Maransin, were getting into such a position as would have destroyed the English columns. Hill had scarcely obtained this unlooked-for success, when the sixth division arrived on the ground. It had been in motion since early dawn, and was followed at a brief interval by the fourth and third divisions.

Perceiving, at a glance, that the battle was won, Wellington warmly congratulated his gallant comrade on the success which he had achieved, and immediately ordered a general movement in advance. It was two

* [Pierre or Peter Soult was the marshal's nephew.]

o'clock. The French columns, vigorously followed up, suffered great loss; till darkness, and the bad state of the roads, put an end to the pursuit.

The Allies lost about 1500 men; three generals, as well as almost all their staff-officers being placed *hors de combat.* The French had in all 3000 men killed and wounded, a heavy loss, if it be remembered that only half of their effective, or 16,000 men, had been seriously engaged. Among the number of the wounded were Generals Maucune and Maucomble. Among other English officers, General Hope had been wounded on the 10th, after exhibiting such courage, that Wellington writing about him to Torrens, says, "We shall lose him if he continue to expose himself to fire as he has done these last three days. Besides the wound in his leg, his clothes and his hat are riddled with balls."

Some blame attaches to Wellington for having left Hill in so critical a situation on the Nive, where he would have been infallibly beaten but for a fortunate concurrence of circumstances, and the truly heroic courage of the English soldiers. Nor can he be excused for having failed to profit by his successes from the 10th to the 12th, so far as to make himself master of the intrenchments which lay in front of his position at St. Pierre.

With respect to Soult, it is past dispute that the excellent plan which he had devised was frustrated, through his own want of vigour in the execution of it. He lost, especially, an admirable opportunity on the 10th of dislodging the left of Wellington's army, which was quite separated from his right.*

* [Captain Brialmont is mistaken here. General Hope had force enough to stop the whole French army on the plateau of Biaritz;

After the battle of St. Pierre, the Allies were again stopped by rains; and the time was turned to account on both sides, each army throwing up field works in front of its own position.

It was at this period that Wellington recalled the 20,000 Spaniards whom he had sent to the rear, in punishment of their habits of pillage. He had need of these troops to continue his operations, and he hoped, besides, that the lesson which they had received, would produce the desired effect upon them; but he soon discovered his mistake, for in the first French village which Murillo's Spaniards entered, they massacred fifteen persons, among whom were several women and children. Mina's bands, by the commission of similar horrors, so exasperated the Basques, that these mountaineers were on the point of commencing a war of partisans; but in order to avert this calamity, Wellington, while he showed no mercy to plunderers, published an order of the day, in which he warned the Basques that they must either join the French army, or remain peaceably at home; that every individual found with arms in his hands, and acting as a partisan, would be shot; and that the houses of the guilty would be burnt without mercy. This terrible threat, which was justified by the delicate position of the allied army, induced the Basques to remain neutral, very much to the annoyance of Soult, who had all along counted on deriving great assistance from that warlike population.

and the light division, which held Arcangues, was at hand to support him by falling on the flank of the French column. At the same time, it must be admitted, that Soult exhibited no great amount of resolution. The duke used to say of him that he was generally right in his plans, but never knew when to strike.]

The treaty of Valençay which had been secretly submitted to the regency in the course of December, 1813, was the cause of still greater embarrassment to Wellington. The treaty in question, negotiated by Count Laforêt, and signed on the 8th December, 1813, had for its object to sow dissension among the enemies of the Emperor, and to place at his disposal the troops which were still left in Spain. It engaged, that in return for the restoration of Ferdinand VII. to the throne, and the immediate evacuation of the Peninsular territory, they who had come to drive away the usurper should be expelled from Spain. It necessarily excited much irritation among all true patriots, and gave great offence to the British government.

The regency also condemned it, because it was little favourable to democratic principles; and Wellington, in spite of his dislike of these principles, and the annoyances which the regency had caused him, did not hesitate to support the authority of that body; solely because the interests, of which he had undertaken the defence, demanded this sacrifice of his private opinions. Moreover, many reasons combined to convince him that the proposed arrangement was very likely to succeed, and that, in the army in particular, it would find warm support. He pointed out to the English government all the dangers with which such a treaty threatened England and Spain. Fortunately, however, they were dispersed by the rapid progress of events, and by the opposition of the Cortès, which refused to sanction an arrangement which Ferdinand, still a prisoner, had the weakness to accept at the hands of the Emperor. But for this circumstance, Wellington's difficulties would have increased from day to day; for, in spite of his

eminent services, his influence over the English ministers was still imperfect, and with those of Spain he possessed none. The former entertained such mistaken notions in regard to the general state of affairs, and the necessities of the war, that sometimes they were eager to carry on operations in Holland and in the Peninsula simultaneously; sometimes they pressed the general to move forward without paying attention to anything else; and sometimes they entertained the idea of sending him, with his army, to another part of Europe. They poured their treasure with a free hand into Germany, and left the Peninsular army in the greatest penury. The pay of the muleteers was twenty-six months in arrear, and that of the troops, seven months. The soldiers marched barefooted through the frozen defiles of the Pyrenees, because the Admiralty was always backward in conveying money and clothing to the seat of war. Obliged to pay for everything, the commander-in-chief had contracted enormous debts. In a letter addressed to Lord Bathurst, he says: "I can scarcely stir out of my house, on account of the public creditors waiting to demand payment of what is due to them." He even declares, in his private correspondence, that he was obliged to borrow from a friend the money that was required to pay a courier, whom he found it necessary to send to General Clinton.

The Spanish authorities did not treat Wellington and his brave soldiers better. At Santander they placed the English officers in quarantine, and were desirous of sending them away altogether, on the pretext that yellow fever had broken out; and this at the very time when Wellington, in order to lessen the charge upon the inhabitants, had carried his complaisance so far as

to send to England for portable wooden barracks, in which his sick and wounded were very indifferently lodged. The political chief of Guipuscoa had, besides, given directions to place all the vessels arriving at Santander in quarantine; an arrangement which would have interrupted the communications of the army with its magazines, and obliged it, in the end, to withdraw from the advanced position which it occupied. Fortunately, Wellington averted the consequences of these decrees, as malicious as they were absurd, by declaring that he would pay no respect to them.

Meanwhile, the Anglo-Sicilian army of Catalonia was in the greatest want, and the national troops which operated in that province were dying, so to speak, of hunger. Indeed, the Spanish Government was unwilling to furnish that army with the ammunition and artillery that were required for the defence of Tarragona.

Taking advantage of these circumstances, the Duke of Albufera continued his hostilities against Clinton and Copons, without, however, obtaining over them any success which deserves to be mentioned. Subsequently to the treaty of Valençay, he received orders to negotiate with Copons the restoration of all the fortresses except Figuieres and Rosas, on condition that their garrisons should be permitted to join the army in the field. But this proposal having been rejected by the regency, on the advice of Wellington, Suchet destroyed the works of several small places, dismantled Gerona and Rosas, and concentrated his troops at Figuieres, where he remained inactive, rather than support Soult with 12,000 or 13,000 veterans, whom he had at his disposal.

While these events were in progress, Napoleon, find-

ing the storm gather on all points at once, hastened to conclude an open treaty with Ferdinand, by setting him at liberty. That crafty and weak prince quitted Valençay on the 13th March, and on the 19th, entered Perpignan, where the Duke of Albufera waited to receive him. On the 22nd, he passed into the Spanish territory, accompanied by the marshal, who, having obtained from him pledges that he would take immediate steps for the restitution of the garrisons, escorted him as far as the banks of the Fluvia. There Copons's army was assembled to receive him. The French drew up on the opposite bank of the river, and both rendered to Ferdinand the honours due to his rank. The new king proceeded in succession to Gerona, Tarragona, Reus, Saragossa, Teruela, and Valencia. He no sooner reached the latter town, on the 16th April, than he gathered about him Elio's army, and proudly declared himself an enemy to reform and to the Cortès. On the 5th May, he resumed his journey, escorted by Elio's troops, and by the grandees of the kingdom, who crowded round him.

A corps of 25,000 or 30,000 men was directed to occupy Madrid; and on the 4th May, Ferdinand put forth, as a sort of presage of his cruelties, the celebrated manifesto, in which, after having severely criticised the conduct of the Cortès, he declared it "to be null and void in its constitution and decrees, and forbade them, on pain of death, ever to be mentioned." This reactionary manifesto was published on the 10th, and immediately afterwards the troops took possession of the hall of the Cortès and that of the regency. Upwards of thirty deputies, two members of the regency, and all the

ministers, were arrested by General Eguia. The other members of the government took to flight.

The Cortès had adopted no measures to defend either its rights or its threatened existence. Indeed, according to the acknowledgment of a liberal deputy, the Count Toreno, it had nothing to trust to, either among the people or in the army.

The king made his entrance on the 14th amid a lively enthusiasm, and this reception, interpreted in the sense which was agreeable to the court, became the starting point of a course of violent reaction against the advanced party. Ferdinand set the example in this career; and thus, instead of pacifying a nation which had need of rest, he drew it into fresh struggles by his ingratitude and duplicity.

After the ceremony on the Fluvia, the Duke of Albufera repassed the Pyrenees, leaving behind him one division at Figuieres and garrisons at Barcelona, Tortosa, Morella, Peniscola, Sagunto, and Denia. The troops in Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, marched out in obedience to orders forged by Van Halen. But they were surrounded in a hollow road by Copons and Clinton, and obliged to surrender. This was the last incident in the Spanish war. Santona, of which the siege was never raised, surrendered, with other fortresses, at the general peace, and on the 14th of April, Clinton's troops began their march, some to embark at Tarragona, others to join Wellington.

All this while the allied army was stopped upon the Nive, partly by want of money, but much more because of the bad state of the roads. Some authors have accounted for the delay by attributing it to indolence and want of resolution on the part of the commander-in-

chief. But on this head we must be permitted to give a preference to the opinion of Marshal Soult, who knew something about military matters, and had no interest in flattering his formidable antagonist. "It appears certain," he writes to the minister of war on the 22nd of December, 1813, "that in spite of the bad weather, the enemy are bent on continuing their operations. The enterprise which they meditate is very difficult, and I do not think they will succeed without heavy loss; but we must not hide from ourselves that they are very strong, and will make great sacrifices to accomplish their object. Up to this moment they must have paid dear for their sojourn on French territory; for their troops suffer much, and they are continually losing a vast quantity of horses and animals."

At the beginning of 1814, the position of the English general was improved by the rejection of the treaty of Valençay, by the transmission to him of a considerable sum in ingots, and by the arrival of reinforcements. The situation of Soult, on the contrary, was rendered more distressing by the departure of 10,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, and still more by the feeling of hostility which the population of the south of France was beginning to exhibit towards the government. He no longer considered his force to be in a condition to carry on a regular war with the Allies, but proposed to leave 14,000 men in the camp at Toulouse, while he directed the remainder of his troops, too few to keep the field, towards the left, with instructions to join a great body of partisans, who, resting upon the Pyrenees, should throw themselves upon Wellington's flanks and rear, in the event of his endeavouring to penetrate into France. This project, which the Duke of Dalmatia wished to

apply to the defence of the whole territory, and to carry into effect by a sort of *levée en masse*, was submitted to the Emperor; but he refused to sanction it, because it was revolutionary and calculated to stir up civil war. It became necessary, therefore, to return to a system of regular warfare, but under conditions more and more unfavourable to the French army.

Wellington meditated at this time a bold stroke, rightly to understand which it will be necessary to observe how the hostile armies were placed. That of the Allies, deployed about Bayonne in a semicircle of three leagues in extent, had its left resting upon the sea, its centre at Ustaritz and Villafranca, its right in the space between the Nive and the Upper Adour. Its head-quarters were at St. Jean de Luz, and the greater part of its cavalry kept, for lack of forage, on the other side of the Pyrenees, along the banks of the Ebro. The total strength of that army, which Soult reckoned at 135,000 men, did not in reality exceed 70,000 Anglo-Portuguese and 30,000 Spaniards, about 100,000 men in all, of whom 10,000 were cavalry, with 100 guns. The French army was, in like manner, spread over the arc of a circle, having its right supported by the mouth of the Adour, its centre at the confluence of that river with the Gaves, its left at St. Jean-pied-de-port, and its head-quarters near the centre of the line. Soult had under his orders, exclusive of garrison reserves and detachments at Bordeaux and in the Upper Pyrenees, as well as of conscripts of the second levy, who were only just beginning to come in, about 35,000 combatants, of whom 3000 were cavalry with 40 pieces of cannon.

The allied army could not commit itself in the French territory, leaving the intrenched camp of Bayonne on

its left flank. But in order to blockade or besiege that place, it was absolutely necessary to drive the French army away from it and to cross the Adour, a river deep, rapid, very large at its mouth, subject to the action of strong tides, and defended, besides, by a flotilla of gun-boats, and by a body of troops established in an excellent defensive position.

The difficulties of the passage might be escaped by crossing the streams tributary to the Adour, above the points which Soult had fortified, so as to turn the left of the French in the direction of Pau. This movement would place the allied army upon the Duke of Dalmatia's communications with Toulouse, and close to those which connected him with Bordeaux. It would compel Soult to retreat upon the latter town across the Landes, where the allied cavalry, greatly superior in number, would, without doubt, find an opportunity of falling upon his little army, and driving it into the sea. In any event, this manœuvre must separate the army of Spain from that of Aragon and Catalonia, under the orders of Suchet. In a strategical point of view, no other combination offered so many advantages, but it had this drawback, that it must weaken the front of operations for the Allies, and place the Adour, as well as its affluents, between the corps acting in the field and the left wing, which would have it in charge to watch and restrain the garrison of Bayonne. This inconvenience might be seriously lessened, if the Gave de Pau could be crossed between Orthez and Peyrehorade. The same strategical end would be accomplished by such a movement, as if an attack were made upon Pau itself. But the movement would be attended with much greater difficulties in the execution, as well on

account of the natural obstacles to be surmounted, as because Soult was prepared to dispute the passage of the streams on that part of his front of defence.

Again, it would be extremely difficult to cross the Adour below Toulouse, because the strength of the current and the ebb and flow of the tide rendered the use of pontoons impossible. The passage could be made good only by vessels of considerable tonnage, whereas the mouth of the Adour, choked up with sand-banks, presented obstacles to the approach of such vessels which the country people considered to be invincible. Such, too, was the conviction of Soult, and it was his knowledge of that fact which determined Lord Wellington to attempt the passage in that direction. By acting in this manner, he would likewise, in the event of success, be able to make himself master of Dax and of Porte de Landes, and so cut off the French army from Bordeaux. That town was extremely well disposed towards the Allies, and its capture without giving his troops much trouble would enable Wellington to exercise extensive influence over the population of the south.

In a military point of view it was doubtless of more consequence to separate Soult from Suchet; but looking at the matter through a political medium, the possession of Bordeaux was to be preferred; more especially as Wellington, whose information was generally correct, could not be ignorant of the circumstances which would render the junction of these two marshals highly probable.

Looking at these considerations in the aggregate, we are not disposed to condemn the determination, bold as it was, at which Lord Wellington arrived, of taking

advantage of Soult's false security to force the passage of the Adour at its mouth; though, if regard be had only to the principles of strategy, we are led to the conclusion that it would have been wiser to turn the left of the French army, by attacking on the side either of Pau or of Orthez.

The following are the arrangements which the commander-*in-chief* adopted, in order to carry his plan into execution.

Forty chasse-marées were secretly laden with planks and other materials necessary for the construction of a bridge. These vessels and a few gun-boats were, with the assistance of the navy, to ascend the Adour, and protect the passage. At the same time, in order to weaken the means of defence on that side, and to deceive the enemy in regard to the real object of the Allies, the great body of the troops were to be moved upon Soult's left, while a demonstration upon his centre should attract his attention towards the lower parts of the streams falling into the Adour, and create in him a belief, by the assembling of boats and other things, that it was intended to cross the river above Bayonne. The frost, which continued into the commencement of February, facilitated the execution of this design.

On the 14th, Hill, with 20,000 men and sixteen pieces of cannon, was directed to move in two columns from Ureurray, and Hasparen upon Helette and Bonloo; the first column was to dislodge Harispe from Helette, the second to drive in the French outposts beyond Larran. Beresford received orders to hold the centre in check, while Hope was especially charged with the operations against the enemy's right.

Hill's first proceeding was to push back Harispe, to

cut off the communications of the French with St. Jean-pied-de-Port, and to invest that place with Mina's troops. On the morrow he advanced towards Garris, where he had a second and sharper affair with Harispe. Wellington himself was in that quarter, and personally directed the operations, which ended in favour of the Allies. The Bedouze was crossed on the 16th at St. Palais, and the Soissons on the day following, near Arriveriette. Hill was then enabled to establish himself on the further side of the watercourses, and to make arrangements for passing the Gave d'Oleron, which the French seemed disposed to defend with great vigour.

It was Wellington's desire himself to superintend the execution of this operation, because, in the event of the passage of the Adour being interrupted by stress of weather, or any other insuperable impediment, much would depend upon it. But, on reaching Garris, he found that the bridge equipment had not yet arrived; he therefore returned to the Lower Adour, where General Hope, in concert with Admiral Penrose, was taking all the steps necessary to ensure the safe passage of the river. This ought to have been effected on the 21st February, but contrary winds and a tempestuous sea rendered it impossible for the convoy to quit Socoa. Wherefore, to avoid further delays, Sir John Hope resolved to do what he could with the means already at his disposal, namely, eighteen pontoons and six small boats. He moved, in consequence, upon Anglet, in the night between the 22nd and 23rd, with 28,000 men, and twenty pieces of cannon; and next morning, placing his guns in battery, forced the French flotilla to move higher up the river. The same evening, six companies of guards, two of riflemen, and a detachment of rockets,

crossed over; but they were scarcely established on the further side, when they were assailed by two French battalions, whom, however, they succeeded in driving back into the town. At the same time, more troops passed to the enemy's bank upon the pontoons, so that three brigades, or 8000 men, were assembled there, when Penrose's chasse-marées anchored in their appointed positions. These vessels, the approach of which was signalled at noon on the 24th, encountered unlooked-for difficulties in surmounting the breakers; indeed, many of them, in the endeavour to cross the bar, grounded upon the sandbanks, or were broken by the fury of the waves. The violence of the wind and the destruction of all signals added greatly to the difficulties of an undertaking which was in itself sufficiently laborious and full of danger.

The chasse-marées, to the number of twenty-six, cast anchor three miles below Bayonne. They were placed forty feet apart, from centre to centre; and upon them, as upon floating piers, steps were immediately taken to lay a platform with cables and planks. By mid-day on the 26th, the bridge was strong enough to bear; and next day, Hope, after reinforcing his troops on the other side (who, since the 25th, had been employed in investing the citadel), sent off to inform Wellington of the success of the operation.

General Thouvenot, who commanded the troops left at Bayonne, offered little resistance to the investment of the citadel, for he had scarcely force enough to defend the intrenched camp, menaced as it was at that time by other bodies of the enemy. Supported by Freyre's Spaniards, Hope advanced upon St. Etienne, from which he drove the French. He then completed

the investment of Bayonne on the side of the citadel, and sent back to the army two English divisions, which had heretofore kept the place in observation between the Nive and the Adour. Meanwhile, Wellington had returned on the 21st to Garris, and the pontoons collected there being directed upon the Gave d'Oleron, Hill's troops crossed on the 24th at Villenare and Montfort.

While this was going on, Beresford, whose duty it was to hold the centre of the French army in check upon the lower Bedouze, had attacked the enemy, on the 23rd, in his fortified posts on the left of the Gave de Pau, and compelled him to withdraw within the tête-de-pont of Peyréhorade. At this moment the whole front of the enemy was stretched over an extent of twenty-five miles, from Hastingues to Oyergave. The object of these extended operations was to mask from Soult the real point of attack.

The passage of the Gave d'Oleron put an end to the marshal's uncertainty. He at once concentrated his troops at Orthez, for the purpose of assuming the offensive. It was a great mistake; for it was the policy of the enemy to draw him away from Bayonne, in order that they might penetrate into France by the St. Jean de Luz road, the single line of operations which was favourable to them.

Soult, who, during the 24th, was with Harispe at a distance of five miles from Montfort, and seven from Villenare, might have prevented the passage of the Oleron, or rendered it a murderous affair. He did nothing of the sort, and thus threw away a good opportunity of obtaining, if not a decisive advantage, at least a partial success over the Allies. After destroying all

the bridges on the Gave de Pau, the marshal fell back, on the 25th, to Orthez, where he intended to give battle. It was there, on the 26th, that he ascertained that Cotton's cavalry, and Picton's infantry divisions, had crossed the Gave de Pau, the evening before, above Berenx; while Beresford's *corps d'armée*, finding the works at Peyréhorade abandoned by Foy, had pushed forward by a ford, and crossed a pontoon bridge between that place and Puyo.

With a view to open a communication between the centre and left of the Allies, Hope constructed, out of the vessels brought from Urt, a bridge at Porte de Landes.

If Soult had foreseen in time the march of Beresford's and Picton's columns, he might have inflicted upon them a severe check. He lays the blame of his own negligence on his light cavalry; but the excuse is admissible only in part, for on the 26th the marshal, if he had acted promptly, might have destroyed the third division, which was entangled in a narrow defile leading from the ford of Berenx to the Peyréhorade road.

Be this as it may, the condition of the Duke of Dalmatia was far from satisfactory. His right wing was turned, or on the point of being so, and his position at Orthez afforded no means of repairing the mischief. The French could retreat from Orthez to St. Sever only by a road through a difficult country intersected with marshes; its right, posted at St. Boës, was *en l'air*, and could easily be overlapped in the direction where the high grounds began to melt away. Now, if this wing were overwhelmed, the Allies would be as near to Soult's line of retreat as his own left, which was established at Orthez; and if a rapid movement afterwards should make them masters of Sault de

Navailles, the whole French army, if not lost, would, at all events, be compelled to abandon the Bordeaux road, as well as its magazines at Dax, Mont de Marsan, and Aire, and to retreat upon Toulouse.

Wellington promptly availed himself of the opportunities presented by such a state of affairs; but as a portion of his force was still in the rear, it became necessary for him to gain time. For this purpose he put Picton's and Beresford's troops in motion, as if he intended at once to attack the French. It was a skilful demonstration, and enabled him to wait two hours, without any offensive movement being attempted by Soult, for the coming up of the sixth and light divisions from Berenx; but as soon as these troops arrived, he directed Beresford to fall upon the enemy's right with the fourth and seventh divisions, supported by Vivian's cavalry, and to turn it. General Picton, meanwhile, with the third and sixth divisions, was to carry the heights held by their centre and left; while Hill, with the second division and Le Cor's Portuguese, should cross the Gave de Pau at Souars, in order to get beyond their left, and cut off their retreat upon Pau. Lastly, Alten's light division received orders to remain in reserve on the right bank of the stream.

The French army occupied a line of heights extending from St. Boës to Orthez, partly wooded, partly bare. On the right was Reille, with the divisions of Taupin, Roguet, and Paris. In the centre was Count D'Erlon, with Foy's and Armagnac's divisions. On the left, resting on the village of Orthez, was Clausel's corps, consisting of the divisions of Villatte and Harispe. Twelve pieces of cannon were attached to this latter division, twelve more were upon the height occupied by

BATTLE OF ORTHES.

27th February 1814.

the centre. The sixteen pieces which remained were in reserve upon the road to Dax.

The action began about nine o'clock in the morning. After a desperate struggle, Beresford carried the village of St. Boës; but the ground to the left and rear of that village was so broken, that the troops were unable to deploy, so as to attack the heights occupied by the enemy's right. They could not, moreover, succeed in turning it, for that movement would have separated Beresford from Picton, and destroyed, in consequence, the connection between the different parts of the allied order of battle.

Observing how matters went, Soult made his principal effort on the side of Reille. The English soldiers performed prodigies of valour, but, assailed by men as brave as themselves in narrow defiles which led up to the position, they were obliged to retire, leaving a large number of dead and wounded on the field.

The battle appeared lost, and Soult was exclaiming, "At last I have them!" when, by a sudden inspiration, Wellington changed his plan of attack, and directed Picton's two divisions, and a brigade of the light division, against the left of the height which was held by Reille's corps. This vigorous effort produced an unexpected result, and was particularly creditable to the 52nd regiment of the line, which received orders to take in flank and rear the troops which were pushing back the column from St. Boës. That gallant regiment crossed a marsh under the fire of the enemy, and threw itself with such violence upon Foy's and Taupin's divisions, that it compelled them to retire.

This success opened to Wellington a direct passage to the rear of St. Boës, of which he availed himself to ad-

vance and deploy the fourth and seventh divisions, Vivian's cavalry, and two batteries of field-artillery. Immediately after the evacuation of the village, where the fighting had continued uninterruptedly for seven hours, Beresford, no longer opposed by any serious obstacle, effected his junction with Picton and Alten upon the crest of the heights.

Meanwhile, Hill, with 12,000 men, had made good the passage of the Gave above Orthez, and after a brief survey of the whole field of battle, moved direct towards the great road from Orthez to St. Sever, in order to cut off the retreat of the French army.

Satisfied that his position was no longer tenable, Soult resolved to abandon it. It was an extremely difficult operation, particularly on account of the nature of the ground, intersected with ravines, and cumbered with brushwood which the right and centre would be obliged to cross. Nevertheless it succeeded perfectly, thanks to the skill and promptitude with which Soult changed his line of retreat. If he had moved towards Bordeaux instead of Toulouse, Wellington could have driven him into the Landes, where the French army would have encountered the greatest hazards, because the English were incontestably superior in cavalry. "The enemy's retreat," says Wellington, "was conducted at first with admirable order; but as soon as the attacks of the English and Hill's movement compelled them to precipitate their march, it became a flight in which the troops fell into the greatest confusion. Many soldiers threw away their arms, and desertion greatly increased from that moment."

The rout of which Wellington speaks was the result of a vigorous attack by Hill. By and by, however, the

French troops got into order behind Luy de Bearne, and continued their movement upon St. Sever, destroying all the bridges upon the Luy and its affluents. This latter circumstance, joined to a violent storm, which flooded the rivers and damaged the flying bridges, rendered the pursuit slow, and little dangerous to the French.

Soult lost 4000 men and six pieces of cannon. During the retreat many thousand conscripts threw away their arms; and within a month, the number of deserters amounted to 3000 more. The Allies had only 277 killed, 1923 wounded, and seventy missing. Among the number of the wounded were Generals Walker and Ross. A ball, which glanced from the guard of his sword, inflicted a severe contusion on Wellington's thigh. The blow gave him such a shock that he fell to the ground; but he was on his feet again in a moment, and in a condition to laugh at General Alava, who was wounded almost at the same instant, but more severely, in a very sensitive and fleshy spot, any accident to which is sure to produce laughter.

At one o'clock on the 28th Wellington passed the Adour at St. Sever, and immediately afterwards detached Beresford with the light division and Vivian's light cavalry to seize the magazines at Mont de Marsan. Meanwhile Hill reached Samadet, mid-way between Orthez and the Adour. He halted there during part of the 29th, after which he resumed his march towards the river, and reached it on the 1st. He next moved upon Aire, where there was a park of artillery and magazines, which the Duke of Dalmatia, during his retreat, had put under the protection of General Clausel. A sharp affair took place on the 2nd of March.

At first all the chances were in Clausel's favour; but in the end Hill's obstinacy succeeded, and his adversary retired, leaving the magazines in the hands of the victors.

If Hill had marched with greater celerity, he might have anticipated Clausel at Aire on the 1st; in which case the battle of the 2nd would have been avoided.

Looking back upon what has just been stated, it will be seen that in sixteen days Wellington effected the passage of five great rivers and many small streams; forced the enemy to abandon two *têtes de pont*, and several works of less importance; fought successfully one great and two smaller battles; took six pieces of cannon; made about one thousand prisoners; took possession of the magazines at Dax, Aire, and Mont de Marsan; threw a bridge over the mouth of the Adour; invested Bayonne, the boulevard of the south of France; and lastly compelled the French army to uncover Bordeaux, and to retire before effecting its junction with the Duke of Albufera; a matter, no doubt, upon which Soult counted very little, though Wellington must have regarded it as imminent.

These results were not owing entirely to the numerical superiority of the Allies. Indeed it is very doubtful whether this superiority was as great as some authors pretend. In point of fact, it appears from very exact calculations, supplied by the most conscientious historian of the war in the Peninsula*, that Soult had at the battle of Orthez 40,000 men, of whom 35,000 were good troops; that Wellington brought into the field 4800 cavalry and eight pieces of cannon more than his opponent, but that in infantry he was inferior by

* Napier.

4000 or 5000 men. The inequality between the belligerents consisted therefore rather in their moral than in their physical strength. But the true cause of the success of the Allies must be sought for in the general effect of the movements ordered by their commander-in-chief. For the impartial observer cannot but perceive that Wellington exhibited in this campaign far greater ability than his illustrious opponent. He took advantage, with singular sagacity, of all the favourable circumstances which presented themselves; and displayed in the execution of his plans a boldness well calculated to put to silence those who speak of him as a timid general, shrinking from the initiative. The only error with which he can be reproached is with having given to Beresford at the battle of Orthez so few troops that the Duke of Dalmatia might have been able to force the centre of the Allied army. Fortunately the French general never thought of profiting by this mistake; or, at all events, did not adopt the measures necessary to turn it to account.

Wellington exhibited little alacrity in the pursuit; but this circumstance, often pointed out already, is attributable rather to some defect in the organisation of the English army than to any want of resolution on the part of the commander-in-chief. The Peninsular army, indeed, was almost always unable to reap the fruits of its successes. We shall endeavour in a subsequent chapter to give the fullest explanation on this point of which the subject will admit.

As it was the object of Wellington not to make a mere inroad into France, but to effect a solid lodgment there, he considered it judicious to awaken sentiments *in his* favour, such as a general in an enemy's country seldom

thinks of drawing forth. Indeed history presents few examples of an invasion carried on under similar circumstances. While combating the military forces of France, the Allies showed themselves to be the friends of the French people. Their leader protected the inhabitants against the excesses of his own soldiers; and, levying no contributions, paid promptly and faithfully for whatever was required. By these arrangements, which were in perfect conformity with his own sentiments and habits, Wellington hoped to accomplish, more surely than by any other means, the object which he had in view; viz. to awaken in the south of France a reactionary feeling in favour of the House of Bourbon. In order to judge of the temper of men's minds, he had proposed to his Government, after passing the frontier, to send to him the Duke of Angoulême. The proposition was well received, and the eldest son of the Count d'Artois proceeded to the allied head-quarters, where he arrived in the beginning of February, 1814. Wellington gave him a hearty reception; yet, while prepared to support him when the proper moment should come, he resisted all premature solicitations, and even induced him to maintain for some time his incognito under the name of Count de Pradel. With the rare good sense which characterised him, he comprehended that to precipitate matters would expose them to the risk of total ruin. Instead, therefore, of declaring openly for the Bourbons, as he was strenuously urged to do, Wellington went no further than to establish relations with their principal adherents, and to draw out opinions in the south of France hostile to the Imperial *régime*.

The members of the exiled royal family did not con-

sider this to be sufficient, and spoke of the English general as exhibiting excessive timidity and reserve. The Duke of Angoulême, in particular, appeared impatient to cross the Adour and to march upon Bordeaux. But Wellington remained immovable in the course which he believed to be dictated by loyalty and prudence. Since the 20th of December, 1813, he had entreated Lord Bathurst to abstain from putting a Bourbon forward so long as there should be a hope of concluding peace on reasonable terms with Buonaparte, and till the French people should make some public manifestation in favour of that family. He wrote in similar terms to many statesmen who pressed him to declare himself openly. He made the same observations to all, that it would be neither convenient nor just to engage the provinces of the south prematurely in revolt, which, in the event of peace being concluded with the emperor, must lead to severe measures of repression. Besides, he was by no means satisfied that public opinion had taken the turn which in some circles it was supposed to have done, or that an attempt at a restoration might not lead to an attempt in an opposite direction. The *émeute* at Bordeaux afforded proof, by and by, that his judgment in this respect was correct, and that he acted wisely in refusing to declare himself. By little and little, however, the urgency of his own Government and the solicitations of the Bourbons and of the allied sovereigns obliged Wellington to change his measures. In a proclamation issued in the commencement of March he says to the French people, "Come, then, and range yourselves under the banner of your legitimate princes;" and in another, in which he contrasted the claims of the rival dynasties, he says, "No more

tyranny, no more war, no more conscriptions, no more vexatious impositions."

This appeal on the part of a man who had made himself respected and almost beloved by the French for the gentleness and equity of his conduct, produced an excellent effect. It may be said that the revolution which was brought about in the public opinion of the south of France turned less upon the prestige of a dethroned royalty than upon the political ability of the English general. In an official letter written from Bayonne at this period we find the following significant avowal: — "The wise conduct of the English general, and the excellent discipline which he maintains among his troops, do us more harm than the loss of ten battles. All the peasants desire to place themselves under his protection."

Wellington had invited the inhabitants, by proclamation, to organise themselves against plunderers, and to send them in to head-quarters, with sufficient proof of their guilt. Subsequently to this recommendation one English marauder was shot by the peasants, and another by order of the commander-in-chief was executed. He even sent away from the army a colonel who had permitted his soldiers to destroy the communal archives of a small town. "Maintain," wrote Wellington to the Spanish general Freyre, "maintain the strictest discipline, for without that we are lost." And in another letter, being full of indignation that he could not stop Morillo's troops from plundering, he says, "I have lost 20,000 men in this campaign, but it was not in order that General Morillo, or anybody else, should come and plunder the French peasants; as long as I command I will not permit it — if they wish to plunder, they must

find another chief for the army. It is a matter of perfect indifference to me whether I command a large army or a small one; but, whether great or small, it must obey me, and, above all, it must not plunder."

Thanks to this policy, as wise as it was moderate, the situation of Soult became continually more and more uncomfortable. The treason and hostile temper of his countrymen made themselves manifest in every conceivable way. "I shall not be surprised," he writes to the Minister of War, "to see the inhabitants of these districts soon taking up arms against us." Desertion into the interior deprived him of many young soldiers, and every attempt to procure food was attended with great difficulty. Meanwhile Bordeaux had become the focus of a Legitimist conspiracy, and the Duke d'Angoulême, who followed the English army, kept up these intrigues, and even invited the soldiers to desert their eagles. With an energy and patriotism which were too rare at that period, Soult made incredible efforts to re-establish public opinion, and called upon the French to defend at least the soil of their country against foreign armies. "Let us show ourselves Frenchmen," he says, "and die with arms in our hands, rather than survive our dishonour." Vain hope! the government of Napoleon, like other tyrannies, had enervated men's character, and substituted for true patriotism a species of national vanity, which could be gratified only by the prestige of victory. At the first reverse the feeling evaporated, and the French people, amid the clouds of smoke which obscured the soil of Europe, saw only their own blood uselessly shed, their families wasted away, their goods taken from them, their happiness destroyed. However legitimate might be these subjects of regret, whatever

amount of blame might attach to Napoleon, it is still impossible not to admire those heroic bands, the slaves of duty and of honour, who up to the last moment gathered round the tricolored flag. Entire devotion to a cause, even if it be unjust, always inspires greater respect than defection, even if it be sanctioned by important considerations of state.

Marshal Soult had halted between Maubourget and Rubastans to cover Tarbes, and watch the development of Wellington's plans, who had it in his power to move either upon Bordeaux or Toulouse. If the English general should prefer the former course, the Duke of Dalmatia, as is shown by one of his letters to the Minister of War, was prepared to throw himself upon the rear of the Allies, and to force them to return. If, on the contrary, Wellington should direct the bulk of his forces upon Toulouse, without taking notice of Bordeaux, Soult hoped that he should be able seriously to disturb the left and rear of the enemy. Between these two extreme plans, however, there was a third, the execution of which circumstances rendered at once more easy and more sure. This was to take advantage of the political agitation which prevailed at Bordeaux to occupy that city with a detached force, while the main army kept Soult at bay; and then, strengthened by the political influence which the possession of such an important place would give to the Allies, to continue the pursuit of the French army in the direction of Toulouse. With a view to the execution of this plan, as well as to meet the demands of the Duke d'Angoulême, which became daily more urgent, Wellington sent Marshal Beresford, with 12,000 men, in the beginning of March, to take possession of Bordeaux. General Lhuillier, not

having troops enough to defend the town, withdrew into the citadel of Blaye, and into other little forts upon the right bank of the river. Beresford arrived on the 12th, and was received with acclamation; on which day also the Duke of Angoulême exhibited himself and determined his partisans to proclaim Louis XVIII.

Wellington, whose great object it was not to embarrass any negotiations which might be in progress by giving pledges to the party of the Bourbons, had put Beresford upon his guard against such an eventuality. "On arriving at Bordeaux," he writes in his instructions of the 7th of March, "declare that I am ready to support all who show themselves disposed to overturn Buonaparte; but add, that I charge the inhabitants well to consider the matter, before they raise a standard against the established government, and engage in acts of hostility. Finally, if the municipality declare that they will not proclaim Louis XVIII. without your orders, you will refuse to give any orders of the sort."

In accordance with this policy, which was frankly avowed, the commander-in-chief considered it right to protest against a proclamation, in which the Mayor of Bordeaux assigned to the Allies a part which they had not undertaken to play. His letter of the 29th of March to the Duke of Angoulême goes even so far as to declare that the proclamation of Louis XVIII. had taken place, in opposition to his wishes. Neither did he conceal from that prince that he was dissatisfied because he, for the sake of promoting the cause of the Bourbons and advancing their interests, had imprudently committed the English army. Lastly, that he might be consistent throughout, he peremptorily refused to the Duke of Angoulême the supplies of money and men which a

few days after the *coup d'état* at Bordeaux, he had solicited, and at a moment when the seeds of reaction were manifesting themselves in that town. Rarely were the prudence and firmness of Wellington so severely tried. He came out of the difficulty with honour. But the royal family of France long regarded him with dislike for what they called his coldness and want of resolution. Having ascertained about this time that 10,000 veterans of Suchet's army, under the orders of Beurman, had arrived at Lyons, Wellington found himself, to his great regret, obliged to call down from the Pyrenees two divisions of Freyre's Gallicans, whose disposition to plunder, notwithstanding that they were paid out of the English chest, could not be restrained. As to the troops of Abisbal cantoned along the frontier, they refused to march, under the pretext that their equipments were defective, and the men greatly fatigued.

Wellington and Soult spent some time in watching one another. They both believed that they were in presence of a force more considerable than either of them could show; Soult because he was ignorant of Beresford's expedition, and Wellington because he imagined that Beurman had already joined the Duke of Dalmatia. The fact is that their effective strength was pretty nearly equal; though the balance was turned on the 13th and 14th by the arrival of Freyre's 8000 Spaniards, and Ponsonby's heavy cavalry. The sole ground of apprehension to the English general at that moment was, lest the Spanish regency should accept the convention, proposed to them by Suchet for the evacuation of their fortresses. It was quite possible, in spite of his remonstrances, that the return of Ferdinand might bring this arrangement to bear, in which case 20,000

old soldiers would arrive to strengthen Soult's army. But events were happily tending to arrest the danger.

It was at this time that the Duke of Dalmatia received new instructions from the Emperor which required him to move upon Pau, and to rest his left upon the Pyrenees. Wellington had then his head-quarters at Aire, and his troops were in cantonments on both banks of the Adour. Conceiving that this disposition of the Allies would favour an offensive movement, Soult on the 12th assembled his army at Maubourget, and the following day advanced between Aire and Garlin; but when the two armies found themselves in presence, neither seemed disposed to risk a battle. Fresh rumours had given to the Duke of Dalmatia an exaggerated opinion of the strength of the allied army, and Wellington attributed the bold determination of the marshal to the approach of Suchet's troops. Such was the state of affairs when Soult received tidings of the evacuation of Bordeaux, and the continual arrival of fresh troops in the allied camp. Not believing that it would be convenient to remain any longer in his advanced position, and perhaps fearing that his opponent might turn him by the valley of Bigorre and get before him to Tarbes, he retired before daybreak on the 16th by St. Gaudens towards Toulouse, which had now become his principal dépôt and the base of his future operations.

Wellington followed him with 40,000 bayonets, 6000 sabres, and 50 or 60 guns. His plan was to throw himself by a rapid march into the valley of the Adour, and to bar against the French army the great road leading from Tarbes to St. Gaudens and Toulouse. To effect this purpose, it would be necessary to carry Vic-de-Bigorre, a little town which was situated three

leagues from Tarbes, and was defended by d'Erlon's corps. The attack took place on the 19th, and General Count Drouet, after disputing the ground foot by foot, fell back in good order upon Tarbes. In the morning of the 20th he found himself in position behind that town, upon the plateau of Oleac, Clausel supporting his right, Reille covering the approaches from Tarbes, and the cavalry extending to the road from Trie.

Wellington advanced the same day in two columns. His right, under Clinton, took the direction from Rabastens, his left, preceded by Hill's corps, followed the great road from Vic-de-Bigorre. The advanced guard of the latter column was stopped for some time by troops posted in the suburbs of Tarbes. But the Duke of Dalmatia, seeing himself again threatened in flank, directed Reille to quit Tarbes, while he himself should retire with the main body of his army to a less exposed position.

Hill passed through Tarbes without opposition, but a little way beyond it, had a sharp affair with Clausel's corps. The latter, obliged to retreat, took post at Clarac, while Reille and d'Erlon established themselves at Tournay, and the cavalry took up a position at Trie.

Soult's movement upon Tarbes has been criticised, and not without reason; for if Wellington had moved rapidly from Vic-de-Bigorre and Rabastans upon Trie, he might have headed the French in the plains of Muret. Fortunately for the Duke of Dalmatia, the English army was obliged to carry with it a bridge equipment, materials for repairing the roads, and beasts of burden to transport its provisions. It could therefore advance but slowly and with great circumspection; besides, it was harassed on the march by free corps,

which succeeded in cutting off several convoys. These troublesome contingencies enabled the French army, disembarrassed of almost all its *matériel*, to reach Toulouse three days before the Allies, — a circumstance of which the Duke of Dalmatia availed himself to prepare for the defence of that town.

Certain writers have ventured, because of this fact, to describe Wellington as a timid and over-cautious general; but they do not consider the enormous convoy which he carried with him, in order to spare the conquered provinces, and his disinclination to commit his troops in an unknown country, where bands of partizans were forming upon his flanks, and where he might encounter Suchet, with force enough to attack him in front. Perhaps, too, he considered it unnecessary to fatigue his troops, or to make any great effort to reach Toulouse, where he might not anticipate serious resistance. Indeed, he was ignorant that the French army had begun on the 3rd of March to fortify the town, and this was probably the reason why, on the 26th, he wrote to General Hope, "I fear the Garonne is too full and large for our bridge; if not, we shall be in Toulouse, I hope, immediately." Be this, however, as it may, as he was stronger in artillery and cavalry than his enemy, he certainly ought to have followed him up with much greater vigour.

Wellington has likewise been blamed for having, after the affair of Orthez, left Soult fifteen days in which to re-organise his troops, restore discipline, call in conscripts, form bands of partizans, place Toulouse in a state of defence, and collect in that town all the dépôts of the French army. But they who so reason, forget that Wellington was kept back by the bad state of the roads, and by the necessity of taking possession of Bor-

deaux, which might have disturbed his rear. He had, besides, the assurance of being speedily joined by reinforcements strong enough to counterbalance all these difficulties, and preferred, as usual, success which, though slow, would be certain, to the renown of a more speedy, but dearly bought advantage.

In retiring upon Toulouse, Soult gave proof of talent and determination, for he had it in his power to move, according to circumstances, from that point, either by Carcassonne, towards Suchet, or by Alby, upon Lyons. Master of that point, he commanded several lines of operation, and had the readiest means of reorganising his own troops, of watching the schemes of the Legitimists, of confirming the authority of the government, which had been shaken, in the southern provinces, and, finally, of holding in check an army superior to his own. Soult made his preparations for defence with extraordinary activity, and neglected nothing which could contribute to its success.

The town of Toulouse is covered on three sides by the canal of Languedoc, and by the Garonne. In 1814 it was, besides, surrounded by an old wall, flanked by towers, which was put in a state of defence. A second line was formed by retrenching the bridges on the canal from its mouth as far as the bridge of Demoiselles. This line, to which the town served as a citadel, covered the road from Carcassonne, by which the junction could be effected between Soult and the Duke of Albufera, whether the latter should at last decide on quitting Catalonia to make a diversion in favour of his colleague, or that both should retire upon Biziers.

The canal was exposed in many places to the fire of musketry, and along its whole extent to the fire of artil-

lery from the old wall. Between the canal and the river Ers there was a height called Mount Rave, which was fortified by throwing up five redoubts, and connecting them by retrenchments. Finally, on the left bank of the Garonne, an excellent tête de pont was formed in advance of the Faubourg St. Cyprien, which was itself surrounded by an old wall capable of defence. Thus all the assailable parts of the town, the gates, the suburbs, the bridges, and roads, were protected by field-works, and a numerous artillery; and Soult had, over and above, sent a detachment to occupy and retrench the tête de pont of Montauban, by means of which he could insure his retreat behind the Tarn, and, in case of need, be in a position to take up a new line of operations.

Reduced to this extremity, the marshal stifled his just repugnance, and wrote, for the last time, to Suchet, entreating him to come and join him. But his present proposal was not more favourably received than those which had preceded it, and the Duke of Dalmatia, deceived over and over again, was thrown, in the end, upon his own resources, and fought rather for the honour of the French flag than for the defence of a territory invaded on so many points at the same time.

When Wellington arrived in front of Toulouse the position of the French army was very formidable. To attack them in front, by the faubourg of St. Cyprien, was to risk a check at the outset. There was a better chance of success in passing the Garonne above the town, so as to interpose between Soult and Montauban, and to turn the town itself on the north and east. "By this movement," says General Vaudencourt, "Wellington could have achieved a threefold object; first, he could have cut off the communication between the

army of the Pyrenees and that of Arragon, and compelled the latter to remain in the Pyrenees, which it could not pass, because Narbonne would be occupied before it; next he might have co-operated in the general plan of invasion arranged by the Allies, which was, that he should take possession of Languedoc, and thence give aid to the troops who were moving upon Lyons; lastly, he would have turned the Duke of Dalmatia's position, and compelled him to retire upon Alby, abandoning the line of the Garonne."

The passage of the river above Toulouse, however, and the attack by the south, could be effected only by making a wide detour, in order to pass the Ariège at Cintegabelle, and by crossing marshy plains that were impracticable for artillery. Still, Wellington, perceiving that the defences on the south side were the least complete, directed Hill, on the night of the 27th, to attempt the passage at Portet; but the river proved too wide to be spanned by the pontoons which had been brought up. This miscalculation proved very useful to Soult, who ordered new works to be constructed, in order to guard against a mode of attack which he had not previously foreseen.

Meanwhile Hill, with 13,000 men and 18 guns, passed the Garonne, on the 30th, upon a bridge thrown across at Pinsaguel. The same day he received orders to pass the Ariège at Cintegabelle, to descend the right bank of that stream, and to attack Toulouse upon the south side. Wellington was to attack, at the same time, the Faubourg St. Cyprien. But the unfavourable condition of the country obliged Hill to fall back; a vexatious result, which the Allies might have escaped if they had reconnoitred the locality in the first instance. The consequence was that Wellington found himself in a

critical situation, till information was communicated to him that by immediately passing the Garonne above the city, he might prevent the completion of the works on Mount Rave, which Soult had begun only on the 2nd of April.

Having discovered between Grenada and Merville a convenient place for the construction of a bridge, he directed Marshal Beresford to move upon that point in the morning of the 4th with Cole's, Picton's, and Clinton's divisions, and Somerset's and Vivian's brigades, followed at a little distance by Freyre's corps and Ponsonby's brigade. The rains and the extraordinary rise in the waters rendered the passage of the river at first impossible. Nevertheless, in the night between the 4th and 5th, Beresford's leading column succeeded in establishing itself on the opposite bank, while, at the same time, a sudden fresh broke away the tacklings and obliged the artillery to withdraw the pontoons. This disagreeable accident isolated Beresford on the right of the river with 15,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry. Had the main body of the French attacked him at that moment, his destruction would have been inevitable. But instead of taking advantage of so favourable a contingency, Marshal Soult contented himself with observing Beresford, who, after forty-eight hours of incessant labour, succeeded in restoring his bridge and putting himself in communication with Freyre.

At an early hour in the morning of the 10th the memorable battle of Toulouse began. Wellington's total strength amounted to 43,000 infantry, of whom 12,000 were Spaniards, with 7000 cavalry and 64 guns. Soult, according to the official statements, could muster only 39,166 combatants; but his artillery amounted to 80 pieces, and his position was strongly intrenched. The

ground, besides, was not favourable to the numerous cavalry of the English, and a third part of the allied army was separated from the main body by a wide river. Thus the disproportion between the belligerents was by no means so great as certain authors have represented it to be.

The real field of battle was limited to Mount Rave on the east side of the city. That hill, or rather, that chain of steep heights, defended by field-works and abatis, and covered by the Ers, lay within cannon-shot of the intrenchments. The bed of the river was not fordable, and in order to reach Mount Rave it was necessary, in the first instance, to carry the bridge of Croix-Daurade, which Wellington had done on the 8th, and then to advance by a flank march under the fire of the enemy between the Ers and the height in question. The height itself must next be stormed, and the canal of Languedoc crossed above the Faubourg Guillemerie, in order to carry the assailants to the south of Toulouse, on which side alone the town could be attacked with any prospect of success.

Though this plan, after the fruitless effort of Hill, was preferable to all others, it could not fail to be defective and in some sort to compromise the safety of the army. Indeed, a general ought never to run the risk of a flank march parallel to a succession of fortified heights, from which the enemy may come upon him with a force twice as strong as his own. Science condemns such operations, the success of which is dependent upon circumstances, exceptional in themselves, and on the occurrence of which no one can calculate beforehand.

Wellington's proposed march was attended by the greater danger that it must necessarily withdraw the

attacking column more than two miles from the rest of the army. To Beresford belongs the credit of having insured its success. He had been instructed, with the 4th and 6th (Cole's and Clinton's) divisions, to turn the right of the French, while Freyre, with 9000 Spaniards, supported by the English cavalry, should attack the northern front of the town. Vivian's brigade, commanded by Arentschild, had it in charge to watch the movements of the French cavalry on both banks of the Ers, below the left of the Allies. Finally, two divisions of infantry, with Bock's German cavalry, under the orders of Picton, were directed to observe the enemy on the lower part of the canal, where General Berlier commanded, and to draw his attention to that quarter by threatening the têtes de pont, while Hill made a similar demonstration against the Faubourg St. Cyprien where Barbot's brigade was *in* position.

Freyre began the attack about seven o'clock; but the precipitancy and unsteadiness of the Spanish troops caused him to sustain a severe check before the height of Calvinet. He succeeded, however, in rallying his battalions under protection of the light division, which was stationed immediately on his right.

Almost at the same moment Picton was repulsed in an attempt which he made upon the bridge of Jumeaux. He had carried that attack too far, for his instructions were merely to draw the enemy's attention to the lower part of the canal. After this double check, the fate of the battle depended entirely on Beresford's movements.

Meanwhile Soult, who had endeavoured to render these movements in some sort aimless, counted upon being able to turn them to his own advantage; but fortune decided otherwise. Concentrated before dawn

at Croix-Daurade, Beresford's troops moved upon the hamlet of Mont Blanc. They then advanced with great difficulty, in three columns, parallel to the enemy's front, along the marshy bottom which stretches between the Ers and Mount Rave. The ground was so soft that the artillery was obliged to be left behind. At this moment the French batteries poured such a furious fire upon the columns, that Beresford's position appeared for the moment desperate. "The opportunity," says Soult, "was favourable, and I ordered General Taupin's division to charge the enemy, to break his line, and overthrow all whom he had so imprudently engaged. One brigade of D'Armagnac's division supported that attack, and a regiment of cavalry, commanded by Soult's brother, was directed to cut off the retreat of the English columns, while two other regiments should attack their left." This arrangement gave promise of the happiest result; but the ardour of Taupin's division soon evaporated. Instead of falling upon the enemy it inclined to its right, and seemed anxious to take up a position, giving time thereby to the English to form and march against it. The French ranks were at once thrown into confusion. In vain Taupin endeavoured to stop it; he fell pierced with a mortal wound, while the Adjutant-Commandant Gasquet, who discharged the functions of a brigadier, was wounded at the same instant.

In this critical situation Beresford exhibited as much energy as talent. His operation was a blunder in itself, but the fault was in some sort unavoidable. The Allies would have paid dear for it if Soult had taken the precaution to support Taupin effectually, and, above all, if he had remembered the battle of Salamanca, where Wellington obtained a decisive success by

throwing the main body of his army upon Thomières when placed in a situation analogous to that of Beresford. The Duke of Dalmatia had then 15,000 men disposable, but instead of directing them against the long and weak columns of the English, he confined himself to taking half measures, and permitted thereby one of the most favourable opportunities which fortune could have presented to pass from him unimproved. "The French general," says Picton, "exhibited in that affair a degree of hesitation which could not have been expected in a man of his well-known ability."

Encouraged by this first success, and supported by fresh reinforcements, Beresford's troops scaled the precipices of Mount Rave, and carried the heights on the right of the enemy, as well as the redoubt Sypiere, which protected them. They waited in this position till they should be rejoined by their artillery, and till Freyre had arranged his second attack; after which, continuing their movement along the high grounds, they took possession of the two main redoubts, and the fortified houses in the centre of the line. General Harispe, by a desperate effort, retook these redoubts at the point of the bayonet, but was soon obliged to abandon them again, with considerable loss.

Meanwhile the sixth division continued to gain ground upon the heights, while the Spaniards assailed the front of the position. Threatened by this double movement, Soult was in the end obliged to abandon the two redoubts and the intrenchments on his left, and so the whole of Mount Rave fell into the hands of the Allies.

At this moment General Hill found himself stopped before the second line of defence, at the Faubourg

St. Cyprien. He retained his position there during the remainder of the day.

The struggle at Mount Rave had been extremely severe and obstinate, and it was the more honourable to the English troops that the advantages of numbers, of artillery, and of ground, were all against them.

About half-past four, the French withdrew behind the canal, and Wellington took possession of the whole of Mount Rave. From that time, nothing more passed between the two armies than a musketry fire, which was kept up by lines of skirmishers. By and by the night closed in, and Soult took advantage of the respite to strengthen his new line of defence, as if a second battle were to be fought on the morrow.

Some authors, appealing to this fact, insinuate that the battle of Toulouse was not lost by the French, but that is an opinion which does not admit of any defence. Choumara, and all those who deny to Wellington the success of the day, pay no attention to the fact that Mount Rave was the real field of battle, and that the abandonment of that height amounted to a defeat. To pretend that "the plateau of Calvinet was nothing more than the post of an advanced guard; that Soult's real line of battle was the Canal of Languedoc, and that the movements of the 10th ought to be regarded as we regard the defence of works in advance of a fortress, which may be lost without involving a defeat;"—to pretend all this is to misunderstand the truths of history, and to give currency to a false principle in the art of war. The Duke of Dalmatia, moreover, better instructed than his blundering apologists, has never advanced the slightest claim to victory in the battle of Toulouse. He has not even

BATTLE OF TOULOUSE.

cited as an argument in his own vindication the immense numerical superiority of the Allies, and in truth that argument would be of small value, because 24,000 men only, and 52 pieces of cannon, were seriously engaged by Wellington. Yet it is beyond dispute that the English were on the eve of being beaten; for if Soult had left a weaker garrison in Bayonne, and if he had better supported Taupin's attack, Beresford must have been repulsed, and the battle lost. We are led, therefore, to the conclusion that, honourable as the battle of Toulouse was to the French troops, they did not gain the day. And upon this point, history has delivered its verdict. It is a good thing to vindicate the glory of our country, but even that praiseworthy purpose must not be sought at the expense of the glory of others, and, above all, at the expense of truth.

The total loss of the French amounted to four generals wounded, and about 3,234 men placed *hors de combat*. The Allies lost four generals, and 4,659 killed and wounded, of whom 2000 were Spaniards.

Some estimable writers, and among others the Count Toreno, Belmas, and Beauchamp, assert that Wellington was cognisant of the abdication of Napoleon before fighting the battle of Toulouse. The commander-in-chief of the Allies, however, has protested against this allegation, which is in every point of view inadmissible. Lord Wellington on the 10th had not so much as been informed of the entrance of the Allies into Paris. Besides, if he had been aware of that fact, his conduct would have been equally blameless; for the entrance of the Allies into Paris did not necessarily terminate the campaign, inasmuch as Napoleon and his lieutenants might continue the war, and had even announced their

determination to do so. As to Soult, he knew nothing about the conclusion of peace, otherwise he would have adverted to it the day after the battle, in order to keep his hold upon Toulouse. Moreover, it has been proved that the first letter of the Provisional Government announcing to him the conclusion of peace was dated on the 7th, whereas on the 4th the Allies were already masters of the Montauban road and the whole city was invested. All that the marshal knew at that time was, that the Allies had made their entrance into Paris.

Wellington, who had been unlucky enough to throw away his ammunition at the beginning of the battle, did not find himself in a condition to push his attack across the canal before the 12th. It has been said that he employed the whole of the 11th in preparing batteries of congreve rockets, and that he took care to make known, through his advanced sentries, his purpose of burning Toulouse. We have not been able to discover any confirmation of this threat; which, besides, could have been nothing more on the part of the English general than a ruse to induce the inhabitants to surrender. A French historian, better informed, as we believe, affirms that the Duke exhibited towards Toulouse feelings very different from those which are here attributed to him. "Impartial history," he says, "must assign to Wellington the praise, that he fulfilled with the most rigorous exactitude the promise which he made to the Duke of Angoulême. That august prince had entreated him to spare the good town of Toulouse, and Wellington thought only from that time how he could protect it, and save the lives and properties of its peaceable inhabitants. He not only abstained from firing upon the town, but he allowed

Marshal Soult's troops to defile without being opposed along the only road which was then open to them.

However this may be, the Duke of Dalmatia felt that he could not further prolong the struggle. Afraid on the one hand of being shut up in Toulouse, and on the other, not having as yet lost all hope of forming a junction with Suchet, he retired during the night of the 11th towards Villefranche in the direction of Carcassonne, carrying with him only a part of his magazines and hospitals. The movement being covered by the canal of Languedoc, was attended with little risk, and Wellington besides made no effort to interrupt it.

In the morning of the 12th the *drapeau blanc* was unfurled upon the towers of Toulouse, and the same day Wellington made his entry into the town. "Forty thousand persons," says a French author, "hastened to meet the victorious general, not knowing how sufficiently to express their joy and the sincerity of their enthusiasm. Simple in his dress, unassuming in his manner, Wellington drew towards himself the undivided attention of the crowd. Loud cries of *Vive le Roi! Vive Wellington!* re-echoed on all sides, outraging more and more the prudence of the English general; who being ignorant of the events which had occurred in Paris, endeavoured to repress a burst, the consequences of which might, he was afraid, prove hurtful to Toulouse.

Wellington, followed by his staff, entered the court-yard of the Capitole on horseback. In an instant he was dismounted, carried by the people through all the halls, and presented several times at a balcony, to the assembled crowd. The intoxication was universal. That night Wellington repaired with his staff to the theatre, where the play of "Richard Cœur de Lion"

was acted. Shouts of the loudest applause passed from bench to bench at his entrance. The national spirit must have fallen to a low ebb, when Frenchmen could give themselves up to such demonstrations. But it is the usual effect of despotism to debase the characters of such as live under it, and of that fact Napoleon had twice the misfortune to receive proof, first in 1814, and again after Waterloo, in the year following.

On the 12th Wellington received at Toulouse Colonel St. Simon, whom the provisional government had despatched to communicate to the Duke of Dalmatia the turn which events had taken at Paris. The same messenger arrived at Soult's head-quarters on the morning of the 13th. The marshal immediately called together his generals, and read to them the letters which had been forwarded to him by the Prince of Benevento, and by Wellington. They were unanimously of opinion that such information was not official, and that they ought to confine themselves to proposing an armistice till orders from Berthier should arrive. Soult acted upon this advice, but Wellington, offended at such extreme reserve, refused the armistice, and even moved a portion of his troops upon Castelnaudary, in order to watch the French army, which he suspected of being about to commence a civil war.

The same day, however, there arrived at Soult's head-quarters a letter from the Prince of Neufchâtel, containing a formal injunction to put a stop to the war. The consequence was, that General Count Gazan proceeded, on the 17th, to Toulouse, to communicate to Wellington this information, and to renew the demand for a suspension of hostilities, with a promise, on the marshal's part, to acknowledge his Majesty Louis XVIII.

The proposition being acceded to, a formal armistice was signed on the 18th. Next day, Soult sent in his adhesion to the new government. The Duke of Albufera had already published his so early as the 14th. Nevertheless, he maintained towards Wellington a hostile attitude till the conclusion of a separate armistice, which was granted to him by that general on the 18th.

To the inexplicable conduct of Suchet may be mainly attributed the unsuccessful issue of the campaign in the Pyrenees. We have already taken occasion to describe that conduct, and to point out the distressing consequences to which it led. It now remains to state what the marshal had been doing ever since the passage of the Bidassoa was effected.

As soon as Wellington crossed that river, the Duke of Albufera abandoned completely all thought of forming a junction with Soult. Yet, in proportion as the enemy made progress in the French territory, such junction became more and more necessary. If it had taken place near Bayonne, there is at least ground to suppose that the two marshals might have driven back Wellington beyond the frontier; because Soult, in spite of his inferiority in numbers, made head, single-handed, against the entire strength of the allied troops. Instead, however, of supporting Soult's army, which was shedding its blood every day, and upon which depended the fate of the south of France, Marshal Suchet remained for four months inactive in Catalonia, with 32,000 veteran soldiers accustomed to victory.

Between the 29th November and 26th December, 1813, his army was weakened by the recall into France, on one account or another, of 9179 men. Yet, after

their departure, there still remained to him 23,000 men disposable for active operations ; which force, joined to that of Soult before Bayonne, would have sufficed to drive the Allies back to the left bank of the Bidassoa.

Towards the end of January, 1814, the armies of the Pyrenees, of Arragon, and of Catalonia were obliged to send more detachments into the interior of France; and Marshal Suchet lost by these means 8051 infantry and 2132 cavalry. With the 13,000 men which remained to him, however, he might have supplied, in part, Soult's losses. But, as has been already stated, not one soldier of the army of Catalonia was employed to any good purpose throughout that disastrous campaign.

The Duke of Dalmatia wrote, on the 9th of February, 1814, to the Minister of War and to Marshal Suchet, explaining to them how necessary it was that Catalonia should be evacuated, and all the troops moved by forced marches from that province upon the western Pyrenees. To that letter the Duke of Albufera replied, "that he did not see how, after furnishing garrisons for Rosas, Perpignan, Porte Vendre, &c., it would be possible for him to employ more than 2000 or 3000 men against the enemy." And yet, a month later, he detached 9661 men to Lyons, retaining still upwards of 11,000 in hand; that is to say, as many as he pretended to have before the detachment quitted him.

If Soult's proposal of the 9th February had been acceded to, the 13,000 disposable men from the armies of Arragon and Catalonia would have been able to effect their junction previously to the battle of Orthez, which, in all probability, would have ended in favour of the French. In this case, Wellington could not have occupied either Bordeaux or Toulouse. The army of

reserve would have found time to consolidate itself, and conscripts might have gathered round its standards. What a difference between such a state of things and the actual position of Soult!

After having been thwarted in all his attempts to unite the two armies, the Duke of Dalmatia informed his colleague that he had determined upon fighting the battle of Toulouse. He therefore invited him to move with his troops by Ariège, upon the enemy's rear, in order at least to disturb his communications — to intercept his convoys, and to weaken, by compelling him to detach largely for their protection. Marshal Suchet, with an obstinacy which cannot be accounted for, again refused, without assigning any other reasons for his refusal; and thus permitted the Allies to direct the whole of their force against Toulouse, in which place they might, and still ought, to have found 10,000 men disposable from the army of Catalonia.

The discussions between the two marshals continued up to the last day of the campaign. The morning after the battle of Toulouse, Soult proposed to Suchet that he should join him at Carcassonne, in order that they might make a movement in advance from that point and carry the war into the district of the Upper Garonne. To this patriotic entreaty, the Duke of Albufera replied by letter on the 12th, "that the state of the roads would not permit him to move upon Ariège, and that the proposed diversion upon Wellington's rear could serve only to disorganise the few troops which still remained to him."

With this fresh proof of ill-will before him, the Duke of Dalmatia addressed to Suchet a last and very touching letter dated the 4th of April. "I regret exceedingly," he

says, "that you have not judged it expedient to combine your operations with mine. I believe that you are mistaken on the subject of the roads as well as regarding the effect which would be produced by a great movement towards the Upper Garonne. Left to myself, however, I can undertake nothing, and must submit to your refusal, however much I may deplore its consequences. By-and-by you will understand them." Impartial history has pronounced for the Duke of Dalmatia.

The victor of Arragon, of Lerida, of Tortosa, of Saragossa, and of Valencia, doubtless exhibited in Spain extraordinary talent, tried courage, great probity in administration, and a remarkable aptitude in directing vast enterprises; but carried away by self-love, and his personal dislike to Soult, he was found wanting at the last moment in determination and patriotism. It is truly deplorable, it is discreditable to human nature, that the fear of elevating a rival by rendering him victorious should have operated so strongly upon a brave man like the Duke of Albufera; and that so many good qualities, such talents, such remarkable services, should have been powerless to save him from the stain of the most vulgar and contemptible of passions.

Lord Ellesmere states that he has heard the Duke of Wellington say, that if hostilities had continued after the battle of Toulouse, he would have marched direct upon Paris. It is even asserted that all the details for that operation were arranged. As Bayonne could not be taken by a *coup-de-main*, the English general had determined to blockade that city with 40,000 Spaniards, while he himself should advance with the rest of his army towards the north, resting always upon the sea, and establishing various points along the coast, so as to

keep open his communication with Great Britain. [Lord Ellesmere's statement is, in the main, correct, but carries his readers somewhat too rapidly to a conclusion. The Duke's next base after the Garonne, was to have been the Loire, where he intended to maintain himself till he should be able to communicate with the allied armies, which were advancing from the north and from the east.]

The capture of Toulouse constituted the last remarkable episode in the campaign of the Allies in France. By-and-by the Spanish and Portuguese regiments returned to their own countries. The English cavalry was embarked at Boulogne, and the infantry at Bordeaux. A part only of the latter arm went back to England; the rest were foolishly thrown against the redoubts of New Orleans, and many regiments went away to perish amid the pestilential atmosphere of the West Indies.

Wellington was deeply grieved at the breaking up of that gallant army, with which, to use his own expression, he felt that he could go anywhere and do anything. He still counted in his ranks the soldiers of Vimiero and Talavera. Never had England possessed such troops: they were, as Napier remarks, "Alexander's Macedonians at Arbela, Hannibal's Africans at Cannæ, Cæsar's Romans at Pharsalia, and Napoleon's Guards at Austerlitz."

The Duke of Albufera quitted Spain with the remains of his army in the course of the month of April, after having blown up the fortifications of Rosas. He left no garrisons, except at Figueiras, Hostalrich, Barcelona, Tortosa, Benasque, Murviedro, and Peniscola. But, in accordance with a treaty signed on the 19th, all these places were evacuated and given over to the troops of King Ferdinand.

Thus, after seven years' hard fighting, the Peninsula

was completely freed — thanks to the support rendered to it by England, to the genius and prudence of Wellington, to the admirable bravery of his troops, and to the patriotism, somewhat extravagant perhaps, but still highly honourable, of the Spanish nation.

The campaign in France put the seal to Wellington's glory, and brought pre-eminently into light his military talents not less than his political sagacity. With 70,000 Anglo-Portuguese he had done more in the south than the Allied sovereigns were able to effect with half a million of troops upon the northern and eastern frontiers; and yet Soult's army was stronger on the 10th November, 1813, than that with which Napoleon fought the battle of Brienne. This simple statement suffices to establish the immeasurable superiority of Wellington's combinations over theirs. But there was a point in which he still more excelled — namely, in the moral influence which his generous conduct towards the French people secured for him. While the Allies in the north and east oppressed the inhabitants and left traces of their barbarous hatred, even upon public monuments, the hero of the Peninsula set an example in the south of France of unfailing respect to individuals and their property. Never have troops shown greater kindness to their fellow-countrymen than the soldiers of Wellington exhibited towards a nation with which, nevertheless, they were at war. This will always remain as one of the loftiest titles to renown of the British army and its illustrious chief.

It has been calculated that the war in the Peninsula cost England upwards of a hundred millions sterling, exclusive of the large subsidies which she furnished to the Spanish and Portuguese governments. It is right,

MAP OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

however, in order to reduce these sacrifices to their proper value, that we should balance against them the successive repayments of advances in treasure made upon letters of exchange, in goods received from America, or in bills upon the public treasuries of Peru and Mexico, which for the most part were faithfully paid. We must likewise take into account the many openings which the war created to English industry and commerce, both in America and the Peninsula, which if the Spaniards had not risen against Napoleon, would have had no existence. Be this, however, as it may, it is certain that England never made so great an effort upon the continent. Her troops fought nine pitched battles, besides numerous combats; all honourable for them, and almost all ending in favour of the Spanish cause. They captured four important places and undertook the siege of several others. They killed, wounded, and made prisoners, about 200,000 Frenchmen, and left upon different fields of battle 40,000 of their comrades. Undeniable proofs these of their heroism, perseverance, and endurance.

The English fleet disquieted the enemy by continual descents upon his coasts; and yet, notwithstanding these sacrifices, Great Britain was still able to supply the wants of the Portuguese army, of which the organisation and discipline were effected entirely by her officers. As to the armies of Spain, Wellington was obliged to furnish to them provisions, arms, ammunition, and everything else, as often as he desired to bring them into play. This was especially the case in the campaigns of 1812, 1813, and 1814, during which alone the national troops obtained any measure of success.

CHAP. V.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE WAR IN SPAIN. — CAUSES OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE FRENCH ARMY. — INCONVENIENCES OF THE SYSTEM WHICH MAKES WAR SUPPORT ITSELF. — CHARACTER OF KING JOSEPH. — HIS POLITICAL FORETHOUGHT. — HIS MILITARY INCAPACITY. — PREDICTS FAILURE IN THE WAR. — NAPOLEON DISBELIEVES HIM. — DESPISES HIS AUTHORITY, AND DESTROYS HIS PRESTIGE. — DISCIPLINE IS RELAXED. — JOURDAN NOT IN HIS PROPER PLACE. — MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE KING AND THE EMPEROR. — CREATION OF SEPARATE MILITARY GOVERNMENTS. — PRODUCES A BAD EFFECT. — THE GUERILLAS. — THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT, THE PORTUGUESE REGENCY, AND THE ENGLISH CABINET. — THEY ALL HAMPER WELLINGTON. — THE CONDITION OF HIS ARMY. — BAD ORGANISATION OF ITS DEPARTMENTS. — NEGLIGENCE AND INCAPACITY OF ITS OFFICERS. — DEPLORABLE STATE OF ITS MATÉRIEL. — SERVICES RENDERED TO WELLINGTON BY THE GUERILLAS. — THE FLEET AND THE INTRENCHED CAMP AT LISBON. — INSTABILITY OF PUBLIC OPINION IN SPAIN. — WEAKNESS OF THE NATIONAL ARMIES. — INCAPACITY OF THEIR GENERALS. — THE GUERILLAS EFFECT LITTLE. — THEIR EXCESSES. — FAULTS OF THE FRENCH GENERALS AND OF THE EMPEROR. — ULTIMATE CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF THE FRENCH ARMIES IN SPAIN.

We have seen how, after seven years of constant fighting, the memorable war in Spain, so fatal to the Emperor and so glorious to the British arms, came to an end. To Wellington will for ever belong the honour of having maintained and brought to a successful issue that vast enterprise, at a time when Napoleon had overthrown, one after another, all the nations of Europe. But as success is in no case the result of accident, we are bound, as conscientious historians, to take into account the cir-

cumstances which enabled an army, seldom more than 50,000 strong, to deliver a country occupied by from 200,000 to 350,000 soldiers accustomed to war, and commanded by the best generals of the empire.

The French had to contend in the Peninsula against immense difficulties, which, in some sort, counterbalanced the advantages arising from their great superiority in numbers. The chief of these was the resistance of the Spanish people, whose patriotism awoke all at once, and whose passions, violently excited by the dishonourable conduct of Napoleon, broke loose with excessive fury. To cure the Spaniards of their barbarism it was necessary to become as barbarous as themselves. The quarrel thus assumed, from the outset, a character of atrocity which relaxed discipline and extinguished the sentiment of military honour.

The system of making war support itself, which was adopted by the French army, was not calculated to calm down these animosities, for it led to acts of violence and brigandage, which were the more easily committed, that on the approach of an enemy all the local authorities took to flight. This marauding, day by day repeated, produced deep irritation, and was soon followed by such a burst of hatred and fury as there is no power in language adequately to describe.

The Spaniard, naturally proud and vindictive, never forgives, and his vengeance recoils neither from danger nor from crime. Moreover, the system of requisitions, however convenient it may be in a country through which troops are passing, offers serious difficulties to the supply of the wants of an army of occupation. It extends too far the strategic circles, and thereby compels the invading army, in case of failure, to traverse pro-

vinces which have been completely exhausted. It renders the concentration of troops for a continuous operation impossible; it necessitates the occupation of scattered cantonments, which exposes the generals to be beaten in detail; it compels corps d'armée to send out marauding parties in such strength that, if suddenly attacked, they are sometimes unable to resist with more than half of their effective force. It exposes the soldier daily to murderous battles, which wear him out the more rapidly, that they are attended with neither glory nor any lasting advantage; finally, it relaxes the bonds of discipline, and engenders habits of plundering, which are alike incompatible with the sentiments and duties of a soldier.

The French army in Spain was not only obliged to secure, by means of requisitions, its food and forage, but it had to procure in the same manner everything else that was required to keep it effective. Thus the pay of the troops, and money for the purchase of horses and matériel, were procured by the same process. It was this which compelled the king continually to disperse his forces, that he might lay the whole country under contribution; a grievous necessity, which led, among other blunders, to the invasion of Andalusia at the very moment when Wellington had concentrated the whole of his army in Portugal. Marshal Jourdan characterises extremely well the system of extended occupation in his manuscript memoirs cited by M. Thiers, and reproduced to a great extent in the Memoirs of Joseph. "The more severe the reverses sustained by the Spanish armies," says he, "the more the population showed itself disposed to rise and take up arms, the greater was the extent of territory covered by the

French, and the more dangerous their position became."

To this terrible source of weakness,—the necessity of dispersing the army to live, and the difficulty of bringing it together again to fight,—must be added two other influences, which acted quite as unfavourably upon the general results of all its enterprises. These were, the want of a commander-in-chief capable of giving a vigorous impulse to the war, and the creation of separate military governments, a measure which weakened the authority of the king, and engendered bitter animosities among the generals.

Though endowed with many excellent qualities, Joseph possessed none of those which contribute to form the characters of great kings and able captains. He wanted determination, activity, and vigour. Without experience in war, and destitute of the natural gifts which compensate for it, he found himself, as commander-in-chief, in a situation the most perplexing. "He did not know," says M. Thiers, "how to take in the *ensemble* of his position, or to connect together the interests of the French army and those of the Spanish Government." The truth is, that the task set him was so gigantic, that even a man of genius might have succumbed to it. In judging the king, the historian of *The Consulate and the Empire* has not taken sufficient account of that difficulty; indeed, we are of opinion that he has been guilty of a still greater injustice in affirming that Joseph was entirely destitute of political penetration.

As our object is to ascertain all the causes which contributed to bring about the issues of the war in the Peninsula, it may not be amiss if we enter considerably into detail, in order to controvert this opinion, which

has been very generally taken up by French historians. We shall be able to prove that if the imperial armies suffered such great reverses in Spain, and if that country became, as Napoleon expressed it, "the cancer of the empire," the blame rests with the Emperor himself; who, in spite of the warnings of fortune and the counsels of the most devoted of his friends, undertook and carried through a war which was dishonourable, iniquitous, and, in every point of view, deserving of condemnation. King Joseph never exhibited anything like enthusiasm about the conquest of Spain. He accepted the crown of Charles IV., indeed, but it was less from personal ambition than through deference to his brother. The throne of Naples was sufficient for his happiness. And though the modesty of which he made a parade was not free from ostentation, it is evident from his correspondence that, throughout his troublesome reign, he was perpetually longing for the quiet enjoyment of domestic life. The cares of the throne were by no means in unison with his indolent and somewhat sensual nature. "Every animal," he writes to the Emperor, "has its own instincts, which it ought to follow. I must either be such a king as the brother of your Majesty ought to be, or I will return to Mortefontaine; for I desire no more than the happiness of living without disgrace, and dying with a quiet conscience. Forty years of existence have taught me nothing of which I was ignorant at any period of my life. All is vanity. There is nothing real, except a good conscience and self-respect."

His letters to his wife are filled with the same sentiments. "To be a man," he says, "I have no need of a crown, nor do I feel myself great enough to be desirous

of walking upon stilts." On the 8th of August, 1810, he wrote to his brother: "I beg that your Majesty will have the goodness to let me rejoin my family, from which I have been separated six years; and that I may regain in domestic obscurity the affections and repose of which a throne has deprived me, without giving me anything in exchange. For to me it is nothing less than a punishment."

Thus, the crown of Spain which Louis had rejected with scorn, Joseph neither accepted nor retained, except with repugnance. As to the final success of the war, it may be said that the king had never the slightest faith in it; and that from the outset he foretold the causes which would bring about defeat. This is a fact of so much importance, that it will be necessary to establish it by a few significant extracts from his correspondence.

Scarcely had the new king crossed the Pyrenees, when he wrote from Vittoria to the Emperor: "No one, up to this moment, has told your Majesty the truth. The fact is, there is not a single Spaniard who declares for me, except the small number of persons who were present at the Junta, and have travelled with me. The rest who arrived here, and in other towns, before me, have disappeared, dismayed at the unanimity of opinion among their fellow-countrymen." Napoleon considered that this language was exaggerated. Whereupon Joseph repeated it in the following terms: "The work which we have undertaken is tremendous, and to come out of it with honour will require enormous means. It is not fear which makes me see double, neither am I confounded by my position; but there is nothing like it in history. I have not here a single partisan."

We observe in this letter the sound judgment and

political perspicacity of Joseph at issue with the blind ambition of the Emperor, who seemed resolved entirely to disregard advice which was suggested by the good sense and devotion of his adherents. Hence, after receiving the melancholy letter which we have cited, Napoleon wrote to his brother: "Be content, keep up your courage and gaiety, and never doubt of perfect success." Strange advice! to which Joseph replied, under a conviction more and more settled, by asking for "veteran troops and millions of money, without which we shall not be able to keep Spain."

Up to the end of the war, the correspondence between the two sovereigns presents the same contrast, — excess of confidence on the one hand, lively and justifiable apprehensions on the other. Almost the whole of Joseph's letters take a prophetic tone. On the 24th July, 1808, he addressed his brother in these alarming words: "The respectable classes are no more in my favour than the rabble. No, sire, you are mistaken, your glory will melt away in Spain;" and on the 18th of July, 1809, he repeats to his brother: "I believe that this will end badly, and very badly." In the following year he says to his wife Julie: "If the system begun in February continues, all Spain will soon become a fiery furnace, from which no one will escape with honour," and on the 4th of July, 1813, to the Minister Clarke: "The pacification of Spain by force of arms is impossible, and I only repeat to-day what I have said over and over again."

This opinion, reproduced in every page of the king's correspondence, though directly opposed to that of Napoleon, is surely one proof of his judgment and political perspicacity; but we have yet other evidence to cite, which more and more invalidates the unfair judgment

pronounced against Joseph by the historian of *The Consulate and the Empire.* Indeed, the king's correspondence testifies that he was not only alive to most of the mistakes committed during the war, but that, over and above, he explained clearly by what means the Spanish nation might be rendered docile under the yoke of France. He protested, in the first place, with great force, against the assumption that with 80,000 young soldiers a monarchy could be conquered which, peopled by 10,000,000 of inhabitants, had at the moment of invasion 50,000 regular troops under arms. He pointed out all the inconveniences of a system of requisition, by means of which Napoleon persevered in seeking to support his army in the Peninsula. He explained, by many remonstrances, that in order to reconcile the nation to a new government, it must be treated with kindness and justice; that it would be necessary to invest the sovereign with greater authority and prestige; that the command of an army would be incompatible with the exercise of regal authority at a time when the troops were forced to subsist by ravaging and plundering the country; that in every event it was expedient to unite military power with political government; and finally, that it would be wise policy to employ Spaniards in civil administration rather than Frenchmen; for though the former might be ill affected, the latter were completely ignorant of the wants, the character, and the interests of the conquered nation. Guided by these inspirations, which he openly avowed, and convinced that to attach Spain to France it would be necessary to govern with gentleness, Joseph was opposed to all those acts of special violence and collective injustice which others seemed

anxious to commit. The Emperor was in the habit of saying to him, "Every thing is fair in war;" but his spirit revolted against a maxim which was at once barbarous and dishonourable. He openly blamed Murat for the excesses committed by him at Madrid during the affair of the 2nd July, and disapproved so completely of bloody reprisals, that he resisted the peremptory orders of Napoleon, who, in the beginning of 1809, had written to him on the instant, "Hang a dozen individuals at Madrid. I hold it to be absurd to bring brigands to justice; they should be carried before a military commission and hung. A military commission must be nominated, to try over again the thirty scoundrels who have been acquitted, or condemned only to imprisonment, by the court of Alcades; cause the guilty to be shot. I am not satisfied with the police of Madrid. Belliard is too weak with the Spaniards; it is necessary to be severe. I have caused fifteen of the most guilty to be arrested at Valladolid, and have shot them. See that thirty are arrested at Madrid. When you treat them with kindness, such a rabble as that consider themselves unassailable; when you hang a few they begin to dislike the amusement, and become submissive and humble as they ought to be."

If Joseph did not succeed in Spain, he has at least the merit of having refused obedience to the barbarous orders of his brother, which, in all probability, would have served only to render his fall more disgraceful than it was. The king also resisted, with the same determination, the project for the dismemberment of the Spanish territory, by extending France as far as the banks of the Ebro; as well as the proposal to create, with a view to such dismemberment, provinces which should be sepa-

rately administered, and treated as distinct military commands. Finally, Joseph had to endure, throughout the entire continuance of his reign, reproaches the most severe, and accusations the most unjust, on the ground that he did not know how to wring money enough from the Spaniards. Napoleon was anxious that he should oppress the nation, and show himself in all respects as pitiless as certain generals had been. Hence the position of the king was rendered so false, his authority was so completely nullified, his influence became so feeble, and his administration so profitless, that towards the end of the war he could only say of himself, "I have never effected any good, and have no hope of ever being able to effect it. It is impossible to be at once King of Spain and Commander-in-chief of the French army. I shall probably finish by being neither."

With all his good intentions, however, and his glimpses of sound political understanding, the king had his moments of weakness and irresolution, which rendered him unfit for the government of a people in a state of violent agitation. He was not the man for difficult times and desperate circumstances. He did not know how to act with firmness, or to make himself promptly obeyed, or to communicate his sentiments to those with whom he came in contact. Aware of these imperfections, Napoleon ought to have endeavoured to conceal them, first by advice, and next by external marks of confidence, such as might give to his brother's throne the prestige which was required to strike upon the lively imaginations of the Spaniards. Now, so far from following this judicious line of conduct, the Emperor laboured from the outset to prove that Joseph was nothing more than the shadow of a king, and that

he was held in a state of dependence more rigid than that in which Philip V. vegetated under the protectorate of Louis XIV.

Joseph had scarcely entered Spain, when differences arose between him and Savary. The powers of the latter were considerable, and the king found himself under the necessity of writing to the Emperor thus: "Have I or has he the right to command?" But this humiliation was nothing in comparison with those which he was forced to endure when Napoleon placed himself at the head of the army of Spain. At the very outset the Emperor took it upon him to leave the king with the rear guard; an injustice with which his majesty could not put up in silence. "Sire," he wrote, "I find myself out of place at Vittoria and here (at Miranda); since your departure an irresistible feeling, more powerful than all human considerations, tells me that I ought not to be found in the rear of the army. Spain and France, and I myself, all desire that I should be at the post of honour. It is that of danger, and in this school I ought to be found. It is no more perilous to me than it is to your majesty. His chief is of more importance than every thing else to your brother, and when his sovereign exposes himself, shall the prince, whom you desire to make a king, keep out of danger? A man so circumstanced must be dishonoured, and will be neither your brother, nor a Frenchman, nor a Castilian. I read in the countenances of my own ministers this morning their astonishment to see me at Vittoria, while your majesty is at the advanced posts. My place has always been with the army in the field; and now, I am loitering, like a mock sovereign or a commissary, three days' march in rear of it."

Notwithstanding this energetic protest, Napoleon stu-

diously avoided, during his stay in Madrid, to mix up the king's name in any of the arrangements which he made for completing his conquest.

Perceiving that the Emperor was determined to give him no opportunity of earning distinction in war; that he carried the contempt of common decency so far as to omit all reference to his political authority in measures which seriously affected him, Joseph was desirous of resigning a crown which he could not keep except at the expense of endless humiliations, and very many sacrifices. Either through weakness, however, or from the habit of submission, he abandoned almost immediately that resolution, with which his inner conscience and a sense of personal respect had inspired him. Yet from that moment, his moral weight as a sovereign became seriously weakened, not only in the eyes of his own subjects, but in those of the French soldiers and generals. We may refer to this circumstance the commencement of the discord which soon developed itself in the army, and produced a total relaxation of discipline.

The Emperor himself struck a rude blow at this "king of armies," by writing direct to generals Belliard, Bessières, and Monthion, that he disapproved of the operations commanded by the king after the affair of Baylen; and by permitting his major-general Berthier, to communicate directly with the chiefs of detached corps, who continually opposed the will of the Emperor to that of the commander-in-chief of the army of Spain. Besides, that title was never, so far as Joseph was concerned, more than a dead letter. "The clergy and the inhabitants ask protection of me," he wrote to the Emperor while the latter was still in Spain, "but

have I in truth the right to dispose of a single soldier? I see all manner of disorders, without having the power to repress them; I have not the authority even of a sous-lieutenant. Do I deserve, from my character, to be the laughing-stock of the army, in a country of which I am to be the king."

"To all this Napoleon persisted in reiterating," says the author of the Memoirs of Joseph, "that his brother was not a soldier, that he had no knowledge of war. On his entrance into Spain, instead of giving him precedence, in order to insure to him the respect of the troops whom he was about to command, he left him in the rear of the army. The unpleasant impressions which such language and conduct produced upon the minds of the generals and officers could never be effaced; not even when the king became invested with well nigh absolute authority; for among military men, obedience, and devotion are proportioned to the amount of confidence which they repose in their chief. What energy in command could the king display, while he knew that his subordinates believed themselves to be greatly his superiors in talents and military experience?"

"Is it not evident that when he prescribes operations of which they do not approve, they carry them indolently into effect, even if they obey at all? May they not say, moreover, after the example of the Emperor, in order to justify themselves in case of reverse, 'I did not approve of the plan, but was obliged to obey; it was the king's fault, and not mine?' In determining between the two parties, which, by the by, could not cure the evil, was it possible for the Emperor to throw aside all prejudice against his brother? This cannot be admitted, and in point of fact it never occurred. Joseph remained

to the end, burdened with a heavy responsibility towards Napoleon, while the responsibility of the marshals to him was altogether illusory."

Marshal Jourdan, Joseph's chief of the staff, who, that he might aid him with his counsels, took rank next to that prince, was himself also in a false position. Merits and former services could not save him from disgrace, for the Emperor to use the language of M. Thiers, "was in the habit of being unjust towards him." Everything which he did was criticised with severity; there was even allotted to him by design a position of moral inferiority towards the other marshals, his colleagues.* These latter, indeed, had all received ducal titles with rich endowments; Jourdan alone remained in a humble position. The marshals naturally attributed to their own merits the honours and emoluments which the Emperor heaped upon them; and entertained a mean opinion of their colleague, who, in spite of his long service, was denied these advantages. Thus was undermined beforehand, the authority of one who ought to have been to them the organ of the king's wishes; while, at the same time, it was upon Jourdan that Napoleon threw the responsibility of operations, when their success did not answer to his wishes. To the inconveniences produced by this want of confidence and harmony between the king, his major-general, and the marshals commanding corps, must be added those which grew out of the want of power in the commander-in-chief to reward soldiers who distinguished themselves.

* The only troops employed in Spain, whom Napoleon decorated, were those of Suchet; and these obtained the successes which won for them their honours, because they were employed against Spaniards exclusively.

On the other hand, the officers and soldiers sent into Spain were not slow in perceiving that while their comrades in other armies received decorations, steps of rank, and rewards of every kind, they were completely neglected. By and by, chagrin and discouragement infused themselves into the best corps, and Spain became a proscribed country, from which every one endeavoured to escape, that he might go and fight under the eyes of the supreme arbiter of the soldier's fortune. The king did not cease to point out these facts, and to express his mortification in terms the most earnest, though always respectful. Thus in the course of 1809 he wrote to the Emperor:—"Sire, if my whole life has not given you the most perfect confidence in me; if you consider it necessary that I should surround myself with poor creatures who make me blush for myself; if I must be insulted in my very capital; if I am not to be allowed to nominate the governors and commandants who are always near me, who make me ashamed before the Spaniards, and deprive me of all means of doing good; if you refuse to judge me by results, and require that I should send in a report of every incident;—in this case, sire, there is no choice left me. I am not King of Spain by force of your arms; I might become so through the love of the Spaniards, but to acquire that I must govern in my own way."

Now it was exactly this which Napoleon did not desire. He would admit of only one method of governing the Spaniards, viz. by dealing with them in a military spirit, by hanging insurgents, whom he called the *canaille*, and oppressing the rest, the honest men who were of the king's party. It was in great measure their difference of opinion upon this point which produced the

first coldnesses and quarrels between the two brothers. Marshal Jourdan places this matter in a clear light. "Forasmuch as the king," says he, "occupying the throne, believed that the main cause of the obstacles which he had to surmount was to be sought for in the aversion entertained by Spaniards to strangers, and above all to Frenchmen, he thought that it was his policy to withdraw himself as much as possible from these latter, in order that the Spaniards, in their turn, might be able to exempt him from the hatred with which they regarded the French. This principle, which he sought from the outset to apply, and which was diametrically opposed to Napoleon's views, was one of the principal causes of the estrangement, deepening by and by into a sort of stupid misunderstanding, which, during three consecutive years, prevailed between them."

This misunderstanding, however, produced results less deplorable than that to which the differences among the generals led, and from which, by little and little, acts of indiscipline of the most mischievous kind proceeded. It is necessary, in order to convey a correct idea of the combination of causes which brought about the evacuation of the Peninsula, to specify one or two of these lamentable proceedings.

In 1809 Soult's army was thoroughly dislocated by a plot, the object of which was to overthrow the marshal and to place St. Cyr at the head of the army of Spain.

The same year, after the evacuation of Galicia, Ney, believing that he had been betrayed by Soult, wrote to Joseph, "Whatever the Emperor's orders may be, I am determined that I shall never serve again with the Duke of Dalmatia."

The violent quarrel between the two marshals, which

arose out of this circumstance, was the means of saving the corps of Romana and Norona, and of compelling the French to withdraw from Galicia.

The same year the operations in Catalonia proved abortive, because of a misunderstanding between St. Cyr and Augereau, while the siege of Gerona was rendered difficult by the quarrel of St. Cyr with Verdier.

The want of cordiality between Soult and Jourdan, Victor and Mortier, was, in the opinion of one of Joseph's aides-de-camp, the principal cause of failure in the campaign of Talavera.

Monsieur Thiers does not hesitate to attribute to the same cause the little support which Soult afforded to Marshal Victor during the siege of Cadiz.

Dorsenne's refusal to fight under the orders of Marmont (26th of September, 1811), saved the English army, as yet imperfectly concentrated at Fuente Guinaldo. And the same general wrought the Duke of Ragusa much harm, by retaining, under pretext of his own urgent necessities, the detachments of convalescents, and even the effective regiments which belonged to the army of Portugal, and ought to have rejoined it.

In 1811, the Allies took, one after the other, the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, because Marshals Soult and Marmont hated each other cordially, and could not agree upon a system of combined operations. We have pointed out * the languor with which the Duke of Dalmatia moved to support Massena at Santarem in 1810. Jealousy was not without its influence in this case. For Soult having failed in the second invasion of Portugal, was annoyed because the Emperor,

* Chap. xi.

in a third attempt; had given a preference to the Prince of Essling.

It is said in the Memoirs of Massena*, "If it had depended upon Joseph, the army of Portugal would certainly have been reinforced. But all his orders were treated as nullities, even by persons least in authority. Take an example: General Eblé entreated General Senarmont, commandant of the artillery of the armies of Spain, to form a reserve parc and dépôt for the army of Portugal. The latter took no notice of it, whereupon Massena addressed himself directly to the king, who gave peremptory orders to Senarmont, that he should attend to Eblé's requisition. Yet in spite of this urgent command, the army of Portugal did not receive a single projectile or a solitary barrel of powder from Madrid."

About the same time, the Prince of Essling sent one of his aides-de-camp to Valladolid, to request that Kellermann would forward with all haste to Salamanca upon country carriages, the grain and forage which the intendant-general had collected in his province. No attention was paid to this order, and the provisions accumulated at Medina-del-Campo, rotted and spoiled for want of store houses. Though professing to be actuated by the best intentions, Kellermann had given instructions to the commandant to send to him the carriages as fast as they should be unloaded. The commissary Lambert complained of this to Massena. "General Kellermann's orders," he says, "paralyse the means of transport, and will destroy them quite. I am not afraid to bring this charge against him; he renders administration impossible

* Vol. vii. p. 38.

by his inconsiderate and culpable opposition to it. There is no want of provisions. They abound at Medina-del-Campo; and yet, forgive the expression, we die of hunger."

Towards the end of the campaign the angry discussions of the Prince of Essling with Marshal Ney led to the recall of the latter, and added a fresh difficulty to the embarrassments of the retreat, already sufficiently distressing.

At Fuentes d'Onoro, Loison, Drouet, and Regnier were guilty of acts of indiscipline and of negligence which were quite as serious in their effects.

Again, the same year, Bessières refused all support to Massena in his attempt to relieve Almeida, the single acquisition obtained during the campaign; as well as to destroy Wellington's army, weakened at that moment by the detaching of a force to undertake the siege of Badajos. Some days before the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, the Prince of Essling had addressed the most earnest entreaties for support to the Duke of Istria. Receiving no satisfactory reply, he wrote to him the evening before his departure from Salamanca; "My entreaties seem to have no effect upon you. If my attempt fail, your devotion to the service of the Emperor will certainly cause you to regret that you did not support me, as you led me to hope that you would, before I was in need of it." And when these remonstrances produced no better effect, Massena wrote again to Bessières on the 29th from Ciudad Rodrigo: "I have asked you for artillery and stores, and still more distinctly for cavalry. Under various pretexts, you have evaded my demand. Yet all the troops in Spain belong to the same family."

Subsequently to these letters, and at the very time

when Napoleon's instructions directed Bessières, in case of need, to send 15,000 men to the army of Portugal, the Duke of Istria determined upon detaching 1200 cavalry and a battery of the imperial guard, which did not join the main body of the army till the 4th of May, the evening of the battle of Fuentes.

The unfriendly feeling of Caffarelli towards the Duke of Ragusa is made apparent, among other proofs, by the letter which Marmont wrote on the 2nd of July, 1812, attributing to that circumstance the fall of the forts in Salamanca.

Alluding to the discord which prevailed among the commanders of the three French armies, previously to the fatal day of Salamanca, we have pointed out that each of these marshals desired to render the movements of his colleagues subordinate to his own. It followed from these controversies that their secret plans were thwarted, and that Wellington surprised them at moments when they were still carrying on their discussions.

One unfortunate circumstance in the campaign of 1812 was the obstinacy with which the Duke of Dalmatia retained Drouet's division on the Tagus, after it had been repeatedly applied for by the king. If that division had come up in time, Joseph could have sent to the Duke of Ragusa 24,000 men previously to the battle of Salamanca, when, in all probability, that action would not have taken place, or would have ended in favour of the French.

In the same campaign Marmont was guilty of great insubordination, by attacking Wellington before he had received the support of the army of the centre. The results of that act of madness having rendered the evacuation of Andalusia expedient, Joseph gave the

necessary orders to the Duke of Dalmatia, who refused to obey, and adhered to his resolution so doggedly that it was considered expedient to threaten him with removal from his command.

In October, 1812, Joseph, in spite of his personal repugnance to Soult, entertained the idea of placing him in supreme command of all the disposable troops in Spain; but he was obliged to abandon a project which might have turned the tide of the war, because Jourdan and Suchet equally refused to serve under the orders of the Duke of Dalmatia.

Shortly before the battle of Vittoria, Joseph, by Jourdan's advice, directed the commissaries of the armies of the south, of Portugal, and of the centre to take steps for establishing magazines. One and all they refused to obey; and upwards of a month elapsed ere orders came from Paris desiring them to pay implicit obedience to the requirements of the commissary-in-chief.*

It is not too much to assert that the deplorable antipathy of Suchet to the Duke of Dalmatia was one of the main causes of the invasion of France in 1813. Indeed, if the Duke of Albufera had united his disposable force to that of Soult, it is probable that Wellington would not have crossed the Pyrenees at all. Still more, history will for ever attach the stigma to Suchet that he carried his obstinacy so far as to refuse so much as the attempt to make a diversion in favour of his colleague, at a time when the latter was engaged in an unequal struggle for the defence of the French territory.

* M. Thiers.

The vexatious consequences of this rivalry between the two marshals exhibited themselves up to the last day of the war. Thus, after Soult had taken the place of Joseph, and was exerting himself less to recover Spain than to save France, the king's partisans still endeavoured, by their vile intrigues, to thwart the intelligent and patriotic schemes of the Duke of Dalmatia.

The rebound of these irritating discussions was felt throughout the whole army. The soldiers espoused the quarrels of their chiefs, and discipline became relaxed. It has been seen to what a state the army of Soult was reduced, in 1809, upon the Douro. That of Joseph, in 1812, was not in a better condition, if we may judge by the following extract from a letter of Marshal Marmont to the Prince of Neufchatel:—"*Up* to the present moment the king can make no head against the disorders which are taking place at Madrid and the anarchy which prevails throughout the army of the centre."

After the battle of Salamanca, General Clausel drew a picture less favourable still of the army of the Duke of Ragusa. He describes it as a band of plunderers and assassins, which would not listen to the voice of their officers.

When Ney withdrew from Galicia, the irritation of his troops was so great against the Duke of Dalmatia, whom they accused of having abandoned them, that it would have been dangerous to have brought the two *corps d'armée* together.

After the battle of Albuera, the garrison of Villalba refused to cover the Duke of Dalmatia's retreat by defending the castle of that town; and at Fuentes

d'Onoro, the Old Guard stood immovable when Massena wished it to advance.

Such were the melancholy effects of animosity among the chiefs. Napoleon alone possessed influence enough to impress upon the generals his own will, and to give unity to their operations. He was deeply afflicted at such a state of things, which he attributed to a want of capacity in his brother, an incapacity real, no doubt, but which could not be unknown to him, and of which he ought to have appreciated the effects when he invested Joseph with the high functions of political and military chief of the Peninsula. Besides, so far from applying a remedy to the evil, by augmenting the prestige of the king and energetically maintaining his cause, Napoleon, when the first symptoms of resistance to Joseph manifested themselves, ingeniously contrived, so to speak, to render the authority of his brother more ill defined, and therefore more questionable, than ever.

Nothing could so completely damage that authority as the scheme of separate military governments, one of the most unfortunate of all the Emperor's arrangements. Joseph, and such of the Spaniards as were sincerely attached to his cause, vainly endeavoured to make Napoleon understand the dangers of that system. He continued obstinate, and the decree came forth. His persuasion was that, in order to overawe the Spaniards, it would be necessary to inspire them with the fear of losing some of their provinces; indeed this was the principal argument which he opposed to the urgent and earnest remonstrances of the king. Observe how completely the political sagacity of the great captain was at fault. The Spaniards would never

submit; and the situation of the king became more desperate every day.

The new governors were to all intents and purposes viceroys, bound only to concur with the head-quarter staff of the army of Spain in military operations; an arrangement, by the way, which, so far as the governors of Aragon, of Navarre, of Catalonia, and Andalusia were concerned, was never observed. "As to the internal administration, — the police, the revenues, the dispensing of justice, the nomination of *employés*, and arrangements of every kind, these they were permitted to settle with the Emperor through the intervention of the Prince of Neufchatel." *

Napoleon gave them this extensive authority for many reasons. He thought that, having less to perplex them than Joseph, the military governors would be able more effectually to work together for bringing the war to an end; and that, finding their personal influence advanced in proportion as they managed matters well, they would procure for the army a larger amount of money without pressing too hard upon the inhabitants. In this latter respect the emperor's system answered his expectations. Order and internal peace were certainly established throughout a large portion of Spain, but the general resources of the country did not increase, for each general looked only to himself, and thought about his own interests exclusively. The king of Spain and of the Indies, in the midst of these improvised sovereigns, resembled one of the princes of the middle ages, whom the great nobles plundered, and who, in the absence of all real authority, enjoyed no more than the mere trappings of supreme power.

* So run the very terms of the decree.

"The Spaniards," says Count Toreno, "took extremely ill with this arrangement, because they knew that the Emperor's avowed design only disguised a plan for incorporating with the French empire the provinces on the left bank of the Ebro, and perhaps other provinces, if circumstances would permit. Joseph's ministers sent to Paris as ambassador extraordinary Mons. Azanza, who, after five months' useless negotiation, wrote to the king, 'The Duke de Cadore, in a conference which we held together on Wednesday, informed us distinctly that the Emperor would require the cession of the provinces on the further side of the Ebro, as an indemnification to France for the men and money which she had expended and must yet expend on the conquest of Spain.'"

The same idea is discoverable in the private letters which the Emperor, after creating the four separate governments, addressed to Suchet, to Augereau, to Reille, and to Thouvenot. M. Thiers is justified in saying, that the claim of the Emperor upon Spain, for indemnification of the wrong which he wrought her in forcing her to accept Joseph, was the very madness of ambition.

To the separate governments of Navarre, of Biscay, of Aragon, and of Catalonia, Napoleon added by and by those of Old Castile under Dorsenne, and of Valladolid under Kellermann. Thus all the military authorities, with the exception of the commanders of the armies in the north of Portugal, were exempt from holding any relations of obedience and responsibility with Madrid.

When the king ascertained at Seville that the separate governments were erected, he was struck with

consternation. Abandoning immediately his new conquest, he returned mournful and silent to his capital, where he found himself isolated and destitute alike of resources and of power. The French generals, from that time forth, did not so much as keep him acquainted with what was going on. "I have not a notion," he writes to Berthier, "what may be the strength either of the enemy or of the French army, each general being isolated from me since the institution of the military governments. Dorsenne tells me, that he is not under my orders. Suchet has not written to me for twenty days past, and sends no reports of any kind. The Duke of Dalmatia has never been my correspondent, and appears to ignore my authority. I say it with regret, but I say it truly, affairs go on badly, — very badly in Spain. There are as many despots as there are governors, generals, and even intendants. Each makes laws according to his own taste, and there is neither unity nor agreement among them. The people, harassed in every way, wearied, disgusted, will recover their courage at last, or assume that of despair."

The same complaints are poured out, with still greater earnestness, in the letters of the king to the Emperor. "Your Majesty," he says, "cannot wish that your brother should be perpetually humiliated by the orders transmitted to him by generals, who levy the taxes, — issue proclamations, — pass laws, and make me ridiculous in the eyes of my new subjects. Marshal Ney has gone so far, as to carry away the chests of my receiver in the very town of Avila." These outrages upon decency and the rules of subordination, appeared to those who were guilty of them very natural, and to a certain

extent even necessary, as witness the following letter addressed by Soult to the Prince of Wagram: —

"I have to combat pretensions and interests which are manifestly opposed to those of the army, and, as a necessary consequence, to those of the Emperor. I am forced by my sense of duty to oppose the execution of many orders issued by the king, and sometimes to act in opposition to them."

Not satisfied thus to disregard the authority of Joseph, the Duke of Dalmatia wrote from Seville, on the 12th August, 1812, a letter to the Duke of Feltre, in which he accuses the king of betraying the Emperor's cause. Almost at the same moment the Duke of Feltre replied, to a similar denunciation by Joseph of the commander of the army of the south: —"If the conduct of the Duke of Dalmatia be equivocal and crafty, the time is coming when the Emperor will be able to punish it."

To these personal quarrels there came by and by to be added embarrassments of a more serious nature. The Spaniards who had submitted to the authority of the king, and especially those who had accepted public employment, were deeply affected by the Emperor's determination in regard to the southern provinces. They had given in their adhesion to the new dynasty only because they had been assured by Napoleon himself, that the sole means of preserving the independence of the nation and the integrity of the kingdom was to support Joseph. Now, as the terms of the decree of the 8th February were accepted by the nation as a menace, if not as the first step towards the partition of the Peninsula, they could not but perceive that their countrymen, paying no heed to the motives

by which they had been actuated, would reproach them with having concurred in the dismemberment of the country. The regency of Cadiz, indeed, represented to the Spaniards that the institution of separate governments was the first step towards the fulfilling of the threats addressed by the Emperor to the deputies of Madrid during his stay in that city, and urged the nation, in consequence, to redouble its exertions to shake off the dominion of the stranger. The Spaniards, fierce and brave, replied to that appeal, and by and by the guerillas multiplied to such an extent, that an entire army was required to fight them and to keep open the communications with France.

The cabinet of London, taking its own view of the case, pointed out to the European governments that the erection of separate governments clearly indicated the intention of the Emperor to place the crown of Spain upon his own head, in spite of his repeated declarations to the contrary. All these dangers might have been averted had Napoleon reposed greater confidence in his brother, who from the commencement of his reign entertained just notions of the Spanish character; and had he paid more attention to the prudent advice of the king and to the respectful observations of the ministers who were attached to his cause. But it was the Emperor's fate to form, with respect to Spain, only unwise resolutions, and to embark upon disastrous measures.

In addition to the military and political embarrassments of which we have spoken, the king was subjected, in consequence of the establishment of military governments, to serious financial difficulties. He had to pro-

vide for the wants of his court, for the general service of the state, and the sustenance of the army of the centre, out of the inadequate resources of Castile. By and by he was reduced to the revenues arising out of the Octroi of Madrid alone. The trifling sums which Napoleon advanced to him, came in by driblets, and very irregularly, and as to the taxes levied in the remote provinces, the governors retained these for their own use. The consequence was, that on very many occasions Joseph was dependent upon the perilous forbearance of his creditors. His correspondence distinctly proves this. "I have not a single sous to give to any one," he writes to his brother. "I am in the fourth year of my reign, and my guard has not yet received more than the first franc, which I gave them four years ago." A little later, when writing to Berthier, he says, "It is right, however, that the Emperor should be aware, that this very day (9th March, 1811) I have been obliged to sell the consecrated vessels of my private chapel, to purchase bread for the troops in Madrid. What shall we do to-morrow? I am ignorant of what each hour may bring forth . . . The troops in my service have neither been paid nor clothed for eight months. . . . If this state of things continue, we shall be obliged, before six months are over, to evacuate Spain for want of provisions. The enemy is not sparing of money. As for me, I may say in one word, that I do not know how I am to pay the expenses of my table for eight days. Meanwhile public opinion favours me, and a great change is on the point of being produced; but public opinion yields to the force of circumstances. How can public opinion long sustain a man who has neither money, nor territory, nor

troops, nor authority. I returned to-day to Madrid, and I see none except the miserable about me. My principal functionaries are reduced so low, as to have no energy left. I have given away every thing, I have pledged every thing. I am myself in the depths of distress. There is famine in the towns, there is despair in the country districts, where means of transport and even of tillage are wanting. The army has not been paid for upwards of a year, and its officers are in a wretched condition."

Towards the end of 1811 Joseph, as a last resource, caused a magazine of corn, which Marmont had formed at Toledo, to be sold. Disregarding the scandal which must follow, the Duke of Ragusa seized the magazine by force, and sent away the purchasers empty-handed to make good their titles before Joseph. Thus were the authority and prestige of the poor king overthrown in a country where, from time immemorial, the crown had dazzled the multitudes by an extent of power and splendour which were truly wonderful.

Napoleon's endeavour to direct the war in Spain without being present on the spot, contributed, in like manner, to mar the success of the operations. Orders issued at 600 leagues from the theatre of war, and arriving six weeks after the events which they were intended to control, could not, in spite of all the Emperor's genius, be of the same importance as resolutions formed upon the spot by generals even of ordinary capacity. Sometimes these orders proved to be inopportune; sometimes they could not be executed because of circumstances of which Napoleon, writing from Paris or Germany, must necessarily be ignorant. For the most

part, his instructions were vague, because he did not venture to make them positive, knowing that disasters would probably ensue if, from a distance, he should give directions which those upon the spot would find it impossible to follow. One of the more immediate causes of the loss of the battle of Talavera was, the concentration of the corps of Soult, Mortier, and Ney, for which Napoleon had given orders while he was still at Schönbrunn. Indeed, the order in question did not reach Joseph till Soult's invasion of Portugal had failed, and Galicia was evacuated.

The misfortunes of Massena in the campaign of 1811 proceeded, in a great degree, from the vagueness of the orders issued at Paris to the generals who were directed to support him. Thus the emperor recommended Drouet "*to support the Prince of Essling, but not to give up his own communications.*" He recommended Marshal Soult to go to the assistance of the army of Portugal, but without treating the act as an indispensable duty; above all, without authorising the sacrifices which would be required to render such assistance possible and efficacious. He, by this means, left an opening through which ill-will or timidity might elude orders which, being given from a distance and out of time, could not be otherwise than indistinct; because when they arrived, after a journey of 500 leagues, and two months posterior to their date, they were either impracticable or inexpedient.

There can be no doubt that Napoleon's orders (issued on the 20th November, 1811) to Reille, Marmont, and Joseph, to move a strong force upon Valencia, hastened the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. We have shown, also, that his instructions to Marmont of the 18th and 21st

February, 1812, and his rejection of the marshal's plan to unite under one command the armies of the north, of the centre, and of Portugal, contributed to the loss of Badajos. Finally, it has been demonstrated that the recommendation of the Emperor, at the opening of the campaign of 1812, to keep Andalusia, resulted in isolating Marmont, and favouring Wellington's offensive march upon Salamanca. These instructions show that, with all his genius, Napoleon did not rightly understand the kind of war which was suitable to the various provinces of Spain ; his orders, though always worthy of admiration so far as they illustrate the art and general principles of war, had this defect, that they were often incapable of being executed. The reason was, that he tested difficulties by the measure of his own capacity, and looked much more to the end to be attained, than to the means of attaining it which were at his disposal.

It was only towards the close of 1812 that he abstained, being unable to do otherwise, from himself directing military operations in the Peninsula. But he had scarcely returned from the disastrous expedition into Russia, ere he again sent to Clarke, from the heart of Germany, orders for the king and for the generals commanding in the provinces. It was thus that in March, 1813, the Duke de Feltre issued direct instructions to Reille and Clausel to put down the insurrection in Biscay and Navarre.

The king never ceased to complain of this proceeding, which often produced the most distressing complications. Already, at the commencement of the war, he had made representations on that head; as, for example, in the following letter, dated 19th of April, 1809 :—"If the Minister of War, instead of transmitting

orders which must be executed, would be content to inform us of your Majesty's intentions, and to give us such general instructions and directions as may be modified according to the changes which have occurred in the affairs of Spain since these instructions were drawn up at Paris — if your Majesty, thus advising, would give me leave to follow your instructions or not, according to circumstances, and thus repose in me the confidence of which, for my own sake and for the sake of others, I stand in need — then we may have a point of central and rapid direction — then I may, with more justice, be held responsible for the measures which I have ordered." To all these complaints, however, as well as to the king's entreaties, sometimes for money, sometimes for more real authority over the military commanders, Napoleon invariably replied, "that Joseph did not understand his position" — "that God had not made him a general" — "that he was gentle and spiritual, but indolent, fond of pleasure, and not of too much work" — "that men intuitively understood his temperament, and that if the guidance of armies were confided to him, nobody would take instructions from such a chief" — "that if people saw near him, at all times, an officer authorised to advise him, nobody would obey his orders; because one would hold in contempt the king-general, and another be jealous of the general-king exercising in reality supreme power" — "that he could not give him more than the command of the army of the centre, the action of which extended twenty or thirty leagues around Madrid" — "that as to money, he had it not" — "that his brothers, who reigned over the richest countries in Europe, were always begging of him" — "that Spain had enough to supply the whole

world" — "that if Joseph knew how to administer, he would find means" — "that he knew very well how to get money enough to give to his favourites, to build royal residences, and to pay for luxuries which, in the existing state of things, were useless" — "that if Spain suffered, it was a misfortune for which he had no remedy" — "that the French soldiers suffered also, and that war was war" — "that if the Spaniards were weary of suffering, they had nothing to do but to submit" — "that Joseph's affectation of benevolence, and his anxiety to win the people, were ridiculous" — "that his expectation of being able to accomplish with millions of money what he could not do with thousands of men, was not less ridiculous" — "that if he sent him money and withdrew the troops, the money would soon be consumed, and he (Joseph), with his court, be led back disgracefully to Bayonne by armed bands" — "that there needed many troops, great vigour, and even terror, to overcome the resistance of Spain" — "that terror would lead to submission, and that submission once accomplished, good administration, which was due to the whole people, would follow" — "that when Spain was attached by these means to its new king, then would be the time for Joseph to follow his own inclinations."*

There was in all this some truth, a great deal of persiflage, with much exaggeration, and moreover, the enunciation of the most fatal of all Napoleon's mistakes, viz.: his determination to subdue the Peninsula by terror, and make his army subsist by marauding in a country which he was desirous of attaching to France.

Another nuisance to the French armies was the war of partisans co-operating with the regular war. Scarcely

* History of the Consulate and the Empire, t. iv. p. 83.

had the insurrection become general, when bands of guerillas gathered together at all points; which were the more easily assembled, that the Spanish peasant is always armed, that his wretched cabin is unfurnished, and that the beautiful climate of Spain enables him to bivouac, as it were, throughout the whole year.

These bands, having neither magazines to guard, nor fortresses to cover, nor depôts to form, could collect wherever they chose, and hazard the most audacious enterprises. Producing no effect in the field of battle, they yet weighed heavily in the scale of secondary operations. It was their business to attack isolated posts, to fall, in force, upon detachments, convoys, depôts, magazines; to intercept couriers and supplies, to burn and plunder the villages through which the enemy must pass; to destroy fords and bridges, to obstruct roads, passes, and defiles; to lay ambuscades, to harass by continually making it appear that troops were on the march, — in a word, to do the greatest possible amount of mischief to the enemy, without paying any attention to the laws which honour and humanity impose upon the generals of civilised nations. The most unworthy means were adopted by these guerillas and justified by public opinion, so long as they had for their object the death or ruin of a Frenchman. Hence it was that they massacred stragglers, and sometimes even the sick and wounded; that they poisoned the wells and fountains to which the French repaired to quench their thirst; that they subjected to the most cruel and revolting tortures the unfortunate soldiers who fell into their hands. It would be difficult to form an idea of the losses which this spirit of murder and of vengeance occasioned to the imperial army.

Fatigue, sickness, and long privations wrought not less damage to that army. Moreover, it appears that at all times, these two pests, vengeance and famine, have been the sure attendants upon armies which carried on war in Spain. "In that country," said Henry IV., "large armies are always starved, and small armies always beaten." A profound judgment, which was about to receive, two centuries later, a striking confirmation, at the expense of the glory and prosperity of France.

Assailed on all sides by these Spanish bands, the French established, at short intervals, intrenched posts, in old forts, convents, and castles. They thus rendered secure their military roads and their depôts of provisions and ammunition; but what an amount of force was employed to obtain this result! One half of the army was sometimes required to guard the other half, and of the latter, two thirds were often absent, to seek by plunder the means of subsisting the whole.

But the greatest mischief which the guerillas wrought to Joseph's army, was the interruption of the communications between its different corps. The generals commanding these corps found it almost impossible to correspond with one another, and to obtain correct information as to the enemy's position. They sometimes did not know what was passing at two leagues from their own head-quarters. M. Jomini cites a case, in which 4000 men were required to carry a despatch from Joseph to Marshal Ney, though the two chiefs were operating in concert at the time.*

The king experienced more than once the same difficulty. Thus, shortly before the battle of Vittoria, he

* In the campaign of 1809.

was obliged to detach 1500 men from his army, to carry an order to General Clausel. A little before this, not fewer than 4000 men had been required to escort a courier from Bayonne to Valladolid.*

In one of his letters, he states, "that Bessières, in 1808, found himself, before he was aware, in the presence of an army 40,000 strong, and that General Merlin, who was sent to support him, could not find a guide, though he offered a handful of gold for the service." It appears, from official documents, that the king was made acquainted with the passage of the Douro, and the retreat of Soult, only by way of Paris. General Thiebault, chief of the staff to the Duke of Abrantes, quotes a similar occurrence: "We have been now a full month," he says, "without tidings from Loison and Almeida; twenty-five copies of the same order have been forwarded by every possible means to him and to General Charlot, and every thing shows that not one has arrived."

The astonishment of Massena on seeing the lines of Torres Vedras is still more remarkable. That marshal had the greatest interest in ascertaining what obstacles he would have to encounter in his march upon Lisbon; yet it was only at Leiria that he became aware of the existence of those famous lines, on which Wellington had been at work for six months, with an immense body of troops and of peasants.

Altogether extraordinary, too, was the march of Romana's corps, in 1809, which stole along Ney's columns without being observed, and succeeded in establishing itself in those positions which the marshal had abandoned in order to go in search of it.

In 1812, Marmont received intelligence on the 15th,

* Memoirs of Joseph, t. ix. p. 152.

at Valladolid, of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was begun on the 8th; and on the 26th, of the capitulation, which had been signed on the 19th. . The same year, on the 21st of July, the king sent six couriers from Madrid, to inform Marmont of his departure from Madrid. Only one arrived, and he reached his destination not till noon on the 23rd, the day after the battle of Salamanca.

On the 1st of October, Joseph forwarded a letter to General Souham. Six copies followed on six successive days, and it was the last, carried by Colonel Lucotte, which arrived first; while a letter written on the 17th, by Hill to Wellington, reached its destination on the 18th, at the same time that Souham received Joseph's despatch.

In further proof of the extreme difficulty with which the French marshals, even when not far apart, were able to transmit the most important information to each other, General Mathieu Dumas cites the following fact:—"After the battle of Salamanca, we have seen that Clausel's rear-guard passed within a few miles of the army of the king, without either being aware of the proximity of the other; and this ignorance of their relative situations involved, by and by, the entire separation of the two corps, and the loss of Madrid."

In the spring of 1813, Joseph's communications with France were so completely interrupted, that despatches sent from Paris on the 4th of January, did not reach the king till the 18th of March,—and then only by the intervention of Suchet; while the Duke of Feltre informed Joseph, that the latest letter from Madrid, received on the 18th of March, bore the date of the 1st of February. It is equally established, by the despatches of Napoleon, by the testimony of the French generals,

and by Wellington's correspondence, that the most exact and detailed information, respecting the strength and position of the allied troops, was supplied to head-quarters by the English newspapers. The circumstance does unquestionable honour to the patriotism of the Spaniards, who, in spite of the most tempting offers, constantly refused to act as guides or as spies. "This country and people," writes Joseph, in 1808, "are not like any other. We cannot find one spy or one messenger among them. And, another thing, 2000 servants have quitted me at once, in spite of the good appointments which I had given them. We cannot find a single guide or a single spy; whatever may be written or said to the contrary, there is nothing of the kind among them." *

This state of things exercised the most mischievous influence over the movements of the French army. For in war, the general who is best informed is almost always the boldest. How many victories have been the result of well-timed information? and how many disasters have been produced by information received too late, or incomplete when it came? All these circumstances must be taken into account, as well as the moral effect which they produced upon the French troops. The war in Spain was the most disagreeable in which French generals and soldiers ever were engaged. Constant distress, unceasing dangers, of which the least were those on the field of battle; the spectacle of murder and pillage always before their eyes; the ferocious hatred and spirit of vengeance which actuated the Spaniards,—took away all sense of security from the

* Letter to Napoleon, 5th August, 1808. We shall see by and by, however, that Spanish patriotism was not always so unbending.

soldiers, as well before as after a battle. And on the other side, there were no decisive victories, no honours or promotions, not even the rewards usually accorded to valour. These were the peculiarities which distinguished that war from all others, and rendered it so fatal. Napoleon besides was prejudiced against the army of the Peninsula, which could not realise for him one dream of glory, and ceased not to mingle its urgent complaints with the songs of victory which attended his triumphal march into the heart of Germany. "Honours and rewards," says General Jomini, "were reserved for the other armies; for that of Spain, sure discouragement and unfailing censure; yet it surpassed all the rest both in courage and in resignation."

The English army found itself in a totally different situation. In the first place it fought for a good cause, and that advantage, whatever certain soldiers may say to the contrary, has a great effect upon the minds of men. Every enterprise disloyal and unjust in itself, is a load which acts unfavourably upon the *morale* of the soldier, and upon the *ensemble* of his operations. And the French army was not slow in being satisfied of that fact. It is necessary also to remark, that all the continental nations had been wounded by the sword of Napoleon, and that, with the exception of Prussia, not one had been crushed. A common sentiment of humiliation, and the hope of signal revenge, as well as the prompt and ample subsidies of England, united these nations by bonds more enduring than treaties. France could count only on their fears,—while England ranged upon her side their interests and self-love.

Germany, fretting under the yoke, prepared in secret the means of a speedy insurrection. The other states

showed themselves not less eager to break their chains. On the other hand, the continental blockade had raised up a party against the empire among the merchants, manufacturers, and maritime population of a great part of Europe. Finally, hatred for French principles was at that period in full force. The privileged classes detested Napoleon, because his genius had given stability to institutions which owed their existence to the revolution, and because his victories had baffled their calculations, and greatly shaken what yet remained to them of power and influence.

All these circumstances were in favour of the English army, which had besides the advantage of being commanded by a general who inspired his subordinates with perfect confidence, and united to military talents of no common order the not less valuable faculties of an administrator, financier, and statesman. This army received from the country in which it made war supplies in men, provisions and money; and even when its resources failed for a moment it could at least reckon upon a friendly neutrality. The commander-in-chief was thereby enabled to keep his troops always in hand — to leave only weak detachments in the most important places, and to combine his operations without taking into account the state of the harvests. At the same time the necessity under which he lay of feeding and paying his troops, without having recourse to marauding or requisitions, occasioned to him at times difficulties quite as serious as those of which the French generals complained. When money did not arrive, when English credit became suddenly depreciated, or the transport of corn was not effected regularly through the fault either of the local autho-

rities or of the English Admiralty, Wellington was compelled to have recourse to all sorts of expedients, in order to feed and pay his troops. Now events of this kind were by no means of rare occurrence during the war in Spain, as the following facts will prove.

In 1809, there was a time when, in consequence of the exhaustion of Portugal, the English army had no other resource for feeding men and horses than to bring up a few cattle and a little straw from the northern provinces.

Towards the end of that campaign, almost the whole nation was fed by the embassy. Great Britain made enormous sacrifices to supply its wants, and when its resources were well nigh exhausted, Wellington procured the money required by establishing a trade in grain with America, and by adopting, in concert with Sir Charles Stuart, all sorts of expedients, marked throughout by the rarest forethought.

During the campaign of Talavera, the Spaniards, in spite of the abundant supplies at their disposal, and the formal engagements which they had contracted, left the allied army in a state of the greatest destitution. The same effect was produced on every occasion when the English army acted in concert with that of Spain. As often as the latter was well supplied, it displayed no generosity whatever, but when it stood in need of everything (and this was the ordinary state of the case), it threw itself for subsistence upon the English magazines.

In the pursuit of Massena, in 1810, the national troops would have died of hunger but for the assistance rendered to them by England. They would have suffered the same misfortune at the period of the battle of

Albuera, had not Marshal Beresford consented to make some advances.

On the 22nd of January, 1810, Wellington wrote to Admiral Berkeley: "I am left entirely to my own resources, and find myself obliged to provide, with the little which I can procure, for the wants of the Allies as well as for those of the English army. If I yield, God help me, for nobody will support me."

In the campaign of 1813, Wellington was obliged to issue to the Spanish troops not only provisions, but clothing, shoes, and accoutrements besides.

Wellington's correspondence proves that, throughout the whole of his campaigns, he experienced great financial embarrassments; for when money failed every thing had to be procured upon credit,—means of transport, hospital supplies, and correspondence itself. "However friendly the Spaniards might be, they never handed over, upon mere promises of payment, the supplies which they kept carefully locked up for their own use."*

While Wellington was at Madrid, his troops were dying of hunger at Salamanca. The subaltern officers were obliged to sell their horses in order to procure provisions, and some even sank under their privations. Sometimes there was such a want of money that, in spite of the successes with which it was attended, the war was more than once upon the point of being brought to an end. It was during such moments that the constancy and genius of the English general shone forth with the greatest brilliancy. The minister reduced to his last shift, proposed, in 1812, that the general should have recourse to a mode of subsisting his troops, not unlike to the system of requisitions, which was acted upon in the French army; but Wellington preferred

* Napier.

enduring all the distress of his uncertain situation rather than annoy the Allies of England, or weaken the bands of discipline by so dangerous a reform. To make war support itself it is necessary to have large bodies of troops, because movable columns withdraw a great part of the army from the main object of its operations. There must also be ready means of recruiting, for the daily combats which marauding provokes occasion considerable losses. Above all there is need of soldiers completely disciplined, for nothing more quickly than rapine changes the habits of order and respect which lie at the root of all subordination. Now the English army possessed none of these advantages; it was not numerous, its recruiting system was vicious, it was composed of soldiers whom their previous habits disposed continually to break through the restraints of duty. Such an army would, without doubt, have aggravated the horrors which are inseparable from a system of requisitions, and thus rendered the English soldiers odious to all Spaniards.

It follows, from the preceding, that the system of provisionment adopted by the English army, though affording great advantages, was the cause of much embarrassment to the general, and constrained him to regulate his movements by the march of his convoys. This inconvenience was still more aggravated by the errors of the native governments, and the want of forethought, we might almost say the negligence, of the English ministry. In looking over the voluminous correspondence between Wellington and the members of the several cabinets which succeeded each other from 1808 to 1815, we are often tempted to ask, whether the Duke did not find it more difficult to please the statesmen of

his own country than to make head against the French. "The ministers of that period," says Alison, "were incapable of judging of military affairs. They were in communication with plausible men, still more incapable than themselves, or they were immersed, in consequence of long inactivity, in a sea of insignificant details." They were never ready in time, and waited, invariably, after receiving urgent remonstrances from Wellington, till the impossibility of remaining longer inactive became self-evident. It is true that the state of the finances, and the diversity of interests engaged in a great European war, as well as the importunities of parliament, which demanded an account of everything, explain, up to a certain point, their dilatoriness and hesitation. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied, that the ministers more than once so conducted themselves as to deserve the reproaches of the army, which sustained so gallantly in the Peninsula the honour and interests of Great Britain. Above all, was to be deprecated the presumption which led them, up to the last moment, to issue complete instructions to their generals respecting all the details of the service, and even to trace for them plans of campaign, which, because of the imperfect intelligence upon which they rested, became sometimes a source of embarrassment, sometimes of serious danger.

We have seen that the cabinet of London, by its contradictory orders and mistaken ideas, would have compromised the success of the campaign of 1808, had not Wellington taken it upon himself to follow his own inspirations. Instead of supporting that able general in the affair of the Convention of Cintra, the government had the weakness to recall him, and to appoint, as his successor, Sir John Moore, who had no more reason

than he to congratulate himself upon the intelligence and activity of the statesmen by whom the councils of his country were guided. The English minister had inundated Spain with incapable agents. These agents supplied the most erroneous information concerning the state of public opinion and the insurrectionary forces; and it was upon such inaccurate reports that the government drew up the instructions by which their generals were to be guided. Sir John Moore soon found out how much he could trust to such instructions, to the enthusiasm of the Spaniards, to the bravery of their troops, and to the efficiency of the supplies sent by England to juntas and to local authorities.

Sir John Craddock was not better treated. They left him destitute of instructions, with 14,000 men, in presence of Soult and Victor, who were preparing to march upon Lisbon, at the head of an army four times as strong as his own. This culpable ignorance brought it about, that after Sir John Moore's check, the cabinet no longer believed in the possibility of maintaining its army in Portugal. "You have been informed by my despatch of the 4th of December," writes Canning to one of his agents, "that in the event of the troops under Sir John Craddock's command evacuating Portugal, an event which the affairs of Galicia render probable," &c. &c.

Under the apprehension that this opinion might become general, Wellington demonstrated the possibility of defending Portugal against the French armies, however numerous they might be. Only half convinced by that demonstration, the Ministers appointed him to his command as an experiment; but instead of leaning for the future upon his experience, they interfered with him at the outset, with instructions which he found himself

for the most part, obliged to modify; "in order that he might not be obliged to stop at a moment when an offensive movement might prove of the greatest use to the cause of the Spaniards."

More than once Wellington was obliged to struggle against such hindrances. It was one of the Ministers' favourite notions, that the Isle of Leon ought to be occupied, and Cadiz rendered the base of operations against the French army. Wellington combated that idea, making his appeal to the principles of strategy, and pointing out that the unfriendly jealousy of the Spaniards would not permit him to create at Cadiz establishments as safe and firm as he had at Lisbon. Events completely justified him in this; and it must be considered as one of the great causes of success in the Spanish war, that the English general came to the determination of abandoning Cadiz, and establishing himself in Portugal, upon the flank of the French lines of operation.

Another mistake of the cabinet of London consisted in this, that it continually employed its troops in secondary expeditions, and weakened without necessity its principal army, under circumstances when it ought on the contrary to have reinforced that army by all the means in its power. Thus, Wellington had scarcely arrived in the Peninsula, when he found himself called upon to give an opinion against the impolitic war into which the central Junta and several statesmen of his own country were anxious to drag Great Britain, for the purpose of reducing the revolted Spanish colonies. In 1812, he resisted, with the same energy, the invasion of Italy, upon which the English Government, at the suggestion of Lord William Bentinck, had decided. The expedition did not take place, but the preparations for it

deferred beyond the proper moment another enterprise on which Wellington reckoned much. "Catalonia," says Napier, "contained the best elements of military organisation. If at any period between 1809 and 1810, there had been on that side 10,000 English ready to attack the French in rear, or to support the Catalonians, the operations of the 7th corps would have been paralysed, and Gerona, Hostelrich, Tortosa, Tarragona, and Lerida itself might have been saved." Wellington attached great importance to this idea, but the English Government considered it more to the purpose to employ the army from Sicily in the reduction of the Ionian Islands, and in passing hither and thither along the coast of Italy, than in reinforcing the Catalonians, while as yet they were masters of all the strong places, and had perfect confidence in the success of the insurrection. Nor was it till after the fall of these places, and the destruction of the Spanish armies, when the population, awakened from their illusions, had undergone severe suffering, that they directed towards the east coast of Spain a *córps d'armée*, the presence of which elsewhere would have been far more useful. So many years spent in hostility with France had not imbued the English cabinet with the first principles of the art of war, and they were so far from acknowledging the fact which their blunders rendered evident, that they carried their blindness to the extent of refusing to avail themselves of the advice of professional men. The consequence was that, even after the decisive victory of Salamanca, their confidence in the final issues of the war was so slight, that they continued to remind the commander-in-chief, that in case of a reverse, the responsibility would rest entirely with him.

In 1813 the question of invading Italy was mooted anew, and Wellington was obliged a second time to point out the absurdity of the project. Finally, at the commencement of 1814, the minister entertained such a mistaken idea of the part which his army was playing in the South of France, that he proposed to transport it to Belgium, that it might form the right wing of the army of the Allies. And when Wellington had successfully combated that idea, as well as the proposal to reduce the monthly subsidy of 100,000*l.* granted to his army, the minister, diverting from the force in the Peninsula the drafts intended for it, sent a good many regiments to be destroyed, without aim or object, at Bergen-op-Zoom. To these many proofs of the military incapacity of the English Government, may be added others not less convincing of its want of forethought and common judgment.

In 1808, after the battle of Vimeiro, the British army passed, in twenty-four hours, from the command of Wellesley to that of Burrard and Dalrymple in succession, without any good reason having been assigned for the arrangement. In 1812 and 1813 the Anglo-Sicilian army, in consequence of a like inconsistency, changed its commanders seven times in one month, a circumstance which was not without its effect in producing the disasters which befel that army. The conduct of the English Admiralty was equally blamable, and the Commander-in-chief complained of it to the end of the war.

[To a certain extent this was the result of our system of administration, which, under all circumstances, renders our naval and military forces independent of each other; but no defence can be offered for an arrangement which created two separate naval commands upon

the coast of the Peninsula, so that a vessel passing from Lisbon to Oporto should be at the disposal of one admiral, and on touching at Corunna come under the control of another. Wellington remonstrated against this latter evil, pointing out the inconveniences to which it subjected him, but he obtained no redress. In like manner the interference of the military authorities at home with the distribution of his troops, and the appointment and recall of officers, proved exceedingly inconvenient to him.* Many of the Duke's letters complain of these proceedings, as well as of the limited discretion allowed him to reward conspicuous services by promotion or nomination to the staff.]

The most minute details were subjected to the control of the minister at home. "It seems really extraordinary," says Earl de Grey*, "that ministers charged with the government of such an empire as Great Britain should have considered it essential to impose upon the commander of that nation's greatest army the necessity of applying to the secretary of state, or a member of the cabinet, in order to be informed how his soldiers should dine; and yet there exists a letter, dated the 14th of March, 1810, to Lord Liverpool, in which Wellington complains of having received no answer to a dispatch dated the 24th of September of the previous year, and addressed to the commander-in-chief, on the subject of camp kettles. 'This delay causes us daily inconvenience; the soldiers clearly cannot cook their food unless they have camp kettles.'" Such absurdities as these show how completely the War Office was then the slave of obsolete rules and practices. The bureaucrats of that department took it for granted that an army in the field would observe all the administra-

* Characteristics of Wellington.

tive formalities which are imposed upon troops in the garrison of London, and its requirements were often followed by the most ridiculous orders.*

The minister required weekly reports of the operations of the army, and detailed notes of the general's plans. Now, more than once these documents, handed over to the newspapers, supplied the enemy's generals with the best information. "It is very well to desire," Wellington writes to Lord Liverpool, "that you would publish no details except those which I give in my despatches. You cannot imagine how much the French are in want of accurate information. Every one of my despatches which you publish is sent from Paris to Massena, and it is in this manner that he is informed of all that is passing." Twenty of Wellington's letters, written at all stages in the Spanish war, refer to the same subject, and are filled with the same complaints, yet not one of them produced the smallest effect.

We may point yet again, as greatly impeding the success of the English army, to the insufficiency and bad quality of its matériel, which the duke, in spite of all his efforts, never succeeded in rendering what it ought to have been. "In the opinion of all the engineers," says Colonel Jones, "Sir Hugh Dalrymple could not have taken Almeida and Elvas under several months, and without enormous loss, because the English had no means of collecting the necessary siege matériel

[* The late war in the Crimea was at least as remarkable as the war in the Peninsula for the constant interference of the civil authorities at home with military matters of which they knew nothing: nor does there appear to be any hope of the establishment of a better system, till the War Office learns to confine itself to finance, leaving all military details to the Horse Guards and to the general commanding in the field.]

at these places. This was the main consideration which weighed with Dalrymple in favour of the convention of Cintra."

The same engineer remarks, "that the retreat to Corunna in which they were obliged to leave a bridge entire, for want of tools with which to destroy it, furnishes a memorable example of the disastrous consequences attendant on an incapable and parsimonious system of administration."

Finally, Jones affirms, that if, during the winter of 1810–11, while the army was shut up in the lines at Lisbon, any one had proposed to supply the engineer park with a sufficient number of miners, and sappers and artificers; with draught-horses, waggons, and pontoons, he would have been pronounced insane. At the same time, it is easy to observe what a different turn events would have taken had Marshal Beresford been able to pass the Guadiana on the 26th of March. The breach of Badajos being at that period open, the ditches filled in, and the magazines empty, the place could have offered very little resistance. The battle of Albuera need not have been fought, nor the English army have sacrificed its best soldiers in murderous assaults.

The siege park was so inadequately supplied, that Wellington was obliged to employ before Badajoz, guns, cast in the reign of Philip II., and for lack of mortars, to mount his howitzers upon wooden blocks. At Burgos he was obliged to suspend the attack till a convoy of ammunition should come up which had been expected for six weeks. He was compelled to apply over and over again, up to the end of the war, for leave to form a special corps of sappers and miners. The first 100 men of that corps did not enter upon the discharge of their duties till the siege of San Sebastian

was resumed in August, 1813. The other departments were not a whit better organised than the engineers. The commissariat was recruited from among civilians in the public service, who had no experience, nor any sane idea of war, and over whom the commander-in-chief exercised an imperfect authority. He was not allowed to dismiss these gentlemen, whatever fault they might commit, and the generals, to whom they were attached, had no power to punish them at all. No guarantee whatever of fitness was required from candidates. We have before us a letter from Wellington, in which he expresses his astonishment that they should have sent a pickpocket to Cadiz as a deputy commissary-general. In another letter he complains, that they do not choose to promote an assistant-commissary, the ablest man in the department, merely because he had not been five years in the rank which he then held. In a third letter he protests against the determination of the War Department not to ratify certain provisional appointments which he had made for the good of the service. "I don't know," he says, "how this may be, but if such be really their intention, I honestly desire that the government will look out for some other officer to manage its affairs in this country, for I am quite unable to attend to them if they treat me in this manner." Is it surprising after this, that Wellington should have been so often obliged to point out the incapacity and negligence of the commissariat, the service of which, however, ought to take the foremost rank in an army which lives at the expense of its own magazines?

In the hospital system also, there was much to be desired. It was strikingly inferior to that of the French hospitals, waited upon as these were by ambulances which excited the admiration of the Allies. Wellington

did not succeed, for want of money and support among the corps of surgeons, in modifying this state of things. His wounded were carried away slowly, and badly attended to. They sent to him from London only ungraduated students, ignorant of the simplest requirements of war, and knowing nothing about their duty.

The engineer corps was by no means master of its work, which accounts for the failure, or faulty direction, given to most of the assaults. "I trust," writes Wellington in 1812, "that future armies will be equipped for sieges with the people necessary to carry them on as they ought to be, and that our engineers will learn how to put their batteries on the crest of the glacis, and to blow in the counterscarp, instead of erecting them wherever the wall can be seen, leaving the poor officers and troops to get into and across the ditch as they can."

Finally, to complete this faithful exposure of the short-comings of the English army, we may add, that the staff, whose duty it is to transmit the thoughts of the general, and to watch the execution of his orders, was weak, and recruited from miserable elements. Apart from Murray, and Pakenham, and a few other officers of incontestable merit, the rest, and above all those coming from High Wickham *, exhibited only negligence and incapacity. "If I were permitted to take them from the line," writes Wellington, "I should do well enough. The pedants of High Wickham may be conversant with theory, but most of them are wanting in activity and practical knowledge;—a young staff is the ruin of an army."

[* There was a staff school, or as it was called, a "Senior Department," at Wickham, of which the Duke never entertained a very exalted opinion. It died out after the peace, and is now about to be resuscitated; let us hope to better purpose.]

We have thus pointed out some of the causes of the inferiority of the English army; it remains to specify the last and most important of the whole, viz. the defects in the recruiting system, and the bad composition of the depôts. As certain critics have attributed Wellington's successes to exceptional qualities in the English troops, it is important that we should stop for a moment to consider that question.

There can be no doubt that the English soldier when well commanded, is admirable in the field of battle, and that he possesses in a high degree, coolness, obstinacy, courage, and that rare quality which General Foy describes as calmness in anger (*le calme dans la colère*). But, side by side with these virtues, what defects appear!! Drunkenness, cupidity, debauchery, and a constant inclination to dispute the authority of his chiefs. All these vices Wellington was obliged to combat throughout the whole of his career. And though possessed of as much perseverance as of energy, he failed to overcome and scarcely succeeded in diminishing them.*

The Duke of York had introduced great improvements into the discipline and organisation of the British troops. Wellington continued these reforms, and under

* [It is scarcely necessary to remind English readers, that this portrait of the English soldier, though painted from the Wellington despatches, is very highly coloured — looking even to what he was in 1813. We are not ignorant of the fact, that the English army, raised by voluntary enlistment, neither is, nor ever can be, made up of the most industrious and sober members of the community. But that it contains fewer individuals prone to violence and cruelty than the armies of France we are perfectly sure; and we know that its behaviour in the South of France in 1814, contrasted admirably with that of the French armies in Spain and Portugal, as well as with the army of Spain in France.]

his able administration, the English army acquired a degree of strength and reputation which it had never previously attained. Neither the one nor the other of these warriors was, however, able entirely to eradicate the bad habits to which the English soldiers were addicted, and in which they had lived previously to their entrance into the service.

Besides the drawbacks which attach to the English method of recruitment, there is one which has its source in the physical constitution of the enlisted men. Though possessed of great bodily strength, and perhaps because of that peculiarity, the English soldier requires food at once abundant and substantial. Privations take away from him some of his best qualities; and again, if his appetite be fully satisfied, he finds great difficulty in making long and rapid marches. We will not say, with Monsieur *Thiers*, "that he cannot fight, or that he does not know how to conquer till after he has been well fed," because Talavera proves the reverse. But we may affirm, without fear of contradiction, that his vivacity and enthusiasm are not such as to render him enterprising under all circumstances.

Wellington was perfectly aware of these natural defects in his men. If he executed no such rapid movements as those by which the French army distinguished itself, it was because he found himself unable to do so. Everything which it is possible to effect with the soldiers of his country, he effected in India and in the Peninsula. During the Mahratta war he performed marches such as, up to that moment, had never been contemplated in those regions. In Spain, whenever the nature of the service required, he pursued the same course. We may quote, among other remarkable examples of the mobility of the

English troops, the following facts, the authenticity of which cannot be doubted.

In 1811, Crawfurd's light division, under the orders of Spencer, quitted the neighbourhood of Almeida during the hottest season of the year, made during several days stages of seven and nine leagues, and reached Badajoz without leaving a single straggler behind.

At the battle of Barossa, General Graham's troops, though they reached their ground after a night march of six hours, fought successfully one of the bloodiest battles on record.

In 1812, Hill's troops, in the valley of the Tagus, accomplished thirteen leagues in a single day.

The same year several English regiments marched without a halt from Cadiz to Burgos, and from Burgos to Ciudad Rodrigo. For five days after quitting Salamanca, the English soldiers received only two rations, and found themselves reduced to the necessity of feeding upon acorns. Yet, in spite of these admitted facts, it is certain that the English army marched with greater difficulty than Napoleon's troops, because each man carried with him only three days' provisions at the most, whereas the French soldiers were laden sometimes with rations for eleven or twelve days. This circumstance, combined with the want of discipline and the rapacity of his English volunteers, hindered Wellington from improving his victories to the extent that would have been attainable under other circumstances and with different implements.

To quote only one example: at the close of the battle of Vittoria the greater number of regiments disbanded themselves, and eighteen days afterwards, according to his own avowal, the commander-in-chief had still 12,500 marauders among the mountains. The following are

the terms in which Wellington expresses himself to Lord Bathurst: — "We started with the army in the highest order, and up to the day of the battle nothing could get on better. But that event has, as usual, totally annihilated all order and discipline. The soldiers of the army have got among them about a million sterling in money, with the exception of about 100,000 dollars which were got for the military chest. The night of the battle, instead of being passed in getting rest and food to prepare them for the pursuit of the following day, was passed by the soldiers in looking for plunder. The consequence was they were incapable of marching in pursuit of the enemy, and were totally knocked up. The rain came on and increased their fatigue; and I am quite convinced that we have now out of the ranks double the amount of the loss in the battle, and that we have lost more men in the pursuit than the enemy."

This fact, to which the war in Spain offers many parallels, confirms a statement which Wellington makes in one of his letters — "We are an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to fight, but, take my word for it, defeat or success would dissolve us."

The Duke attributes his own inferiority in this respect a good deal to the carelessness with which his officers discharged their duty. "We shall do no good," he says, "till we change our system so far as to compel all ranks to do their duty." The order-book of Wellington and his correspondence attest that the English officers, though brave and intelligent in the day of battle, were ignorant in many respects of matters with which they ought to have been familiar, and showed themselves extremely careless in superintending the instruction and discipline of their men. This is a circumstance not generally

known, and about which we should have entertained doubts had not the testimony of Wellington entirely removed them. Indeed, we read in a general order of the 17th August, 1812 — "To do his duty bravely in action is but a small part of what is required . . . Officers of all ranks, and in all situations, are too much accustomed to leave to their inferiors the performance of the most important duties, without so much as taking the trouble to superintend their proceedings. The consequence is, that all duties are performed negligently and inaccurately, if they are performed at all, and that the greatest inconveniences follow. . . . Our officers of cavalry," he says again, "have learnt the habit of always going at a gallop, and gallop just as fast to the rear as they do to the front. They pay no attention to the situation in which they are, and never think of manœuvring before an enemy, so that one would think they could not manœuvre except on Wimbledon Common."

On the 2nd of July, in the same year, he writes to Lord Bathurst — "The officers of the lower ranks will not perform the duties required from them, for the purpose of keeping their soldiers in order; and it is next to impossible to punish any officer for neglect of this description. As to the non-commissioned officers, as I have repeatedly stated, they are as bad as the men, and too near them, in point of pay and situation, by the regulations of late years, for us to expect them to do anything to keep the men in order."

In the same spirit he writes to Colonel Torrens, the military secretary — "The fact is, that if discipline means habits of obedience to orders, as well as military instruction, we have but little of it in the army.

Nobody ever thinks of obeying an order, and all the regulations of the Horse Guards, as well as of the War Office, and all the orders of the army applicable to this peculiar service, are so much waste paper."

It would be unbecoming to suppose that these severe opinions were expressed under the influence of ill-humour, or that their sole object was to stimulate the *amour propre* of the English officers. Fifteen years after the close of the war, on the 22nd of April, 1829, Wellington, then head of his own cabinet, wrote a remarkable letter upon the discipline of the English army, in which, among others, the following passage occurs: — "In my opinion the duty of a subaltern officer is not at all understood in the cavalry and infantry of the line, as it is in foreign armies. In the Guards it is performed by the sergeants. It follows that our officers — however admirable their conduct may be on the field of battle, however honourable they themselves may be, whatever glory, whatever benefit, they may obtain for the country, — though gentlemen, are poor creatures in maintaining the discipline of their companies in camps, towns, and quarters."

On 31st of May, 1809, the Duke wrote to Lord Castlereagh,—"The army behaves shockingly, it is a band of vagrants, it plunders everywhere." The same day he wrote to Mr. Villiers,—"I have long been of opinion, that an English army cannot bear either success or defeat." In another letter to Lord Castlereagh, he declares, "We are more to be dreaded than the enemy." And in a general order of the 28th November, 1812, addressed to the commandants of divisions and brigades he says: — "I have observed with pain, that the army under my command has fallen, in respect to discipline, during the

late campaign, below what I have ever seen in any other army. . . . I do not hesitate to attribute the evil to the habitual negligence with which regimental officers set about the performance of their duty."

Nothing, besides, is more clearly proved, than that the indiscipline of the English troops, throughout the war of the Peninsula, was habitual. On the 20th November, 1813, Wellington wrote to General Lambert, —"I desire that you will make known to the court-martial, that it is a very common and a very alarming offence in the English soldier, to resist not only non-commissioned officers, but even officers, in the performance of their duty; and to do so sometimes with blows." He attributes these crimes to drunkenness. "No soldier," he writes to Colonel Torrens, "can withstand the temptation of wine. This is constantly before their eyes in this country, and they are constantly intoxicated when absent from their regiments; and there is no crime which they do not commit to obtain money to purchase it, for if they cannot get money they obtain it by force."

Inferior to the French army in its recruitment and system of drill, the British army was inferior likewise in this: that all its generals, with the exception of Hill and Hope, were men of very ordinary ability. Now, the former was almost always detached upon the flank of the main army, and the second did not offer his services to Wellington till after the passage of the Bidassoa. Marshal Beresford, and Generals Alten, Crawfurd, Picton, Campbell, Paget, and Cotton, were brave, intelligent, and devoted men; but they were incapable of acting alone. Many generals of division in the French army were in this respect immeasurably their

superiors: among whom may be specially mentioned, Foy, Clausel, Maucune, Laborde, Harispe, Caffarelli, Lasalle, Dorsenne, and Montbrun.

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is, that the French marshals were better supported than Wellington; that they had better troops; soldiers more easy to be managed; a materiel more handy, ambulances more easily organised, a cavalry more steady, and an infantry more pliable, though less obstinate upon the field of battle, and less effective in the defence of positions.

We have thought it necessary to enter into these details, in order to show that Wellington was not indebted for his success in the Peninsular War, to the constitution of the English army, or to the quality of its officers. We must seek elsewhere for the reasons of that superiority, long misunderstood; and which it would be childish at the present day to dispute. The co-operation of the inhabitants, the system of supporting war by magazines, the singular obstinacy of the English soldier on the field of battle, the varied genius, the great prudence, the extreme firmness of purpose, in the commander-in-chief: these were the real causes of the perfect success which crowned the achievements of the Allies in the Peninsula.

Nor must we forget to point out, as exercising much influence on the final issues of the war, the broken nature of the ground in the Peninsula and its capabilities of defence, as well as the peculiar temperament of the English troops, better suited than the French to that species of warfare.

Wellington derived great benefit also from the constant presence of a British fleet on the coasts of Spain. Its incontestable superiority enabled him to establish a

movable line of depôts all through the Peninsula. And that circumstance, joined to the support of the inhabitants, gave him the power of changing at will the direction of his marches.

All these advantages, however, would not have counterbalanced the numerical superiority of the French, if Wellington had not multiplied the resources of his own genius, rendering Lisbon impregnable — supplying the shortcomings of the English Government — overcoming the hostile temper of the local authorities — improving the organisation and discipline of his troops; in a word, gathering together and consolidating all the elements which are necessary to achieve and confirm a victory.

The labours of the English engineers, under the direction of their chief, transformed Portugal into an immense intrenched camp, from which it was always easy to disturb the flank of the long line of French operations, which extended from Bayonne to Cadiz. Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo formed, so to speak, the advanced posts of that fortification, which threatened at once Soult in Andalusia, Ney in Galicia, Marmont in Estremadura, and Joseph in Madrid. Resting upon such a base, Wellington could act to good purpose against an enemy dispersed throughout the whole kingdom — who was beset by endless snares — who had no means for constructing a system of magazines and convoys — who was unable, in consequence, to keep his troops together in masses; and finally, was obliged to take up extended positions, in order to feed his men and cover his line of retreat, without ceasing all the while to be menaced by the guerillas.

While Wellington could depend upon his fleet for supplies, and upon the waters of the Tagus and the

Douro to facilitate their transport, the French, obliged to make use of carriages or mules, and to protect the smallest convoys by strong escorts, died of hunger in their cantonments. They found enemies everywhere, assistance nowhere. Living in the heart of an insurgent country, without means of subsistence, of transport, or of navigation, they were unable to set up more than mere temporary establishments. Nor indeed, if they had succeeded in creating a permanent position similar to that at Torres Vedras, could it have been of the same importance to them, or afforded such resources as that of the English, who derived their principal strength from the good-will of the inhabitants and the co-operation of the British marine, which the destruction of the French fleet at Trafalgar had rendered all-powerful.

No doubt the success of Wellington may, in some measure, be attributed to the facility with which he obtained accurate information as to the strength, position, and plans of the enemy's corps d'armée. It is right to observe, however, that this information was almost always supplied by the agents of the English staff, inasmuch as no confidence whatever could be placed upon reports emanating from other sources, and particularly from the Spanish generals. Wellington, therefore, was kept well informed, because he had arranged his system of correspondence and espionage with much greater care and ability than his adversaries. He had secret agents everywhere — at the court of Joseph, and even among the superior officers of the French army. Still, in spite of all the precautions which he took, Wellington, like the French generals, was often completely ignorant of the plans and dispositions of the enemy. This circumstance is attributable, in part,

to the indolence of the Spanish people, but much more to their unfriendly feeling for the English. They had already given proof of this disagreeable temper to the unfortunate Sir John Moore. Monsieur Thiers, indeed, comes to the conclusion that Moore found as great difficulty in obtaining accurate information as the French, "because his countrymen were hated as strangers." There is, besides, proof of that fact in the correspondence of Moore himself. Thus, on the 9th December, 1808, he writes in his journal, — "Here the people do nothing. We have the greatest difficulty in finding persons who will give us any information whatever."

Sir John Moore did not receive till a week after the event, and through the public newspapers, intelligence of the defeat of the Count de Belvidere; which opened Castile to the French, and compromised the safety of the English troops. It happened at the same time that tidings of Blake's check arrived at Salamanca, not by public report, nor yet by direct communication from the Spanish leaders, but through Mr. Charles Stuart, one of the agents of England. The Central Junta itself gave no information of that occurrence to the representative of Great Britain till thirty hours after the arrival of the courier who brought the official announcement. Finally, and this is more inconceivable still, Sir John Moore acquired no certain knowledge of the capitulation of Madrid till six days after the event, when a despatch from the Prince of Neufchâtel to Soult, which was intercepted by the Spaniards, fell by chance into the hands of an English officer, who paid for it in money.

Sir John Craddock, the successor of Moore, experienced the same difficulties. "It is certain," he writes to Colonel Donkin, "that we cannot depend upon the Portuguese government for speedy and accurate infor-

mation." Wellington complains of the same thing. "When you shall have passed some time in this country," he writes to Burrard, "and satisfied yourself of the many false reports that are in circulation, you will not be at all surprised at the want of correct intelligence in which I find myself."

The capture of Valentia, in 1812, was not known in Madrid till a week after the event, and the news did not reach Cadiz till a full month had elapsed.

In 1809, Soult was able to assemble three corps d'armée at Salamanca, unknown to the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, or the Junta of Castile, a circumstance which ought to have proved fatal to the English army. "In the campaign of Talavera," says Napier, "it was fear alone which induced the Spaniards to give correct information. The French were in consequence better served than the English, and even than the Spanish generals, who for the most part were unaware of the enemy's approach till they ceased to be able to resist them."

Towards the end of the war, the best sources of information for Sir Arthur Wellesley were the intercepted letters of the French generals. In 1810 the inhabitants of Castile, dissatisfied because the English would make no effort to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, "refused," says Wellington, "to correspond with the English, or to give them any information, or even to point out to them the proper persons whom they might employ to obtain it."

Speaking of the Spanish generals, Napier says that they could never obtain information respecting the enemy's movements, while their own movements were immediately communicated to the French; because at the Spanish head-quarters all projects were discussed openly and even ostentatiously. The fact is, that

Reding, on his death-bed, lamented that the *Somatenes* had never been supported; that his plans were betrayed to the enemy, his orders badly executed, and that no one ever supplied him with valuable information. We may conclude from all this, that if Wellington in the end obtained prompt and accurate intelligence, it was less through the assistance of the Spaniards, and the concurrence of their generals, than by the skill with which he had arranged his system of espionage and correspondence. Still it is certain that the leader of the allied army, so far as concerns information, enjoyed greater facilities and much more extensive means than the French marshals.

On the other hand, as he subsisted his army from magazines, he was not obliged to regulate his movements according to the state of the harvest.

In spite of these favourable circumstances, however, the war in Spain presented immense difficulties, in the foremost rank of which may be placed the state of anarchy into which the Peninsula had fallen, and the secret aversion of the Spaniards towards the English troops. The junta, with an imprudent rashness which usually distinguishes governments that have their origin in a popular movement, believed that the insurrection alone was more than sufficient to destroy the French armies. The capitulation of Baylen had completely infatuated them, and they carried their ideas of national independence so far as to treat the English as mere auxiliaries, who affected for Spain a disinterested sympathy which was not real. The Spanish generals, on their side, exhibited as much of pride as of ignorance and presumption; instead of acting together for a common object they operated, each in his own pro-

vince: a fatal system, which was not only permitted but encouraged by the juntas.

The assembling of the Cortès did not improve matters in this respect, as the following fact will show. In March, 1811, Sir Henry Wellesley, the British Envoy, requested that the command of the provinces bordering upon Portugal might be handed over to his brother, in order that he might turn to account the resources which they contained, and so combine his measures more effectually. The Regency and the Cortès replied to that demand, so pure in motive, and opportune as regarded time, with a refusal which Count Toreno himself stigmatises as disgraceful.

The Cortès, always bent upon diminishing the expenses of the war, and bringing it to a speedy issue, ceased not to press upon Wellington the policy of *fighting*. Wellington, on the contrary, was little carried away with such enthusiasm, and did his best to convince the Cortès and the Spanish nation, that a defensive war was the only one of which their troops were capable, and which was suitable to the condition of the allied forces. His observations, unfortunately, produced no effect. Ever vain and presumptuous, the Spanish generals continued to fight battles, and to get themselves shamefully beaten. It was thus that they lost in a few months the Asturias, Andalusia, Estremadura, and the strongest fortresses in Catalonia. A long series of disasters was required to demonstrate their military incapacity, and to force upon the Cortès, at last, the determination of placing their troops under the orders of Wellington. Yet such was the repugnance with which some of the generals accepted this arrangement, that the Regency was obliged, for example's sake, to depose Bal-

lesteros, who had dared to address to the Spanish people a violent manifesto, in which he appealed to the national pride against the humiliation of serving under a foreign leader.

The hesitation which Wellington on several occasions displayed, arose out of the troubled state of Spain, the conflict of authorities, and, above all, the necessity under which he lay of maintaining a good understanding with the juntas and the commanders of corps. As often as the opportunity was afforded him of acting unrestrained, he exhibited as much determination and boldness as it is possible to do at the head of an English army. Besides, he had not the advantage, like the French generals, of commanding homogeneous troops imbued with the same sentiments, acted upon by the same influence, and subject to the same discipline. His ill-assorted army consisted of regular troops, of militia, and of ordinanzas; of Englishmen difficult to manage, of Spaniards and Portuguese jealous of one another, and animated by a mutual hatred, the growth of many ages. Nor was he so fortunate as to be supported and encouraged, like the French generals, by a nation of warriors, whose sovereign united to absolute power the prestige of extraordinary genius.

Left to himself, without advice, without instructions, well-nigh without support, Wellington long sustained the war by his individual firmness; for the English minister, even when most favourably disposed towards his general, was unable to send him reinforcements proportionate to the greatness and difficulty of the enterprise. He had to contend in parliament against an opposition which never failed, as often as an opportunity presented itself, to embarrass him with pre-

dictions of coming disaster. Even in Spain, calumny adopted every expedient to blacken the character of the hero who defended the cause of independence with as much of courage as of determination. The Spanish generals did their best to hamper his movements, while the local authorities, under the pressure of the mob of Cadiz, started off from their engagements almost as soon as they were concluded.

It is impossible, at this time of day, to comprehend the extent of embarrassment which such a state of public feeling, both in England and Spain, occasioned to the commander-in-chief. For a long time he exposed himself on the field of battle, with the conviction on his mind that the slightest reverses would be exaggerated, or even treated as crimes, while his most brilliant triumphs could secure for him no substantial benefit. But this conviction, painful as it was, produced no effect upon his temper; indeed, up to the very end of the war, he was as remarkable as he had ever been for activity, perseverance, courage before the enemy, coolness in misfortune, and self-possession and moderation in prosperity. He never despaired of saving the Peninsula, and this self-reliance, the first of virtues in a general, enabled him to bear up, with singular philosophy, against disappointments and crosses without number. By the steadiness of his convictions, and the unhoped-for result of his enterprises, he succeeded in giving confidence to his countrymen, and in overcoming the lukewarmness of the English Government; while by the amenity of his character, and the services, more and more striking, which he rendered to the national cause, he ended by gaining the esteem of the Spaniards, and the honourable support and sympathy of their generals.

The English army, which, even after the reforms introduced into its organisation by the Duke of York, was far from what it ought to have been, became, under the able management of Wellington, the most perfect military machine which, up to that time, had ever been seen in the United Kingdom. Still its inferiority in point of numbers obliged the commander-in-chief to form a Portuguese contingent. The organisation and construction of that contingent were so well managed, that its incorporation with the English army was attended by no evil consequences. Indeed, towards the end of the war, English and Portuguese battalions mixed up in the same divisions, formed, in spite of the immense difference in character, between the recruits of the two nations, one perfect homogeneous body. It was a result highly honourable to the commander-in-chief, and still more so to Marshal Beresford, on whom the formation of the Portuguese army specially devolved. "It was by creating such sources of moral influence and physical power, that Wellington elevated by degrees the Spanish war. Setting out with a handful of troops, he returned to his native country the commander of the finest army which, up to that time, had ever existed in England, and the conqueror in the greatest war in which her armies had ever taken part." From that hour England, thanks to the talents of her general, figured no more in the second rank of military powers.

This triumph surprised all the world, except perhaps him who had achieved it. At a moment when the idea of fighting Napoleon on land appeared to the majority of English statesmen mere folly, and while the whole of Europe, so to speak, lay submissive under the *Im-*

perial yoke";—in 1808, shortly after Tilsit, Wellington had noticed the defect in the system of French occupation, and conceived the hope of delivering the Peninsula from its unwelcome guests. And this hope he had talent enough to communicate both to his troops and to his fellow-citizens. Won over by the determination of her general and the grandeur of the result to be achieved, England came at last to understand the nature of the war, its European importance, and the extent of the duties which it imposed upon her. The allied princes, equally incredulous at the outset, and the Emperor Napoleon himself, who spoke with such contempt of the English troops, understood in the end that the struggle carried on in a corner of the Peninsula might lead to the unravelment of the war, and change completely the face of the world. Such was Pitt's prediction in 1805, which Wellington had the merit of adopting after him, and by his victories more and more decisive leading on to its accomplishment—yet what prudence, what determination, what genius were required to arrive at such a result!

In face of the strife of parties and of the national susceptibility of Spain, badly supported by the cabinet of London and sometimes even unjustly accused by it, he found it necessary (the hardest task of all) to bear with the excitements of the Spanish democracy, the sarcasms of the English opposition, the clamours of the people whom by flattery it had won over, the intrigues of courts still more dangerous, outraged self-love, the discouragements produced by ingratitude, and the irritation which leads, even in minds above the common order, to misstatements and reiterated calumnies. In our opinion, it would be difficult to say of the Spanish

war whether it does most honour to the military talent of Wellington or to his natural strength of character and political perspicacity.

Some writers, jealous of the glory of the English arms, or interested in making too much of the insurrectionary movement, have attributed the final success of the struggle to the patriotism of the Spaniards. Certainly it must be admitted, that without the perseverance and determined hostility of the Spanish people, the English could not have driven from the Peninsula forces three or four times more numerous than their own. But, on the other hand, it is equally certain that without the support in men and money furnished by England, and without the genius of Wellington, the war would have come to an end after the evacuation of Corunna.

Throughout the whole struggle, the Spaniards displayed more vanity than true courage. Too often the tenacity of vengeance took with them the place of that calm and persevering intrepidity without which nothing durable can be accomplished in war. Indeed, it appeared as if they were animated rather by hatred of the French than by enthusiasm for their own cause. "In their insane pride," says Monsieur Thiers, "they were incapable of understanding what a French army can do, and their ignorance saved them from becoming discouraged. Fleeing almost before they were beaten, they suffered little, for it is only defeats obstinately disputed which are deeply felt, and they were ready to renew indefinitely a war which brought disaster only upon towns, which was agreeable to their active habits and responded to all their sentiments, religious and patriotic."

During the war in the Peninsula, there were many periods when enthusiasm gave place to discouragement,

and the hatred of the stranger to the dawnings of a reconciliation with King Joseph. There are incontestable proofs that the loss of the battle of Rio-Seco, the pressure upon Saragossa, the preparation of Moncey for a second attack upon Valencia, the confusion of public affairs, and, far above all, the terror and disgust inspired by the excesses of the mob, so weighed down the spirits of the bravest, that a single victory would have enabled the French to triumph completely over the moral and physical strength of the insurrection. If the struggle went on in spite of these periodical crises, it was because the efforts of England and the success of her army re-animated, on each occasion, men's failing courage and disappointed hopes. Without doubt the Spaniards, by their revolt, opened a vast field to the efforts of the English troops, and presented a point of resistance to a lever which was capable of shaking the civilised world. Yet the genius which directed their defence, and the power which caused it to triumph, came to them from without. Useful only as auxiliaries, they displayed as principal actors neither the wisdom, nor the courage, nor the steadiness, that were requisite to oppose the prodigious force that assailed them.

Enthusiasm, even if it be that of the most impressionable people in the world, is incapable of contending successfully against troops in a high state of discipline. The history of all times and of all lands testifies to that truth, yet it has nowhere received a more distinct confirmation than in the Peninsula. After the troubles at Aranjuez, after Baylen, after the departure of Napoleon and the evacuation of Madrid, the whole people rose with a burst of patriotism which was sublime; the last day of French domination appeared to

have arrived. There was universal confidence, universal delirium,—unfortunately, like all strong emotions, this was of brief continuance. And it was followed by a great prostration, moral as well as physical.

In Spain and Portugal, enthusiasm blazed up only by fits and starts. Scarcely was the struggle begun, ere reaction set in, as is shown by the evidence of the best informed authority. On 14th December, 1808, Mr. Frère, a great admirer of the Spaniards, wrote from Merida to Sir John Moore: — "The extinction of popular enthusiasm in this country, and the means of reawakening it, would lead us into too long a discussion." About the same time, the Portuguese Brigadier Francisco de Paulo Leyte, complained to General Moore, that "the Spaniards, after promising a great deal, do nothing." The fact is, that Sir John was met in no quarter with the enthusiasm on which he had counted. Addressing himself to his own government, he says, "We have nothing to expect from the inhabitants; no use can be made of them, they are apathetic, eager to promise, slow to act. They retire when they ought to advance, they have no forethought, are insensible to the shame of fleeing before an enemy, and refuse us all assistance. I am obliged to supply them with ammunition, provisions, and money. The Spanish armies display no determination, the people have given no proof of enthusiasm or hardihood, and I do not know upon what ground we expect to find in them by-and-by, the virtues which they ought to exhibit at the outset."

This judgment was confirmed by Wellington after the campaign of Talavera, during which he had experienced all the difficulties and disappointments of

which his predecessor complained. He wrote to his brother, and to the minister of war, long letters, to the following effect:—"Our position here is as bad as if we were in an enemy's country. . . . Never has an army been so badly treated; we receive no assistance from the Spanish armies; every thing must be done by the English army."

Some of the provinces never made a single effort to support the insurrection. Contreras, in his memoirs, relates, that he was in the habit of sending movable columns through the villages of Galicia, which were required to furnish contingents of recruits, accompanied by a court of justice, to punish the refractory.

Desertion also was frequent among the national troops. A Spanish historian, a member of the Cortès during the war, particularly notices the fact:—"After the capture of Tarragona," says Count Toreno, "the army lost heart, and desertions became frequent." The memoirs of Joseph, likewise, notice other occasions on which desertion would have become almost general had there been money enough to support and pay the deserters.

In Portugal recruiting was always difficult, notwithstanding the hatred of the people for the French. "There was constantly to be seen," says Napier, "the odious spectacle of men laden with chains, in order to force them into the armies which maintained the national cause."

In the Asturias, the people showed themselves to the last hostile to the English. At other points the arms and ammunition sent by Great Britain were squandered

away, diverted from their proper destination, and even sold to foreign merchants.

In the provinces of the centre, the south and the east, the population ended by taking part with the usurper, and rendering him assistance. Thus after the battle of Ocana, the peasantry of La Mancha themselves pointed out to the French cavalry the direction taken by the fugitives from Areyzaga, which enabled the enemy to overtake and cut them to pieces. Joseph had a Spanish guard, Suchet undertook to form in Catalonia a similar corps, and Soult in 1812 had 6000 *escopiteros* in the field, with 30,000 national guards in his fortified posts.

All these troops, though Spaniards by birth, fought against the guerillas, and regular armies of Spain, with greater determination than they had originally displayed against the armies of the intrusive monarch. Their fidelity became doubtful only when their pay ceased to be regularly issued. This we gather from the correspondence of King Joseph. "The Spaniards who have taken service," he writes, "have ceased to desert. As long as they are paid, public opinion will not induce them to abandon their colours. If I had received the remittances which were promised, I might have had 10,000 Spaniards, instead of 5000. Public opinion is greatly improved; with a few millions we should make immense progress, which would save in the end a good deal of bloodshed and trouble. All the bands applied to be admitted into my service: they follow the progress of opinion, but I have not a single sou."

A vain attempt has been made to deny, that before the battle of Salamanca the Cortès were on the point of treating with Joseph. Wellington's decisive victory presented the only obstacle to that arrangement, which

would have terminated the war. After the check at Burgos, public opinion again took a change favourable to France, which is proved by what Joseph wrote from Valladolid to the minister Clarke. "The news from the south could not be more favourable, the English party loses ground, and the insurrectionary troops are disorganised."

An important historical fact corroborates these statements. On the 16th of January, 1834, Joseph received a visit from Mina in London, when that celebrated partisan assured him that, in 1812, the Infantado, Ballesteros, Montejo, and himself, would have acknowledged the authority of the king if the Emperor had consented to the withdrawal of the French troops. "He asserted besides, that, at the same period, the king had entirely mastered the scruples of the Impecinado, who was ready to make common cause with them."

It is well known that these insurrectionary bands were, to a great extent, armed, equipped, and fed by England; and if we compare the enormous sacrifices which she imposed upon herself, with those to which, in order to support their own cause, the Spaniards and Portuguese submitted, we shall see that certain authors have made a great deal too much of the enthusiasm of the inhabitants of the Peninsula. The following fact, moreover, affords an accurate standard by which to try that enthusiasm. After the affair of Baylen, at a moment the most favourable for insurrection, Spain could scarcely assemble an army of 100,000 men. On various occasions, the number of citizens in arms for the cause of independence did not exceed one-third of that number. In 1813 there was a time when 160,000, guerillas included, were under arms; but of that

force not quite a third was available for active service; and even that third would have been without provisions, without clothing, had not Wellington found means of supplying them from England. Clearly, if the enthusiasm had been as general as has been represented, or if it had not evaporated in vain declamation and idle boasting, it would not have been difficult to assemble in the Peninsula a regular army of half a million of men.

The truth is, that this sublime enthusiasm had no existence except in proclamations. The insurrectionary troops, besides being weak in numbers, were rendered weaker still by their defective organisation, their want of discipline, the inexperience of their officers, and the disorder and confusion which reigned in all branches of the service. The chiefs enjoyed no prestige, and inspired no confidence in their subordinates. Chosen and cast aside by the Juntas, jealous of one another, and constantly exposed to party strife, too vain to accept good advice, too ambitious to submit to one general control, they followed sometimes their own inspirations, sometimes those of the politicians on whom they were dependent. The military machine was thus brought to the brink — or might have been so — of irremediable ruin. After every defeat, each general accused the other of not supporting him. Witness the quarrels of the leading chiefs subsequently to the affair of Tarançon — those of Venegas and the Duke del Infantando after Uclès — those of Castanos and Palafox after Tudela — those of Blake and Cuesta, after Rio-Seco, &c. &c. Towards the end of 1809, the war would have ceased in Spain had not England been able and willing to continue it.

The insurrectionary forces were capable of defending

fortified posts, and of thus becoming useful auxiliaries to the English army; better organised, they might have become, in time, fit even for operations in the field; but the stupidity and vanity of the native generals would not permit them to arrive at this condition. It was necessary, at all hazards, to fight battles, to execute great manœuvres, and to surround the enemy. It is well known to what these things led. Napoleon in the first instance, and his generals after him, destroyed in succession all the Spanish corps, so that in the end they were obliged to give place to the English in regular warfare, and to guerillas in a war of partisans. Rio-Seco, Somo Sierra, Santa Cruz, Tudela, Epinosa, Almonacid, Cardade, Uclès, Vallus, Albacon, Gevora, Medellin, Ciudad Real, Selinas, Puelo, Falces, Balchite, and many other battles, some disastrous, others at once disastrous and disgraceful, bear irrefragable testimony to the weakness—let us say, to the nullity—of the regular armies of Spain.

This opinion, though supported by facts, might seem to be too severe were it not confirmed by the testimony of Sir John Moore, of Wellington, of Napoleon, of the French generals, and of the Spanish officers themselves. "The whole body of insurrectionary forces," says Napoleon, in a note written 30th August, 1808, "is incapable of beating 25,000 French in a good position." Still more explicitly Berthier writes to Joseph on the 31st January, 1810:—"The Emperor considers that the English alone are formidable in Spain; the rest are the merest canaille, which can never keep the field." Marshal Marmont expresses the same opinion in different language:—"The Spanish armies are good for nothing except the defence of fortresses." "A point to

be seriously considered," says Wellington, "is the conduct of the Spaniards, always disgraceful before the enemy. Nobody speaks in England of their defeats and blunders, and here Spanish officers have quoted to me twenty affairs like that of Arzobispo, the details of which have never, I believe, been published. At the battle of Talavera, where the Spaniards were scarcely engaged at all, entire corps threw away their arms and took to flight, though they had neither been attacked nor threatened. These cowardly soldiers laid every thing waste in their flight; they even plundered the baggage of the English army, which was fighting bravely for their cause." About the same period he writes to Lord Castlereagh:—"I advise you not to mix yourself up at all in their affairs; they are mere children in the art of war; they know only how to advance, how to take to flight, and reassemble again, as if they were in a state of nature."

In 1812, giving an account of Clausel's offensive movement after Salamanca, and of the siege of Astorga, undertaken by Castano's Spaniards, he says:—"It is little encouraging to see that the best Spanish army cannot make head against the wreck of Marmont's beaten troops; that in the two months, and more, in which they have been before Astorga, they have been unable to open a breach; and that the English troops must still, and always will have to do, whatever is important to be done." "The Spaniards," adds Napier, "though arrived at the seventh year of the war of independence, were still such as Sir John Moore had described them to be, without an army, without a government, without a general."

One portion of these statements is confirmed by the

testimony of the Spanish generals themselves. The Duke of Albuquerque, without the smallest periphrasis, says of the army of Cuesta, with which he had served in 1809: — "In our marches we stopped to rest like a flock of sheep, without taking up any position. By-and-by we resumed our journey like pilgrims, without paying any attention to distances, to order, or to formation."

General Blake, with the same frankness, gives an account of the confusion which, after Suchet's attack, took place at Belchite, in the following terms: — "One regiment gave way without firing a shot; it was followed by a second, then by a third; the whole were in full flight before a gun had been discharged, and in a few minutes the position was abandoned. Thus we were left to ourselves, generals and officers, without being able to rally the troops so as to offer the smallest resistance; and I had the mortification to see the army dispersed before a single French corps, deserting its baggage, and throwing away its arms, and even its clothing. We could make no use of the strongest points because we had not two hundred men with which to resist an attack."

The rout of Romana's volunteers, when attacked in 1809 by Ney's cavalry, drew forth the following remark addressed to their commander: — "I do not know in what this patriotism, so highly vaunted, consists; the slightest reverse, the smallest check, disheartens the Spaniards; they think only of how they may save themselves, at the risk of sacrificing their country and compromising their general."

Copons, whose army operated in Catalonia, had a chief of the staff called Cabanès, who wrote to General Murray in 1813: — "We have good soldiers, but with-

out discipline or subordination, and in want of clothing, artillery, ammunition, magazines, money, and the means of transport." Copons himself declared that "his troops were incapable of taking the field."

Among the French generals there was only one who thought favourably of the Spanish armies, and this was Gonvion St. Cyr. But the opinion of that marshal, who secretly hated the Emperor, and who was, besides, desirous of giving importance to the most trifling of his own acts by heaping praises upon his enemies, must be received with distrust, particularly in reference to the matter under discussion. Besides, it is not by an isolated fact here and there that the Spanish volunteers ought to be judged; because, though they committed a great number of deplorable and even disgraceful acts, they exhibited also, in several instances, a courage and audacity which would have been worthy of the best troops. We would especially quote, as very honourable to them, the combat of Alcanitz in 1809, which General Blake maintained successfully against a part of Suchet's army — that which preceded the battle of Epinosa and the affair of Tudela, where they displayed much courage, though they were beaten through the mistakes of their commanders.

At Rio Seco, at Almonacid, at Sagunto and Medellin, the Spaniards behaved well in the outset, though the end did not at all correspond with the beginning. Del Parque's troops made a good appearance at Tamamès in 1809, where they repulsed an attack, badly combined by-the-by, of General Marchand. Those of Areyzaga displayed at Ocana dash, but little steadiness. O'Donnell gave proof of determination and talent at Margalef in 1810, and his army bore itself bravely. We may quote

again, with commendation, the struggle maintained in 1813 by the Spaniards at Ordal, against a detachment of Suchet's army; the affair of Castalla, where the Spaniards and English, under the command of Sir George Murray, repulsed the Duke of Albufera, and finally, the greater number of the actions which took place in the intervals between the battles of Vittoria and of Toulouse*, where Wellington himself was present to direct, and where they were under the eyes of the English army.

These isolated actions, however, exercised no influence upon the general results of campaigns, nor can those be called really good troops, who fight well one day, and disperse the next, the moment firing begins.

The conduct of the Spaniards in fortresses was sometimes gallant in the extreme, and sometimes remarkable for imbecility. One would never predicate of the same nation the defences of Saragossa, and Gerona, and those of Tarragona, Valencia, Mont Serat, Badajoz, Tortosa, Peniscola, Fort St. Philippe, and Murviedro.

The Portuguese troops, who towards the end of the war rivalled in steadiness and bravery those of the British army, would have been of as little use as the Spanish contingent, had not Wellington organised and disciplined their regiments, and placed English officers at their head. The first body of Portuguese volunteers whom Wellington met in the Peninsula, were about as valuable for active operations as the Spanish corps.

* At Toulouse, the Spanish divisions of Freyre, though probably the best in the army, behaved shamefully. Their attack on the French position was repulsed by one volley, and they ran away so fast and in such confusion, that Wellington, who was close behind them, said to his staff, laughing, "Well! I never saw ten thousand men run a race till now!"

Thus at Braga, the discharge of a single piece of artillery was sufficient to throw Freyre's little army into disorder. They rushed in confusion into the town, where they committed horrible excesses. Freyre, accused of treason, the constant cry of soldiers who want some excuse for their cowardice, was put to death in the streets, at the very moment when Soult's army arrived in view of the place.

As to the Ordinenzas, and Portuguese militia, of which the English general made use in some of his expeditions, they never attained to the slightest steadiness. This is particularly pointed out in the following extract from one of Wellington's letters to Lord Liverpool:—"Besides these troops there are different bodies of militia, infantry, and artillery in our positions; but I should deceive myself if I could expect, and your lordship if I should state, that any advantage would be derived from their assistance, in an offensive operation against the enemy."

If circumstances had permitted Wellington to organise a regular army in Spain, he would have doubtless obtained results similar to those which produced the Portuguese army; but neither the soldiers, nor the generals, nor the Spanish authorities could endure that an English general should introduce order and discipline into their irregular bands. "I am quite convinced," says Wellington, "that the Spanish officers would rather submit to France than consent to give to us the smallest authority over their troops; neither will they allow that our officers know more than their own." The English government encouraged this quackery by exalting, on all occasions, the valour of these troops and the importance of their services. The same censure may be applied to

the Cortès; nevertheless, convinced in the end against their will, they determined on offering the chief command of their armies to Wellington; and the English general, in spite of his repugnance more than once expressed, accepted the dangerous honour.

This occurred at the time when the campaign of 1812 was about to open, and Wellington employed the brief space at his disposal to improve the organisation and discipline of the troops. The success which attended his efforts, notwithstanding the hindrances of every sort which the Spanish government and generals threw in his way, proves that the determination of the Cortès, if it had been arrived at in the beginning of the war, might have produced prodigious results. Indeed, it is only from this moment that we find the Spanish troops exhibiting the slightest determination upon the field of battle. At Salamanca the corps of España and Julian Sanchez so conducted themselves as to merit honourable mention in the report of the commander-in-chief. At Vittoria, Hill showed himself satisfied with the support which he received from Murillo; and at Sauroren, Wellington highly praised the conduct of the regiments of Del Principe and Pravia. In the defence of San Martial the bravery and steadiness of the Spanish troops were still more remarkable; and the commander-in-chief, in his report to Lord Bathurst, speaks of them in the most commendatory terms. He again testifies to his satisfaction with their conduct at the passage of the Bidassoa, in the following language:—"The Spanish troops, under the orders of Don Freyre, behaved extremely well. They turned and carried the enemy's retrenchments upon the hills with great skill and courage." Murillo's division again obtains honourable mention for the attack

of Heletre. Finally, though it might be less brilliant, the behaviour of the Spanish corps at the battle of Toulouse deserves praise.* It must not be forgotten, however, that in these various situations the Spaniards were supported and encouraged by English troops. Left to themselves, or placed under the orders of a Spanish commander-in-chief, they would doubtless have conducted themselves very differently.

The ineffective state of the national armies was greatly aggravated by the want of experience and talent in their generals. If we except Castanos, Reding, Albuquerque, and Romana, who gave proof of a certain amount of ability, all the rest were either perfect nullities, or fit only for partisan warfare. They exercised no influence over their troops, and did not even understand one another. Their differences, still more than their want of talent, brought on many of the disasters which they sustained. The quarrels between Blake and Cuesta contributed in a great degree to the rout of Rio-Seco. The interminable disputes between Palafox and Castanos ended in the check at Todela; and the rivalry of Cartaojal and the Duke of Albuquerque exercised a marked influence over the issues of the battle of Ciudad Real.

Wellington likewise had repeated cause to complain of the stupidity and ignorant presumption of the Spanish chiefs. In the campaign of Talavera Cuesta was rather an embarrassment to him than a support. He either did not comprehend, or did not choose to execute, any order. To cite only one fact. His abandonment of the defiles

* See previous note. Freyre's division returned at last, and being brought up again in second line, gave good support to the English, who were in front of them.

of Banos, which he had promised to guard, enabled Soult to debouch by Placentia upon the flank of the English line of operations.

Equally culpable was the behaviour of Don José de Imar, the governor of Badajos, who agreed to surrender at a moment when Wellington had informed him that succours were on the march. Mendizabal, on the other hand, neglected all the precautions which had been pointed out to him for covering the place; while Ballesteros, partly through his own perverseness, partly through that of the junta, carried the plan agreed upon into effect so badly, that Wellington was obliged to detach Beresford towards the Guadiana, and to fight, with only a part of his troops, the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, in which he ought to have been beaten.

At Barossa the Spanish general, La Pena, left Graham exposed to the whole of Victor's force, when it would have been perfectly easy for him to come to his support and repulse the French.

Just before the battle of Salamanca, General D'España withdrew the garrison from Alba de Tormès without giving information to Lord Wellington, who lost thereby the opportunity of cutting off the retreat of two-thirds of Clausel's army.

Finally, the obstinacy of Morillo, in refusing to put down pillage, obliged Wellington to send back the army of that general across the Pyrenees, and to fight the battle of Orthes with an inadequate force.

Such was the manner in which the native generals supported the English army, which they affected, nevertheless, to treat with the greatest *hauteur*. The fact is, that the war in Spain did not produce a single eminent

officer or statesman. "Nothing," says Napier, "proves more effectually than this latter fact the difference between the opinions and interests of the inhabitants of the Peninsula; which cannot be attributed to any want of talent, because the temperament of the Spanish people is clearly quick, ardent, and vigorous. But there was no interest strong enough to connect the different classes together, and of which a man of ability could take advantage to influence the crowd."

The only men who exhibited talent and energy were the chiefs of the great guerilla bands, among whom may be specified O'Donnel, Juan Martin, Rovera, Julian Sanchez, Mina, and Longa. The chiefs of the little bands were, for the most part, public offenders or patriots, who were remarkable only for their ferocity.

The system of waging war, supported by these bands, to which the Spaniards showed themselves partial throughout, took its rise in 1809, in the district which is included between the Ebro and the French frontier. It is said that Romana was the author, or, at all events, the first organiser of that system. It extended, by and by, throughout the whole of Spain, in consequence of the discontent which was produced by the decree for the establishment of separate governments, and the anticipation of a speedy dismemberment of the country. The English minister showed himself, from the first, favourable to the organisation of partisan corps, and encouraged it by all the means in his power, because they were less expensive than regular national troops; and perhaps because the partisans, led by priests and nobles, were especially opposed to the imperial régime, under which the *bourgeoisie*, with their democratic ideas, would have ended in arraying themselves with

much greater satisfaction than under the old government of divine right. Wellington did not partake in this enthusiasm for guerillas, because he had no confidence in anything except a force regularly organised, disciplined, and maintained; and because he was, by character, averse to the barbarous measures to which these bands had recourse, and which alone, moreover, made them useful in promoting the insurrection. He made use of them, however, under certain circumstances, as a *pis-aller*; but never so combined his operations as to render them dependent upon such co-operation. Besides, the partisans were not all citizens animated by the noble desire of avenging their native land. To a great number of them the only object sought was the plunder of their countrymen, and that they might *live like brigands*; these were the terror of towns and of the open country. They did more injury to the Spaniards than to the French, insomuch that it was by no means uncommon to see the peasantry join the enemy's movable columns, in order to hunt them down. Colonel Jones affirms that in 1812 Wellington received many addresses from the inhabitants, requesting the assistance of the English cavalry "to free the country from bands of guerillas, whose exactions they described as more harassing than those of the French." Sydenham, who testifies to the excesses of all kinds committed by the armed bands which entered Burgos at the tail of Wellington's army, does not hesitate to say that the guerillas were of no more use than Tartars or Cossacks of the Kischack, or than hordes of gipsies. Napier pronounces a sentence against this description of troops quite as severe, and which seems to be not at all exaggerated. "The guerilla system," he says, "harassed

the French without starving them, at the same time that it harassed the people and caused them to die of hunger. Most of the chiefs of these bands, besides plundering, massacred prisoners and stragglers, in order to make the fury of the French fall upon a village or a district on which they desired to wreak their vengeance because of some pretended affronts, or personal quarrels. Moreover, the guerillas were much less numerous than was generally supposed. Their effective strength never exceeded 30,000 men, of whom one-third was made up of English and French deserters. This effective followed the oscillations of public opinion. When Wellington retreated, the guerillas disappeared; whenever he gained a victory, fresh bands came together."

After Salamanca, and especially in 1813, the organisation of these bands grew into a fashion. Those of Navarre and of Biscay, in particular, became numerous and disciplined. "Public opinion changed in these provinces to such an extent," says Napier, "that fathers sent their sons to join bands which heretofore had consisted entirely of fugitives and deserters. It was not then the guerillas who achieved Wellington's successes, but the successes of Wellington which developed the strength and importance of the guerillas." Besides, in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814, when the partisans had attained to the height of their strength and importance, their duty was confined to the defence of posts and defiles.

The guerillas of Biscay, Navarre, Aragon and Catalonia, though amounting in the aggregate to more than 30,000 men, and often commanded by bold and enterprising chiefs, never compelled the enemy to employ against them a force exceeding one half of their own

strength. They never succeeded in beating a single French division. They never prevented a single important operation, with the exception of a *coup de main* upon Figueras. They never distinguished themselves by a single exploit which was capable of exercising important influence upon the principal operations of a campaign. The partidas would have been quickly exterminated, had not the French, pressed by Lord Wellington's battalions, been obliged to keep themselves united in large masses. Such is the secret of Spanish constancy.

It appears from the preceding statements, that the success of the war in Spain must be attributed to various causes: to the military genius of Wellington; to the bravery of the Anglo-Portuguese army; to the enormous sacrifices made by Great Britain during the continuance of the struggle; to the constancy, firmness, and resignation of the Spaniards; to the faults committed by Napoleon and his marshals; and, lastly, to accidental circumstances favourable to the Allies, and disastrous to France.

Among these latter, may be included the declaration of war by Austria, which compelled the Emperor to quit Spain at the very moment when affairs were taking a turn favourable to his designs; the marriage ceremony, which, with the follies attendant on it, prevented the sovereign from taking the command in person of the third expedition into Portugal; and lastly, the rupture between France and Russia, which necessitated the recall of his best troops from the Peninsula.

The disaster of Moscow, and the political embarrassments to which it gave rise, exercised in like manner, a salutary influence upon the operations of the Allies in

Spain; because it was the Emperor's intention, and he repeatedly announced it, to put an end by a thunder-stroke, to that long and fatal war, as soon as he should have composed his differences with Alexander. "If Russia," says Napier, "owes in some degree her safety to the struggle which went on in Spain, it is past dispute on the other hand, that the fate of the Peninsula was, in its turn, decided on the plains of Russia."

We shall not recapitulate all the faults committed by the French generals; they have been exposed in the body of the work. It may suffice to quote the following as having exercised an influence more direct than the rest.

1st. The invasion of Andalusia, which, rendering a large portion of the French army immovable, hindered Soult from supporting effectually the army of Portugal, in its expedition against Lisbon, and from coming to the assistance of the king after the battle of Salamanca.

2nd. The want of accord and resolution in the corps of Victor, Ney, Mortier, and Soult before and after the battle of Talavera. The operations of the French army in the course of that campaign, if they had been pushed with ability and vigour, ought to have ended in the destruction of the enemy's forces.

3rd. The want of vigilance in Marmont, who allowed Ciudad Rodrigo to be taken, without making any attempt to relieve that important place.

4th. The orders contradictory, and almost always incapable of being executed, which Napoleon gave to the Duke of Ragusa, in the end of 1811, and the beginning of 1812. These orders contributed to the fall of Badajos, and to a certain extent, at least, to the loss of the battle of Salamanca.

5th. The hesitation of Soult, who in 1812, having it in his power to crush Wellington, by a flank march upon the Arapiles, gave him time to reach Ciudad Rodrigo.

6th. Lastly, the bad disposition of Suchet, who persisted, in spite of the eager and pressing solicitations of the Duke of Dalmatia, in keeping his troops in Catalonia, where they could accomplish no important purpose, whereas he might have supported his colleague with 32,000 effective men, and hindered the Allies from crossing the Pyrenees.

This catalogue would be incomplete, if we failed here to point out the serious blame, which the man of thought and the statesman are justified in laying to Napoleon's charge. His first fault, his great error, was that he misjudged the Spanish people, and imagined that he would be able, with a handful of soldiers, to bring them under the yoke. This illusion having been once dissipated by the troubles of Madrid, and the insurrection in the Provinces, he was greatly to blame for not sending into the Peninsula, an imposing mass of those veterans, grizzled, bronzed, and having their foreheads scarred with wounds, who had vanquished at Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, the best soldiers of Europe. A first impression is often decisive, and the appearance of strength sometimes more imposing than strength itself. This moral truth, which General Bonaparte had so ably enunciated in Egypt, by his addresses and theatrical proceedings, he completely disregarded in the Peninsula, by showing to the Spaniards and Portuguese, regiments of young soldiers, exhausted by fatigue and privations. That spectacle made a strong and lasting impression upon the inhabitants of the Peninsula, who had till then entertained a very different idea of Cæsar's

legions: It inspired them with an exaggerated confidence, and probably contributed to bring about the prompt and general insurrectionary movement which ensued.

Another fault committed by the emperor was this, that he applied to the Spanish war the system usually followed in France since 1789, and which consists in making war support war. This system, extremely good for an army which passes through a district where it makes but a brief halt, is detestable if it be acted upon in a country, where resistance is apt to take the character of a national quarrel. If Napoleon instead of pillaging and devastating Spain, in order to support his soldiers, had treated the inhabitants with kindness and justice; if he had taken care to pay rigidly for food, and all other things necessary for his army; if he had declared himself an enemy to the English alone, and at the opening of the war had directed an imposing force upon the Tagus, in order to seize Lisbon, — it is probable that the insurrection would have been promptly put down, if indeed it had ever broken out at all. Once master of Portugal, it would have been easy for Napoleon to keep the English thenceforth at a distance, and to act against Spain, with all the weight which is derived from a strong position, and the moral superiority of a first success.

The Emperor, however, followed a totally different course. He sent into Portugal an army too weak to resist 16,000 English. He then directed upon Spain various columns, which now made themselves masters of fortified towns by the most dishonourable means, and now co-operated, under the disguise of pretended good will in the execution of hostile plans, of the

bearing and object of which the chiefs themselves were ignorant. To this aggression, wily and deceitful, came by and by to be added the scenes of violence and acts of brigandage of every kind, which the mode of subsistence adopted in the French army rendered necessary. Finally, as if to free the credulous Spaniards from their last delusions, the chief of the French army openly supported the infamous Godoy, and, mixing himself up in the quarrels of the court, flattering some, threatening others, and deceiving them all, he ended by removing the royal family to Bayonne, where by pressing the entire weight of his authority upon an imbecile prince and a degraded king, he obtained first a renunciation, and then an abdication, of which the consequence was to place the crown of Charles V. upon the head of Joseph. Thus that weak and inexperienced prince, from the mere circumstance of his relationship with the hero of the age, became King of Spain, and by and by commander-in-chief of the imperial armies in the Peninsula. From that moment the resistance assumed a decided character. Dupont yielded to it at Baylen, Junot was obliged to evacuate Portugal, and the English established themselves on the flank of the French line of operations.

The troops of which he had been so chary at the beginning, Napoleon now poured in crowds into the Peninsula. In order to feed, it was necessary to scatter them; to occupy at once Catalonia, Aragon, Murcia, Castile, the kingdom of Leon, Biscay, Navarre, and lastly Andalusia. This was a great blunder, yet it could not be avoided, except by deviating from the Imperial system; and Napoleon was moreover pressed to it by Joseph, ever anxious to extend his authority over new states;

and by Soult, who burned to wipe out the recollection of his failure in the campaign of Portugal. So situated, the corps of the French army resembled, in some sort, brigades of *gendarmerie*, whose business it was to superintend the collection of taxes, and cause the authority of the king to be respected. The leaders of these corps, independent one of the other, finished by withdrawing themselves from the king's supremacy altogether. Entirely occupied with local interests, they lost sight of the general good. Each regarded his own command as the most important of all, and desired that others would regulate their movements so as to be in concert with his. All desired to command, none cared to obey; it was the anarchy of jarring interests and self love. In such a state of affairs great operations, which required the unison of several corps, became impossible. All such as were undertaken failed because there was no good understanding or unity of command. Besides, as the French army lived upon the produce of the soil, it was almost always compelled to wait till the corn was ripe before it could take the field. This was remarkably shown in the case of Marmont's army, which for want of provisions was unable to open the campaign in good time, and ended by being destroyed at Salamanca.

The system of making war support itself was attended by another troublesome consequence; it disheartened the army by exposing it to continual fatigues and dangers, and weakened the authority of discipline by engendering fatal habits of plunder. Sometimes one half of a corps was obliged to go out to maraud, and that at a moment when the residue were likely to be attacked at any instant. Misery, weakness, confusion, anarchy, such were, and could not fail to be, the results of that system.

We have before us an important letter from the commander-in-chief of the army of Portugal addressed to the Duke of Feltre, on the 27th December, 1812. After enumerating the miseries of the soldiers, General Reille says in plain language, "The officers are in a still more deplorable plight; they cannot procure articles of the first necessity, such as clothing and shoes. Obliged often to subsist upon what the soldiers steal, discipline becomes relaxed, and it is all but impossible that confusion should not arise out of such a state of things."

Marshal Marmont, bearing testimony to the same misfortunes, writes to the Prince of Neufchatel, "The system of requisitions, which admits of great license, and is subversive of all order, becomes quite impracticable in the long run, when an army is stationary. For as requisitions always involve the necessity of employing force, they must be undertaken at a little distance from home, and thus the entire resources of the country are speedily exhausted. It becomes then impossible to live except in such a state of dispersion as renders the army incapable of acting. Besides all this, as the system occasions many disorders, so it almost always involves a twofold result. It is in consequence of that system that the provinces of Salamanca and Estremadura are laid waste, and two thirds of the country lie uncultivated. If on the other hand we paid for everything, we should be able without violence or the employment of force to subsist ourselves, and the Emperor would not be the loser, because for this very reason he could impose taxes. For supposing the charge to be too great, it could nevertheless be borne, because all would contribute to it. Whereas, by the process of requisitions, a small number of individuals alone sustain it. Hence it is that Anda-

lusia is in perfect order, because for a year past the system of requisitions has there ceased."

Under the influence of that fatal system, the armies of Spain, as soon as the country round their cantonments became exhausted, were obliged to change their position, and "to act absolutely like a shepherd who changes his pasture ground, when he has eaten up all the extent of country, over which for some time he may have wandered."

There was besides very little reason in introducing the system of forced requisitions into a nation, which it was the object to attach by strong and lasting ties to France. It is not by laying waste a country that you render it friendly; nor need you hope by exhibiting daily to the inhabitants the spectacle of pillage, and of the violence and excess of all kinds which are inseparable from that mode of subsistence, to re-establish peace and concord in agitated provinces.

It was not enough to introduce Joseph with great pomp into Madrid, and to announce emphatically to the Spaniards, that his object was to put an end to all abuses and regenerate Spain, on the principles of the constitution of Bayonne. It was necessary to begin by himself setting the example of respect to property, and to individuals, instead of seeking to strengthen himself by acts of reprisal and intimidation. It was a bad mode of rendering a new king acceptable and strong, to give him for his escort some hundred thousand men converted into plunderers by the force of circumstances, and whether they wished it or not.

It would have been becoming also neither to violate that constitution to which others were required to swear; nor after having promised to maintain the integrity of the nation, to announce haughtily, as was done in 1810,

the purpose of incorporating with France all the territory which lay on the left bank of the Ebro.

The institution of the separate governments, of which we have pointed out the vices, was the first step towards the realisation of that threat. It exasperated the people when on the point of becoming calm, it gave a fresh impulse to the formation of guerilla bands, and placed the king in a position the most false and the most humiliating. It was, undoubtedly, one of the Emperor's great faults, for it was at once a military and a political mistake.

But the greatest of all his errors, and we cannot too often repeat it, for it was that which in some measure led to all the rest, was his having undertaken the war in Spain at a period when France had her best troops occupied in Italy and Germany, and transforming into the allies of England, at a moment when he ought to have isolated her, all the maritime states, harassed, humiliated, and ruined by the continental blockade.

The facts and circumstances which we have here recorded, rendered, without doubt, Wellington's task more easy; nevertheless, to ensure success under such circumstances, it was not enough that he should be, as has often been said of him, "a fortunate general." It is not good fortune which enables us to profit by the oversights of others, and the favourable opportunities which present themselves. What did Napoleon, to whom has never been refused the title of the greatest general in the world,—what did Napoleon do in Italy, in Germany, in Prussia, in all his memorable campaigns, except beat generals who committed faults, and profit by the opportunities which were offered to him by fortune? But this is exactly the nature of genius of a superior order, both in war and in politics or anything else, that

it invariably avails itself of human weaknesses,—of whatever may give promise of advantage in the progress of events. So acted Wellington in Spain and at Waterloo. If he made less of his successes than Napoleon would have done under similar circumstances, and this is very doubtful, at least the glory cannot be denied him of having done more in the circumstances in which he was actually placed than the generals to whom he was opposed. Envy and detraction will not rob him of this renown, and impartial futurity will say, "that he was the first of England's captains, and the second in the world."

[It will probably be in the recollection of some of our readers that strenuous attempts were at one time made on the other side of the Channel to represent the battle of Toulouse as ending triumphantly for the French arms. We believe, indeed, that the word Toulouse is inscribed on the triumphal arch in the Champs Elysées, which bears the record only of victories achieved under the imperial standard. We know that many books and pamphlets have been written to prove that Lord Wellington there sustained a defeat. Among others, a M. Choumara, ancien capitaine de génie, in his "*Considérations Militaires sur la Bataille de Toulouse*," took up this line of argument. His *brochure* was shown by Colonel Gurwood to the Duke of Wellington in 1838, and drew forth the following memorandum:—

"1. The object is to maintain the character of Marshal Soult; first, in relation to his communications with Marshal Suchet during the campaigns of 1813 and 1814, and to the publication by the latter of parts of the correspondence between the marshals, and of the correspondence of the latter with the Ministre de la Guerre,

in the history of his life; secondly, in relation to the battle of Toulouse.

"2. It is on the last point only that this publication would be interesting to the mass of English readers.

"3. The work is, however, well worthy of attention, as showing the evils with which these great military establishments and systems are pregnant, and which must destroy them.

"4. Here we find two republican generals, with great titles and fortunes, and holding the highest military rank, and exercising the greatest authority, quarrelling as did the sons, legitimate and illegitimate, and the marshals in the service of Louis the Fourteenth; neither party ever thinking of the public interest, excepting as connected with his own personal objects of ambition and aggrandisement, and each appealing to Bonaparte, as the others did heretofore to Louis the Fourteenth; and Bonaparte following the example of Louis the Fourteenth, and giving no answer.

"5. But there are some curious details worthy of attention, as tending to show that but few of the publications are calculated to afford materials for history.

"6. It will be seen (Choumara's Letter, p. 113), that when Marshal Suchet wished to avoid engaging himself to carry on an operation proposed by Marshal Soult, he did not scruple to transmit a false statement of the amount of the disposable force under his command. This is clearly proved by M. Choumara. (Resumé et Conclusion, p. 97.)

"7. Then he exaggerates the force employed against him (p. 114). 'Rowland Hill avait rejoint Bentinck avec 24,000 hommes, que le Comte de La Bisbal, arrivé de la Navarre avec 15,000 hommes, &c. . . . Il suffit pour

en être convaincu de savoir que les ennemis ont réunis plus de 200,000 hommes au-delà de l'Ebre.' . . . All this is either false or exaggerated; and Marshal Soult's aide-de-camp, who saw the army which was employed against Suchet, says that there were never 25,000 or 30,000 men, of which 10,000 were English or Sicilians, the rest Spaniards. In truth, the Empecinado believed that, after the corps under the Duque del Parque was sent away, the allied army did not amount to 30,000 men, of which two-thirds were Spaniards.

"8. Then Marshal Soult, on his side, corrects the mistakes of Marshal Suchet, so far that he will not suffer the latter to take into the account a man from the amount of those employed against himself. Accordingly, he shows that Hill and Morillo and La Bisbal were in his front; but he, as well as the other, exaggerates the amount of that force. In his letter of 27th of September to the Ministre de la Guerre, he calls it 120,000, and, including other arms, 140,000 men. In a letter to Suchet, of the 14th of October, he says that 'Lord Wellington has 115,000 infantry, a great quantity of artillery, and a numerous cavalry.'

"9. This matter is of no importance excepting to show how little faith can be given to such details.

"10. The Allied army opposed to the French army, called 'L'Armée d'Espagne,' consisted at the battle of Vittoria of 60,000 British and Portuguese, 20,000 Spaniards; 80,000 all included. The British and Portuguese army never had afterwards more than 50,000 men under arms. They were joined at first by 5000 Spaniards. Then 10,000 Spaniards, and afterwards another 10,000 Spaniards, which last came from Catalonia, and are mentioned as the corps under the Duque

del Parque; making in the whole 45,000 Spaniards and 50,000 British and Portuguese employed in the operations in the Western Pyrenees. It will be seen that these are called 140,000 men (see page 132, Dépêche du Ministre de la Guerre).

"11. The force of British and Portuguese can be accurately ascertained at any given period.

"12. Marshal Soult likewise talks of the Empecinado and Duran as being in his front. They were so, to be sure: so were the troops in Gibraltar and Africa; both were at a great distance from the scene of operations. Mina, Longa, Morillo, and Don Carlos d'España are reckoned in the number of 45,000 Spaniards.

"13. It is not so easy to ascertain Soult's force in the army, called 'L'Armée d'Espagne.' It appears that he intended and proposed to form in Aragon an army of 85,000 men, of which 32,000 were to come from Catalonia; 53,000 must have been from his own army. He was to leave 20,000 men in the intrenched camp at Bayonne, and 15,000 in the garrison of Bayonne, besides a garrison in St. Jean Pied-de-Port. This would give him an army of 73,000 men in the field, besides the Catalonian army. His last proposition was to go into Aragon with 45,000, which would give him an army of 65,000 men in the field, besides the garrisons and the Catalonian army. In this number General Paris's division, say 5000 men, are not included, as they were to be sent into Catalonia to join Marshal Suchet. But when he came to the operations in February, 1814, he had not sent away General Paris. He had, therefore, at that time an army of 70,000 or 78,000 men, unless, indeed, he had sustained enormous losses between the month of November, 1813, when he

was in correspondence with Marshal Suchet and the Ministre de la Guerre, and the month of February, 1814, when the allied army commenced its operations. The revision of all this will show that no reliance can be placed upon such details.

"14. The question is then discussed,—Who won the battle of Toulouse? Toulouse is surrounded by an ancient wall with towers. It stands upon the Garonne, over which there is a bridge protected by an ancient tête-de-pont. The Canal du Languedoc joins the Garonne about a mile below the town. Its course is about 1000 yards distant from the river, and less than half that distance from the wall of the town, from the point at which it approaches the town. The town then was protected, not only by its walls, but by the river Garonne on one side, and by the canal on two others. It was protected by its wall only on the side of the Faubourg St. Michel and the road from Montpellier. The ground near the town was there more open. Thus situated, and occupied by an army called 'L'Armée d'Espagne,' the town of Toulouse might have been considered inexpugnable.

"15. But to these defences of the town of Toulouse, which may be called permanent and natural, Marshal Soult added other works, described very minutely by M. Choumara. He augmented and extended the works of the tête-de-pont over the Garonne. He formed têtes-de-pont on all the bridges over the canal within reach of fire from the wall of the town. He fortified convents and houses in the neighbourhood of these bridges. He formed a line of fortification, consisting of redoubts, connected by intrenchments, on the heights of Calvinet beyond the canal, of which the summit was about the

same or little greater distance from the canal as the canal was from the wall of the town.

"16. It is obvious from his manœuvres, as reported by himself, that the commander-in-chief of the allied army saw clearly that he could obtain possession of Toulouse only by becoming master of the approaches to the town from Montpellier. His first measure was to endeavour to form a bridge over the Garonne above the town. The number of boats was not sufficient: he could not expect to supply the deficiency by chevalets or other means, and to secure the bridge prepared for passage of the troops across in time to resist the attack which might so easily have been made upon them from Toulouse. He then laid a bridge over the Garonne, above the junction of the Arriege with that river. A part of the army crossed the Garonne and the Arriege, and reached Villefranche, in the very country which it was wished to occupy. But the roads and country were found impracticable, owing to the fall of rain, and the detachment returned to the left of the Garonne.

"17. It was then necessary to endeavour by other means to attain the same object, viz.: access to the ground in the neighbourhood of the Faubourg St. Michel, between the canal and the Garonne.

"18. It appears that Marshal Soult was aware of the importance of the position on Mount Calvinet. He ordered it to be fortified on the 2nd of April. As soon as he heard that that part of the army which had passed the Garonne and the Arriege had returned, he was sensible of the probability that an attempt would be made to pass the river below the town. It was obvious that he was aware that Mount Calvinet was the key of the position. He stationed upon it for its

defence, three fourths of his army, leaving but few to defend the tête-de-pont of the Garonne, and the bridges and fortified houses of the canal; and he ordered that all should be brought eventually to the defence of that position. He conceived that the attack would be made by the other side of the Ers, and he particularly ordered General Soult, his brother, to defend that ground with his cavalry; and, above all, he instructed General Taupin to attack the corps which should attempt to gain the heights, by turning his right flank. In his letter to the Ministre de la Guerre (p. 257) after the battle, dated 11th of April, Marshal Soult says: *L'armée était en position, la droite appuyée à l'Ers, et la gauche au Canal du Languedoc, jusqu' à son embouchure. La tête-de-pont du Faubourg St. Cyprien* (that is upon the Garonne) *était occupée.* Considering that the principal attack would be made upon Mount Calvinet, he had fortified it.

"19. The battle was fought on the 10th of April. It ended by the allied army being in possession of all the works on Mount Calvinet, and (with the exception of the Faubourg Guillemerie and its fortified posts at Sacarin and Cambon) of all the ground on the right of the Canal du Languedoc, and their posts of cavalry on the bridges of the canal above the town.

"20. On the 11th of April, Marshal Soult wrote a letter to the Ministre de la Guerre, and to Marshal Suchet, in which he clearly indicated what must be the result of the previous day's battle. He states the probability of his retiring from Toulouse. On the same day he made all the preparations, arrangements, and dispositions for the retreat which was made on that night.

"21. The battle of the 10th had been a most desperate one. The position, naturally strong, was the strongest

that could be formed by all the additional defence that art could devise. The canal could not be attacked by main force, nor the bridge over the Garonne. The country beyond the Ers had been reconnoitred, and it was found impossible to manœuvre on it for the purpose of repairing or forming new bridges, with a view to the passage of the river. It was necessary to march between Mount Calvinet and the river Ers, the distance not being greater from the works upon the summit anywhere than 2000 yards, diminishing to 1000 yards, and in some places to 500 yards. The distance marched was not less than two miles under the fire of the enemy's position. In the meantime the Spanish corps which was to attack the enemy's position in front, while Marshal Beresford was marching along its front, made their attack, but failed, and gave way. The marshal's corps was therefore exposed to the attack of all the enemy's troops on Mount Calvinet. They were attacked by General Taupin, whose division they defeated, and then got possession of '*La Redbute Sypière,*' the farthest on the enemy's right. The light division was called to the support of the Spaniards; these were brought back, re-formed, and again ordered to attack the heights, which were at length carried, as originally intended, by the co-operation of an attack moving along the summit from the enemy's right of them, with the attack of them from the front.

"22. These operations took up a great length of time. It was necessary to cover and protect, by a very heavy fire of artillery, the march of the troops to turn the flank, the advance, the retreat, the re-formation, and subsequent attack by the troops on the front of Mount Calvinet.

"23. It happened also by mistake, that General Picton, who had been ordered to make a false attack upon one of the bridges of the canal, and whose division it was intended to keep in reserve, as well as the light division, was involved in a real attack upon the fortified convent *Les Minimes*, which failed, and the Allies suffered much loss. This caused a heavy cannonade.

"24. The consequence of this continued fire of artillery, was the necessity of making a fresh distribution of gun and musket ammunition before the battle could be renewed, and the commander-in-chief crossed the Garonne, to see the exact state of the tête-de-pont after the attack of its exterior works, by the troops under Sir Rowland Hill on the 10th, and to make the arrangements for the ulterior movements of the army. He did not get back to Mount Calvinet till the evening of the 11th. All the dispositions were made for passing the canal above the town on the morning of the 12th, when it was found that the enemy had evacuated, having marched by the very road of which we must have had possession.

"25. M. Choumara pretends that the position of Toulouse was the whole position, viz., the town, the tête-de-pont on the Garonne, the canal, its fortified bridges and houses, the works on Mount Calvinet. The last only were taken. Marshal Soult remained during the night of the 10th and the day of the 11th in possession of the remainder; therefore he won the battle. If Toulouse was to be considered as a fortress, of which possession was to be held till the body of the place should be entered, M. Choumara's idea would be correct. In that case Marshal Soult must have been prepared with means of all descriptions,

to enable him to remain in the town. Even in that case, the possession of Mount Calvinet would have given the Allies the means of a fire by enfilade upon the canal, very near to its junction with the Garonne. But Toulouse could not be considered as a fortress. It was a field of battle, of which the principal fortified position, most important in the view of those who attacked, as well as of those who defended it, was taken by the allied army after a desperate combat. The consequence of the battle was, that the allied army took possession of the passages of the Canal du Languedoc above the town. In his letter to the Ministre de la Guerre (page 265), on the 12th of April, Marshal Soult says, 'that the allied army occupied the heights of Baziege, by which he was to retire.' In his letter of the 11th, he had expressed to the same minister and to Marshal Suchet, his apprehension that he should have to fight his way out of Toulouse, as he certainly would if he had not marched when he did.

"26. But M. Choumara contends that Marshal Soult, having remained in Toulouse for twenty-four hours after the battle, won the battle of Toulouse, as the Allies had in 1810 won the battle of Busaco — their position having been turned by Marshal Massena, after his army had been repulsed, and the Allies having abandoned Coimbra. There is this *difference* in the two cases. The battle of Busaco was fought fifteen miles from Coimbra. The French army gained no part of the position of the Allies in the battle of Busaco—not even a *mamelon*. They were totally and entirely defeated and repulsed at all points. The result of the battle gave Marshal Massena no facility in making his subsequent movement to turn the position of the Allies. In the battle

of Toulouse the Allies carried, after a most desperate struggle, the key of the fortified position of the French army, the most important point in it, according to the opinion of Marshal Soult, the commander-in-chief of the Allies, and every officer concerned on either side. They held undisturbed possession of this position; from their ground they could, by their fire, prevent the occupation of the remainder of the position of their enemy. The possession of it gave them the means, of which advantage was taken, to cut off the retreat of their enemy; and their advanced troops were actually on the night of the 11th on the ground, over which Marshal Soult was under the necessity of passing on the same night in his retreat. Marshal Soult left in Toulouse about 1600 prisoners, three general officers, and several pieces of cannon. None were in Coimbra in 1810, after Busaco. But there is another remarkable difference between the affairs at Toulouse and at Busaco. The French army left at Coimbra, when they passed that town after the battle, not less than 6000 sick and wounded, who were captured in the town in little more than a week by General Trant. The battle of Toulouse had no resemblance to the battle of Busaco. M. Choumara's readers will judge which party won it.

"27. As usual in all such works, this one contains much more misrepresentation respecting the numbers engaged on each side. The allied army at Toulouse consisted of Freyre's Spanish corps, about 10,000; Morillo's Spanish division, about 5000; Le Cor's Portuguese division, about 5000; the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th, and light divisions of the British and Portuguese arm, about 25,000. Total, 45,000. There were besides, four brigades of cavalry, each from 1000 to 1200, or 1500

men, and a sufficient artillery. General Giron's reserve, as it is called, was in Spain. It is stated in M. Choumara's work that the French army consisted of 32,288 infantry, and 2583 cavalry: but it does not appear that General Paris's division, which certainly was at Toulouse, is included. This division would add 5000 to the number."]

CHAP. VI.

WELLINGTON PROCEEDS TO PARIS.—FROM PARIS TO MADRID.—FROM MADRID, THROUGH FRANCE, TO ENGLAND.—HIS ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION THERE.—NATIONAL GRATITUDE.—IS CREATED A DUKE.—APPOINTED AMBASSADOR TO PARIS.—MAKES A MILITARY SURVEY OF THE LOW COUNTRIES.—HIS RESIDENCE IN PARIS.—TAKES LORD CASTLEREAGH'S PLACE AT THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA.—NAPOLEON QUITS ELBA.—REACHES PARIS IN TRIUMPH.—PREPARATIONS OF THE ALLIES.—OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN.—BATTLES OF LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS.

[It is not necessary to speak at length of the great events which had occurred at Paris and Fontainebleau. The abdication, by Napoleon, of the throne of France, and the offer of it on conditions by a Provisional Government to "Louis Stanislaus Xavier of France," are matters of history. The latter arrangement, as politic as it was just, solved a great problem, and was intended to get rid of a great difficulty; it both satisfied the pride of the French people, by a virtual abnegation of the principle of hereditary right, and enabled the Allies to conclude a peace which promised to be lasting. Many minor points, however, remained to be considered, especially in reference to other branches of the House of Bourbon, and the settlement of the balance of power in Europe; and Lord Castlereagh, who represented the British Crown at the Congress of Paris, wrote, by desire of the allied Sovereigns, to request that Lord Wellington would repair immediately to the French

capital and aid them with his counsels. The letter which conveyed this message intimated at the same time that the Prince Regent proposed to nominate Lord Wellington to be his Ambassador at the Court of the Tuileries as soon as a permanent government should be formed in France; and it received the following characteristic reply,—"Your brother Charles has just given me your letter of the 13th, and I am very much obliged and flattered by your thinking of me for a situation for which I should never have thought myself qualified. I hope, however, that the Prince Regent, his government, and your lordship are convinced that I am ready to serve him in any situation in which it may be thought that I can be of service. Although I have been so long absent from England, I should have remained as much longer, if it had been necessary; and I feel no objection to another absence in the public service if it be necessary or desirable."*

It was not, however, in Wellington's power to quit Toulouse just at that moment. There were difficulties to be overcome which he could not intrust to others in making arrangements for the breaking up of his own army; for sending away the Portuguese and Spanish corps, and bringing back the French garrisons from the posts which they still held in the Peninsula. The presence, likewise, at Bordeaux, of the Duc d'Angoulême, as well as the temper of the Imperialist officers who commanded in the fortresses along the course of the Garonne, troubled him. "Your brother," he writes to Lord Castlereagh, "will inform you of the circumstances here which would render my absence just now

* Letter from Toulouse to Lord Castlereagh, 21st April, 1814.

inconvenient, and possibly dangerous to the public service." Among these may be mentioned certain premature attempts of the adherents of the House of Bourbon to assume, as a matter of right, the functions of an established government. For such a step neither the state of the public mind, nor the feeling of the armies which still held together, was ripe; and Wellington was compelled, in consequence, to write urgently upon the subject; not a little to the disgust of the headstrong prince to whom his communication was addressed. After explaining that France, on the 24th of April, was in a very different condition than on the 12th,—that the Provisional Government, with the Duc's father at its head, had recognised the basis of a constitution yet to be framed, and that Bordeaux, as well as the other portions of territory of which the allied army retained the occupation, was retained, in terms of a military convention, he goes on to say:—

"The territory which under this convention is allotted to me is occupied in a military manner by the army under my command; and it rests with me to make such arrangements for its government as I may think proper. The arrangements which I have thought proper to make are those directed by the Provisional Government of France, as far as they may have come to my knowledge; and, above all, I have endeavoured to make no alteration which might embarrass or distress the government of Monsieur or of the King when his Majesty shall resume his authority.

"I would now beg leave to suggest to your Royal Highness to consider how far it is proper or right, under these circumstances, for your Royal Highness to exercise any authority within this line of demarcation.

According to the laws of war your Royal Highness can exercise such authority only with the sanction of the general officer commanding an army, which must, in this view of the case, be deemed that of an enemy; and it certainly appears to me that the relations of your Royal Highness, both in regard to the government of France, *de facto*, and to this army, are so changed that you ought not to exercise any at all.

"I would also request your Royal Highness to consider whether, if you do exercise any authority, you ought not to take care to confine yourself entirely to carrying into execution the orders and instructions of the Provisional Government, as conveyed through the ordinary channels. If your Royal Highness should agree with me upon this last point, I would then beg leave to suggest to your Royal Highness to consider again whether you ought to make any alterations in the customs at Bordeaux, or in any other tax or law of the country, which, according to the constitution, the bases of which have been agreed to by your Royal Highness's father, could be made only by the combined authority of the king, senate, and legislative assembly."

His unflinching firmness and steady application to business enabled Wellington to put matters in train, so that he was in a condition to quit Toulouse for Paris on the 1st of May. He reached the latter city on the 4th, and quitted it again on the 10th. This brief interval appears to have been spent in advising, on all subjects, as well with the Allies as with the French government. It was marked, also, by two occurrences, both of them of personal interest to himself, namely, the commencement of an intimacy with Talleyrand, which continued till the death of that remarkable man;

and the receipt of a letter from Lord Liverpool announcing that he had been raised to the dignity of a dukedom. The latter event, which occurred on the 5th of May, was followed, on the 10th, by a proposal from the minister to endow the dukedom with a sum of 300,000*l.*, which the House of Commons, under the guidance of the leaders of the opposition, raised by acclamation to half a million: so completely had the tide of popular feeling turned; so entirely was he become the favourite of the nation, whom, but a year previously, those who affected to be in a marked manner the spokesmen of the people, denounced as rash, incompetent, and bent wholly on aggrandising himself.

One of the main purposes for which he had been called up to Paris was to give an opinion as to the course which it would be judicious to follow in dealing with Spain. Ferdinand, as is well known, adopted at once a violent reactionary line of policy; and that miserable state of things began which has since become chronic in the Peninsula. But he accompanied his dissolution of the Cortès with the promise of a free and better constitution; and it became, in consequence, the policy of England, and indeed of Europe, to prevent, at least, the occurrence of civil war. It was naturally imagined that if influence could be exercised over the king by any one, the Duke of Wellington was the person to exercise it; and he undertook the task with the same postponement of selfish considerations to duty which is conspicuous throughout the whole of his public life. "I propose to go to Madrid," he writes from Paris on the 9th of May, "in order to try whether I cannot prevail upon all parties to be more moderate, and to adopt a constitution more likely to be practicable and

to contribute to the peace and happiness of the nation. I am afraid that I shall not be in England till the end of June; but I hope I shall be able to do much good by this journey."

The hope here expressed was realised only in part. Wellington unquestionably stopped the outbreak of a civil war into which the liberal party was about to rush, by appealing to the military spirit of the third and fourth Spanish armies, the latter of which he reviewed and addressed at Tarbe on the 18th, and the former on the 20th, at Mandragon. But though induced, on his first arrival in Madrid, to hope for something more, a brief residence in that capital sufficed to dissipate the illusion. Hence, on the 25th of May, he writes to Sir Charles Stuart, "You will have heard of the extraordinary occurrences here (at Madrid), though not probably with surprise. Nothing can be more popular than the king and his measures, as far as they have gone to the overthrow of the constitution. The imprisonment of the liberals is thought by some, I believe with justice, unnecessary, and it is certainly highly impolitic, but it is liked by the people at large. Since the great act of vigour which has placed Ferdinand on the throne, unshackled by a constitution, nothing of any kind has been done, either for the formation of a new system, or for any other purpose, and, as far as I can judge, it is not intended to do anything. However, I arrived only yesterday, and I have not had time to learn much. Those to whom I have talked, who pretend and ought to know, say that his Majesty will certainly perform the promise made in his decree of the 4th of May, and will give a free constitution to Spain. I have urged,

and shall continue to urge this measure upon them, as being essential to his Majesty's credit abroad."

The constitution which Ferdinand abolished was, in point of fact, no constitution at all. It had failed to serve the purposes of a government during war, and was unfitted for the administration of the affairs of a great nation in peace. But it was succeeded by pure tyranny, and a return to all the abuses of a worn-out system. The persons chosen to administer this system, appear also to have been singularly wrong-headed and bigoted. No appeals, either to the honour or to the interests of the country, had any weight with them. "I have been very well received," the Duke writes to Lord Castlereagh on the 1st of June, 1814, "by the king and his ministers; but I fear that I have done but little good. The Duke de San Carlos promised me in a conversation I had with him, first, that the decree for calling the Cortès should appear forthwith; secondly, that all the prisoners should be released on St. Ferdinand's day, the 30th of May, excepting such as it was determined to bring to trial, who should be fairly tried without loss of time; thirdly, that the king was determined to carry into execution all he had promised in his decree of the 4th of May, and moreover to establish in Spain the independence of the judges. Nothing has yet been done on any of these points. I told him that he must expect that the king's measures would be attacked and abused in all parts of the world, but particularly in England; and that until some steps were taken to prove that the king was inclined to govern the country on liberal principles, and that necessity alone had occasioned the violent measures which had attended the revolution, he could not expect much countenance

in England. • Nothing, however, has as yet been done, and I hear that nine more persons were imprisoned the night before last."

Being a grandee of the first class, and the lord of a considerable domain which had been conferred upon him by the Cortès, and confirmed by the king after his return, the Duke of Wellington felt himself justified in giving his advice, as well in regard to the internal administration of the country, as relative to its foreign policy. He handed to the king a paper*, in which both subjects are fully discussed, and the ablest advice given with respect to the revolted colonies. He addressed himself also to the Minister of War on the subject of the permanent organisation of the Spanish army, suggesting a plan which combined perfect efficiency with economy†. He did every thing, in short, which was consistent with his own character for moderation and good sense, to set before Ferdinand and his counsellors maxims of justice, policy, and good faith. But he quitted Madrid on the 8th, consoled by no higher reflection than is expressed in these few but emphatic words: "I think there will certainly be no civil war at present." Indeed, the impression left upon his own mind appears to have been the reverse of satisfactory. Writing from Bordeaux to Lord Castlereagh, about Ferdinand and his ministers, he says, "I am inclined to suspect that something passed, of which they are ashamed, in their negotiation at Valencia, with Buonaparte, of which —— has a knowledge, which they are desirous of concealing."

* Memorandum to Ferd. VII.

† Mem. to Minister of War, 2nd June, 1814.

The Duke of Wellington, in passing from Paris to Madrid, had lingered a week at Toulouse to expedite the measures which he had suggested for breaking up the army. He adopted a similar mode of proceeding in his progress from Madrid; for he arrived at Bordeaux on the 11th of June, and did not quit it till the 15th. He saw, in this interval, the last preparations completed for the departure of his victorious troops from the scene of their triumphs; and, in a simple but touching order of the day, took his final leave of them. The document in question is short, and contrasts strongly with the more theatrical performances of his great rival in the art of war; we are therefore tempted to give it in full.

"1. The commander of the forces, being on the point of returning to England, takes this opportunity of congratulating the army upon the recent events which have restored peace to their country and the world.

"2. The share which the British army has had in producing those events, and the high character with which the army will quit this country, must be equally satisfactory to every individual belonging to it as they are to the commander of the forces; and he trusts that the troops will continue the same good conduct to the end.

"3. The commander of the forces once more requests the army to accept his thanks.

"4. Although circumstances may alter the relations in which he has stood towards them, he assures them he will never cease to feel the warmest interest in their welfare and honour; and that he will be at all times happy to be of any service to those to whose conduct, discipline, and gallantry their country is so much indebted."

Having published this order, the Duke of Wellington quitted Bordeaux on the following day, and, after a brief sojourn in Paris, crossed the Channel between Calais and Dover. His arrival at the latter place was soon made known, and the streets became thronged with multitudes of all ranks, eager to see and salute England's greatest hero. It was with some difficulty, indeed, that he could prevent the people from pressing upon him, even into his carriage; and his progress, till he got well clear of the town, was therefore slow. Nor was the case different in any of the towns through which he passed. Every inn at which he stopped to change horses was surrounded by an eager crowd, who welcomed him back to his native country with enthusiastic cheers; and when, at last, he reached Westminster Bridge, public enthusiasm broke through all further restraint. The horses were taken from his carriage: men struggled and fought for the honour of supplying their places; and thus, dragged by strength of hand, and preceded and followed by such a concourse as London only can exhibit, he pursued his way up Parliament Street, along Whitehall, and so by the Haymarket and Piccadilly to Hamilton Place, where the duchess and his two sons were then residing. Not yet, however, were the people satisfied. As soon as the carriage stopped, they lifted him in their arms, and carried him across the pavement, and into the very hall of the dwelling. Indeed, it was only in deference to his good-humoured but urgent entreaty, that they set him down at last, and left him to receive the first greetings of his family in private.

If ever man was actuated by the pure principle of duty, the illustrious Duke of Wellington was he. Find-

ing, on his arrival in London, that the Prince Regent had, with the allied sovereigns, gone down to Portsmouth, to witness a naval review, he followed thither on the 24th, and proceeded at once to pay his respects. It is unnecessary to say how he was received, or with what dignified modesty he bore himself on that and all similar occasions. Neither unconscious of his own merits, nor ostentatiously pretending to undervalue them, he yet shrank from the most remote appearance of demanding what all whom he approached were anxious to give, and constantly endeavoured to divert towards others the tokens of public respect and admiration which were intended for himself. But it would be hopeless to attempt, by description, to communicate any adequate idea of the Duke's singularly unaffected manner, as well in public as in private society. He became, as was to be expected, wherever he appeared, the object of universal attention; yet he either did not observe, or acted as if he had not observed, the circumstance; returning with perfect simplicity the salutes that were offered to him, or entering into easy conversation with those who immediately surrounded him. Nor is it undeserving of notice, that his personal appearance gave no inaccurate index of the mind and spirit that were in him. Rather above than below the middle size, his figure was slight, but wiry and well proportioned; while his fine Roman features, his clear dark grey or violet eye, his broad forehead, and well-developed chin, all combined to mark him as a man of no ordinary capacity and strength of character.

The Duke's stay in England did not, on this occasion, much exceed a month. It may be best described, so far as he was himself concerned, as a continued ovation.

On the 28th of June, he was introduced into the House of Lords as baron, viscount, earl, marquis, and duke, by accumulation; and received, through Lord Chancellor Eldon, the thanks and congratulations of that august assembly. "I cannot forbear," said the chancellor, on that occasion, "to call the special attention of all who hear me to a fact in your grace's life, singular, I believe, in the history of this country, and infinitely honourable to your grace, that you have manifested, upon your first entrance into this house, your right under various grants, to all the dignities in the peerage of this realm which the crown can confer. These dignities have been conferred at various periods, but in the short compass of little more than four years, for great public services, occurring in rapid succession, claiming the favour of the crown, influenced by its sense of justice to your grace and the country."

The Duke's answer was characterised by the same modesty and simplicity of expression which gave its peculiar charm to all his public acknowledgments of services rendered by him to the country:—"In truth, my lords," he said, "when I reflect upon the advantages which I enjoyed in the confidence reposed in me, and the support afforded by the Government and by his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief; on the cordial assistance which I invariably received upon all occasions from my gallant friends, the general officers of the army, who are an honour to their country, on the gallantry and discipline of the troops, and the manner in which I was encouraged and incited to exertion by the protection and gracious favour of the Prince, I cannot but consider that, however great the difficulties with which I had to contend, the means to contend with

them were equal to overcome them; and I am apprehensive that I shall not be found so deserving of your favour as I wish.

"If, however, my merit is not great, my gratitude is unbounded; and I can only assure your lordships that you will always find me ready to serve his majesty, to the utmost of my ability, in any capacity in which my services can be at all useful to this great country."

The scene which occurred in the House of Commons a few days subsequently was, if possible, still more impressive. On the 28th of June, a deputation from that body waited upon the Duke to offer to him the House's thanks and congratulations on his safe return to England; and he solicited and obtained permission to tender his acknowledgments of the great honour in person. The 1st of July was selected as the day on which his wish should be complied with; when he, who had last crossed the threshold of that chamber as the representative of an inconsiderable borough in Sussex, now entered as one of the foremost peers of the realm. Of all that followed, no more faithful or touching account could be given than the records of Parliament have happily preserved.

"House of Commons, 1st July, 1814.

"Viscount Castlereagh acquainted the House that the Duke of Wellington having desired that he may have the honour to wait upon this House, his grace is in attendance.

"At about a quarter before five, the Speaker, being dressed in his official robes, and the House being crowded with members—some of them in military and naval uniforms, and many in their court dresses, in which they had been attending the Speaker with an

address to the Prince Regent on the peace—the House was acquainted that the Duke of Wellington was in waiting.

"*Resolved*, 'That the Duke of Wellington be now admitted.'

"A chair being set for his grace on the left hand of the bar, towards the middle of the House, he came in, making his obeisances, the whole House rising upon his entrance within the bar; and Mr. Speaker having informed him that there was a chair in which he might repose himself, the Duke sat down, covered, for some time, the sergeant standing on his right hand with the mace grounded, and the House resumed their seats. His grace then rose, and, uncovered, spoke to the following effect:—

"'Mr. Speaker:—I was anxious to be permitted to attend this House, in order to return my thanks in person for the honour they have done me, in deputing a committee of their members to congratulate me on my return to this country; and this, after the House had animated my exertions by their applause upon every occasion which appeared to merit their approbation; and after they had filled up the measure of their favours by conferring upon me, at the recommendation of the Prince Regent, the noblest gift that any subject had ever received.

"'I hope it will not be deemed presumptuous in me to take this opportunity of expressing my admiration of the great efforts made by this House and the country, at a moment of unexampled pressure and difficulty, in order to support the great scale of operations by which the contest was brought to so fortunate a termination. By the wise policy of parliament, the government was

enabled to give the necessary support to the operations which were carried on under my directions; and I was encouraged by the confidence reposed in me by his majesty's ministers, and by the commander-in-chief, by the gracious favour of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and by the reliance which I had on the support of my gallant friends, the general officers of the army, and on the bravery of the officers and troops, to carry on the operations in such a manner as to acquire for me those marks of the approbation of this House, for which I have now the honour to render my humble acknowledgments.

"'Sir, it is impossible for me to express the gratitude which I feel. I can only assure the House that I shall always be ready to serve his majesty in any capacity in which my services can be deemed useful, with the same zeal for my country which has already acquired for me the approbation of this House.'

"Whereupon Mr. Speaker, who, during the foregoing speech, sat covered, stood up, uncovered, and spoke to his grace as follows: —

"'My Lord: — Since I had last the honour of addressing you from this place, a series of eventful years has elapsed; but none without some mark and note of your rising glory.

"'The military triumphs which your valour has achieved upon the banks of the Douro and the Tagus, of the Ebro and the Garonne, have called forth the spontaneous shouts of admiring nations. Those triumphs it is needless on this day to recount. Their names have been written by your conquering sword in the annals of Europe, and we shall hand them down with exultation to our children's children.

"'It is not, however, the grandeur of military success which has alone fixed our admiration and commanded our applause; it has been that generous and lofty spirit which has inspired your troops with unbounded confidence, and taught them to know that the day of battle was always a day of victory; that moral courage and enduring fortitude which, in perilous times, when gloom and doubt had beset ordinary minds, stood, nevertheless, unshaken; and that ascendancy of character which, uniting the energies of jealous and rival nations, enabled you to wield at will the fate and fortunes of mighty empires.

"'For the repeated thanks and grants bestowed upon you by this House in gratitude for your many and eminent services, you have thought fit, this day, to offer us your acknowledgments; but this nation well knows that it is still largely your debtor. It owes to you the proud satisfaction that, amidst the constellation of great and illustrious warriors who have recently visited our country, we could present to them a leader of our own, to whom all, by common acclamation, conceded the pre-eminence; and when the will of Heaven, and the common destinies of our nature, shall have swept away the present generation, you will have left your great name and example as an imperishable monument, inciting others to like deeds of glory, and serving at once to adorn, defend, and perpetuate the existence of this country amongst the ruling nations of the earth.'"

To speak, after this, of feasts at the Mansion House, of the enrolment of the Duke's name on the lists of the various civil companies of the metropolis, of the Academic honours presented to him by grateful Oxford, and of the endless addresses which poured in upon him from

the cities, towns, and boroughs of the United Kingdom, would be to fix the attention of the reader upon points of comparatively secondary moment. Enough is done, when we state, that the last spark of party and personal ill-will seemed to be extinguished; and that for him, to whom, but a few years ago, lord mayor, and aldermen, and members of the parliamentary opposition, grudged even the first step in the peerage, with a small pension to support the dignity, no honours which the nation could offer appeared to be sufficient. Yet he who had endured with patience the hostility of an ignorant or prejudiced populace, did not permit himself to be unduly elated by their adulation. He accepted their praise, as he had borne their calumnies, unmoved; and went forward in the way of duty, not because it conducted him to personal honour and influence, but because it was the only path on which such a spirit as his cared to tread.

Early in August the Duke set out to assume the functions which he had been appointed to discharge as British ambassador at Paris. He did not, however, proceed direct to the French capital, but took the road through Belgium, which having been united by treaty to Holland formed, at that time, part of what became by and by the kingdom of the Netherlands. As one great purpose in the creation of this kingdom was to provide a bulwark against France in the north, and as it had been determined to station there for a while a combined army of British, Hanoverian, and Netherlands troops, the Duke was requested to visit the country, and to report upon the means which should, according to his judgment, appear most suitable for putting it in a defensible state.

He was accompanied, on that occasion, by Colonels Carmichael Smythe, Chapman, and Pasley, of the Royal Engineers, and executed with them a careful though rapid survey of the whole frontier line, from Liege, along the Meuse and the Sambre, to Namur and Charleroi, and thence by Mons to Tournay and the sea. It is well known that Austria, when mistress of the Netherlands, had covered that detached portion of her empire with a line of fortresses. Many of these had been alternately taken and retaken during the early stages of the revolutionary war, and on the annexation of the Low Countries to the French empire, most of them had been destroyed. In an elaborate memorandum which he transmitted to Lord Bathurst, the Duke of Wellington recommended that they should be restored; and certain positions, which he pointed out, marked off, so to speak, for occupation by armies, in the event of a future invasion from France. Among these latter, he specifies the entrance of the Forêt de Soignes, by the high road which leads to Brussels from Binch, Charleroi, and Namur; in other words the famous field of Waterloo, on which, within less than a year, the fate of Europe was to be decided. At the same time he deprecated the destruction of Antwerp, which had been pressed upon the English government by naval men. He pointed out both the impolicy and the injustice of razing a fortress, which he describes as the key of the extended line which a friendly power was advised to take up, merely because when under the authority of an unfriendly power, a great naval arsenal had been formed there. It was well for the credit of England, on the continent, that his arguments on this subject prevailed, and though some authorities, and among

the rest, M. Brialmont, hold, that in recommending the system of a cordon of fortresses, he did violence to the established principles of strategy,—still the peculiar nature of the country to be held, the absence from it of all commanding features, and the facilities of frequent inundation which it affords, must make us pause before we adopt such views, even if the recorded opinions of the great Duke were not opposed to them. Be this, however, as it may, the Duke's advice was so far acted upon, that an arrangement was made for granting to the King of the Netherlands a certain sum annually, sufficient, as was believed, to enable him to put the fortresses in a state of defence, and to arm and equip them. Unfortunately, when the hour of trial came, it was found that little had been done towards the accomplishment of that object: though for many years subsequently, England continued to pay for the maintenance and repair of works, which the altered condition of her relations with the continent of Europe had rendered perfectly useless to her.*

[* The Duke was not blind to the fact, that under ordinary circumstances, wide cordons of fortresses are mistakes. He had shown, by his plan of defence for Portugal, that centralisation, not dissemination, is the true principle in war; and he would have adopted a similar principle in the Netherlands, had it been possible to do so. "The general unpopularity attached to fortifications, their expense, and the difficulty in remedying the defects of the situation of some of the ancient fortresses in the Netherlands, induced me to endeavour to find a situation which, being strongly fortified, might cover the country, and which the enemy would not venture to pass; but I can find no situation which would answer the purpose. 1st. There is no situation in the country which affords any advantages to be taken up as a fortress, or which covers and protects any extent of country.

Having completed his survey of the Netherlands, the Duke proceeded to Paris, where he arrived on the 22nd of August. On the 23rd he was presented to Louis XVIII., and delivered his credentials. The reception afforded to him by that prince was cordial enough. Louis XVIII., though from physical causes little calculated to awaken the enthusiasm of the French people, was wiser than other members of his family. He did not, therefore, share the unworthy feelings of those about him, who thought more of the Duke's reluctance to declare prematurely for the Bourbons, than of the important services which he had rendered to their cause, and his singularly gentle treatment of that portion of France which he had entered and occupied as a conqueror.

The Duke's residence in Paris on this occasion, did not exceed five months, and the public business which he was instructed to manage, seems for the most part to have been comparatively unimportant. The public mind in England was bent at that time, upon the abolition of the slave trade, and he was directed to press upon the French government, the sound policy, as well as the fitness in a moral point of view, of giving its support to that movement. This he did both in personal communications with the Prince of Benevento and

2ndly. There is no situation to which the enemy could not have an easy access, both by land and water, for the artillery and stores necessary to attack it: and 3rdly. There is no single situation in the country which, if fortified, the enemy might not pass without risk, as, in case of being defeated and obliged to retire, he could not fail to find innumerable roads which would lead him to some one or other of the strong places on the French frontier."]

in elaborate minutes, of which copies were transmitted to London. He even saw the king upon the subject, and handed to him an autograph letter from the Prince Regent; but the results, as he himself describes them, were by no means commensurate with the efforts made to attain them. "From what I learn here," he says in a letter to Lord Castlereagh, dated August 25th, "I have reason to believe that the opinions in the legislative body, and particularly in the House of Peers, are very much against the abolition of the slave trade, and that several ships are now fitting out at Nantes and Bordeaux, with the aid of British capital, to carry on the trade on the coast of Africa."

Besides this graver question, there were many matters of detail to be settled, connected with the capture of public property in Bordeaux and elsewhere, as well as difficulties arising out of the American war, of which it was his duty to obtain the solution. The Duke's public correspondence shows that he applied himself to these, as well as to every other point of diplomacy, with the same singleness of purpose and clearness of judgment which are discernible in his conduct of the operations of war. Nor was he an inattentive observer of all that was going on in France itself.

The principle of loyalty, which was perhaps stronger in him than in any public man of modern times, was not sufficient to overcome his sense of justice; and while he appeared, so to speak, to turn away from the idea of a second revolution, it is very evident from the tone of some of his letters, that he always regarded such an event as possible. The following, addressed to Lord Bathurst, on the 17th of December, 1814, indicates clearly enough in what channel his thoughts were beginning to run. He

had elsewhere spoken of discontents and murmurings, and threatened conspiracies, and changes in the personnel of the government arising out of them, and now says: "The appointment of Soult to the ministry, and the change in the ministry of the Police, have been of some advantage in tranquillising matters here; but they are still very uncomfortable. I believe the truth to be, that the people of this country are so completely ruined by the revolution, and they are now suffering so severely from the want of the plunder of the world, that they cannot go on without it; and they cannot endure the prospect of a peaceable government. If this is the case, we should take care how we suffer the grand alliance to break up; and we ought to look to our alliance with the powers of the Peninsula as our sheet-anchor.

Of the private life of the Duke of Wellington during this interval few records remain. He appears to have been joined by the duchess soon after his arrival in Paris, and to have dispensed a liberal hospitality to such of his countrymen, as, from their social position or on account of letters which they brought to him, seemed to have any claim upon his notice. In this way many acquaintances were formed, and some friendships, which lasted till the close of his life; among the latter of which none deserves to be more especially recorded than his long, close, and enduring connection with the Right Hon. Charles Arbuthnot. That gentleman, who had formerly represented England at the Ottoman Court, and at a later period held office as Chief Commissioner of Woods and Forests, visited Paris in 1814 with his young and accomplished wife. It would be difficult to conceive a greater contrast, we might almost say,

than the gentle and effeminate manner and turn of mind which belonged to one of these men, offered to the frank, open, and manly temperament of the other. Yet such was the attachment which sprang up between them, that when both became widowers they lived together; Mr. Arbuthnot dying at a very advanced age in the apartments at Apsley House, which the Duke had made over to him.

So passed the current of the Duke of Wellington's existence during the autumn and winter of 1814—15; now in negociations with the French Government for the abolition of the slave trade; now, in remonstrances with Ferdinand of Spain on his unwise proceedings towards his most faithful servants *; now, in communicating to the cabinet of St. James's his views of the general condition of France; now, in arranging details of business relative to American privateers, or the settlement of old army accounts. It was a position scarcely worthy either of his acknowledged ability or his European reputation. But the course of events soon led him into a wider and more important field of exertion, where the opportunity was afforded of placing the last stone upon the pinnacle of his military glory.

The Treaty of Paris, though clear enough, so far as

[* Ferdinand, among other acts of base ingratitude, caused, or permitted, General Alava to be cast into the dungeons of the Inquisition. Now General Alava was one of the very few Spanish officers, who throughout the whole of the war had manifested both talent and devotion to his country. He had been Spanish Commissioner at the Duke's head-quarters, from 1809 up to 1813, and was never absent from his post, except for six weeks in 1812. The Duke remonstrated strongly but respectfully upon the subject, and Alava, after a while, was released, on condition that he would go into exile in France. Alava was a Constitutionalist.]

regarded the exclusion of the family of Napoleon from the French throne, left many questions affecting the general interests of Europe unsolved; and it was agreed in consequence that a Congress should meet in Vienna; to be composed of such of the Allied Sovereigns as should find it convenient to repair thither, and of plenipotentiaries chosen expressly to represent others who might be either unable or indisposed to attend. Lord Castlereagh, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, was sent over by the British Cabinet to represent the Prince Regent, and remained in Vienna, taking part in the business of the Congress, till the middle of January, 1815. But the near approach of the meeting of Parliament rendered necessary, at that time, his presence in England; and the Duke of Wellington was requested to proceed from Paris and supply his place. The Duke reached the Austrian capital at the end of the month, and gathered up at once the thread of diplomacy where Lord Castlereagh had laid it down. It is worthy of remark, however, that of the arrangements made by the Congress for the redistribution of territorial Europe, no portion of the responsibility rested with him. Indeed he was not called to take any part in the deliberations of that body till after these points had been settled.

Yet the card given him to play, when he did mix in the game, was by no means an easy one; and it may be doubted whether even he would have been able to play it satisfactorily, had not that remarkable event befallen of which we shall presently have to speak. A few prefatory words, however, in explanation of the general state of affairs at that moment may not be out of place.

The progress of the French arms, during the first twelve or thirteen years of the 19th century, had entirely

changed the face of continental Europe. Holland, Belgium, Savoy, the Swiss cantons of Geneva and Valois had all been formally incorporated in the Empire; while the erection of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the setting up of dependent kingdoms in Italy and Germany, had established a permanent influence everywhere, from the Meuse to the Oder, and between the Danube and the shores of the Baltic. This mighty fabric, the successful campaigns of 1813 and 1814 overthrew; and now the Allies believed themselves called upon to construct a new map; and to dispose of territories peopled by nearly thirty-two millions of inhabitants so as at once to gratify the ambitious desires of monarchs, and to secure the general peace of the continent. In the unseemly scramble which followed, England had no selfish interests to promote. She therefore protested, through Lord Castlereagh, against more than one arrangement of which she recognised both the injustice so far as the populations were concerned, and the impolicy in regard to the balance of power in Europe. But she did not always prevail.

The points immediately under dispute, when the Duke of Wellington reached Vienna, were, the annexation of the whole of Poland to the Russian empire, and the entire absorption of Saxony by Prussia. These demands had been resisted by England and Austria, who called in the representative of the French monarchy to their support; and so exasperated was the Emperor Alexander by what he pronounced to be the ingratitude of Louis XVIII. that he entered into close relations with Eugène Beauharnais, then in Vienna, and warmly espoused the cause of Murat, king of Naples, who alone, of all Napoleon's sovereigns had been permitted to retain his throne.

The result was that the Russian armies, which had begun to return to their native country, were halted in Poland, and that Prussia declared her determination to keep Saxony with the strong hand. These movements were naturally followed by corresponding acts on the part of England, Austria, and France; among whom, early in February, a secret treaty was concluded, which by-and-by ranged or tended to range the whole of western Europe in one camp, and the northern powers in another.

Meanwhile Murat, conscious that Alexander's friendship must render him an object of suspicion, and perhaps of hostility to Austria, adopted a course of his own. He raised his army from 30,000 to 50,000, and ultimately to 100,000 men. He took possession of a considerable portion of the Papal States, including Ancona, and assumed a high tone in his communications with Congress on the subject of the apparent disinclination of the king of France to recognise his right to the Neapolitan throne. The Duke of Wellington recommended that Austria should form as a counterpoise to these projects an army of 150,000 men in Italy, which she at once proceeded to do, not a little to the chagrin and annoyance of Russia and Prussia.

Affairs were in this somewhat unsettled state, and the Congress of Vienna was about to break up, not in the best possible humour, when on the 7th of March Wellington received information from Lord Burghersh that Napoleon had quitted Elba. This news, which reached Prince Metternich at the same time, by way of Leghorn, threw the Allied Sovereigns and statesmen into the greatest perplexity.]

Another despatch announced, on the morrow, that

Buonaparte had landed in France, and was marching upon Paris; whereupon a general opinion was expressed that the faithful armies of Louis XVIII. would find no difficulty in putting down such a foolish attempt upon the part of the fugitive from Elba.

While the statesmen at Vienna were thus deluding themselves, affairs followed elsewhere their own course. At the head of no more than 1000 men, Napoleon cast himself upon the French territory, to which the wishes, both of the people and the army, had called him. Labedoyère hastened to throw himself into his arms at Grenoble, while Marshal Ney, forgetful of his duty and his word of honour, yielded to the feelings of his troops and to a sentiment for which he could not account, and delivered up the keys of the important city of Lyons to his old master. From that city, all the way to Paris, the progress of Napoleon was but a succession of triumphs. He entered the capital on the evening of the 20th, and reascended the throne without having shed one drop of blood. The Bourbons had set a price upon his head, and a sub-prefect, named Buguet, went so far as publicly to boast, in a pamphlet, written in 1816, that he had been selected by M. Blacas to assassinate the Usurper. Such are the wretched means employed by all governments which are conscious of their own weakness and unpopularity. The prisoner from the isle of Elba had only to show himself in order to win back again both the throne and the army; indeed, such was the rapidity with which that marvellous revolution was effected, that Louis XVIII. scarcely found time to escape into Belgium.

France would not thus have abandoned a king whom she had so recently welcomed with transport, if the

king and his court had known how to forget and to forgive. But, instead of looking at the reign which preceded their own through the medium of its useful labours and the glory which attached to it, they persecuted, with blind hatred, men whose only fault, in their eyes, was, that they had served the cause of the Usurper courageously and faithfully.

There was no humiliation to which the brave soldiers of the empire were not subjected. On entering Paris, with swords stained with the blood of the Allies, they saw the capital of France lavishing upon their enemies the incense of its baseness and its flattery. The houses were decorated, the bells rang merrily, and the balconies were crowded with spectators, as on gala days. Some women, the disgrace of their sex, threw themselves publicly into the arms of the Cossacks. The salons and boudoirs overwhelmed the titled conquerors with flattering attentions. The theatres and public ways greeted the allied generals with shouts of applause. The Institute itself went so far as to congratulate Alexander, and to offer to him the tribute of its love and admiration. Barbarians themselves would have blushed at such proceedings. And, as if it were not enough that the court and the government should exhibit such base adulation to the Allied Sovereigns,—that the higher classes of society should receive with transport the enemies of France,—that the Les Fontaines, the Sequiers, the Lacratelles, the Garets, the Villemains should be guilty of equal meanness,—that the National Guard of Paris should give a golden sword and a banquet to General Sacken,—it was necessary, to complete the national disgrace, that among the crowd of intriguers and worshippers of the powers that

were, there should be mixed up the Berthiers, the Augereaus, the Soults, the Marmonts, the Victors, the Suchets, the Oudinots, the Dukes of Treviso, and the Princes of Essling, all the glorious names, in short, which the army for so long a time had been accustomed to pronounce with an equal degree of respect and admiration.

This absence of character and of dignity exasperated the patriots, and above all the military classes. It served admirably, on the other hand, to promote the designs of the court, whose one anxiety seemed to be to disparage everything which had constituted the strength and glory of the preceding *régime*. The army became the object of its first acts of oppression. It was reduced, by degrees, first to 180,000, then to 140,000 men. The fleet was cut down to the level of that of Holland or of Sweden. The fortresses were not kept up. The arsenals, the depôts of remount, and the naval and military establishments were threatened with destruction; and the king, not daring to trust to a guard of French soldiers, surrounded himself with Swiss regiments. The brave and effective officers of the empire were put upon half-pay, and replaced by young men without titles, or by old gentlemen, whose only merit it was that they had been emigrants. The Count d'Artois reinstated, on his own responsibility, the men who, under the preceding reign, had been set aside as untrustworthy or incapable. General Dupont, so unfortunately celebrated for the capitulation at Baylen, became minister of war. The Labories and the Bourriennes became prime favourites under the restoration; and, which was truly disgraceful, the family of George Cadoudal received letters of nobility. There were intro-

duced into the ranks of the army the adherents of all the factions which for years it had detested and combated. The Legion of Honour was degraded by unworthy selections and a scandalous prodigality. The effigy of the Emperor was superseded on all the crosses by that of Henry IV., and in order to humiliate the old servants of the order, the Abbé de Pradt was named Grand Chancellor. An idea was even entertained of suppressing the Legion of Honour as a military distinction, and of restoring that of St. Louis to its original splendour. But from this enormity men shrank, as well as from the project of reducing, by 800, the number of the orphans of the Legion of Honour, who were maintained at Barbeau and at Loges. An attempt was also made, but without success, to render the military schools accessible *only* to the sons of generals and of superior officers, with a view to exclude those of the poor soldiers who had served the empire with the greatest fidelity and disinterestedness.

This insane hatred of all which had created, defended, and rendered glorious the imperial *régime*, exhibited itself down to the most minute acts of authority. It was not enough to have transformed the tricolour cockade into an emblem of faction, to have changed the numbers and badges of regiments, to have substituted the *drapeau blanc* for the eagles torn at Austerlitz and Borodino, to have condemned old officers to a state bordering upon destitution, and to have subjected them to a variety of vexatious arrangements. It was not enough to have degraded the Legion of Honour, to have aimed at driving the orphans of the valour of France from their asylums, and to have endeavoured to shut out the sons of the people from the schools which had been established for

their benefit. It was not enough to have struck at the most cherished sentiments of the army, and to have dried up the sources of its grandeur and its might by suppressing the conscription, it remained yet further to expel from the mansion consecrated to old age and the sufferings of war a crowd of soldiers mutilated upon the various battle-fields of Europe. Nay, the restoration carried the principle of indignity so far as to dismiss 2500 invalids, some without pensions, because they had been born in territories at a distance from France, others, with pensions merely nominal, because they belonged to the *élite* of the French army.

To all these insulting proceedings there came to be added small annoyances, which increased still more the animosity of the military classes and of the patriots towards the new *régime*. At court, the nobles of the empire were proscribed as unworthy to be received; the very wives of the marshals who had rallied round it became the objects of sarcasm to the old gentlemen and marchionesses of the *ancien régime*. The soldiers were obliged to attend mass and the confessional; they were expected to be present at doctrinal discussions, and a chaplain was introduced into each regiment, with the title of first captain; indeed, the system of proselytising was carried to such an extent that a sum of money was given to each man who professed to become converted.

The police, inexorable in the repression of everything which had a tendency to bring discredit upon legitimacy, authorised and encouraged the publication of libels and of shabby caricatures upon Napoleon and the grand army. *The brigands* and *the Usurper* were represented every day in broad farces at the theatres on the boulevard. The people relished these spectacles very little,

the army was exasperated by them, the court and the legitimists alone applauded them; but the moment was approaching when all these bravadoes were about to receive their chastisement. The manly part of the nation, disgusted by the reactionary measures of Louis XVIII., by his law for the observance of the Sabbath, by his attempt to suppress the Court of Cassation, by his settled purpose of robbing the holders of the national property for the sake of enriching the nobles and the priests, by the narrow views and bigotry of his counsellors,—waited only an opportunity to rise. In Paris, in the provinces, at the court itself, men said, "This cannot last." France had reached the limits of patience and resignation. Acts of injustice and the abuse of power had been carried to such excess that an insurrection must have taken place sooner or later, had not the arrival of Napoleon applied a match to the train.

The government, and the short-sighted politicians by whom it was surrounded, little took into their consideration the influence which this state of affairs was exercising. Such, indeed, was their want of forethought, that they despised the warnings even of the most devoted of their followers. De Beauchamp asserts that, as early as the month of August, 1814, the police arrested emissaries from the island of Elba, on whom were found papers announcing that Buonaparte intended to return to France; yet government persisted in regarding these and other signs, which one by one manifested themselves, as vain dreams and idle menaces.

November came, and it was no longer possible to deny that Napoleon meditated an attempt to regain his power. But the ministers, convinced that he would not venture upon such an enterprise while the Congress was

sitting, were of opinion that the Usurper would wait till that assembly broke up, then proceed to Naples, raise Italy and Piedmont, and enter France by the way of Dauphiné. They believed, moreover, that it would be easy, through the vigilance of the police, to put a stop to any attempt of the kind.

It was at this period that the ministers of France and Spain addressed to the Congress a demand for the removal of the Emperor to a greater distance. The common story is, that the conspirators became acquainted with this demand, and urged their chief to hasten on the execution of his project. Be this as it may, there can be no doubt of the fact that letters were circulated from Grenoble to Paris, announcing that the Bourbons would be expelled on the 1st of March.

All these signs failed to move the government, which believed that it could depend upon the army and the people. Appearances, no doubt, seemed to justify this notion up to a certain point; for the higher administrators of the law vied with each other in servility, while the rest, who were anxious for the success of the conspiracy, concealed everything which tended to create alarm. Indeed, the blind security of the ministers did not abandon them even after they had been made aware of the Emperor's return. On the contrary, they were almost glad, for they imagined that Buonaparte was about to throw himself into the wolf's mouth. M. de Blacas treated the enterprise as madness. The court turned it into ridicule, and the king said, smiling, to the ambassadors, "Reassure your sovereigns about all that is passing here; the repose of Europe will not be more troubled than that of France."

Orders were given to hunt down (*courir sus*) Napo-

leon; "an old legal expression, which shows," says Chateaubriand, "the temper of the men of that epoch." Soult, who in 1814 had exclaimed, in the presence of the magistrates of Toulouse, "We are threatened with the Bourbons! be it so. I would rather be a chief of brigands in the mountains of Cahors than submit to such princes as these!"* — this same marshal, having been informed of the arrival of his old master, issued an order of the day, in which, after describing the attempt of *that man* (he did not even condescend to name him) as the last act of madness, he congratulated the army on having at its head, to crush the Usurper, the Count d'Artois, *that model of French knighthood.* "Buonaparte," continued the Duke of Dalmatia, "mistakes us so far as to believe that we are capable of abandoning a legitimate and well-beloved sovereign, in order to share the fortunes of one who is nothing more than an adventurer. He believes this — the idiot!! — and his last act of folly aims at making us understand that he does so."

Marshal Ney went still further in this melancholy course. "Go," said the king to him; "I trust to your fidelity and devotion." Upon which the marshal promised that "he would bring back the Usurper in an iron cage."

All these tomfooleries, suggested by a factitious devotion, and hawked about by the courtiers, ended in a most humiliating result. "*The model of French knighthood,*" sent on to Lyons in order to collect the troops of the south, was obliged to quit that town followed by a single gendarme. The Duchesse d'Angoulême, en-

* De Beauchamp, t. iii. p. 98.

deavouring to harangue the old soldiers of Napoleon, provoked only raillery, as much because of her own manner, as because of her reference to the Bourbons. Finally, the brave Ney, now exasperated against Napoleon, by-and-by yielding to the lamentable contagion of example, presented, during several days, a spectacle of the most humiliating vacillation. At Bourg, speaking of Buonaparte, he had said, "*That man* cannot exist upon the same soil with me. If my soldiers refuse to do their duty, I shall challenge him to single combat. It is my destiny to kill him." * And at Lons-le-Saulnier, addressing himself to the prefect, he said, "What would you have me do? I cannot stop the waters of the sea with my hand." Next day Ney formed his troops in column in the square, and read to them a proclamation which the emissaries of Buonaparte had given him. The soldiers listened to it with enthusiasm. Immediately after that demonstration, which would have been intelligible perhaps if the presence of the Emperor had produced it, the Prince of Moskowa penned an order of the day, beginning thus: — "Soldiers, the cause of the Bourbons is lost for ever."

Vague rumours of these defections, and of the rapid progress of the Emperor, were circulated in Paris. Yet the government endeavoured to deceive the public by issuing proclamations, one after another, that Buonaparte and his band were dispersed among the mountains. "He entered France like an adventurer," it was said, "stealing along the frontier, keeping out of sight, and hastening to seek such reinforcements as disaffection might bring him." Less credulous and more ob-

* Beauchamp, t. iii. p. 234.

servant than he pretended to be, the king was one of the first to come to the conclusion that the enterprise had been conceived with coolness, arranged a long time before, and rested upon a pledge that the army would revolt. This idea left him small ground of hope. Nevertheless, in order to produce an effect, he presented himself on the 16th March to the parliament, appealed to the loyalty of all, and promised to die in the defence of the people. At this moment those about him repeated the declaration which, at the beginning of his reign, he had pronounced in the presence of the marshals: — "If ever he compel us to draw the sword, gouty as I am, I will march with you." Idle protestations! France was no longer his. She hastened to greet another protector. The Emperor arrived on the 20th, followed by a feeble escort; and the court, which had promised to die at its post, was too happy to reach, uninjured, the Belgian frontier.

Such, in few words, is the history of that prompt restoration, in which some historians can see nothing more than the organised revolt of an army rendered furious by being placed upon half-pay.

Napoleon, taught by what had just occurred, endeavoured to govern France upon a principle directly opposed to that of the Restoration. Instead of giving himself up to the just indignation which so many acts of baseness and treason, accomplished under his eyes, might have awakened, he forgot all, and showed himself magnanimous even towards those who had directed against him the poniard of the assassin. The Duke d'Angoulême, though taken with arms in his hands, was freely permitted to withdraw into exile.

Before quitting the island of Elba, Napoleon had

charged Murat to enter into an engagement at Vienna, in his name, that he would adhere to the treaty of Paris, and undertake, for the future, to occupy himself wholly with the internal prosperity of France. This proposal, with others, which he caused to be made by Marie-Louise, by his brother Joseph, by Prince Eugène, by Queen Hortense, and by the Grand Duchess of Baden, might have produced some effect if the Congress had been dissolved, as, in consequence of a report which reached him at the moment of his departure from Elba, he believed it to be. But being communicated to an assembly of sovereigns, united together by ancient animosities and alliances still recent, his propositions were, of necessity, rejected. Self-love was wounded, and divided interests became at once reconciled. The declaration of the 13th March, worded in strong terms, placed the Usurper under the ban of nations, and closed the door against all accommodation. It was, as it were, a barrier of steel erected between France and Europe. Castlereagh, whose business it was to fan the flame, expressed himself on the subject of Napoleon with extreme violence. "The return of *that man* to France," said he, "in defiance of all his engagements, is a positive insult to England—an insult which surpasses all that were offered by the revolutionary governments which preceded it, vile and degraded as these were."

The most clear-sighted politicians, among whom Fouché may be numbered, saw from that moment that all hope of maintaining the imperial dynasty was lost, and that in order to save the nation it would be necessary to abandon one man. Napoleon, on the other hand, flattered himself that the Allies would arrive at a different mode of thinking, when they became acquainted

with the rapidity with which he achieved his triumph, and with his specific intentions. But upon this point he completely deceived himself, if indeed we can admit that the Emperor looked in reality to a pacific solution of the difficulty. The opinion generally entertained among the Allies was, that Napoleon sought only to gain time, that he was not sincere, and that it would be impossible for him to maintain the Treaties of Paris, the unpopularity of which was one of the causes of the downfall of the Bourbons. Moreover, the sudden attack of Murat, who fell about this time upon Austria, whether it was made with the concurrence of the Emperor or not, put an end to all doubt. From that moment it was evident that war alone could cut the knot of the question.

Some historians have blamed Napoleon, as if he had deceived France, and paralysed the zeal of the nation by opening with the Allies negociations which could end in nothing. According to them, Napoleon on the very morning after his restoration ought to have declared the country in danger, and recalled to their standards all its discharged soldiers. We are not of this opinion. The Emperor was bound, in order to render himself acceptable to France, long since denuded of her resources, and exhausted with war, to make a public announcement of his pacific intentions, and to enter into a formal engagement to govern according to the wishes of his people. It would have been a great mistake to throw down the gauntlet in the first instance to Europe, in whose eyes his principal fault was his lust of conquest. No doubt war must be the consequence of his restoration, but he felt that to render the struggle effective and national, he must appear to submit to it with regret, and in some measure to be

dragged into it by the ill-will and systematic hostility of the Allied Sovereigns. No doubt these attempts at negociation, which postponed till the 9th of April the publication of the decree calling back all military men to the imperial standard, occasioned the loss of three precious weeks. Still at the end of these weeks the situation of France was such, that being convinced of the determined hostility of Europe, and that all chance of a pacific arrangement was taken away, there remained for her no alternative except to undertake again the hazards of a contest.

From that moment the Emperor exhibited extraordinary activity, devoting sixteen hours every day to the work of reorganising his troops, and collecting stores and military equipments. He directed Generals Haxo and Lery to fortify Paris and Lyons: the two points at which, in all probability, the fate of France would be decided. Other engineers received orders to arm the fortresses, and to retrench the more important positions upon the frontier. Fieldworks were constructed in the forest of Mormale, and in the five passes of the Vosges. Instructions were given for guarding the defiles of the Jura, and the whole frontier of the Alps. Works pushed on with great activity placed Soissons, Laon, La Fère, St. Quentin, Guise, Château-Thierry, Vitrey, and Langres, in a condition to offer a stout resistance, while the defences of Châlons, Rheims, and Dijon, were at the same time repaired, though there was little hope that the greater part of these fortifications could be completed in time.

The manufactories of small arms, abandoned at the restoration, recovered such a degree of activity that they produced about 4000 muskets per day. The

Garde Nationale Mobile were organised throughout the whole empire, and recruiting, as well voluntary as by conscription, went on with such effect that enormous masses of soldiers flocked in to the depôts of regiments. And, with a view to give fresh activity to this national movement, the Emperor conciliated the party of the revolution by calling Carnot and Fouché to the ministry, and by solemnly promising to conduct the government hereafter in accordance with constitutional liberty, and the freedom of the press and of the tribune.

The French army, which on the 1st of January, 1815, numbered 118,000 infantry and 23,000 cavalry, and which on the 1st of April showed a total of 223,972* men of all arms, was raised in sixty days to the amount of 363,500† men. And in September it would have reached 700,000. The Allies, however, taught by experience, exhibited quite as much of energy and decision as the Emperor. Scarcely had the latter made good his landing in the bay of St. Juan, ere they determined to support the King of France with all the means in their power. This agreement was ratified by the declaration of the 13th of March, in which the statesmen who signed the treaty of Paris pledged themselves to maintain that treaty, as well as all the measures subsequently taken to secure the maintenance of a general peace. Seeing the sovereigns thus firmly

* Such is the official statement in the documents of the French War Office; but out of the 223,972 men, not more than 155,000 were fit to take the field.

† Colonel Charras justly observes that the Emperor includes in this effective force the conscription of 1815, amounting to 75,500 men, though the order to call out that class was not issued till the beginning of June.

united and well disposed, Wellington wrote on the 12th of March to Lord Castlereagh, that he had not the slightest doubt of the ultimate failure of Buonaparte's attempt. "He must fall," said he, "under the cordially united efforts of the sovereigns of Europe." At the same time, from his experience in war and his imperturbable self-possession, he rendered the greatest services to the Allies in the perplexing circumstances amid which they were thrown. Indeed, he became in some measure the soul of the new coalition. His advice, always demanded and received with deference, gave a character to all the military arrangements of that coalition. It is said, indeed, in one of the letters of Lord Stewart, the English ambassador at Vienna—"This last news has caused the greatest consternation; and I think that the Duke of Wellington, who was at first disposed to treat the matter lightly (he fancied at first that it was a mere military insurrection, which the troops that were faithful to the king would put down), has gone to the opposite extreme. All urge him to set out at once for Belgium, to organise the force which is to act on that point. Prince Talleyrand appears to regard his departure as affording the only chance of safety. I am also of that opinion; though the military cabinets assembled here have arranged among them a system of combined operations. Frequent conferences are the order of the day. Knesebeck, Schwartzenberg, &c. &c. advise the King and the Emperor; and the Duke of Wellington is of the greatest possible use."

On the 25th a new treaty of alliance among the various sovereigns was concluded at Vienna. Four days afterwards the Duke set out for Brussels, where he arrived on the 5th of April. At that period the

Prussian army in the Low Countries was commanded by Kleist, for Blucher did not reach Liége till the 17th.* Kleist proposed, in case of being attacked, to retire behind Brussels; but Wellington objected to that arrangement. His first intention was to assume the offensive towards the end of May. He imagined that by that time the Allies would be able to carry into France 270,000 men, against the 180,000† which were supposed to be with the Emperor. But on the 13th, receiving more accurate information as to the state of affairs in France, he abandoned that idea, and besought the Government not to give effect to his original proposals.‡ He then proceeded to draw up a memorandum which should point out clearly the object and nature of the war:—"Since the power of Buonaparte depends entirely upon the army, it is necessary to destroy that army, and to take all our measures for the accomplishment of that purpose. First, by throwing into France, with as little delay as possible, the greatest number of men whom we can collect. Second, by executing that movement in such a manner that it shall be supported by the allied forces, which immediately follow. Third, and by so arranging that the troops appointed to invade France may have a safe retreat, in case of misfortune, upon the armies which support them."§

* The troops of England and of the Netherlands, stationed in the Low Countries, were at that time commanded by the Prince of Orange, who gladly placed himself under the orders of the Duke of Wellington.

† Letter to Lord Clancarty, 10th April, 1815.

‡ Letter to Lord Clancarty, 13th April.

§ See the Duke's published Despatches to Lord Stewart, on the 8th of May; to Prince Schwartzenberg, on the 9th; and to the

On the 16th of April Wellington informed the Prince Regent of Portugal that he had requested his own government to apply to the Regency at Lisbon for the immediate despatch of a corps of Portuguese troops, who should be employed in Belgium under their former chiefs, and side by side with their old companions in the Peninsula. But Wellington was destined to be thwarted to the last by the agents of the English policy. Canning, more of an orator than a man of action, was then ambassador at Lisbon. It had been arranged that 15,000 Portuguese should be added as a contingent to the Anglo-Prussian army. Marshal Beresford had collected for that purpose the *élite* of the old troops, with the baggage and artillery necessary for a campaign. The transports were ready, and the marshal informed the ambassador that he waited only for the order to embark. Instead of eagerly embracing the opportunity, Canning suggested that the affair ought to be managed according to the strict forms of diplomacy. The Souza faction took advantage of the delay to try their strength anew. They opposed the departure of the force, and England's illustrious statesman had the mortification to find himself beaten with the arms which he had furnished to his opponents.

Wellington did not receive intelligence of this unfortunate circumstance till the 13th of June, which was the more vexatious that, in spite of his reiterated demands, the English troops were far below the amount which they ought to have reached. "I have got an infamous army," he writes to Lord Stewart; "very weak and ill-equipped; and a very inexperienced staff.

Emperor of Austria, on the 5th June. These fully explain the plan of operations which he had formed.

In my opinion they are doing nothing in England. They have not raised a man ; they have not called out the Militia either in England or Ireland ; are unable to send me any thing ; and they have not sent a message to Parliament about the money. The war spirit has therefore evaporated, as I am informed." *

The renewal of war seemed to revive the hostility of the Parliamentary opposition ; for in the debates arising out of it, Wellington was charged with having signed a declaration which delivered over Buonaparte to the dagger of the assassin. In a letter to the Right Honble. W. Wellesley Pole, dated at Brussels, 5th of May, 1815, he expresses himself with just indignation upon this subject: — " If I have done any thing wrong or unbecoming my own character, or that of the station I fill, I ought to be prosecuted or at least censured for it, in consequence of a specified motion on the subject ; but it is not fair to give to the act of any individual a construction it will not fairly bear — a construction which no man breathing believes it was intended to bear, — and to charge him home with being an assassin day after day in speeches and never in form.

" I say, first, that the declaration has never been accurately translated ; and the meaning of the words *vindicte publique*, is not *public vengeance* but *public justice*. But even if the meaning was public vengeance, the declaration does not deliver Buonaparte over to the dagger of the assassin. When did the dagger of the assassin execute the public vengeance ?

" In regard to his being declared '*hors la loi*,' first, it must be recollected at what period and under what cir-

* Letter to Lord Stewart, 8th May.

cumstances he was so declared. The period was the 13th of March; and although we knew Buonaparte had landed and had made progress in France sufficient to create a contest there, we were not aware that he could be established without firing a shot. The object, then, of this part of the publication was to strengthen the hands of the King of France by the opinion of the Congress.

"Secondly, was he not *hors la loi?* and had he or not broken all the ties which connected him with the world? The only treaty by which he was connected with the world was that of Fontainebleau. That he broke," &c.

Annoyed, but not disheartened, by these contradictions (for he was accustomed to despise injuries and to struggle against misfortune), the Duke carried forward with great activity his preparations for war. That he might possess a sufficient number of points round which to manœuvre, he had given orders to place the southern fortresses of the Low Countries, which Joseph the Second had dismantled, in a position to resist a *coup de main*,—by clearing out the ditches, throwing up and completing embankments, giving a direction to the inundations, and constructing in haste a few field-works in advance of the fronts of attack. All the guns necessary for arming these improvised places were brought from London; and such was the activity of the corps of engineers, that the frontier was found to be, at the commencement of hostilities, in a respectable state of defence.

Ypres was restored and suitably armed; Ostend, Nieuport, Ath, and Tournay underwent some repair; Mons was surrounded with water and covered by a fort constructed upon Mont Panisel. Antwerp was made

strong in anticipation of the possible retreat of the English upon that point. The Lys alone was without works of defence, because little more than the wrecks of the old fortresses of Menin and Courtrai remained. Nevertheless, as it was by no means impossible that the French might push a corps upon Ghent, while they directed their principal attack by Mons and Charleroi, as had happened on other occasions, some solid field works well palisaded and frised were constructed in advance of that town; resting on one side upon the Lys and on the other upon the Scheldt. Lastly, in order to facilitate the movement of troops along both banks of the river, Audenard was fortified as strongly as circumstances would permit. "The object of these various works," says Colonel Carmichael Smith, "was not to stop the French from invading Belgium, but to detain them long enough to give the Allies time to concentrate upon their line of operations."

That object was not however attained, because Napoleon, contrary to Wellington's anticipation, advanced by Charleroi, which there had not been time to render safe against a *coup de main*.

Towards the end of May, Blucher and Wellington had assembled between Liége and Courtrai, 220,000 English, Prussians, Belgians, Hanoverians and Brunswickers. The Bavarians, the Wurtembergians, and the troops of Baden, collected in the Black Forest and the Palatinate. The Austrians were on the march to join them; and the Russians moved by Franconia and Saxony. A million of men were about to fall upon France. The plan of campaign of the Allies may thus be shortly described:—

Schwartzenberg was about to pass the Rhine in two

columns; the right at Mannheim and Germersheim; the left at Basle and Rhein-felden. The one was to move upon Chalons by Marne, the other by St. Diziers. The right column was to connect itself with the Russian army, which had orders to pass the Sarre, above the point where Schwartzenberg passed it; the Moselle between Thionville and Metz, the Meuse near to Verdun. The points of direction for the Russians were, Chalons-sur-Marne, and Rheims. Kleist's corps was to observe and attack the forts of the Meuse in the direction of Sedan. Finally, Wellington and Blucher were to regulate their movements according to the progress of the Russians and the Austrians, and to take the road towards Laon, debouching by Maubeuge and Auvergne. As to the Austro-Sardinians, they were instructed to march upon Lyons, to ascend for a while the course of the Loire, and to fall in upon the left of Schwartzenberg.

Three courses were open to the Emperor under these circumstances: first, he might negotiate, though that proceeding offered no chance of success after the treaty of the 25th of March, and above all, after the publication of that remarkable statement, in which the Allies pledged themselves not to interfere with the internal affairs of France, provided she should place herself under another chief. Second, he might remain upon the defensive, and accept the attack of the Allies near Paris and Lyons. But this would be to deliver over half of France to the enemy, to throw the populace into consternation, and discourage the troops. Third, he might advance against the Anglo-Prussians, and beat them before the other contingents could come up. But this was to precipitate the war, while as yet no army had been brought

together strong enough to maintain the contest with fair chances of success.

This latter inconvenience, however, appeared less serious than the others. At all events, the Emperor suffered himself to be carried away by one urgent consideration. "The plan of anticipating the Anglo-Prussians," said he, "was alone in conformity with the genius of the nation, and with the spirit and principles of the war in which he was engaged; and it would get rid of the fearful inconvenience which attached to the second project, viz., the abandonment of Flanders, Picardy, Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, Burgundy, Franche-Comté, and Dauphiné, without firing a shot."*

This plan offered besides the advantage, that it would stimulate the ardour of the French, who have little in common with the policy of Fabius; that it would take the Allies by surprise†; that it would carry the war into the enemy's country and bring about, in case of success, a rising in Belgium and in the Rhine Provinces, which Napoleon believed to be favourable to his cause, and indeed ready to declare for him.

To carry this plan into execution, Napoleon had at

* Mémoires de Napoléon, t. ix. p. 51.

† Napoleon imagined that by taking the initiative in the middle of June he would gain six weeks upon the Allies; but it is certain that the Allies had determined to invade France on the 1st of July — in which case, looking to the numerical force of his army, he would have gained little or nothing by remaining on the defensive. (See Thibaudeau, t. x. p. 469.) The Duke of Wellington's letter to his brother Henry, of the 2nd of June, refers also to this matter: — "Schwartzenberg's whole army," he says, "will not be assembled upon the Upper Rhine before the 16th, by which time I hope that we shall begin."

his disposal 128,088 men of all arms, and 344 pieces of cannon. The army of the Alps, under the Duke of Albufera, numbered at the same date 8814 troops of the line. The army of the Rhine, under General Rapp 19,031 men. The army of the East, under General La Marque, 8570 men. The corps of observation at Bifort, under Le Courbe, 4446 men. That at Marseilles, under Marshal Brune, 4081 men. That of the Eastern Pyrenees, under De Caen, 3945 men. That of the Gironde, under Clausel, 3933 men.

About the 15th of June, the extraordinary army consisted of from 140,000 to 150,000 Garde Nationale Mobile, of whom 13,500 were joined to Le Courbe, 11,700 to Brune, 20,300 to De Caen, and 20,300 to Clausel. Besides these, there were 45,000 old sailors and discharged soldiers, and from 5000 to 6000 gunners of the coast-guard, and an equal number of chasseurs of the Alps and of the Pyrenees. About one half of this force was without uniform, and a full third destitute of arms.*

The Emperor had a choice among three lines of operations. He might attack by the Meuse, and cut off the Prussians from their base; he might approach by Mons, and push back Wellington upon Antwerp; or he might advance by the Sambre upon the point of junction between the two armies. The two former lines were subject to this defect, that they rendered possible the concentration of the Prussians and the English: on this account the Emperor gave the preference to the third line.

It is impossible to admire too much the promptitude and sagacity of the resolutions which resulted from that

* History of the Campaign of 1814, by Colonel Charras.

choice. At the very moment when he was believed to be still in Paris, entirely occupied with *fêtes* and spectacles, he passed the frontier, and fell like a thunderbolt upon the enemy's cantonments.

Blucher's four corps, numbering in all about 117,000 men, were stationed at Charleroi, Namur, Dinant, and Liége. Those of Wellington, estimated at about 92,000 men, were cantoned from the Scheldt to the Nivelle. Hill, with the right wing, occupied the environs of Ath. The Prince of Orange, with the left, was at Braine-le-Comte, and Nivelle. An imposing mass of cavalry was stationed at Grammont, under the orders of Lord Uxbridge; and a reserve, of all arms, lay around Brussels, where the Duke had fixed his head-quarters.*

The allied generals have been blamed, not without reason, for dispersing their force in this manner, seeing that so early as the 6th of June, they had been informed of the concentration of French troops about Maubeuge. Alison and Von Damitz account for the circumstance by referring it to the duplicity of Fouché, who, after having promised Wellington that he would forewarn him, not only of the day of the invasion, but of the very plan of the Emperor, so arranged matters that the bearer of his message should be arrested upon the frontier. This story is repeated by the apocryphal author of the "Memoirs of Fouché," and by Sir Walter Scott, in "Paul's Letters to his Kinsfolk." But Lord

* Various writers give varied accounts of these facts; but the statements in the text may be received on the whole as pretty correct. Colonel Charras, a modern French author, who writes well upon the whole, estimates the Duke's force, inclusive of every thing, at 95,503 men. It was rather above than below this strength, if the garrisons of Antwerp, Ostend, and other remote places be included.

Ellesmere, who lived thirty years upon terms of intimacy with the Duke of Wellington, affirms that neither the Duke nor any of his officers ever trusted to information to be received from Fouché. There are those who attribute the tardy concentration of Blucher and Wellington to the circumstance that neither the one nor the other expected Napoleon to act on the offensive; and the Duke's correspondence undoubtedly shows that he considered a defensive policy on the part of Napoleon to be more favourable to him than its opposite. Still, he never put out of view the probability of an invasion of the Low Countries.* Hence, on the 30th of April, he explained to the Prince of Orange, to Lord Uxbridge, General Hill, and the Quartermaster-General, the movements of concentration which it would be necessary to make in the event of an attack, either between the Lys and the Scheldt, or between the Scheldt and the Sambre, or by both lines. On the 9th of May following, he wrote to the Duc de Berri — "I have reason to believe that the enemy's force, now assembled at Valenciennes and Maubeuge, is much greater than has been represented to your royal highness, and I should not be surprised if we were attacked." In like manner, on the 7th of June, he issued to the governors of the Belgian fortresses instructions beginning with these words: — "As soon as the enemy shall have entered the territories of the Low Countries, the under-named places ought to be put in a state of siege."

The troops were thus forewarned of what they would be expected to do in the event of an invasion; and it was thus that the orders issued on the evening of the

* See the Duke's memorandum, printed at the end of this volume.

15th came to be executed with so much promptitude and regularity.* Nevertheless, on the very day that the Sambre was crossed, Wellington wrote at length to the Emperor of Austria about the arrangements to be adopted when the French territory should be invaded; and this communication, in which no question is raised as to the probability of an attack upon the part of the enemy, as well as another letter written a few days previously, in which Wellington states his opinion that, in the face of the Anglo-Prussian army, Buonaparte would not venture to invade Belgium†, give at least some show of reasonableness to the opposite view of the case. At all events, it would appear from these documents that the English general was not without hopes of being able to anticipate the Emperor in the offensive.

Though the event disappointed this expectation, and though the invasion of Belgium by the Sambre contradicted the anticipations of the Allies, it is incorrect to say that the announcement of that fact, on the 15th, took Wellington by surprise, while he was attending a ball given by the Duchess of Richmond. Ever since the 9th of June the Duke had assumed an attitude of watchfulness; for at that date orders were issued to keep the divisions ready for marching, to assemble the

* It follows from all this that General Jomini is justified in saying (p. 151 of his Précis sur le Campagne of 1815), "If the allied generals were taken by surprise at the moment of the irruption, it must be acknowledged that they were, in the main, well prepared for that event — happen when it might."

† In a letter to Sir Henry Wellesley of the 12th of May, he says, "There has been a good deal of stir upon the frontier during the past week. But I am inclined to believe that Buonaparte will not venture to quit Paris."

troops by battalions near their cantonments every morning, and not to allow them to return at night to their quarters till it was ascertained that all was quiet.* He understood also, upon the 9th†, that Napoleon had arrived that day at Maubeuge — a piece of intelligence inaccurate no doubt‡, but scarcely of a nature to create any feelings of misplaced security. If, in spite of these warnings, the Duke maintained his positions, and exhibited no signs of alarm, it was, first, that he might not encourage the partisans of France, who were somewhat numerous in the city of Brussels; and next, because he was unwilling to run the risk of making a false movement. This latter determination had its origin in the high opinion which the English general entertained of the Emperor's abilities, and in his settled conviction that the real attack would not take place by the Sambre.§

The opinions are endless with regard to the hour when Wellington first received information of the commencement of hostilities. Von Damitz affirms that as early as four in the morning Blucher sent off an orderly with the intelligence to Brussels. Colonel Charras, misinterpreting a letter to the Duke of Feltre, written by

* Order of the 9th of June to the Prince of Orange's corps, signed by the chief of the staff, Constant de Rebecque.

† Letter to Colonel Hardinge of the 10th of June, 11 A.M.

‡ In point of fact, Napoleon did not quit Paris till the morning of the 12th.

§ See the Duke's memorandum on the battle of Waterloo appended to this volume. It appears also that Napoleon really did hesitate whom he should attack first, Wellington or Blucher; and that he determined at last to begin with the Prussians, because he imagined that Blucher, with his hussar-like habits, would be the most prompt to concentrate.

Wellington at ten in the evening of the 15th, assumes that the English general was aware at nine in the morning of the attack upon the Prussian posts at Thuin and Lobbès.* Others, erring in an opposite extreme, assert that the information first reached the duke at the ball. The truth respecting this important point has never been made quite clear; and yet the heavy blame which foreign historians cast upon the Duke of Wellington for his supposed inactivity during the day of the 15th, and his mistaken sense of security during the night of that day, rests entirely upon inaccurate statements with respect to time. The Wellington Correspondence, an article in the "Quarterly Review," written by Lord Ellesmere from notes supplied by the Duke, and, above all, a manuscript memoir, of which his son has been so obliging as to allow us to make use, enable us accurately to account for all the events of that memorable day.

The first intelligence of the attack of the French was communicated to Wellington at three o'clock in the afternoon, by the Prince of Orange, who came over from Braine-le-Comte to dine with the Duke. While they were sitting together, General Müffling, the Prussian Commissioner at the English head-quarters, came in, and informed the Duke that he had received a despatch announcing to him the attack of the advanced posts at Thuin and Lobbès. It was imme-

* The Duke's letter admits of no such interpretation. We subjoin the statement as it is given in French: — Je reçois les nouvelles que l'ennemi attaqua les postes Prussiennes ce matin à Thuin sur la Sambre, et *il paraissait* menacer Charleroi. Je n'ai rien reçu depuis neuf heures du matin de Charleroi." (I have received no tidings from Charleroi since nine o'clock.)

diately after the intelligence thus indirectly received, that Wellington sent his first orders "for the march of the whole army to its left." This was about five in the evening. "The whole moved on that evening, and in the night; each division, and portion of a division, separately, but unmolested, because they were protected on the march by the defensive works constructed at the different points referred to, and by their garrisons."*

The orders here referred to were addressed to the outlying divisions of the two advanced corps, commanded respectively by the Prince of Orange and by Lord Hill. The reserve, which was stationed in and about Brussels, was warned to be under arms at four next morning; and it is to this circumstance that the Duke refers, in a letter addressed to the Duke de Berri, at half-past nine P.M., on the 15th:—"J'a ordonné à nos troupes de se préparer à marcher à la pointe du jour, et j'ai prié votre Altesse Royale de faire concentrer les siennes sur Alost."

Partly, perhaps, because of this order, the purport of which is misunderstood, the English general has been blamed for not directing the whole of his troops to move, by forced marches, upon Quatre-Bras. But the Duke, convinced that Napoleon had nothing to gain from an attack by the Sambre, was unwilling, till he should be more correctly informed respecting the occurrences of the morning, to move the whole of his troops towards the left. Besides, a letter from the Hanoverian general, Dornberg, received between nine and ten o'clock, had a good deal perplexed him, because it announced that all was quiet in the direction of Mons. Imme-

* See Memorandum.

MAP
OF THE SCENE OF OPERATIONS
IN 1815.

diately afterwards, however, at ten o'clock, he directed the first, second, third, and fourth divisions, as well as the cavalry, to march, without delay, in the direction of Enghien and Nivelles.* It is self-evident, however,

* The first order issued, between four and five in the afternoon, runs thus:—"General Dornberg's brigade of cavalry and the Cumberland hussars to march this night upon Vilvorde, and to bivouac on the high ground near that town.

"The Earl of Uxbridge will be pleased to collect the cavalry this night at Ninhove, leaving the 2nd hussars looking out between the Scheldt and Lys.

"The 1st division of infantry to collect this night at Ath and adjacent, and to be in readiness to move at a moment's notice.

"The 3rd division to collect this night at Braine-le-Comte, and to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice.

"The 4th division to be collected this night at Grammont, with the exception of the troops beyond the Scheldt, which are to be moved to Audenarde.

"The 5th division, the 81st regiment, and the Hanoverian brigade of the 6th division, to be in readiness to march from Brussels at a moment's notice.

"The Duke of Brunswick's corps to collect this night on the high road between Brussels and Vilvorde.

"The Nassau troops to collect at daylight to-morrow morning on the Louvain road, and to be in readiness to move at a moment's notice.

"The Hanoverian brigade of the 5th division to collect this night at Hal, and to be in readiness at daylight to-morrow morning to move towards Brussels, and to halt on the high road between Alost and Assche for further orders.

"The Prince of Orange is requested to collect at Nivelles the 2nd and 3rd divisions of the army of the Low Countries, and, should that point have been attacked this day, to move the 3rd division upon Nivelle as soon as collected.

"This movement is not to take place till it is quite certain that the enemy's attack is upon the right of the Prussian army and the left of the British army.

"Lord Hill will be so good as to order Prince Frederic of Orange

that the interval between the issue of the first and second of these orders was required for assembling the troops and putting them in motion, so that the wise reserve of Wellington led to no inconvenient results, inasmuch as the concentration of the whole army took place with as much rapidity as if the order to march had been given to all its portions at five in the afternoon. As to Wellington's critics, they forget that the Anglo-Netherlands troops occupied positions much more widely extended than those of the Prussians; that intelligence of the attack by the French did not reach the Duke till past three in the afternoon, and that, notwithstanding all this, he was collected at Quatre-Bras, in force, twenty-four hours before Bulow succeeded in rejoining the three other corps of the Prussian army. Still, we cannot altogether acquit the English general

to occupy Audenarde with 500 men; and to collect the 1st division of the army of the Low Countries and the Indian brigade at Sotteghem, so as to be ready to march in the morning at daylight.

"The reserve artillery to be in readiness to move at daylight."

At ten the same night supplemental orders came out to the following effect:—

"The 3rd division of infantry to continue its movement from Braine-le-Comte upon Nivelles.

"The 1st division to move from Enghien upon Braine-le-Comte.

"The 2nd and 4th divisions of infantry to move from Ath and Grammont, also from Audenarde, and to continue their movements upon Enghien.

"The cavalry to continue its movement from Ninhove upon Enghien.

"The above movements to take place with as little delay as possible."

With such documents before them it is surprising that any military writers should have spoken of the Duke of Wellington as either careless or inactive.

of error in having detained his reserve nine hours too long in Brussels. For it commenced its march only at four A.M. on the 16th, whereas the courier who announced the capture of Charleroi by the French and their advance upon Quatre-Bras, reached Brussels at eleven the previous night. And the fault thus committed was unquestionably rendered more serious by his halt of these same corps at the debouches of the Forest of Soignes, where, as we shall see by-and-by, it remained four hours doing nothing.*

The opening of the campaign by Napoleon deserves to be regarded as one of the most remarkable strategic operations of his life. Nine corps of infantry and cavalry, which had been stationed between Lisle and Metz, were so admirably handled, and their marches so accurately calculated, that not only did they arrive before Charleroi simultaneously, but that their arrival occurred at the same moment with that of the Guard, of which the starting point was Paris.

These troops occupied, on the 14th, the following positions. The right, about 16,000 men, under the orders of General Gerard, was at Philippeville; the centre, about 60,000, under Napoleon, in the neigh-

* The Duke meets this charge, which M. Clausowitz brought against him, by saying (see Mem.), "He can have no proof of this fact, of which there is no evidence; and, in point of fact, the two armies were united about mid-day of the 16th of June, on the left of the position of the allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington." The latter statement can hardly be accepted, for it has been proved that the English troops, which first came up to the support of the Prince of Orange, did not arrive till three P.M.; and it can scarcely be doubted that the reserve, had it quitted Brussels at two A.M. and made no halt, might have reached Quatre-Bras before noon on the 16th.

bourhood of Beaumont; and the left, about 45,000, at Ham-sur-Eur and Solre-sur-Sambre.

Reille's corps, occupying Ham-sur-Eur, was to cross the Sambre at Marchiennes. That of Erlon, cantoned at Solre-sur-Sambre, was to follow in the same direction. The centre, or main body, with the cavalry reserves, under the orders of Grouchy, was to cross the Sambre at Charleroi. Finally, the right was to effect its passage at Chatelet.

The Emperor intended that these different operations should be completed by mid-day. But the troublesome obstacles which retarded the march of Gerard's and Vandamme's corps prevented the accomplishment of that object.* Had these not interfered, a part of the French army would have been in possession of the important strategic points of Sombreffe and Quatre-Bras, on the evening of the 15th.

Master of the first of these points, Napoleon could have hindered the Prussians coming from Namur, from forming a junction with the English; master of the second, he could have deprived the English coming from Brussels, of the means of forming a junction with the Prussians.

On the evening of the 15th, Grouchy received a verbal order to march upon Sombreffe, but it could not be executed, because in the first place his column was

* Napoleon and Gourgaud charge General Vandamme, who led the head of that column, with commencing his movement too late. But it appears from the statements of Colonel Jamin, of the staff corps, who was present on the occasion, that the circumstance ought to be attributed entirely to the negligence of the staff, who failed to convey to Vandamme in proper time the order of march. As to the delay on the part of Gerard's corps, which was directed in the first instance upon Charleroi, it was occasioned in a great measure by Napoleon's determination to send him by a bad cross-road to Chatelet.

stopped for some time at Gilly, by the bold countenance put on by a portion of Ziethen's corps*, and in the next place Gerard and Erlon were far in the rear. Besides, Napoleon was probably afraid that he might encounter the whole of the Prussian army at Fleurus.

Marshal Ney arrived from Paris on the evening of the same day, and according to common report, took at once the command of the left wing; of the troops composing which, as well as of their positions, he was entirely ignorant. It is said, also, that he was sent immediately with a portion of the 2nd corps in the direction of Gosselies, to keep the English in check, and hinder their junction with the Prussians. But these statements cannot be admitted in face of the testimony to the contrary borne by Hyèmes and Soult, the latter of whom discharged at that time the duties of chief of the staff.† The instructions issued at five in the afternoon, amounted only to this, that Ney should return to Gosselies, and there wait for further orders. Indeed, it is proved that it was not till eleven in the morning, that the Prince of Moskowa received in that town the first notice of the movements which he was expected to execute during the 16th. This was conveyed to him in a letter dictated by the Emperor to General Flahout,

* It is by no means improbable that Napoleon himself halted Grouchy. But that marshal, not having reached Sombreffe, the arrival of Ney, had it taken place on the evening of the 15th, would have been useless, because the occupation of that point, to be effectual, ought to have taken place simultaneously with the occupation of Sombreffe.

† In 1829 Soult stated to the son of Marshal Ney, and to Colonel Hyèmes, that the Emperor never thought of occupying Quatre-Bras on the evening of the 15th, and gave no orders about it; and added, "that the order to occupy Quatre-Bras was not issued till after the

between eight and nine o'clock in the morning, and of which the terms were abundantly vague.* They ran thus: "I shall attack the enemy if I fall in with them. Then, after the affair is over, I shall begin my march at three in the afternoon, perhaps this evening. My wish is, that immediately after I shall have set out you shall be ready. I desire you to make such dispositions as that as soon as the orders shall arrive, your eight divisions may march rapidly and without check upon Brussels.†

It was only at two o'clock that Soult sent formal orders to Marshal Ney, to carry the position of Quatre-Bras; and after vigorously pushing back the enemy, to connect himself again with the main body of the army. This order, addressed to Gosselies, could not reach the marshal till between three and four o'clock. Now, Ney, who has been accused of want of activity, had been already for two hours in presence of the enemy.‡ Im-

Emperor's breakfast on the 16th." — *Documents inédits publiés par le Duc d'Elchingen*, p. 30.

* This statement is confirmed by General Flahout in a letter, written on the 22th of November, 1829, to the Duke of Elchingen (*Documents, etc.*, p. 63). The letter, dictated by Napoleon, reached Gosselies about eleven o'clock, and arrived a *little* later at Frasnes, whither Ney had proceeded.

† A letter from Soult, forwarded about the same time, but which was later in reaching its destination, contained this passage, which some authors have interpreted as an order for attack: "Unite the corps of Reille and D'Erlon to that of Count Valmy, which is at this moment on the march to join you. With these troops you will be able to fight and destroy all the enemy's corps who may oppose you." It is worthy of remark, that not one word is said here about sending the troops towards Ligny.

‡ Report of the Prince of Orange to the King of the Netherlands, 17th June, 1815.

mediately after reading the Emperor's confidential letter, the marshal, without waiting for formal orders, had made his arrangements for attacking Quatre-Bras.* "About eleven or twelve o'clock," says Count Erlon, "the Prince of Moskowa sent me instructions at Gosselies, to get my corps under arms, and to move upon Frasnes and Quatre-Bras.† This corps had only two short leagues to march.

Ney, who, according to the testimony of his first aide-de-camp, calculated the enemy's force at 25,000 men, understood that he was to wait for Drouet. "One o'clock came," says this witness, "and still the first corps did not arrive. There were no tidings of it, yet it could not be very distant. The marshal therefore did not hesitate to begin the battle." ‡ His force amounted to 18,377 men, a portion of which, Jerome's division, commanded in fact by Guilleminot, was still in the rear.§ Napoleon explains matters very differently: "the marshal," he says, "received orders during the night of the 15th to move at daybreak next morning in advance of Quatre-Bras, and to occupy a good position upon the road to Brussels. Meanwhile the Emperor was to advance with the main body of the army towards Blucher,

* This letter, which arrived at eleven o'clock, said nothing about attacking. It merely directed him to establish his troops—in front and about the four roads—as if no resistance were to be expected.

† Letter of the 9th of February, 1829, to the Duke of Elchingen (*Documents, etc.*, p. 64).

‡ Narrative of Col. Hyèmes, first aide-de-camp to Ney.

§ According to the list published in the Memoirs of Napoleon, Ney had 43,756 men, of whom 7800 were cavalry. But there ought to be deducted from this amount 2000 men of the cavalry of the Guard, whom Ney, by Napoleon's orders, could not dispose of, 3925 infantry of Gerard's division, and 19,454 men of the first corps.

in order more completely to separate the two armies from each other. At ten in the morning he was to halt and form in front of the Prussians, who did not expect to be attacked that day."

"At this time the Emperor received intelligence that Ney had halted in consequence of various reports which led him to believe that the Anglo-Belgians had effected their junction with the Prussians. Afraid of being turned, the Prince of Moskowa demanded fresh instructions from the Emperor*, who on his part blamed him for having lost eight hours. The Emperor repeated the order to push forward and advance on Quatre-Bras, and directed him as soon as he should have taken up a position there, to detach a column of 8000 infantry with Lefebvre-Desnouette's division of cavalry and twenty-eight guns by the Quatre-Bras road towards Namur. This column was to quit the road at the village of Marbais, in order to attack the height of Bry, in rear of the enemy's army. After the departure of that detachment, there still remained to Ney in the position of Quatre-Bras 32,000 men, and 80 pieces of cannon. "The marshal," adds Napoleon, "received this order at half-past eleven, and according to the Emperor's calculation, he ought to have been in position at noon, and two hours afterwards the detached corps ought to have been at Marbais."

The facts cited above, which we shall render more complete at the end of this chapter afford proof that Napoleon's version of these transactions, accepted by

* Memoirs of Napoleon. It is not known in what terms this demand was made. It must have arrived at head-quarters before eight o'clock in the morning.

Gourgaud, is incorrect in more than one particular. The letter brought at eleven o'clock by General Flahout, is, in truth, much less detailed, and less explicit throughout than Napoleon pretends. On the other hand, there exists no trace of a prior order giving directions to the marshal to move in advance of Quatre-Bras.* The Prince of Moskowa, on arriving at Gosselies at two in the morning of the 16th, was profoundly ignorant what movements he ought to execute. He needed only to read attentively the letter dictated to General Flahout, between eight and nine in the morning, in order to be satisfied on that head. Besides, the Emperor himself appears to confirm this assumption by declaring that in the morning of the 16th the Prince of Moskowa sent to require from him new instructions, which he very certainly would not have done if, as some critics suppose, he had received over night distinct orders to occupy Quatre-Bras.†

* De Vaulabelle quotes, as the only proof of the existence of a verbal order of that kind, the following extract from a letter, written in the evening of the 15th, by Marshal Soult, which letter appeared in the "Moniteur" of the 18th,—"The Emperor has given the command of the left to the Prince of Moskowa, who has established his head-quarters this evening at Quatre-Bras, upon the road to Brussels." This extract cannot, in our opinion, be weighed against the inferences to which the facts set forth in the text naturally lead, and which are confirmed by the distinct statement of the Duke of Dalmatia, himself a disinterested witness, and by the following passage from General Reille's historical notice of the movements of the second corps: "In the morning of the 16th, about seven o'clock, I went to see Marshal Ney, who had passed the night in Gosselies, and to ask for his orders. The marshal told me that he was waiting for the Emperor, to whom he had sent a report of his position."

† Statement of Colonel Hyèmes confirmed by Reille. (See *Documents, etc.*)

Having cleared up this point, we shall return to the Prussian army, which, at the moment when the storm was about to break upon it, was disseminated between Liege and Charleroi.

In the evening of the 14th Blucher had been informed of the movement which was expected to take place on the morrow.* Orders were immediately issued from head-quarters to hasten the concentration of the army in rear of Fleurus.

That point was a great deal too near to the enemy. If Napoleon in the morning of the 16th had taken the initiative with promptitude and vigour,—if he had shown himself equal to what he was in Italy, at Ulm, at Ratisbon, at Jena, at Champ-Aubert, and at Montereil,—all the Prussian corps must have been beaten in detail. But the Emperor was so fully impressed with the conviction that Blucher would concentrate towards Namur † that he paid no attention to the intelligence conveyed to him by Grouchy at six in the morning that the Prussians were debouching in considerable force by Sombreffe and St. Amand.‡ The orders to occupy

* Some writers pretend that Blucher was informed of the march of the French only in the course of the 15th by Lieutenant-General Bourmont, who at six in the morning of that day quitted his post with many officers attached to his personal staff. This is a mistake. The first intelligence reached him from Ziethen on the 14th, between nine and ten at night.

† This is proved by the letter dictated to Flahout between eight and nine in the morning.

‡ Observations upon the campaign of 1815, by Grouchy. General Lamarque, in an historical essay upon the One Hundred Days, published with other documents in 1836, affirms that Napoleon on arriving upon the plateau of Fleurus, would not believe that he was in the presence of the enemy, in spite of assurances to the contrary given to him by Vandamme and other officers.

Sombreffe were not issued till between eight and nine o'clock; at the same time with those intended for Marshal Ney.

While the Emperor was thus losing time which could not be recovered, Blucher was effecting the concentration of his troops with remarkable celerity. By two in the morning of the 16th, he had collected three out of his four corps d'armée, between Bry and Tongrinne.

Napoleon arrived before Fleurus at eleven o'clock the same day: about noon he reconnoitred the position, and an hour afterwards returned to the camp, in order to make his dispositions for the attack. This reconnoissance, however, appears to have been somewhat negligently made, for it gave the Emperor a very incorrect idea of Blucher's strength. It is stated, indeed, in a letter to Marshal Ney, written by the major-general of the French army at Fleurus, two hours after dinner, "The Emperor commands me to inform you, M. le Maréchal, that the enemy has collected *a body of troops*, between Bry and Sombreffe; and that at half-past two, Marshal Grouchy, with the 3rd and 4th corps, will fall upon him." Napoleon (the circumstance is so extraordinary as well-nigh to appear incredible) had not discovered that *the body of troops* consisted of an army of 80,000 men, all ready for battle.*

* After the battle, Soult committed an exaggeration of a directly opposite nature. At half-past nine in the evening of the 10th he wrote to Joseph, "The Emperor desires me to report to you a complete victory obtained over the English and Prussian armies, united under the orders of the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blucher." (See Joseph's correspondence).

Three courses of action were now open to the Emperor: —

1. He might turn the right of the Prussians with Ney's two corps, leaving that of Kellermann at Frasnes to cover the Charleroi road, which was the line of retreat for the French army.

2. He might direct upon Ligny D'Erlon's corps, leaving those of Reille and Kellermann on the defensive, towards Frasnes and Quatre-Bras; so as to observe the enemy, and cover the line of retreat.

3. He might desire Ney to fall fiercely upon the Anglo-Netherlanders, push them back towards Brussels, then double round upon Bry, and take the Prussians in reverse.

The first of these plans would have favoured the junction of the two armies; the third would have exposed the Emperor to the risk of not receiving support in time, and thus disabled him from obtaining more than an incomplete victory. The second offered solid advantages; and would, without doubt, have been adopted by the French leader, had he been aware of the actual state of the enemy's forces. In proof of the latter assumption we may quote the fact, that when, between three and four o'clock, he had ascertained the real numbers of the Prussians, he sent peremptory orders, but too late, to recall the first corps.

The French and Prussian armies were, at this moment, nearly of equal strength; numbering each about 80,000 men.* The latter was deployed between St. Amand

* Blucher, in his report, calculated his own strength at 80,000 men; that of the enemy at 130,000. This is a mistake. He imagined that he had the whole of the French army before him.

Lithographie

BLUCHER

and Sombreffe, facing the Sambre. Its front, which extended rather more than a league in length, was covered by a ravine; through which ran, in a winding course, the little stream of the Ligny.

General Jomini pronounces this position to be "detestable," and in truth it was subject to these grave disadvantages, that its right rested upon nothing, and its front was so encumbered with obstacles, that no opportunity of acting was afforded to the numerous and excellent Prussian cavalry. The Prussian General Müffling finds great fault with the occupation of St. Amand, and we are assured that the Duke of Wellington expressed himself in similar terms to Marshal Blucher. [Indeed, the Duke did more. After surveying the entire position, and observing that it exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery, not the line of battle only, but the reserves also—he remarked to Prince Blucher, "Every man knows his own troops best; but if I were to place my men where you have placed yours, I should expect to be beaten." Blucher's answer was, "My men like to see the enemy," to which the Duke made no reply; but when riding back to Quatre-Bras he observed to the officers about him, "Well, if I am not very much mistaken, the Prussians will get an

The acounts given by various writers of the strength of the French army differ very widely. According to Gourgaud, Napoleon had only 59,310 engaged, with 204 guns,—11,770 men and 30 guns of the reserve having taken no part in the battle. Vaudoncourt puts his force at 42,500 infantry, 14,830 cavalry, and 204 guns; the author of the Victories and Conquests at 71,000 men, of which 60,000 were engaged. Wagner and the German authors say that he had 74,000; Berthier estimates his force at 94,000 men and 242 guns. Colonel Charras states it at 68,000 infantry, 13,000 cavalry, and 210 guns; exclusive of his reserve at Lobau.

awful thrashing to day;" and, as we shall have occasion presently to show, the event fully justified the prediction.]

The strategic point of attack upon the position of Ligny was evidently the right. By making a great effort in that direction, and seeking only to keep the centre and left in check, it would not be difficult to separate Blucher's army from that of Wellington, and then to act with concentrated masses against either of them separately.* Napoleon wished to accomplish the same object by a combined attack upon the right and the centre. The thing was certainly possible, but the dispositions made for achieving it were by no means judicious. The attack on the enemy's right ought to have been delivered in great force; he employed upon it only Girard's division, about 4297 men, with 8 guns, and Vandamme's corps of 19,160 men, of whom 1017 were cavalry, and with 38 guns; Gerard with the fourth corps, numbering 15,995 men, of whom 1628 were cavalry, and 38 guns, formed the centre; and Pajol's and Excelman's cavalry held the French right. The whole of the Guards, with Milhaud's cuirassiers, were in second line in rear of Fleurus.

The battle began about half-past two in the afternoon, with a furious attack by Vandamme upon St. Amand. After a desperate struggle, the village was carried at the point of the bayonet; but almost immediately afterwards it was recovered by the Prussians. The attack on the centre by General Gerard commenced

* Such also is the opinion of General Müffling. (*Histoire de Campagne, &c.*)

about a quarter of an hour later, and at half-past eleven the fighting became general along the whole line.* It was at this time that Napoleon, perceiving that the resistance would be more obstinate than he had anticipated, sent to call up Count D'Erlon, who had not yet got beyond Frasnes. A second time Vandamme, by a vigorous rush, made himself master of St. Amand, though at the expense of the life of the gallant Girard. But Blucher immediately directed against it a portion of his reserve, and the affair ended by leaving the Prussians in possession of the village.

Still more desperate was the fighting in front of Ligny, on the centre of the Prussian position. General Gerard, with desperate courage, repeatedly carried that village, but was unable to maintain it. Here, as well as on the right, the Prussian troops fought with an obstinacy, which can be accounted for only by referring it to the positive hatred which they entertained towards the French army. "Man engaged man," says an eye-witness, "with all the animosity of personal rancour. It appeared as if each had encountered in the individual who confronted him his mortal enemy."†

At half-past five, the Emperor was preparing to strike a decisive blow at Ligny, when Vandamme sent to inform him that a body of troops, apparently about

* General Rogniat justly observes that, by attacking the Prussians in parallel order upon all these points at once, Napoleon lost the opportunity of gaining a decisive victory; for success itself could only drive Blucher back upon Wellington, which, at all hazards, he ought to have avoided doing. General Vaudoncourt vainly endeavours to prove that the battle of Ligny became a combat of parallel lines only because part of the French left failed to co-operate in time.

† Journal Militaire Autrichien.

30,000, were beginning to show themselves on the left of the French army.* "That corps," says Napoleon, "was supposed at first, to be the column which had been detached to the left; but besides that it was much stronger, it approached by a different road." Gerard's division hesitating, under the persuasion that it was an enemy's column, Napoleon suspended the movement of the Guard, and sent a general officer to reconnoitre it closely.† He thus ascertained, at half-past six, that he had to do, not with the English, but with D'Erlon's corps, which was beginning to support the attack on St. Amand.‡

"The Emperor," writes Gourgaud, "could not account for such a movement," and yet it has been

* Up to this moment the French had brought into action only 36,000 or 37,000 men; the Prussians, 46,000 or 47,000. Each had, therefore, about 41,000 in reserve. Such, at least, are Colonel Charras's calculations.

† Napoleon says that General Dejean was employed on this service; but the general, in a letter to the Duc d'Elchingen, denies that it was he.

‡ Such is the account given by Napoleon and Jomini. General Vaudoncourt asserts, on the other hand, that Napoleon calculated on the arrival of the first corps, and was surprised only when he learned that, with the exception of Durette's division and a detachment of Jacquinot's cavalry, it had gone to the right-about. This statement is corroborated by many important proofs, and especially by the fact that Napoleon gave no instructions to D'Erlon while he was in sight, a circumstance which clearly would not have occurred had the sudden appearance of that corps been, as Gourgaud says, unexpected — *un événement inexplicable*. Jomini asserts that Gerard took the road to St. Amand by mistake; but the Emperor imputes to him no such error, and Soult, in his letter of the 17th of June to Ney, says distinctly, that if Count D'Erlon had executed the movement on St. Amand which the Emperor directed, the Prussian army would have been put to the rout.

proved, that he himself had given directions for it. The only point in question really is, whether Drouet ought to have operated by Bry or St. Amand. General Jomini and the Duc d'Elchingen pronounce in favour of the former assumption; but the order written by Soult at a quarter-past eleven o'clock is by no means specific, inasmuch as it directs the marshal to move upon the heights of Bry and St. Amand. Be this, however, as it may, the arrival of the first corps*, or rather the blunder of those who mistook it for an enemy's column, was the cause of the disastrous delay which occurred in the attack of the village of Ligny.

There is something in all this which defies explanation. We naturally ask why, at such a critical moment, Napoleon should have left the first corps without orders, instead of directing it upon Bry. "That act of forgetfulness," says General Jomini, "whatever may be alleged to the contrary, was a palpable error, and prevented the battle from producing all the results which it ought to have done."

It was near seven o'clock when Napoleon drew in the greater part of the Guard from before St. Amand, to direct it, with Milhaud's cuirassiers, numbering 3194 sabres, upon Ligny.† Blucher mistook that movement for the commencement of a retreat. He filed off

* The movements of that column seem to be inexplicable. It passed between Ney and Marshal Blucher, or rather between Quatre-Bras and Charleroi.—*Memoirs of Napoleon.*

† The Guard numbered 18,652 men, of whom 1718 were cavalry, and ninety guns. By moving the greater part of this force on St. Amand, Napoleon expected that he would lead Blucher to weaken his centre; and, indeed, forty battalions, with sixty squadrons of Prussians, were massed on the right when Ligny was attacked.

with all his disposable troops towards the right, in order to pursue the French, who, meanwhile, massed their force against his centre, which had thus been weakened. But he no sooner discovered his mistake, than he turned back to the point threatened, with a handful of cavalry, as many as he could assemble on the moment. Too few in number to resist the French cuirassiers, that weak corps was overthrown; and Blucher, unhorsed in the fight, lay, happily unrecognised, on the field of battle till his aide-de-camp was able to remount him on a charger taken from one of the dragoons.

Meanwhile the Guard carried the village, and broke through the enemy's centre. Had this movement been made a few hours earlier, the victory would have been complete; indeed, as it was, the pursuit, if vigorously followed up, must have produced immense results. But it was stopped by the approach of night, by the coming in of the enemy's left, still untouched, from Sombreffe; and by the bold countenance put on by the wrecks of Ziethen and Pirch's corps between Bry and Sombreffe. It must be acknowledged, also, that Napoleon did not exhibit after the victory of Ligny the ardour which he had been accustomed to display under similar circumstances elsewhere.*

The main object of the battle of Ligny was, to prevent the junction of the two armies. That object was not attained, because of the wrong direction given to the attacks. Its secondary purpose was, to drive the Prussian army out of the field. And that failed in like

* General Jomini observes, however, that the Prussian troops, which had their right at Bry and their left at Sombreffe, were in good order, and strong enough to stop any rash pursuit.

manner, because the battle was begun too late. To attain so decisive a result, the attack ought to have been made between seven and eight in the morning, when, as yet, the position of Ligny was held by Ziethen's corps only, and three divisions of that of Pirch.*

We shall see, by-and-by, how D'Erlon's corps was recalled by Ney at a moment when it was about to render the most important services to the Emperor.† No doubt the Prussian army would have found itself in a very critical position if that corps, the strength of which amounted to 20,000 men, and forty-six guns, had marched upon Bry as soon as it made its appearance. But it was left without instructions, and without a guide. Durutte's division, which alone Count d'Erlon kept in front of St. Amand, took no part in the action. It remained all night upon the flank of the columns in retreat. Thus, in the fatal campaign of 1815, every incident that befel went counter to the French army. It was evident that fortune had deserted it.‡

Napoleon committed another mistake in not bringing

* The fourth division of that corps, as well as Thielman's corps, did not come up until towards four o'clock.

† Some historians pretend that D'Erlon ought to have disobeyed Ney's orders. Had he done so, he would have doubtless well served the Emperor. But who shall venture to establish the principle, that the commandant of a detached corps is to judge of the circumstances under which he ought to obey or disobey his chief? Besides, D'Erlon was probably influenced by the extraordinary fact that, on arriving at the field of battle, he received no instructions from the Emperor.

‡ According to Napoleon, the French lost 6950 men. The historian of the "Victories and Conquests," puts their loss at 7000 or 8000; Charras, at 11,000. According to the former of these authors, the Prussian loss amounted to 20,000 men killed, wounded, and missing; according to the latter, to 18,000, with twenty-five or thirty guns.

into play Lobau's corps, which arrived at Fleurus at half-past six, the very time when the decisive blow was about to be struck at Ligny. This corps, moved in support of the left, would have overwhelmed the Prussian right, and cut off Blucher from the road to Nivelle, as well as from the highways which lead to Wavre.

We have left Marshal Ney all this while just as he had given orders to attack the Prince of Orange.* It has been asserted that the latter had then in position 30,000 men, whereas, as in the morning, he could have brought into action only 10,000. This is a mistake. When Ney began the battle at two o'clock, the Prince of Orange had but nine battalions, or 7312 men, with sixteen pieces of artillery. It was not till between three and four o'clock that there came up General Van Merlen's brigade of cavalry, 1112 horsemen, and the fifth English division under Picton, numbering 7282 combatants. The junction of these troops raised the number of guns to twenty-nine or thirty; and the total amount of the force engaged, to about 16,000 men. The Brunswick contingent, consisting of eight battalions, five squadrons, and two batteries — in all, 6658 men,— and that of Nassau, composed of three battalions, 2900 men, did not enter into line till after the check received by Van Merlen's brigade, of which we shall presently have occasion to speak.†

* Between one and two o'clock, according to Dutch authors; at two o'clock, according to the Prince of Orange and General Reille; at three, according to Napoleon.

† Jomini states the Prince of Orange's force at 30,000 men. According to Napoleon he had, between three and six o'clock, 25,200 infantry, 1500 cavalry, and twelve guns. Between six and nine o'clock, 37,500 infantry, 1500 cavalry, and the same number of guns. According to Gourgaud, the allied troops at the end of the battle

When he was preparing to make his attack, the Prince of Moskowa had under his orders two divisions, those of Bachelu and Foy, numbering 8991 men, 1865 horses, and twenty-two guns. He had, besides, 2000 horse, and the battery of the division of Lefebvre-Desnouettes. Napoleon had charged him not to make use of these. Encouraged by the near approach of Jerome's division, and believing that he was followed by Count d'Erlon's troops, the marshal made his dispositions accordingly.*

After an obstinate combat, which did honour to the Netherlands troops, the second division, under the Prince of Orange, was overpowered. At this moment, Van Merlen's brigade of cavalry arrived from Nivelle, and debouched upon the position almost simultaneously with Picton's English division, which had set out from Brussels at two in the morning. These reinforcements determined the Prince of Orange to assume the offensive. But being attacked by a superior number of veteran soldiers, he was forced a second time to retire.

It was now four o'clock. The Duke of Wellington, who had quitted Quatre-Bras between ten and eleven o'clock in the morning, to confer with Blucher at

amounted to 50,000 men. The same authorities give to Ney only 22,840 men; Van Damitz gives him 24,700, and forty-four guns; Clausewitz gives him 23,000 men, and forty-eight guns, Napoleon 22,000, and Plothe 20,000 or 30,000. All these calculations are exaggerated. Ney had only from 18,500 to 19,000 men disposable for the battle. As to the Prince of Orange, it is certain that, at the beginning, he could oppose to this force only nine battalions and sixteen guns (Van Lobensels).

* Jerome's division, commanded by Guilleminot, about 7819 men, without artillery, did not reach the field of battle till towards three o'clock.

Sombreffe, returned at this juncture and assumed the direction of the battle.* The Netherlands troops then

* According to an eye-witness quoted by Lobensels, Wellington arrived between ten and eleven o'clock. According to Siborne, between eleven and twelve o'clock. We shall see that it was earlier, because the Duke in his manuscript note states, that he quitted Brussels at daybreak, in order to proceed directly to Quatre-Bras. His first business was to inspect the troops of the Prince of Orange, whom he complimented on the excellent dispositions which he had made. De Vaulabelle states that he said to the Prince, "If the enemy have more than one division, we shall not be able to hold our own"; and by-and-by, observing that an entire corps was before him, added, "There is a marshal in our front; if he attack, we are lost." All these statements, however, must be received with caution. We believe that the Duke, before going away, merely advised the Netherlands troops to remain firm till reinforcements should arrive. As to the Prince's dispositions, it is just to observe that they were made in a great measure by Lieutenant-General Perponcher. That officer having taken up the position of Quatre-Bras, in consequence of instructions conveyed to him, in the afternoon of the 15th, by the quartermaster-general of the Netherlands army, received orders from the Prince of Orange and the Duke of Wellington, between twelve and one at night, to march from Quatre-Bras upon Nivelle. He perceived that the Duke had given that order in ignorance of the exact situation of the army. He comprehended the risk that would be run, if the enemy, finding the Brussels and Namur roads open, should push on and interpose between the two armies. He therefore took the responsibility upon himself, and stood fast in the position of Quatre-Bras. (General Gneisenau's Letter to the King of Prussia, 12th June, 1817). If Perponcher had acted differently, other results would have attended the affair of the 16th, for it was his presence at Quatre-Bras, during the night of the 15th, and the good countenance which he maintained next morning, which deceived Marshal Ney, and favoured the concentration of the English army. The Prince of Orange, detained at Brussels by the Duke of Wellington, did not return to his head-quarters at Braine-le-Comte till two in the morning. He approved the dispositions which had been made by General Perponcher, and took up more

retired into the second line, and were replaced in the first line by the battalions of the Nassau contingent, and by the Duke of Brunswick's infantry, just arrived from Brussels.*

Foy's division, supported by one regiment of chasseurs à cheval, and another of lancers, fell vigorously upon this newly-arrived corps, and compelled it to retreat. The lancers broke one of Picton's squares, but a second drove them away. At this moment (five o'clock) Jerome's division arrived to the support of Foy. All the chances were in favour of the French. But Alten's division behaved so gallantly, that it stopped Jerome's progress, and compelled Foy's division to descend again into the valley of Gemoncourt. Just then (it was now six o'clock) Ney received a despatch dated from Fleurus, at a quarter-past three. He immediately caused Kellermann, with one of the brigades of the division which had halted at Frasnes, to advance, not venturing as yet to dispose of the other brigade, nor of Kellermann's† second division, nor of the division of Lefebvre-Desnouettes. The orders given to Keller-

ground for the defence of Quatre-Bras. It is very probable, however, that the Duke, better informed by the letters which he received during the evening, had instructed the Prince of Orange how to act.

* Napoleon says that the infantry in question quitted Brussels on the 16th, at ten in the morning. Gourgaud, without particularising the hour, says only that it was put in motion during the morning. These assumptions must be correct, because it was about ten at night of the 15th, when Wellington directed the Brunswick contingent, which was established between Malines and Brussels, to concentrate between the latter town and Vilvorde. Now, if it set out at ten in the morning, the contingent would, in point of fact, arrive at Quatre-Bras about half-past four.

† Kellermann had in all 3360 sabres and 12 guns under his orders.

mann were to pierce the English infantry, an impossible task for 800 cuirassiers to accomplish. Nevertheless he sabred the square of the 69th in Halket's division, as well as the 33rd regiment, and two battalions of the Brunswick contingent, and penetrated with the fugitives as far as Quatre-Bras.* Wellington's centre was more or less thrown into disorder by this bold stroke. But the lancers and chasseurs, renewing their attack at this moment upon Picton's division, were repulsed. And Kellermann received at Quatre-Bras such a murderous fire upon his broken squadrons, that he was compelled to face about, and to uncover, in so doing, Foy's division which was coming up to support him. The gallant Kellermann, dismounted and wounded, escaped from the enemy only by laying hold of the manes of two troop horses. Seven o'clock came, and with it arrived on the field Cooke's division, the English Guards, with a battery, and the two remaining battalions of the corps of Brunswickers. This reinforcement rendered success on the part of Ney impossible. The marshal; however, was still hesitating whether to retire or not, when intelligence reached him that he must not any longer rely upon the arrival of D'Erlon's corps. It was then, that full of rage, he pronounced the memorable words: "Do you see these bullets? I wish they were all in my belly." †

[In the course of this battle the Duke was more than

[* The 69th was broken before it could form, and one of its standards lost. The Brunswick contingent suffered also. And the 42nd Highlanders, charged in a rye field, had two companies cut off while in the act of forming square. M. Brialmont is, however, mistaken in regard to the 33rd regiment.]

† Mémoires de Fleury de Chaboulon.

once exposed to the most imminent risk of being killed or taken. He was everywhere in the thick of the fight, bringing up supports or striving to rally the fugitives. When the Brunswick infantry gave way, a regiment of hussars of the same contingent moved up to cover them, and the Duke of Wellington went with it. But being composed of young troops, it got into confusion under a hot and very murderous musketry fire. The Duke, unable to stop the tide, was carried away with it. And the French lancers, charging at the moment, he had nothing for it but to trust to the speed of his horse. He arrived, hotly pursued, at the edge of a ditch, within which the 92nd Highlanders were lying, and the points of their bayonets bristled over the edge. He called out to them as he approached, "Lie down, men," and the order was obeyed; whereupon he leaped his horse across the ditch, and over the bayonets, and immediately pulled up with a smile upon his countenance. But all this was not effected till after a French officer, named Burgoyne, had made a dash at the Duke himself, in which a musket ball from one of the 92nd, passing through both his ankles, stopped him. It may not be out of place to add that M. Burgoyne lay for some weeks in the same house with Lieut. Winchester, of the 92nd, who was also wounded, and that these two brave men became in consequence personal friends; Mr. Winchester subsequently passing some time as a guest in the family of M. Burgoyne, at Paris.]

Wellington did his best to follow the enemy sharply. But Roussel's division covered the retreat so effectually, that the French army succeeded in regaining the position which it had occupied in the morning. It was nine o'clock before Ney quitted the ground. At that

time the Anglo-Netherlands army amounted to about 50,000 men, of whom, however, not more than 37,000 had been engaged. It was a well-fought field, of which the results long hung in the balance. The Prince of Orange, as we have seen, remained alone, up to four o'clock, in the presence of a force more than double the strength of his own. The English cavalry and artillery did not come up till six in the evening. One portion of the troops which entered thus piecemeal into the battle, had made a forced march of eight or nine leagues. Maitland's brigade of guards maintained an obstinate combat, after marching fifteen consecutive hours without food or water. Meanwhile other corps had halted unnecessarily some leagues from the battle: Picton's division, with the Brunswick and Nassau contingents at Waterloo, which they reached at eight in the morning, and did not quit till noon; Chassé's division, and Collaert's two brigades at Nivelle and Arquennes, between twelve and one o'clock, to rest there; and finally Optima's brigade and Alten's division at Arquennes, where it was obliged to wait for further orders.

There can be no doubt now, that had the Duke moved the whole of his troops at once upon Quatre-Bras, he would have done well, because the Prince of Orange, left to himself, ran great risk of being destroyed for want of support. But to affix its proper value to this judgment, it is necessary to bear in mind, that when he quitted Brussels at daybreak on the 16th, the Duke knew no more than that Charleroi had fallen, and that the French were advanced as far as Quatre-Bras. By directing the whole of his force on that point, he might therefore run the risk of having his divisions destroyed in detail; and this it was which probably in-

duced him to halt them in rear of Quatre-Bras, till he should be able to satisfy himself exactly how affairs really stood. He reached the Prince of Orange's position between nine and ten o'clock; and immediately afterwards sent orders for the troops which had halted at the debouches of the forest of Soignes, to move upon Quatre-Bras. There is surely nothing in such conduct to justify the terms of censure with which it has been criticised. It is surely just, in every instance, to treat with contempt opinions formed after the event, and delivered under the influence of judgments which personal or national prejudices have obscured.

The same measure of indulgence we are bound to claim for Ney, who, however, committed two grave errors: first, in failing to reconnoitre the enemy's position closely on the morning of the 16th; and next, in employing 800 cuirassiers only at the critical moment of the battle, instead of throwing upon the enemy's centre the whole of Kellermann's corps, as well as the division of Lefebvre-Desnouettes, which he kept in reserve.

But the circumstance which, more than all others, proved fatal to the Prince of Moskowa, was the slow and hesitating march of D'Erlon's corps, which ought to have supported him. The following facts explain or account for that extraordinary movement.

Between seven and eight o'clock, when Ney was becoming impatient for the arrival of the first corps, he received a letter dated Fleurus, a quarter-past three, in which the major-general directed him "to manœuvre, so as to turn the enemy's right, and to double it up with its rear, towards Bry and St. Amand." General Labédoyère, who was the bearer of this letter, fell in, behind Frasnes, with D'Erlon's corps, which was then march-

ing towards Quatre-Bras.* Being an intelligent officer, he took it upon him to stop the march of that corps, and to turn it in the direction of Wagnelée and Bry. This was at four o'clock.

In two letters of the 9th of February, 1829, to the Duc d'Elchingen, Count d'Erlon thus describes the incident in question: "Behind Frasnes I halted with the generals of the Guard. I was here joined by General Labédoyère, who showed me a note, in pencil, which he was carrying to Marshal Ney†, and which commanded that marshal to move my corps upon Ligny. General Labédoyère informed me that he had already given orders for that movement by changing the direction of one column (it is to be observed that Drouet's column was in advance). I sent off, therefore, my chief of the staff, General Delcambre, to the marshal, to inform him of this change in my destination."

The marshal assuming, after the instructions issued at two o'clock, just as the battle of Ligny was about to begin, that the Emperor intended him to drive away the Allies before he himself fell upon Bry and St. Amand, sent back General Delcambre to Count d'Erlon, with positive orders to stop the first corps, and move it in all haste upon Quatre-Bras. It is said that, in thus acting,

* Count D'Erlon also testifies to this fact. See the letter just quoted.

† The son of Marshal Ney is of opinion that the Duc d'Elchingen recalled the first corps, because the order (in pencil), written at a quarter-past three, directed him to manœuvre "so as to overlap the enemy's right;" and because in order to accomplish that object the corps in question would be obliged to take the paved highway to Namur, not the road to St. Amand. But this explanation cannot be accepted, because in order to reach Bry there was no necessity to come to Quatre-Bras at all.

he was guided by the conviction that the great business intrusted to him was to oppose, by every means in his power, the junction of the two armies.

Be this as it may, there can be no doubt that Drouet counter-marched just as he came in sight of the French army at Ligny. Durutte alone continued the forward movement, with one division of infantry and three regiments of Jacquinot's cavalry.* Unfortunately, however, he lost time, and did not reach Bry till after the evacuation of the village. The same evil fortune attended the remainder of the first corps: when it reached Quatre-Bras the battle was over. The cavalry, however, arrived in time, — about nine o'clock, — to cover the retreat of Jerome's division, hotly pursued by those of Cooke and Alten.

It was thus that the first corps oscillated, throughout the whole of the 16th, between the two armies, just as Bernadotte's corps, on the 14th of October, 1806, oscillated between the field of battle at Jena and Auerstadt.

Count d'Erlon is of opinion that Labédoyère had no authority to change the direction of his column till he should have seen the marshal. Some doubt must always remain upon this point, as upon many other remarkable incidents in the campaign of 1815.

Marshal Ney charges the Emperor with having scattered his troops at a time when, if well kept together,

* Marshal Ney's son would lead us to suppose (see Documents, page 67) that it was his father who left these troops behind; but General Durutte, in his narrative, distinctly states that the measure was adopted by Count d'Erlon to prevent the enemy from throwing themselves between Bry and the wood of Delhutte, by which the communication between the Emperor and Ney would have been broken.

they would have rendered the victory sure. The reproach is well founded. Napoleon knew, or ought to have known, in the morning, that he had three corps of the Prussian army before him. If, upon this, he entertained any doubts as to the strength of his attack, he ought to have brought up the first corps, and directed Ney to occupy a position at Frasnes, and to content himself with keeping the Prince of Orange in check. At a quarter-past three it was no longer the time to recall that corps, for he had every reason to believe that it would then be engaged with the enemy, and troops under fire cannot be withdrawn except at great risk of loss. Under any circumstances this support could not arrive earlier than seven in the evening, and already, at five o'clock, Napoleon was prepared to strike his decisive blow at Ligny. The whole benefit, therefore, which could be expected from the tardy intervention of the first corps was, that it would render the enemy's retreat a disastrous one.

It has been said, that but for Ney's counter-order the Emperor would have *destroyed* the Prussian army. But Clausewitz justly observes, that the sudden appearance of a considerable force in the rear of that army would, on the contrary, have led to a battle with doubtful results, by obliging Blucher to retire sooner than he did. As to complete destruction, such as befell at Jena, that was quite out of the question.

With respect to the order given by Ney, to countermarch the first corps, it must be considered that the marshal, at that moment, was ignorant of the distance to which the corps had proceeded; and that, on the other hand, it was of the utmost importance that he should bring the battle which had begun to a successful

issue. "That is one of those determinations," says General Jomini, "which may, or may not, produce a good effect upon the general issues of affairs, but which no liberal-minded military man will venture to condemn." All this goes to show, that the unfortunate movements on the 16th, and the loss of the battle of Quatre-Bras, were occasioned by—first, the conviction on the mind of the Emperor that his left wing would experience but a feeble resistance from the Allies *, and next, by Ney's settled belief that the left wing ought to push back the enemy upon Brussels before moving upon Ligny.

In spite of the failure of the attack on the 16th, however, and the vexatious orders which paralysed Drouet's corps, the results of the battle of Quatre-Bras were favourable to the French. In point of fact, the Prince of Moskowa's instructions required him to hinder the English from coming, on the 16th, to the support of Blucher, and that object was attained.† Still, the success would have been much more complete if Ney had taken possession of Quatre-Bras in the morning.

* General Clausewitz asserts that in the interview between Blucher and Wellington, at the mill of Bussy, the Duke said, "My army is collecting at Quatre-Bras; I shall soon be in force enough to keep in check anything that can be brought against me, and even to give you effective support here. I shall be in this condition at four o'clock." (*Der Feldzüg von* 1815 *in Frankreich.*) Now, as Wellington does not support this statement in the memorandum which is appended to this volume, we can scarcely believe it to be correct.

† Napoleon's order, dated Charleroi on the 16th, was sent to Ney almost at the same time with instructions dictated to Flahaut (an order which, by-the-bye, takes no notice of the attack of Quatre-Bras), and directs the Prince of Moskowa to push his reconnoissances as far as possible in the direction of Brussels and Nivelle.

In this case, the concentration of the English army could have been effected only at Waterloo; while the French left, set free by these movements, could have thrown itself upon the right flank of the Prussian army and driven it quite away. The same result would have followed if Napoleon, when Reille informed him that the Prussians were collecting in rear of Fleurus*, had directed Marshal Ney to move Drouet and Kellermann upon Bry, masking the Prince of Orange with the second corps and the light cavalry in Frasnes.†

Napoleon, who had given up the morning of the 16th to Blucher, dedicated that of the 17th to Wellington. He caused a despatch to be written at Fleurus, at eight o'clock, by Soult to Marshal Ney, in which he said, "General Pajol is following the Prussian army along the roads to Namur and Liége." That despatch required the marshal to take up a position at Quatre-Bras, in case the ground should be occupied only by the enemy's rear-guard.

Between eight and nine Napoleon proceeded in a carriage to St. Amand, where he got upon horseback to review his troops and to visit the field of battle. At ten o'clock he directed Lobau to move upon Marbais, pushing on before him the cavalry divisions of Subervic and Domont. An hour afterwards, the Imperial Guard and Milhaud's corps took the same direction. About noon, occupied all the while by his visit to the field of

* These tidings, sent off at nine o'clock, ought to have reached the Emperor about ten.

† General Jomini, in his correspondence with the son of Ney, asserts that a serious engagement at Quatre-Bras at two o'clock, when the battle of Ligny was beginning, produced the worst possible effect in that quarter.

battle, conversing with his officers, and losing time, the Emperor ascertained, after making a reconnaissance, that the English were still at Quatre-Bras. Thereupon he wrote to Ney (the letter was dated, noon, in front of Ligny) that he ought to attack the enemy at Quatre-Bras, and drive them from their positions; and that to enable him to accomplish this, he should be supported by the troops which had been directed to move upon Marbais, whither the Emperor himself had determined upon going. This done, Napoleon gave to Grouchy 33,319 men, with 96 pieces of cannon, and charged him to pursue the Prussians, to complete their defeat, and never to lose sight of them.*

Shortly afterwards, in conformity with these verbal instructions, the Emperor wrote to the marshal, by the hand of General Bertrand: "Proceed to Gembloux with Pajol's corps of cavalry. You will feel your way in the direction of Namur and Maestricht, and follow up the enemy."† This latter recommendation, too faithfully acted upon, led to distressing consequences. It was, indeed, modified by other communications, none of which, however, reached the marshal in time, so that at seven in the evening of the 18th, the only instructions before him were those which he had received on the previous evening, and the spirit of which was con-

* Grouchy, in his "Observations, &c.," says, that "he received a verbal order, without any explanations, to follow in pursuit towards Namur and the Meuse, and that on expressing his desire not to be removed so far from the army, Napoleon good-humouredly asked him 'whether he pretended to give him lessons?'" A letter written on the 17th by Soult, to Marshal Ney, proves that this verbal order was really given. (*Les Documents inédits*, p. 46.)

† Letter dated at Ligny.

tained in the expression, "You will follow the Prussians up."

The delays which occurred during the 17th, and the false direction given to the right wing, must, we think, be attributed to the erroneous judgment formed by the Emperor respecting the importance of the check which the Prussian army had received. He persuaded himself that it was totally routed, falling back upon the Meuse, and not proposing to make its appearance again on the field of battle. A fatal opinion, which ever afterwards gave their character to his arrangements, up to the very day of Waterloo itself.

CHAP. VII.

BATTLE OF WATERLOO. — CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS. — NAPOLEON'S CENSURE OF BLUCHER AND WELLINGTON. — RETREAT OF THE FRENCH ARMY. — MARCH OF THE ALLIES ON PARIS. — GENEROUS TREATMENT OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE BY WELLINGTON. — HIS WISE COUNSELS. — ABDICATION OF NAPOLEON. — THE ALLIES ENTER PARIS. — ARRIVAL OF LOUIS XVIII. — TREATY OF PEACE. — OCCUPATION OF FRANCE BY 150,000 ALLIES. — WELLINGTON APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY.

WELLINGTON'S troops passed the night between the 16th and 17th on the field of battle: their head-quarters were established at Genappe. It has been asserted by more than one historian, and among the rest by Von Damitz, that the Duke expected to be joined in his position by Blucher, and that it was not till seven in the morning of the 17th that he became aware of the loss of the battle of Ligny. Documents supplied from different sources, but especially the Duke's Memorandum —appended to this chapter—enable us to rectify that error, as well as to clear up various points which have heretofore been treated as obscure.*

While the battle of Ligny was going on, Wellington received frequent communications from Colonel Sir

* In point of fact, it had been arranged at the mill of Bussy that the army which was first free to act should march to the support of the other; and that, come what might, the point of concentration should be Mont St. Jean.

Henry Hardinge, whom he had attached as British Commissioner to the Prussian head-quarters. Sir Henry having been severely wounded (he lost his left hand and wrist by a cannon-shot), sent by his brother, a captain of artillery, his last report—a verbal one—which reached the Duke just as darkness was closing in. Up to that moment Wellington had been able to follow, with his glass, the main incidents in the battle.* He had seen distinctly the last charge of the Guard upon Ligny, the rout of the Prussian cavalry, and the commencement of the retreat. During the night he was made acquainted with several details; but the exact issues of the battle, as well as Blucher's intentions, were still unknown to him. In order to satisfy himself on these heads, he sent, at daybreak on the 17th, Captain Wood, of the 10th Hussars, with a patrol, to examine the field of battle. The report brought back by that officer was, that not a Prussian could be seen; whereupon Colonel Gordon, the Duke's aide-de-camp, proceeded with a squadron of the 10th Hussars to Sombreffe (the squadron was commanded by Captain Grey), where he communicated with General Ziethen, to whom the command of the rear guard of the Prussian army had been intrusted. Having thus made himself acquainted with the exact state of affairs, and ascertained the real line of retreat and the ulterior purposes of Blucher, Wellington determined, in the early part of the day, on falling back from Quatre-Bras upon Waterloo.†

* The distance between the two armies did not exceed two leagues and a half, or between seven and eight English miles.

† Almost simultaneously with the return of Gordon was the arrival of Lieutenant Massow, from Blucher himself, with a despatch.

"The Duke was fully informed on the 17th of all that had taken place at Ligny, where, till late in the afternoon, no movements appeared to be made. Between three and four o'clock a large body of troops appeared upon the field of battle: one French corps struck off in the direction of Namur, the other followed the road to Wavre. This latter appears to have been Grouchy's corps. The main body, with the cavalry, moved upon Quatre-Bras by the Sombreffe road."*

Wellington began his retrograde movement about ten in the morning. In order to hide its object, and mislead the enemy, he left his picquets and the cavalry on their ground, and placed bodies of dismounted dragoons upon the heights, with some pieces of light cannon. These troops were not withdrawn till they were touched by the enemy's advanced guard.

Meanwhile Ney, whom Napoleon, at eight in the morning, had directed to take post at Quatre-Bras in the event of the occupation of that point by the enemy's rear guard only, remained still on the defensive; for he knew that the whole Anglo-Netherlands army was in his front. A second order, dated at noon, had, on the other hand, required that he should wait the arrival of the troops that were moving upon Marbais. It is clear from this that Napoleon was not then aware that the English army had begun its retreat; nor can it be accurately ascertained at what hour Ney himself became cognisant of that fact. Some say that he discovered it as early as twelve o'clock; others, that the truth was not known to him till two. We are ourselves inclined to adopt this latter opinion, because it is certain

* See Mem. in Appendix.

that Ney was joined by Napoleon before the pursuit began, and that Napoleon did not enter Ligny till after noon on the 17th. Be this, however, as it may, the fact remains, beyond the reach of dispute, that the pursuit was conducted late and languidly, and that the only incident deserving of notice which occurred in it was the charge of the English cavalry at the debouche of Genappe. When that occurred, the entire Anglo-Netherlands army was already in position at Waterloo.*

One division, consisting of four English and five Hanoverian battalions, with three batteries (eighteen guns) of English artillery, remained under the command of General Colville at Tubize, where it covered the road from Mons. Prince Frederick, with his corps d'armée of Netherlanders, took post between Hal and Enghien, that he might co-operate, in case of need, with that division. As he was apprehensive of being turned by the Nivelles road, which the retreat from Quatre-Bras had thrown open to the French, Wellington did not venture to call in these troops, though their junction would have proved at that moment very serviceable to him.†

In the evening of the 17th, Napoleon found himself in presence of the Allies. The day was, however, too

* From all this it would appear that the pursuit did not begin till between two and three o'clock, or perhaps later. This date, besides, agrees with Napoleon's statement, when he says that the French advanced guard did not reach Planchenoit till after six in the evening.

† Wellington never ceased to be anxious on that head, as is shown not only by many of his letters, but by the fact that he instructed his cavalry patrols, during the night between the 16th and 17th, particularly to observe the Nivelle road.

far spent to give battle, and it became necessary to wait till the morrow.

It was the anxious hope of the illustrious leader of the French army that he might be able to destroy the English without receiving any annoyance from the Prussians, whom he believed to have been fully disposed of by the affair of Ligny. Wellington, on the other hand, flattered himself that he should succeed in holding his ground till after mid-day, by which time, according to the arrangements made with Blucher, he might expect to be joined by the Prussian army.*

The armies now confronting each other may be thus described. That of the French consisted of from 70,000 to 72,000 men, of whom 15,000 were cavalry, with 240 guns; that of the Allies, of 69,894 men, including 13,400 cavalry, with 159 guns. The English contingent mustered 25,389 men; the German Legion, 6793; the Hanoverians, 10,995; the Brunswickers, 6303; the

* The tales are endless of the communications carried on between Wellington and Blucher. Von Damitz says that in the morning of the 17th Wellington informed Blucher of his intention of accepting a battle next day, at Mont St. Jean, provided two Prussian corps could support him; and that Blucher answered that he would support him with his whole army. Others state that these arrangements were made in the evening of the 17th. (*Militär Wochenblatt*, 1845.) Capefigue, in his "History of the Hundred Days," makes Count Pozzo di Borgo the organ of communication between the two chiefs. General Müffling's well-known version, though not quite accurate, comes nearer the truth. The fact is, as the MS. Mem. shows, that the Duke was in constant communication during the night of the 17th, by cavalry patrols, with Bulow; and that on the 18th, before the battle began, he saw a body of Prussian cavalry massed in front of the defile of St. Lambert. According to Soult, this same cavalry corps became visible to the French about half-past twelve.

Nassau troops, 2926; and the troops of the Netherlands, 17,488.* So far as mere numbers are concerned, the Allies were not, therefore, greatly inferior to the French; but when we come to inquire into the respective qualities of the troops composing the two armies, it will be found that the inferiority on their part was enormous. Not only was the allied army composed of heterogeneous elements, but it consisted almost entirely of young soldiers, a large proportion of whom had never been under fire. The Hanoverian contingent was made up of militia, and many regiments were fit only for garrison duty.† With a force so constituted, of which the officers were unacquainted with their men, and the corps had never fought side by side, it was impossible to command that unity of action which is the surest guarantee of success in the day of battle.‡

In addition to his knowledge of this fact, Wellington had to bear up against the unpleasant thought that the whole of the French army, with the exception of the third corps, was before him. He believed, therefore, as his general correspondence shows, that it was greatly superior to him in numbers; yet he awaited, calm and confident, the shock of that redoubtable host, led on

* The strength of the Allies is accurately stated from official documents; that of the French cannot be so fully verified, owing to its heavy losses. Napoleon himself puts down his force at 69,909 men. Jomini makes it 70,000. Colonel Charras, who seems to have taken infinite pains, fixes it at 72,247.

† See the Duke's Memorandum.

‡ On this subject the Duke writes to Lord Bathurst, seven days after the battle (28th June), "I really believe that, with the exception of my old Spanish infantry, I have got not only the worst troops, but the worst equipped army, with the worst staff, that was ever brought together."

by the greatest captain of the age. That confidence, admirable in itself, though somewhat partaking of rashness, the Emperor treated as a fault. He entertained no doubt whatever of his own success; indeed, when he saw the English posted in front of the Forest of Soignes, he exclaimed, as Soult had done at Orthes — "*At last I have them! There are nine chances to one in my favour.*"*

Before entering upon the description of this great battle, which decided the fate of the Empire, it is necessary that some account should be given of the operations of Grouchy, of whose conduct during the campaign accounts so contradictory are in circulation.

We have seen that this marshal received no orders till after noon on the 17th, to follow the Prussian army along the road to Gembloux. Some time was required to assemble his troops and put them in motion. The two corps of infantry did not quit St. Amand and Ligny till two and three o'clock in the afternoon respectively.† The roads were in such a bad state that in spite of all

* Napoleon quotes himself, in his Mémoires, to this effect. It is said that Soult warned him not to be too confident; and that Foy made use of the expression, "The English infantry are the very devil in the fight." But Napoleon treated their remonstrances with contempt: "You think, because he beat you, that Wellington is a great general." Had their advice been followed the French cavalry would not have been sacrificed, that day, in the vain attempt to break the English squares.

† General Gerard, in notes addressed on the 23rd of February, 1820, to Col. Grouchy, the son of the marshal, states, that he received orders to march about half-past twelve, but that he was obliged to wait till the left of Vandamme's column had cleared the ground before getting into motion. It was about three o'clock when he began his march.

the exertions of the generals* their corps were unable to reach Gembloux till between nine and ten o'clock at night.† The darkness of the night, the fatigue of the troops, and, still more, the uncertainty of Grouchy as to the line of march followed by the Prussian army, hindered him from pushing farther. He contented himself with sending out his light cavalry to obtain accurate information. Meanwhile, he wrote to the Emperor, at ten at night, to announce to him his arrival, and to acquaint him with the measures which he had taken to find out the exact position of the enemy's army.

Napoleon, in his St. Helena narrative, has fallen into the grossest mistakes respecting Grouchy's first movements. Indeed, he has so expressed himself that it is impossible not to see that he was anxious to diminish the amount of his own responsibility by sacrificing the reputation of his subordinates. Thus, the Emperor pretends that he received, at eleven o'clock at night on the 17th, a letter from Grouchy, dated Gembloux at five in the afternoon, which letter has no existence, and never could have existed, because Grouchy's first despatch, which is dated ten at night, did not reach Mont St. Jean till about two in the morning of the 18th.

Napoleon next launches out in censure of the inactivity of the marshal, whom he charges with having spent the whole day in marching about eight miles, and who, though he arrived at Gembloux as early as five in the afternoon,

* General Gerard praises the fourth corps for marching as quickly as possible.

† This fact is proved by a letter from Gerard, dated at Gembloux at ten o'clock at night. Vandamme, who set out at two o'clock, had reached Gembloux about nine. (Quelques Documents, par Gerard.)

found nothing better to do than to halt till next morning, because, he said, that his troops had already taken up their ground, and were getting ready their soup. With respect to the slowness of this march, it is to be attributed, in the first place to the Emperor, who gave no orders to follow the Prussians till mid-day; and next, to Grouchy, or to the general staff, who, instead of breaking up the two corps into several columns, moved them by one cross-road, bad in itself, and rendered worse by the passage, on the previous evening, of Bulow's and Thielman's corps. It is possible, likewise, that the generals commanding these corps may have wasted too much time in making preparations for the march; but nothing can justify the reproach cast on Grouchy, that he kept his troops inactive from five in the afternoon, in order that they might get ready their soup. The fact is, and it is established on irresistible testimony, that not a single soldier of the third and fourth corps arrived at Gembloux before nine o'clock in the evening.

Lastly, Napoleon asserts that at ten o'clock on the evening of the 17th, he sent off to Grouchy, whom he supposed to be in the neighbourhood of Wavre, a courier, to inform him that a great battle would take place on the morrow — that the Anglo-Netherlands army was in position in front of the Forest of Soignes, with its left resting upon the village of La Haye — and that he ought, therefore, to move, at daybreak, a detachment of 7000 men, of all arms, and 16 pieces of cannon, upon St. Lambert, with a view to strengthen the right of the army, and act in concert with it. Napoleon, besides, recommended Grouchy to support the detachment sent to St. Lambert, as soon as he should be satisfied that Marshal Blucher had evacuated Wavre, either to con-

tinue his retreat towards Brussels or to proceed in any other direction.

These instructions bear all the marks of foresight and skill; but not only is it certain that they never reached their destination, but there is good reason to believe that they were not issued, at all events, at the hour cited by Napoleon. In point of fact, there remains no trace, in the archives of the *état-major*, of any communication of the sort having been made in the evening of the 17th. Neither Marshal Soult nor any body else had any knowledge of it, nor has the officer ever been named who was the bearer of so important a message. And there is as little proof of the reality of a second order, which it is pretended was despatched at four in the morning of the 18th, to repeat to the marshal the instructions of the previous evening. Grouchy has formally denied having any knowledge of these two documents, and his statement is remarkably corroborated by the fact that an order was issued at ten in the morning of the 18th, which the marshal received, but which, as will be seen by-and-by, makes no allusion whatever to the fabulous detachment in the direction of St. Lambert. This order was handed to Grouchy at four in the afternoon, near Wavre. In the face of such testimony, we are compelled to acknowledge that the idea of throwing out the specified detachment never occurred to Napoleon till towards one o'clock, when Bulow's horsemen first became visible to him.

We may be pardoned for having anticipated a little the events which befell, in order to settle a point which is essential to the right understanding of the operations which took place on the memorable day of Waterloo.

It rained without ceasing from about mid-day, on the 17th. The ground was terribly beaten about, and the troops on both sides had suffered much in their marches and in the bivouac. Was this the reason which induced the Emperor to suspend his attack till late in the morning? Most writers are of opinion that it was; but, after carefully studying the orders issued on the previous evening, we find some difficulty in admitting the explanation. These documents, indeed, appear to show that the Emperor expected to encounter the Anglo-Netherlands army alone, either because he regarded the Prussians as disorganised, or because he believed that Wavre was occupied but by a fraction of their force, or considered the junction of Blucher and Wellington in front of the Forest of Soignes to be impossible. Of these various suppositions the latter is the most admissible; because, in order to recover his connection with the English, Blucher would find it necessary to lead his army through the forest, and expose his flank to Grouchy, who was supposed to be at his heels.* Besides, whether the Emperor was of that opinion or not, it appears certain that on the morning of the 18th he did not count upon the arrival of the Prussians. Hence, it is not to be wondered at, that he put off the commencement of the battle till the sky should clear and the ground become a little dry.†

* That such was Napoleon's opinion is proved by the fact that, in his Mémoires, he blames Wellington for having accepted battle in front of the forest instead of behind it.

† General Jomini does not admit the excuse which turns upon the state of the ground, and he is right; ground is not made much better by a few hours of dry weather. Besides, Napoleon himself says, in his Mémoires, that the artillery officers who had examined the plain announced, at eight o'clock, that the guns could

Wellington occupied, in front of Waterloo, a position which crosses the great roads from Charleroi and Nivelle. His right was thrown back behind a ravine, near Merbes-Braine, and his left extended as far as the Château of Frichermont, upon the high ground above La Haye. Detachments guarded the heights of Merbes-Braine, La Haye, and Smohain, as well as the farm of Papelotte, the buildings and gardens of the Château de Hougoumont, situated in advance of the right centre, near the Nivelle road; and the farm of La Haie-Sainte constituting a post in front of the left centre, and upon the Genappe road. Chassé's division and D'Aubremé's brigade occupied the environs of Braine-l'Aleud, upon the extreme right. This flank was well protected, the other lay more or less open. It was therefore necessary to place a corps there, not only to cover the flank of the position, but still more to guard the road by which this wing could communicate with its supports.

Wellington had divided the Anglo-Netherlands army into three corps. That on the right was under the orders of Lord Hill — that in the centre was in charge of the Prince of Orange — while General Picton was at the head of the left corps. The cavalry was commanded by the Earl of Uxbridge, well known in Spain as Lord Paget, and subsequently to the campaign of which we are now writing, as Marquis of Anglesey.

It is easy to perceive, from the manner in which he disposed his troops, that Wellington was jealous of an attack upon his right and afraid of being turned in the direc-

be manœuvred, though with some difficulty, which another hour would greatly diminish. It must be remembered, also, that upon the same ground Wellington effected, between six and eight o'clock, all the movements necessary to take up his order of battle.

tion of Hal.* It was in anticipation, also, of the same event, that he wrote, on the morning of the battle, to the Duc de Berri, begging that, should this anticipation be realised, his Royal Highness would cause the French court to remove to Antwerp, by the left bank of the Scheldt. We find some difficulty in accounting for the fact that Wellington should have attributed to Napoleon a plan of operations, of which the result must have been to hurry on that junction of the British and Prussian armies which it was his great object, from the commencement of the campaign, to render impossible. But apart from these considerations, we are bound to admit, with the majority of military historians, that the position of Mont St. Jean was well chosen, and very suitably occupied. The Emperor, however, and the generals who, in a spirit of prejudice, have undertaken their master's defence, are not of this opinion. They maintain, on the contrary, that the Duke committed a grave error in accepting battle with a forest in his rear,

* The Duke had a corps of 17,500 men, under Prince Frederick of the Netherlands, at Hal. It was perfectly useless. He massed his own troops, moreover, more upon his right than his left, which was unwise. The author of the "Victories and Conquests" says, that Hal was thus occupied in consequence of a cavalry feint made on the night of the 17th in that direction. [All this is a mistake. The Duke was jealous of the road by Hal, because it was the best, and because the occupation of Brussels, even for a day, by the French army, would have produced a moral effect scarcely less disastrous than the loss of a battle. As to the inconvenience of fighting with the forest in his rear, it is a mere delusion. Several roads pervious to wheel carriages ran through it. By these, in case of a reverse, the guns and cavalry could have withdrawn; while the open glades (for it is singularly free from brushwood) would have enabled his infantry, in skirmishing order, to cover the movement.]

which, in case of disaster, would have presented insurmountable difficulties to the retreat of the beaten army. "Wellington," says the Emperor, "could have done nothing more adverse to the interests of his country, to the general plan of the campaign, or the most obvious principles of the art of war, than to remain in the position which he had taken up. He had the defiles of the Forest of Soignes behind him; had he been beaten, there was no retreat for him." In answer to this objection, the intelligent author of the *Précis de l'Art de la Guerre* replies, "that the allied army had behind its centre the great Waterloo road; and behind its right that of the two Braines; and behind its left that of Hulpe: three trunk roads all converging upon Antwerp, the base of their operations. There were, besides, many smaller alleys which traversed the forest itself, which, consisting of trees of large bulk, offered endless facilities for the cover of troops. The allied army was, therefore, better disposed for effecting a retreat than if it had been required to cross a huge open plain."

The Emperor drew up his army, in order of battle, on both sides of the great road which leads from Charleroi to Brussels. In his first line there were the corps of Reille and Drouet; the former consisting of Jerome's, Foy's, and Bachelu's infantry divisions, with Piré's cavalry; the latter, of four infantry divisions, deployed, like those just specified, in two lines, at a distance of sixty yards one from another. In second line, to the rear of the wings, was the cavalry; in third line, behind the centre, the sixth; Lobau's corps and the Imperial Guard constituted the reserve.

Napoleon says that it was his intention to direct two divisions of the first corps, and two of the sixth, sup-

ported by 120 pieces of cannon, on La Haie-Sainte; while the two remaining divisions of the 6th corps should advance against La Haye. He hoped, by these means, to turn the left of the position, to separate the Prussians from the English, to oblige the latter to fall back upon Hal, and to favour the junction of Grouchy's corps with the main army. This plan of battle, which reminds us of the operations at Wagram and Borodino, gave the better promise of success, that the left of the Allies was, undoubtedly, their weak point; and it is asssumed, that by falling upon the left only, the Emperor would have obtained the same decisive results which attended a similar mode of attack by Frederic II. at the battle of Leuthen. But General Jomini observes, with reason, that the movement in question would have uncovered the French line of retreat, and thrown the army into the woody country about St. Lambert, where a defeat must have proved fatal to it.

About half past eleven *, Jerome's division, under the command of Guilleminot, supported by those of Foy and Bachelu, began the attack of the post of Hougoumont. It was the object of this manœuvre to draw off the attention of Wellington to his right, and thus to favour the main attack on his left. The wood, which surrounds the château, and which was occupied by some of the English Guards, was taken and retaken several times. It remained, at last, in possession of the French; but the château itself offered a desperate resistance. About two o'clock, it was found necessary to suspend the

* Wellington and Gneisenau fix the commencement of the battle about ten; Alava and Vaudoncourt at half-past eleven; Napoleon and Drouet at twelve; and Marshal Ney and Col. Heymes at one.

assault, and to try other means of destroying the building. If, at the outset, a strong howitzer battery had been turned upon it, this vexatious delay would not have occurred. "The general opinion," says Van Lobensels, "is, that Napoleon, after carrying the post of Hougoumont, intended to make himself master of La Haie-Sainte, and then to finish the battle by throwing all his reserves upon the English centre.* As, however, the château held out longer than he had anticipated, the Emperor considered that it would not be prudent to wait for the accomplishment of his purpose in that direction before commencing his intended movement elsewhere. The consequence was, that Marshal Ney received orders to hold himself in readiness to advance.

About half-past one Napoleon perceived at a great distance, a sort of mirage or mist, which some declared to be troops in motion, some to be a column halted, and others to be trees.† About a quarter of an hour afterwards, a Prussian hussar was brought in, with a letter to the Duke of Wellington in his possession, who pronounced it to be the advanced guard of Bulow's corps. Immediately the Duke of Dalmatia, chief of the staff, sent off to Marshal Grouchy intelligence of the verbal report and of the intercepted letter; with orders to

* Précis de la Campagne de 1815, &c. This opinion is confirmed by Gourgaud in the following terms: "These dispositions indicated the intention of the Emperor to pierce the centre of the English army, and to cut off its retreat on the right and left of the line."

† Napoleon and Gourgaud maintain that Bulow's advanced guard was seen about eleven o'clock. They commit a wilful mistake, for Soult's letter, written immediately after the examination of the Prussian hussar, is dated one o'clock. Besides, it is easy to refute the error by the statements of Napoleon himself.

march upon St. Lambert and take the enemy in rear. The officer who carried these instructions spent five or six hours on the road. It was therefore impossible that Grouchy could reach the field of battle earlier than eight or nine at night. Besides, we know that this officer, owing to hindrances which have never been explained, did not fall in with the Marshal till seven in the evening; and that a similar delay prevented a despatch, sent off at ten in the morning, from arriving till four in the afternoon.*

To guard against the danger with which his right was threatened, Napoleon detached the 6th corps (Lobau's), with two brigades of light cavalry (Daumont's and Subervic's) to take post wherever, with 10,000 men, they might be able to stop 30,000. These troops were to attack Bulow in front, while the 6000 or 7000 men from Grouchy's corps fell upon his rear.†

These dispositions having deprived Napoleon of the force which was required for a combined attack upon

* The distance from the king's house to Gembloux is not quite sixteen miles in a straight line, and by the roads about twenty-one. There is, however, a tract, passing near Wavre, by which the distance may be compassed in something short of eleven miles. Col. Zenowitz was the name of the officer who carried the dispatch. M. de Vaulabelle says that he made a distance of eleven leagues by Genappe, Quatre-Bras, Sombreffe, Gembloux, and Sart-lez-Walhain. Besides, it is well known, that the dispatch sent off at one did not reach its destination at Wavre till seven. (*Grouchy's Report to Napoleon 20th June.*)

† Napoleon reasons as if his orders of the previous evening had been obeyed, and as if the three other Prussian corps were not following that of Bulow. The defile of Lasne would have afforded the sort of position pointed out; yet Lobau, with the consent, if not by the orders, of the Emperor, waited Bulow's arrival on this side *le bois de Paris.*

the English left and centre, he found himself under the necessity of modifying his plan of battle. "For he had no longer troops enough in hand to fill up the void, which a movement to the right must have left between the 1st and 2nd corps." *

It was now that Ney received orders to break through the centre, and to push back the right upon the road to Brussels. It was clearly the arrangement calculated to produce the greatest possible amount of harm to the English army. Had the left been turned, it would have been separated, without doubt, from Blucher; but this operation, by throwing it back upon Braine-l'Aleud, would have enabled it to retire unbroken upon Hal. Nor must it be forgotten, that at that hour of the day, Napoleon still retained the conviction, that the three other Prussian corps would never arrive upon the field of battle.

Marshal Ney succeeded with some difficulty in placing seventy-eight guns in battery upon some soft ground in front of the English left. A warm cannonade began upon that point at one o'clock; but owing to the extreme range † it produced no great effect.

At two o'clock Ney formed the first corps in four columns of battalions, which advanced by echelons left in front. These columns were clearly too deep for the purpose of attack, and too close to be deployed.‡ The

* De Vaudoncourt.

† This mistake, like many others committed on that memorable day, proves that the French army knew but little of the position of the enemy and of the ground in their front.

‡ It is not quite clear what the groundwork of their formation was. According to some it was the battalion; according to others the company. Military writers are not more agreed respecting the

right column, under the orders of Durutte, moved upon Papelotte, in concert with Jacquinot's cavalry, in order to keep the left of the enemy in check. In rear of the three other columns, Milhaud's cavalry moved. The artillery was obliged to remain stationary, in consequence of the state of the ground, and that circumstance, added to the depth of the columns, caused the French to experience considerable loss. The 1st column, under the orders of De Quiot, took La Haie-Sainte on the left, and attacked and put to the rout Byland's Netherlands brigade. But in rear of that brigade, and sheltered by a dip of the ground, was Picton's English division, which drove back the assailants by a well-directed fire, and by an able movement which the 42nd and 92nd regiments executed upon the left of the column. It was in this fierce contest, that the gallant commander of the English division fell gloriously at the head of his troops. The 2nd column, consisting of Donzelot's division, was about to come into action, when Wellington, profiting by the mistake which Ney had committed in failing to occupy La Haie-Sainte, whence it was easy to debouch upon the flank of the French, sent Ponsonby's brigade of dragoons to take Quiot's half-broken column in reverse. That column, thrown into confusion by so fierce a shock, fell back upon the 2nd, which it carried with it in its movement of retreat. The English squadrons there-

manner in which the attack was made, nor even as to the number of columns. Col. Charras professes to have been informed by an officer of rank in D'Erlon's corps, that the battalions were deployed in columns at a distance of five paces one from the other; the space between one echelon and another was not more than 400 paces.

upon passed between the columns of Marcognet and Donzelot, and pushed forward to the bottom of the ravine, where two batteries of division had been imprudently posted. They sabred a great many horses, and rendered fifteen pieces useless, by upsetting them in the mud; after which, they rode towards the guns remaining in position. But there they were first stopped and then fiercely charged by the two brigades of Milhaud and Jacquinot, which were sent by Napoleon's orders to the support of the Prince of Moskowa. General Ponsonby received a mortal wound while charging at the head of his dragoons. Durutte, less severely handled, followed the retrogressive movement of the other columns, not, however, till he had repulsed an attack of Vandeleur's light cavalry, and driven before him Best's and Vincke's Hanoverians.

Marshal Ney had barely time to reform the 1st corps at the bottom of the slope, and to give his artillery the opportunity of refitting a little, when Napoleon sent orders to attack La Haie-Sainte. The operation began by a vigorous charge of Milhaud's cavalry, and of a brigade of the light cavalry of the Guard. These magnificent troops passed through the first line of the English, shouting "*Vive l'Empereur.*" But the second opposed to them an impenetrable barrier. There, formed in squares, stood General Alten's celebrated division; admirably seconded by Somerset's cavalry, and by that of the Dutch General, Baron Trip. While Ney's squadrons sustained the shock of these *troupes d'élite*, Quiot's division attacked La Haie-Sainte with irresistible fury. Here, as at Hougoumont, the mistake was committed of not prefacing the assault by a fire of howitzers; hence the struggle lasted long and was

brilliant on both sides. But in the end, the ammunition of the Allies began to fail, their fire grew slack, and about half past three the farm fell into the hands of the French.*

Meanwhile the howitzer batteries upon the left set fire to the Château of Hougoumont, where the English Guards continued to maintain themselves amidst flames and ruins. This resistance, however, no longer disquieted the Emperor, for his attention was directed entirely towards the centre, where, from one instant to another, the crisis seemed to be at hand. And in truth Wellington's situation appeared to be extremely serious. The Anglo-Netherlands troops were beginning to grow impatient under a purely defensive line of action and a very heavy loss. It was time that succour should arrive; and it was remarked that the commander-in-chief often turned his glass towards the left. Blucher had promised to debouch upon the field of battle about an hour after midday; but the state of the roads was such that he found it extremely difficult to get along†; still it was known that he was approaching, and that every depen-

* Wellington says that the farm was carried at two o'clock (see his dispatch and his letter of the 17th of August to Walter Scott); Napoleon fixes the event at three o'clock; Wagner at six. Half-past three is the hour which agrees best with the statements of the largest number of credible witnesses.

† The delay may be reckoned at two full hours. Bulow, in like manner, had been stopped at Wavre between seven and eight in the morning. His advanced guard had already got beyond the town when a great fire broke out in the principal street, through which the *corps d'armée* must of necessity pass. The main column set itself to extinguish the fire; meanwhile the advanced guard arrived at St. Lambert at eleven o'clock, where it was not joined by the rest of the troops till past two.

dence could be placed upon him; and that assurance went far to sustain the *morale* of the Allies.

As soon as Wellington perceived that he had nothing more to fear upon the right, he reinforced his centre, in order to make head against the danger which threatened that point, in consequence of the fall of La Haie-Sainte. Already, by anticipation, he had moved up Mitchell's brigade and the Brunswick contingent, from their post in rear of Hougoumont. Between three and four o'clock, the Hanoverian brigade of Picton's division took a position upon the great road in front of Mont St. Jean; while Clinton's troops hastened from the right towards the centre, and those of General Chassé, hitherto left at Braine-l'Aleud, established themselves between Merbes-braine and the Nivelle road.

When, at half past four o'clock, the Emperor saw Bulow's leading columns begin to debouch, he entertained the idea for a moment of changing his front to the rear, by rendering Hougoumont his pivot on the left, and Planchenoit his *point d'appui* upon the right; but he immediately abandoned that project, because it is said he still clung to the hope of being joined by Grouchy, and because on the other hand, the last report sent in led him to believe that the Allies were not in a condition to offer a much more prolonged resistance.*

* This is Vaudoncourt's account; that of Gourgaud is a little different. "Napoleon," says he, "hesitated for a moment whether he would not change his line of operations and establish it on the Nivelle road, thus turning the right of the English army instead of the left, and marching upon Mont St. Jean by the Nivelle road, after having carried Braine-l'Aleud." General Gourgaud adds, that the plan was abandoned, because it would have compromised Grouchy, and favoured the junction of the Allies. Besides, the ground between

This story, however, appears to be somewhat incredible, so far, at least, as concerns the probable arrival of the right wing; because between two and three o'clock Napoleon had received a report dated from Walhain at half-past eleven in the morning, which was brought by Colonel Delafresnaye, and the tenour of which left no room to doubt as to Grouchy's intention of pursuing the Prussians in the direction of Wavre.* Moreover it is certain that Napoleon was possessed with the conviction that he would be able to destroy the English before the Prussians could come up, and it is therefore perfectly intelligible, that he would not desire to lose time by making a change of his front to the rear. Besides, the concentration of his troops between Hougoumont and Planchenoit would not greatly improve the state of his affairs; it would simply render the battle indecisive. Napoleon might indeed reach Genappe during the night, and before daylight on the 19th effect his junction with Grouchy. But in the meanwhile Blucher and Wellington would in like manner become united; the object of the campaign would be defeated, and the Emperor be obliged to re-enter France, and to assume the defensive against half a million of the Allies. †

After the capture of La Haie-Sainte, the fighting of

La Haye and Planchenoit was the least favourable of any to the troops which had been told off to check Bulow.

* The Emperor besides affirms, in his Memoirs, that he had learned, about four o'clock, from Daumont's scouts, that they could discover no trace of Grouchy.

† Gourgaud says that Napoleon, on seeing Bulow approach, entertained for a moment the idea of changing his line of operations, and transferring it to Nivelle. But this movement would have completely isolated Grouchy, and could not therefore have been of any use to the French army.

the first corps was suspended by order of Napoleon, who was anxious to satisfy himself as to the exact movements of Bulow. Ney was therefore left to maintain that post, while Durutte's division should attack the farms of Papelotte and La Haye.

Meanwhile, about four o'clock*, Wellington having conceived the hope of retaking the park of Hougoumont and La Haie-Sainte, launched the Hanoverians upon the latter post, at the same time that he directed Lord Hill's English troops upon the former. Ney repelled this attack with vigour; but in contradiction to his orders, he resolved to profit by the advantage which he had gained, and to occupy the ground in the centre which the enemy had abandoned. Not having any infantry at his disposal, he asked for a brigade of cavalry, which executed the movement at a trot. We have never been told through what fatal blunder that brigade was followed by the whole of the reserves, not excepting even the reserve of the Guard, whose invariable rule it was to obey only their own officers, or orders issued directly by the Emperor.† This enormous mass of cavalry,

* Mémoires de Napoléon, t. viii. p. 202. The English documents all agree upon this point.

† This is the account of Heymes, first aide-camp to Marshal Ney. Napoleon says, that Milhaud engaged without orders, dragging after him Lefebvre-Desnouette's division. According to the "Victories and Conquests," Milhaud's cuirassiers, Delort and Wattier's divisions, ascended the heights under the orders of the Duke of Elchingen. They were followed by the chasseurs and lancers of the Guard, (Lefebvre-Desnouette's division). Shortly afterwards Napoleon caused these divisions, which had become prematurely engaged, to be supported by those of Lheritier and of Roussel d'Urbal, of Kellermann's corps. At the same moment, Ney caused the division of heavy cavalry of the Guard to advance in like manner under General Guyot. This general has since stated that, from about three in the

about twelve thousand horses, threw itself, with more of courage than discretion, upon the plateau, where it delivered, without any result, several brilliant charges. Colonel Heymes thinks that the Guard was pushed forward because after Ney's attack the enemy was supposed to be in retreat, and the calling up of a brigade of cavalry seems to confirm that opinion. "That false movement," says he, "took place under the eyes of the Emperor, who might have stopped it, but did not."* Napoleon, however, in his Memoirs, pretends that he sent General Bertrand to call back the reserves, that unfortunately nothing was done, because when the general arrived, they were already engaged with the enemy, and because every retrograde movement attempted under such circumstances is attended with great hazard. Be this as it may, there is no doubt that the mistake in question, whether voluntary or otherwise, exercised a fatal influence over the fortunes of the day, and, as we shall see by and by, was the principal cause, if not of the loss of the battle, at all events of the total rout which ensued.

Several authors contend, not without reason, that if that enormous mass of cavalry, when it crowned the plateau, had been supported by a reserve of infantry, the battle would have been over between five and six o'clock; but there is nothing to show that, at this

afternoon, he had been placed at the disposal of the Prince of Moskowa.

* According to Gourgaud, Jomini, and Vaudoncourt, the Emperor sent to support Ney, who, in defiance of his orders, had brought Milhaud's cuirassiers and the light cavalry of the Guard into action upon the plateau. "He sent Kellermann's cuirassiers," says Gourgaud, "to support our cavalry upon the plateau, because he was apprehensive that they might be overpowered by the enemy's cavalry."

period of the day any force of infantry was disposable. Indeed, Colonel Heymes goes so far as to state, that Ney actually sent, about six, to ask for a few battalions, and that Napoleon, in the presence of Drouet and Jerome, replied, "Where am I to find them? Do you wish me to make them?" Besides, it was Napoleon's opinion, that before breaking the English line, it would be necessary to drive back, or at all events to stop, Bulow; and this it was which led him to say to certain officers who were congratulating each other on the progress of Ney's attempt, "It is a premature measure, and will lead to fatal consequences."*

We left Bulow's corps delivering its attacks, about half-past four in the afternoon, against the troops which were drawn up, *en potence*, upon the right of the French army. Count Lobau, who commanded there, offered, in spite of his inferiority in numbers, a stout resistance. By little and little, however, he was outflanked by the Prussian lines, and forced to fall back. Already Bulow was in possession of Planchenoit, when Napoleon sent Dubesme, with a division of the Young Guard, one regiment of the Old Guard, and twenty-four pieces of cannon to support Lobau's corps; whereupon the Prussians, assailed by these choice troops, were, in their turn, compelled to give ground, and to evacuate the village of which they had made themselves masters.

While this was going on, Durutte's division had car-

* These are Gourgaud's words, which we quote with diffidence, because Gourgaud is very inaccurate in his narrative of the events of 1815. But the general truth of the statement is vouched for by Capefigue and other historians, who describe Napoleon as saying, as soon as he crossed the threshold of the Tuileries, "Ney behaved like a fool. He sacrificed my cavalry."

ried, in succession, Papelotte, La Haye, and Smohain.* Six o'clock came and passed, and the Prussians seemed to have brought all their force into action. Meanwhile, in the centre, the cavalry, despite the murderous fire of the English, held its ground upon the plateau, broke several squares, and took three standards.† The enemy's line began to waver; all the reserves, including Chasse's division and Calloert's cavalry, had come into action; and, according to the testimony of several eye-witnesses, the paths through the forest were choked with men and carriages. At length Grouchy's cannon, heard upon the right, at the distance of two or three leagues, awakened the hope that the main body of Blucher's army was stopped.‡

* This is denied by Van Lobensels, because the fact is not related in any Dutch document. But French authors are unanimous in asserting it.

† [M. Brialmont supports this statement by a quotation from Vaudoncourt, which it is not necessary to translate. The truth is, that M. Vaudoncourt is mistaken in all that he says, and that M. Brialmont errs in trusting to him. Not one English square was broken that day; not one English standard was taken. The story of the Duke throwing himself into a square of infantry, which received credit, for a while, in England as well as on the Continent, is a mere romance. Indeed, the charges of the French cavalry were so irregularly and feebly given that, after the first or second, the very recruits in the English ranks (and the English army was full of recruits) laughed at them. I say this in no spirit of disparagement to the French army, which never fought with greater determination than at Waterloo. But I state a fact to which all who survive from the squares of that memorable day will bear witness. The French cavalry rode hither and thither like drunken men, and, with a few exceptions, never so much as touched the British bayonets.]

‡ [Grouchy's cannon were never heard that day, — and could scarcely be heard at a distance of two or three leagues, under such circumstances. As to the description here given of the wavering of

It was now half-past seven; and the Emperor believed that the moment had arrived for making a last desperate effort for bringing the struggle to a close.* He recalled, for this purpose, some battalions and batteries of the Guard which he had detached to Planchenoit. It is asserted by Vaudoncourt, whose narrative is most favourable to the French, that several general officers, who were present on the field, observed in the Emperor, at this juncture of the battle, something like hesitation. Since six o'clock, Bulow had been held in check. "Had

the allied line, and the choking up of the great roads with fugitives, it is, as M. Brialmont himself shows, a gross exaggeration. The only troops which fled *en masse* were the Cumberland regiment of Hanoverian Hussars, the colonel of which was subsequently dismissed the service. Still it cannot be denied that very many individuals of all nations made off. Indeed, it is well known that from no other battle-field in which the Duke commanded had such a large number of men escaped.] General Jomini asserts (in his "History of Napoleon") that *towards the close of the day the road to Brussels was choked up with deserted guns, with waggons, and wounded;* and *that retreat was impossible.* "Wellington," he adds, "felt that all was at stake. He determined to conquer or die." We believe that such was the determination of the English general; but of the impossibility of retreat we are by no means satisfied. The authors of the "Victories and Conquests" go so far as to assert that, notwithstanding the confusion in his rear, Wellington was about to give orders for a retreat, when the arrival of a despatch from Blucher induced him to withhold it. "Come what will," he observed to the officers who surrounded him, "we must play our last card. It is more dangerous to withdraw than to hold on." There is absolutely nothing to support this statement, in the face of a whole mass of evidence to the contrary.

* The authors of the "Victories and Conquests" are mistaken, when they say that at this time the Emperor intended to change his front; and that the eight battalions of the Guard thrown forward were intended to mask this movement. It was not till after the attack which we are now going to describe, that the Emperor thought of changing his front, and then it was too late.

Napoleon, by a rapid movement, carried the 2nd corps and the Guard up the plateau, he might have forced the English centre, before seven, with a mass of 18,000 men. A single division would have sufficed to observe Hougoumont."

The plan was carried into effect, but too late; and only four battalions were engaged in it instead of ten.

Just before the movement began, Wellington had ascertained that Pirch's corps was on the eve of forming a junction with Bulow's column, and that the corps Van Ziethen* was debouching from Ohain upon the left of the English line. This joyful intelligence produced a magical effect upon the Anglo-Netherlanders, who were beginning to suffer from the repeated charges of the French cavalry.

At seven o'clock Reille received orders to debouch from the right of Hougoumont, and to fall upon the enemy's line. At the same time, and without waiting till the whole of the troops destined for that attempt were collected, Napoleon pushed forward four batteries of the reserve and as many battalions of the Middle Guard, under the orders of General Friant. He himself accompanied this weak corps, as far as La Haie-Sainte, in order to support it with all the cavalry which he still had disposable. The officers of his staff galloped along the line to announce that Grouchy was approaching—an idle subterfuge, by which the army was not deceived for one instant.†

* Blucher had quitted Wavre at eleven in the morning, and arrived at St. Lambert about four—time enough to direct Bulow's movements. Two divisions and Pirch's cavalry, as well as Ziethen's corps, had quitted Wavre about noon. It has never been satisfactorily explained why these latter troops began their march so late.

† There was a moment when the whole of the right wing and even

The four battalions of the Guard, led by Ney in person, carried La Haie-Sainte upon the left. Behind them marched a line of cuirassiers, itself followed at a wide interval by six battalions of the Old Guard.* They attacked the English with great impetuosity, but had scarcely entered into the battle when a cry of alarm was heard upon the right. It announced the arrival of Blucher, who, with Ziethen's † corps, carried, after a brief resistance, La Haye and Papelotte. A general movement followed throughout the whole of the French right, which found itself immediately cut off from the 6th corps. The battalions of the Old Guard, instead of pushing straight forward to support the four battalions of the Middle Guard already engaged, found it necessary to move to the right, that they might become a reserve and a rallying-point to the troops driven out of La Haye.‡ They formed themselves into squares of battalions across the field of battle.

the personal attendants upon Napoleon himself believed these tidings to be correct. After debouching upon the left, Blucher found himself in the presence of the Nassau troops, under the command of the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, who still wore the uniform of the Imperial army. Blucher, mistaking them for the enemy, drove them from their position. The French officers observed the retrograde movement, and shouted, "The left gives way! Grouchy is coming!" The word flew from mouth to mouth, but was immediately succeeded by the disheartening and ominous cry, "The Prussians! The Prussians!"—(Letter from the Prince of Saxe-Weimar to his father, quoted by Van Lobensels.)

* These battalions were collected and put in motion a quarter of an hour after those of the Middle Guard. Gourgaud and Vaudoncourt speak of them as eight in number, but they do not appear to have exceeded six. (*Libourel*, p. 299.)

† Almost at the same moment Pirch's corps entered into action in support of Bulow's corps.

‡ We follow here Gourgaud's version. Napoleon charges Durutte's

Meanwhile, the Middle Guard, supported by a line of cuirassiers, broke the Brunswicker and Nassau battalions. The Prince of Orange, while endeavouring to rally the latter, received a wound in the shoulder, which obliged him to quit the field. But suddenly Maitland's brigade made its appearance, led on by Wellington in person, and opened upon the assailants a tremendous fire, which instantly stopped them. In order to reply to that fire, the Guard endeavoured to deploy; but General Chassé, conceiving the moment to be favourable, threw his brigade upon the left of their line, while Wellington pressed them in front with Maitland's veterans.

The Guard supported that well-timed effort with unequalled energy. Whole ranks fell under the enemy's fire, like corn before the reaper. The brave Michel was mortally wounded, and Ney had his fifth horse shot under him. He rose, however, with flashing eyes and garments covered with blood and dust, to fight on foot, sword in hand, among the *triarii* of the French army. He stood for some time—as at Jena, Elchingen, and Borodino—exposed on all sides to death in a thousand shapes, yet received no hurt. He ought to have died that day amid the squares of the Guard. It would have been an end worthy of him whom the soldiers had named the bravest of the brave.

The four battalions actually engaged no sooner observed the onward march of the Prussians and the disorderly retreat of the right wing, than they lost all

division with having made a bad defence of La Haye. He asserts also that in the ranks of this division the cry was raised, "Sauve qui peut." But Marshal Ney, who was at hand, and quitted the field of battle among the last, affirms that he heard no such cry.

confidence. The other six, drawn up by squares in rear of the right, found themselves in a most critical situation. Assailed by constantly increasing numbers of fresh troops, their ranks grew every moment thinner, till presently there was left to them no other prospect than that of an honourable death. It was at this moment that Wellington moved towards the centre of his position the cavalry brigades of Vandaleur and Vivian, which the coming-up of the Prussians rendered useless on the left. These passing between La Haie Sainte and Reille's corps, turned the battalions of the Old Guard, in order to throw themselves upon the extreme right, now in full retreat. Napoleon ordered his four squadrons of body-guard, the sole cavalry which he had at his disposal, to charge them; but what could that feeble band effect against the numbers and growing confidence of the Allies? Then was the moment for him to have brought his reserves into play; but these had long been engaged, repulsed, and annihilated. It was a misfortune beyond the reach of alleviation, rendering an orderly retreat impossible, and changing a common defeat into a rout unparalleled in history.*

The same confusion marked the retreat of Erlon's corps; the Guard alone maintained an attitude of defiance.

Meanwhile, the Allies poured, wave after wave, across the plain. Already five squares were broken, and cut to pieces. Observing that frightful carnage, that he-

* "If at eight o'clock the reserve had existed," says Napoleon, "the storm which swept over the field of battle might have been stayed." Yet, a little lower down, he states that it was his intention to have brought the reserve into action at six. There is something like a contradiction between these two passages.

roic devotion, which was now without an object; seeing the squares which still showed front penetrated in all directions, their officers cut down, their ranks torn by the iron hail, Napoleon determined to put an end to such a magnificent but useless sacrifice. He withdrew his Guard, all reddened, so to speak, from that fiery furnace within which it was ready to lose the last man.* "The Guard is retiring!" exclaimed some one, and the word, repeated amid the darkness, flew from mouth to mouth, and converted retreat into flight.†

Wellington saw that the moment was propitious, and took at once a vigorous offensive. He advanced his whole line of infantry, supported by cavalry and artillery, against the French masses, which were attacked at the same time in reverse by the Prussian cavalry. A total rout was the consequence.

Napoleon hoped for a moment to arrest that entire dissolution at Rossomme‡, by forming his last regiment of the Guard into square, and desiring Gourgaud to support it with a few half-dismounted pieces which were left upon the road.§ It was a vain attempt. The darkness prevented the fugitives from discovering the rallying point, and the tumult of the battle-field ren-

* The guard disputed every inch of ground, unbroken by the mass of fugitives, till it reached the heights of La Belle Alliance, where, a moment afterwards, the English and Prussian armies formed their junction.

† Up to this moment, Reille's corps had preserved its order. It was through the interval between that corps and the squares of the Guard, that the English cavalry charged across the field of battle.

‡ Others say that it was on the high ground between the farm of Belle Alliance and Decostre's house.

§ A bullet from one of these carried off Lord Uxbridge's leg.

dered the action of detached bodies powerless. Napoleon was anxious to die in Cambronne's square*; but Soult turned his horse away, exclaiming,—"Ah, sire! the enemy are fortunate enough already!" From that moment the man of destiny fled like the rest. "The eagle was no more in the keeping of the gods."

Meanwhile the square stood its ground in order to cover the escape of the Emperor. A cry of "Surrender!" arose on all sides. A soldierlike refusal, such as history delights to place on record, was the only answer vouchsafed by Cambronne, and immediately, as if death would not come to these heroes with sufficient rapidity, they threw themselves impetuously upon the enemy's ranks. One last shout—"Vive l'Empereur!"—was heard amid the smoke and clash of arms. A moment afterwards, and there was profound silence—the Guard had perished—the Empire was brought to an end.

That glorious immolation consoles, to this day, the French people for the most terrible disaster which their arms ever sustained.

If the valour of the English troops, on that memorable day, amounts to heroism, it must be admitted that the

* According to M. St. Hilaire (author of a "History of the Imperial Guard"), the last square of the Guard was commanded by Baron Martineau. This may be true; but it is equally so that General Cambronne, with a great number of other officers, was in the middle of that square. According to the author of the "Chronological History of the Empire," there still remained at this hour three squares of the Guard. One, under the orders of Cambronne, stood upon the high ground near Decostre's house, to the left of the great road; the two others, under the command of General Petit, on the right of the Charleroi road, near the farm of Rossomme. It was into the first square that Napoleon wished to enter. This square charged the enemy, and perished; the two others retired.

BATTLE OF WATERLOO.

French army did not come short of its brilliant reputation. Indeed, we know not which to admire the most, — the steadiness of those battalions which, for two hours, sustained the charges of 7000 French cuirassiers, or the ardour of the Imperial troops, which, after a night spent in the mud, stood to their arms in the morning, the greater part of them fasting, and sustained the toil of eleven hours of battle and of marching over a trampled ground, without one word of complaint, without one sign of weakness, notwithstanding the unhappy impressions which recent desertions had left upon them, notwithstanding the bitter disappointments of the field of battle. It was a memorable day, during which might be seen, on both sides, soldiers who had never fought before rivalling, in courage, endurance, and intrepidity, the veterans of Austerlitz and Wagram.

At half-past nine in the evening Wellington and old Blucher met at the Maison du Roi, where they embraced in presence of their troops. General Gneisenau, an officer of great talent and determination, hung upon the rear of the French with the Prussian cavalry. His vigorous charges, favoured by a clear moonlight, rendered futile all attempts to rally. Wellington supported Gneisenau's movement with a part of his troops, and put himself at the head of the pursuers; but the fatigue of his soldiers compelled him to halt between Rossomme and Genappes.

The Prussians continued the pursuit with an eagerness which marked their determination to take vengeance for the disasters of Jena, Auerstaedt, and Ligny. On reaching Genappes they found, besides a mass of fugitives, the park of the French army, enclosed within barricades. But this precaution, instead of proving

useful to the vanquished, augmented their losses, by blocking up the only passage which remained open for their retreat. It was at Genappes that the Emperor's carriage was taken, as well as different objects which are yet to be seen in a special collection in London. It was here also that the Prussians, in a paroxysm of fury, slaughtered many wounded Frenchmen, and among the rest the gallant General Duhesme.

Never was battle fought with greater obstinacy and determination. About 6000 men of both armies perished in the attack upon Hougoumont. Nearly 10,000 Frenchmen were there placed *hors de combat*. Foy's division alone lost 3000 men. The total loss amounted to the following figures: — English and Hanoverians, 11,678; Netherlanders, 3178; Brunswickers, 687; Nassau troops, 643; Prussians, 6999. Total, 23,185. The French had 18,500 men killed or wounded, and 7800 taken prisoners. They lost, besides, 227 pieces of cannon.*

Among the slain, on the side of the French, were Generals Michel, Devaux, Bauduin, Donap, Autard, Mallet and Jamin. On the side of the Allies, Ponsonby and Picton. The latter fought like a lion, though he had received two wounds in the battle of the 16th.

In giving an account of the battle to Marshal Beresford, Wellington writes, "Never did I see such a pounding match. Both sides were what the boxers call gluttons. Napoleon did not manœuvre at all. He just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and was

* According to Colonel Charras, the French had 31,000 or 32,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, at Waterloo. Napoleon calculates their losses at 23,600 men, of whom 7000 were prisoners.

driven off in the old style. The only difference was, that he mixed cavalry with his infantry, and supported both with an enormous quantity of artillery."

Not less complete in its results than the combats of Agincourt, Poictiers, Hochstadt, and Vittoria, the battle of Waterloo decided the fate of the empire, and laid the foundations of the political state in which Europe continues to this day. Its loss has been attributed to various causes, some accidental, others arising out of errors committed, and orders imperfectly obeyed. If we may believe French historians, Napoleon must have inevitably conquered, had not the rains so saturated the ground as to render it impracticable for the movement of troops and guns earlier than mid-day; had not Ney committed the terrible mistake of engaging the cavalry reserves an hour too soon; had not Grouchy, through sheer indolence, lost the opportunity of reaching Wavre on the morning of the 17th, and rejected the advice of Count Gerard, to march upon the cannonade at Waterloo. But, as we have shown above, the delay in commencing the attack cannot fairly be attributed to the state of the ground, which though it was precisely the same to Wellington and Blucher as to Napoleon, did not hinder them from manœuvring at an early hour on the morning of the 18th. As to the premature employment of the reserves, it is hard to say whether Ney or Napoleon was most to blame. According to all the documents heretofore published, the responsibility appears to rest mainly with the latter, who not only made no effort to stop the false move of the cavalry, but supported it with Kellerman's troops. Be this, however, as it may, to Napoleon's neglect, in failing to replace the Duke de Treviso*—whom

* Mortier was attacked, just as the campaign was about to open,

a painful malady had removed from the command of the Guard — must be attributed the absence of skill which was observable in the handling of these troops at the critical period of the battle.

The faults attributed to Grouchy are, without doubt, of a very serious nature; yet impartial judges have recorded the opinion that if the instructions given to him at the outset had been precise, and if proper pains had been taken to convey to him the orders issued during the night of the 17th, and early in the morning of the 18th, there might have been time for him to reach the field of battle. The simple questions to be answered seem, therefore, to be, Under what circumstances would he have arrived? and, What would have been the effect of his arrival?

Of the many conjectures to which these questions have given rise, the following seems to us to be the most reasonable. On the morning of the 17th, Blucher, with the whole of his army, was in and about Wavre. Grouchy had no means of preventing that concentration, for it was not till noon that he received orders to quit Sombreffe. So far, he is perfectly blameless. The great blunder was, that he halted upwards of seventeen hours at Gembloux. But we have already seen, in spite of the Emperor's assertions to the contrary, that the fourth corps reached Gembloux only at ten at night; and not, as the St. Helena narratives assert, at five in the afternoon. And there is another mistake which, equally with this, we are bound to rectify. Napoleon has stated, that

with severe neuralgia. His illness has been considered by some writers as a mere pretext for not following the Emperor, whom the greater portion of his lieutenants regarded, at that period, as a doomed man.

at four in the afternoon of the 18th, he received the embarrassing intelligence that at ten in the morning Grouchy was still at Gembloux. Now the inaccuracy of this statement is proved by an order from Grouchy to Vandamme, which still survives among the archives of the War Department of France, and by which it appears that the third corps was directed to quit Gembloux at six in the morning. On the other hand, Gerard, in a letter to General Hulot, says distinctly, that Grouchy gave him orders to set out at eight; but that, in point of fact, his corps did not begin its march till an hour later.

These facts exculpate Grouchy, to a considerable extent, from the charge which has been brought against him, of wasting time at Gembloux. We must acknowledge, however, that on this head he is not entirely blameless. Had he been more on the alert and more determined, he might have obtained certain intelligence of the intentions of the Prussian army, and followed it up with greater alacrity.* But if we suppose that the marshal, fulfilling the Emperor's intentions, had arrived in the morning of the 18th before Wavre, would he have been able to prevent an army more than twice as strong as his own from beating him,† or else from detaching to the support of Wellington?‡ No man will believe it for

* Grouchy was not aware of the reunion of the Prussian army till he reached Sart-lez-Walhain. This was at eleven o'clock, at which hour he despatched Lieutenant-Colonel Delafresnaye to Napoleon.

† Many writers assume that Blucher could bring 86,000 men into line. We are induced to believe that his effective force did not exceed 75,000; of these, 50,000 were directed upon Waterloo, while 25,000 remained, under Thielman, at Wavre.

‡ Napoleon held to the idea, that if Grouchy had encamped during the night of the 17th, in front of Wavre, Blucher would not have ventured to detach to the support of Wellington. ("Memoirs," t. ix.,

a moment. One course, and only one, held out, under the circumstances, the faintest prospect of important results, namely to fall upon the flank of the Prussian columns, by marching in the morning of the 18th from Gembloux to Mont-Saint-Guibert.* Indeed, there is good reason to believe, though it cannot be proved, that Blucher would have suspended his movement on Ohain and St. Lambert if in the afternoon he had heard the sound of the French cannon in that direction.† But, as Jomini well observes, very few generals would have had the hardihood to throw themselves, in this manner, upon St. Lambert, in ignorance of the amount of force which it was proposed to interrupt. On the whole, then, we are led to the conclusion, that whatever damage the French army sustained from Grouchy, it would have sustained from any other leader who was not a military commander of the first order. It is true that between eleven and twelve o'clock, Gerard advised him, at Sart-lez-Walhain, to march upon the cannonade at Waterloo;‡ but this the marshal declared to be contrary

p. 174.) He rested his opinion on an entirely mistaken view of the condition, physical and moral, of the Prussian army.

* "He ought," says General Jomini, "to have moved Vandamme and Gerard, at daybreak, upon Moustier, and Pajol's cavalry and Teste's division towards Wavre, in pursuit of the rear guard."

† This may be doubted. Nothing, in all probability would have induced Blucher to halt, because he believed to the last that only the third corps had followed him. Such, also, was the opinion of the Duke of Wellington, as is shown by his letter of the 22nd of June to Lord Bathurst; in which he says, "the third corps, which, as I informed your lordship in my despatch of the 17th, had been detached to observe the Prussian army, made its retreat by Namur and Dinant."

‡ Napoleon, in his "Memoirs," attributes this advice to General Excelmans, who was not then at Sart-lez-Walhain, and who never even saw Grouchy throughout the day.

to his instructions, which required him to follow the Prussians and march upon Wavre.* Besides, had Grouchy even been disposed, acting in the spirit rather than on the letter of his instructions, to follow the advice of Gerard, he would have found it impossible to reach the field of battle before half-past eight or nine in the evening;† because, between Sart-lez-Walhain and Frichermont there is a space of six leagues and a half, and because the roads were so bad and the defiles so intricate, that it took the Prussian army, moving under similar circumstances, nine hours to compass the four leagues that separate Wavre from Mont St. Jean.

* So completely bent was the Emperor on the execution of this order, that it was reiterated in his despatch of the 18th, which Grouchy received at four in the afternoon. The following is an extract:—"The Emperor commands me to inform you that he is about to attack the English. His Majesty, therefore, desires *that you will direct your movements upon Wavre*, in order to approach us, and put yourself in accord with our operations, and communicate with us, *driving before you* the Prussian army, which has taken that route." If this order had reached its destination at noon, as was expected, Grouchy could not have acted otherwise than he did.

† Count Gerard is of opinion that he might have arrived sooner. According to him, three hours and a half should have sufficed for a march from Sart-lez-Walhain to Frichermont. According to the "Victories and Conquests," three hours only. This is a mistake. The distance, in a straight line between these two points, is about 22,000 yards; by the roads about 26,000; and these roads were in such a wretched state that the general of artillery, Baltus, declared to Grouchy that the pieces could *not* follow the infantry. As the discussion in the garden of the hotel at Sart was a long one, it would have been about one o'clock when the march began, and seven at least, as we believe, before the two corps could have reached Planchenoit. The delays experienced by the Prussian army, which had been on the move since early morning, go far to confirm this opinion.

It follows, from what has just been said, that 32,000 men, detached upon the right, if they had conformed to the instructions of Napoleon, would have found it impossible to prevent the great body of the Prussian army from coming to the support of Wellington; and, that if they had acted upon the advice of the commandant of the fourth corps, they would have arrived too late.*

The truth is, that Napoleon's only chance of victory at Waterloo depended upon his commencing the attack at an early hour in the morning, which he certainly might, and probably would have done, had he been fully aware of the actual condition of the Prussian army. But this is not all. Supposing that the Emperor had compelled the Anglo-Netherlanders to retreat, after sustaining considerable loss, what benefit would have accrued to the French army from such a victory? Probably it would have been obliged to fight a fresh battle on the morrow; and if not on the morrow, certainly in a few days afterwards half a million of

* Here is another fact quoted against Grouchy. At two o'clock on the 18th, General Berthezene arrived upon the heights of Baraque, about a league from Wavre, whence he saw the columns of Ziethen and Pirch moving in all haste towards Mont St. Jean. They were entangled at that moment in the defiles of St. Lambert. The marshal, when informed of the fact, replied that he was following his proper course, and continued his march upon Wavre. What would have been the consequence if he had thrown himself upon the flank of these columns in march? We believe that he would have been attacked by Thielman, and that Blucher would have continued his progress all the same. The adventurous character of the marshal, his promise given to Wellington that he would support him with two corps at least, and the order issued at six o'clock, when he heard the cannonade at Wavre, all tend to justify this opinion.

Russians and Austrians would have forced it to retire upon Paris.

France was torn by factions — exhausted, ruined by twenty years of war. All the energy of 1792, all the activity of the conqueror of Rivoli would have been powerless to save it. The Allies, on the other hand, were bent upon restoring the Bourbons; they were more united than ever, more powerful than at any period in history; their armies were excellent, and their generals had profited wonderfully by the severe lessons of the past. Hence, in spite of the confidence which he could not but repose in his own genius as the victor of so many coalitions, it was vain for Napoleon, in the state of isolation to which France had been reduced by the proclamation of the 13th of April, to count upon the ultimate triumph of his arms. When he passed the Sambre, the only hope for him was to finish his career with honour. No doubt some brilliant victories might yet add lustre to his eagles; but be his successes what they might, a fatal catastrophe was before him. Waterloo deceived no hope of his, except by hastening forward a few days earlier a result which must have been foreseen, and was, under all circumstances, inevitable.

The impartial historian will acknowledge that the campaign of 1815, however worthy at its opening to be ranked with the mightiest deeds of the empire, exalts in no high degree the qualities and marvellous talents which have immortalised the victor of Rivoli, of Marengo, of Ulm, of Ratisbon, of Champ-Aubert, and Montmirail.

In the morning of the 16th, Napoleon lost some precious time, which enabled Blucher to recover him-

self, and which, by the inaction to which it reduced the corps of Marshal Ney, favoured the concentration of the Anglo-Netherlands army.* On the same day he committed the fault of recalling Count d'Erlon's troops, at a moment when the Prince of Moskowa stood in the greatest need of them; and fell into the still graver error of permitting them to go away again, after they had shown themselves in rear of St. Amand. To this double mistake may be attributed the loss of the battle of Quatre Bras, and the reorganisation of the Prussian army after Ligny.

It has been said, with reason, that Blucher's defeat would have been complete and irreparable, if Napoleon, instead of inspecting the field of battle and the troops which had been engaged, had entered at once upon the pursuit of the vanquished. The Emperor has also been blamed for having neglected the opportunity of separating the Prussians from the Anglo-Netherlanders, by attacking their right in a more oblique order of battle;

* Napoleon, at six in the morning, ought to have followed up the Prussians, or else fallen with all his strength upon Wellington, whose reserves of cavalry and artillery, and a portion of his infantry, did not arrive till night, and were then worn down by fatigue. The necessity of guarding the line of retreat by Charleroi against the English general, "ought to have guided him in making his attack there." (Jomini.) This opinion agrees with that of Marshal Ney, expressed in a letter to the Duke of Otranto. The Prince of Moskowa was anxious that, instead of fighting two battles on the same day, the Emperor should have masked the Prussians with a corps of observation, and proceeded immediately with the main body of his troops to the support of the first and second corps, already engaged at Quatre Bras. Thus the English army might have been overthrown between Quatre Bras and Genappes, and separated from Blucher; the Emperor could then have turned round upon the Prussians, and destroyed them easily.

for having left behind him the sixth corps, of which the effective strength amounted to 10,500 men, and massed his cavalry upon the right, where it could not act with the same effect as upon the other wing. It has been proved, also, that from nine in the evening of the 16th, up to eight in the morning of the 17th, Napoleon had no communication with his left wing, from which he was separated by three leagues only, insomuch that Marshal Ney was ignorant, in the morning of the 17th, that the battle of Ligny had been won.*

The main body of the French army remained throughout a large portion of the 17th in the environs of Fleurus, nor was it till mid-day that Marshal Grouchy received orders to quit Sombreffe, and to follow the Prussians in the direction of Namur.† Thus, after having given up the morning of the 16th to Blucher, Napoleon committed the irreparable mistake of leaving the whole of the 17th at the disposal of Wellington.

At Waterloo itself other grievous errors were com-

* See Soult's letter to Marshal Ney, dated from Ligny eight in the morning of the 17th.

† It would have been well to have given Grouchy, early in the morning, a route intermediate between Liége and Brussels, which would have corresponded, under any hypothesis, with the line of Blucher's retreat. The occupation of the line of the Dyle would have sufficiently covered the right of the French army.

If Napoleon, in the morning of the 17th, had been acquainted with the exact situation of the Prussian army, and with Blucher's intentions, he would not have sent 32,000 men in pursuit; it was, in fact, a detachment too weak to hinder 88,000 men from arriving at Waterloo, and too strong to discharge the functions of a mere corps of observation. The Emperor's excuse lies in the mistaken idea which he entertained of the state of the army which had been beaten at Ligny.

mitted. In the first place, no pains were taken to examine with care the enemy's position. In the next place, the Emperor, convinced that the Prussians were thoroughly crippled, began the battle later than he would have done had he been under any apprehension of Blucher's arrival. He attached too much importance also to the attack upon Hougoumont, which ought to have been regarded as a diversion only, but in which he employed, from first to last, a body of troops superior in number to those of the enemy. At the same time he neglected, in the attack on that point as well as in those upon all the rest, to prepare the way for the action of his infantry by a sufficient fire of artillery and the use of petards. He made his first attempt on the left centre in columns too dense, which were not supported closely enough by cavalry; he engaged, or permitted others to engage, his reserves too soon; finally, he displayed considerable hesitation at a time, about six o'clock, when there was proof before him that a great and combined effort in the centre might have succeeded. Generally speaking, every one of the attacks delivered throughout the day was feebly supported. On this head the French writers are themselves agreed.

Marshal Grouchy blames the Emperor for having made no arrangements to keep open his communications with the right wing; and he is fully justified in so doing. That wing was neither protected nor covered; and hence, in spite of his own weakness on the left, the enemy had every right to expect that reinforcements would come to him from that quarter.

Doubts still hang over the question, whether to the Emperor himself, or to Soult as major-general, are to be attributed the absence of precision from the orders

issued, and the mistake of intrusting to a single courier the despatches forwarded to Marshal Grouchy, on which the safety of the army may be said to have depended. Care should have been taken, as was always done in Berthier's day, to have employed several officers in carrying the same order. Care ought likewise to have been taken to superintend more closely the execution of every movement on the spot, and to distribute the columns more skilfully, for which a country abounding in roads afforded ample facilities. The numerical weakness and imperfect organisation of the staff corps were undoubtedly among the causes which led to the failure of the campaign of 1815. Among the Allies, on the other hand, the staff did its duty with rare intelligence and precision*, the Prussians especially showing that they had made great progress in that branch of the art of war since the disastrous events of 1806.

Throughout the brief but decisive campaign of 1815 Wellington and Blucher exhibited as much activity as talent.

The Prussian marshal concentrated his troops with rare ability. Attacked unexpectedly on the 15th, he found himself next day at Ligny, with 80,000 men, and though defeated on that day with considerable loss, he was able, on the 17th, to assemble his whole army at Wavre. The chief of his staff proceeded the same day to arrange with Wellington his dispositions for the morrow; and on the 18th, before four in the morning,

* [It is curious to find this stated, in the face of the Duke of Wellington's repeated declarations that he believed that he had the worst army and the worst staff that ever took the field, "that he really did not know what to do with the young gentlemen whom the Horse Guards sent out to him."]

Bulow's corps had received orders to move in the direction of St. Lambert. Two other corps took the same route afterwards, insomuch that, soon after midday, about 45,000 Prussians found themselves struggling along execrable roads, threading a forest, and presenting their flank to 32,000 Frenchmen. In that march, full of peril as it was, considered as an isolated movement*, Blucher had the courage to persevere, notwithstanding that he heard, about one o'clock, the tumult of a cannonade towards Wavre.† Hence he effected his junction with Wellington at the decisive moment of the battle, and, on the defeat of the enemy, conducted a pursuit, which, considering that his men had been on

* General Müffling asserts that the situation of the Prussians would have been critical in the extreme had Wellington been beaten or Grouchy arrived while the battle was going on. "The first corps," he says, "was separated from the second, the second from the fourth, and the fourth from the first, by defilos; and between all and the the third corps was the enemy. The tracks through the Forest of Soignes had become almost impassable for artillery, in consequence of two days of heavy rain, and the high roads were in possession of the French. It is just to observe, however, that Blucher supposed his flank and rear to be threatened by Vandamme's corps only—a belief which rendered his determination less rash than it would have otherwise been.

† According to Grouchy, General Excelmans attacked the rear of the Prussians, about half-past ten, at Baraque, a short league from Wavre; but the narratives of Gerard and other witnesses show that this statement is not quite accurate. Grouchy himself says that, while the affair of the rear-guard was going on, he heard the cannonade at Waterloo, which did not open till towards noon. Besides, the third corps did not reach Baraque till about two, nor the fourth till a later hour; still the attack on Wavre seems to have been made about four. German authors say that Blucher only heard of the last attack at six; that he directed Pirch and Von Ziethen to continue their march; and Thielman to maintain himself alone, and, if defeated, to retire to Liege.

their legs about nineteen hours, was vigorous and energetic to a marvel. Exploits like these remind us of the *more* brilliant days *in* the career of the victor of Lodi; and the credit of them belongs in no slight degree to General Gneisenau, the able chief of the staff in the Prussian army.

To the Duke of Wellington equal credit is due. His plan of campaign was admirably conceived, and it may be fairly said that he left no measure neglected which was necessary to secure its success.

The selection of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe as the points of junction for the English and Prussian armies was in perfect agreement with the principles of the art of war; and the position in front of Mont St. Jean, whatever may be said to the contrary, offered an excellent field of battle. At the same time we cannot deny that he would have turned it to better account if he had placed more troops on his left and fewer on his right, because the great object of the Emperor was to separate entirely the English from the Prussians.

Tactitians observe that Wellington wisely spared his men, by concealing, as long as it was possible to do so, certain regiments behind the dip of the ground; that the unexpected apparition of these regiments disconcerted the enemy's combinations; that all his movements, from daybreak till the arrival of Blucher, were well combined, and admirably supported; that he availed himself with perfect coolness of every favourable circumstance which occurred; and most ably prolonged his defence, by bringing his reserves gradually and successively into action. We must, however, if we desire to act fairly, place side by side with these commenda-

tions a certain measure of criticism, of the fairness of which the military reader will judge for himself.

According to our view of the matter, Wellington erred in keeping his troops too long scattered in their cantonments when they ought to have been encamped. He himself was keenly alive to this censure, as it was cast upon him by General Clausewitz, in a work which appeared in 1836; and, in 1842, the Duke replied to it in a manuscript note [which we have considered it right to print *in extenso*]. In that paper he points out that he was required by the Congress of Vienna to cover Brussels, Ghent, and the communications with England, Holland, and Germany, and that he must have sacrificed all these objects at once had he withdrawn, as certain writers contend that he ought to have done, to a position in rear of Brussels. What would have been the moral effect upon the Belgian people, and even upon the young troops of which the allied army was composed, had they seen Brussels and Ghent taken, their magazines lost, and the king in precipitate flight, all because a few regiments of French light troops had made a sudden inroad into the country? To have sacrificed all these objects with a view to fight a great battle, with or without the Prussians, would have been, says the Duke, "to run a great risk in order to attain an object, the result of which, had it even been completely favourable, would not have compensated the Allies for the loss of their magazines and communications, and of the posts, of which the defence had been committed to them, and which were necessary to enable them to invade France in co-operation with the other allied armies."

Such are the Duke's reasons for adopting the course

which he actually followed, and we would not appear to undervalue their importance for a moment; yet it appears to us that it would have been judicious, not to take up a position, as Clausewitz and Kleist suggest, either in rear of Brussels or on the Sambre, with a view of staking all upon one decisive battle, but, on the 9th of June, when everything betokened a speedy invasion, to have concentrated the Anglo-Netherlands troops between Hal and Quatre Bras, and placed the reserves at the debouches of the Forest of Soignes. It would have been wise, also, at the same time to have drawn Bulow's corps nearer to the three other corps of the Prussian army. Had these steps been taken, all the political interests referred to, except the retention of Ghent, which was neither possible, nor of the slightest real importance, would have been cared for; while the allied army would have been in a condition to give battle to the French, whether they came on in the direction of the Sambre or by the Mons road.

We have seen that Wellington, up to the close of his life, and in spite of all which had been said and written on the subject, held to the opinion, that it would have been more advantageous to the Imperial army, had its attack been made from Mons and Enghien, with a view to turn the right of the Allies. That settled idea, which strategists have regarded as puerile, and which, to say the truth, the Duke himself supports with no very cogent reasons, accounts for the degree of hesitation which is manifested, in the first orders which he issued on the evening of the 15th and morning of the 16th. It accounts, also, for the presence at Hal, throughout the whole of the 18th, of a corps of 17,500 men, which rendered no useful service whatever. Be this, however, as it

may, the Duke ought unquestionably to have called in that corps to Waterloo, as soon as it became manifest that the whole French army was there in his front.

Apart from these censures, which will probably be disputed to the end of time, no serious charge can be brought against the conqueror of Waterloo, whose conduct, from the beginning to the end of the battle, was that of a great commander. The Anglo-Netherlands troops, animated by his example, and encouraged by his stoical bravery, nobly seconded his efforts. Never, according to the testimony of the French themselves, had squares sustained and repelled so many charges from a cavalry so numerous and formidable as that of the Imperial Guard. "About seven o'clock," says General Vaudencourt, "Wellington was informed that Picton's division, which on the 16th had amounted to 7188 men, was reduced to 1500 or 1600 combatants." "They must keep their ground," was his only reply, "to the last man," and they did so. To General Hill, who desired to know what his Grace's intentions were, in the event of the battle being lost, he answered, "I have no intention, except to remain where I am as long as possible." And when a general officer, whose brigade was reduced to a third of its numbers, requested leave to retire, he said, "It is impossible. He and I, and all of us must die, if necessary, where we stand." In the same spirit he passed from square to square, encouraging his men, and saying to them, with characteristic simplicity, "What will they say of us in England, if we are beaten?" Yet it is no reproach to him to believe, that over and over again, he looked at his watch anxiously, and wished for night or the arrival of the Prussians.*

* [The fact we believe to be — for we have often heard the Duke

All impartial historians are agreed that the Duke never exhibited greater activity and personal courage than on the memorable 18th of June, 1815. If it were worth while to refute the allegations of certain authors, who describe the Duke as standing motionless, like a statue, behind a tree, issuing no orders, nor paying any heed to his men, till the arrival of Blucher roused him from his lethargy; — if it were not beneath the dignity of history to contradict such calumnies as these, we might appeal to the unanimous testimony of every officer who was present in the battle. But among them there is one, who, both as a foreigner and a Spaniard, can be very little suspected of entertaining any extravagant goodwill for Wellington. We allude to General Alava, who, after the battle, wrote to his countryman, Don Pedro Cavallos, in these terms: — "About seven in the evening, Buonaparte, at the head of his Guards, made such a furious attack upon the English position, that, for a moment, the victory was indecisive, and even more than doubtful. The Duke, perceiving that the crisis had come, spoke to his troops with the effect which really great men can alone produce, and then, placing himself at their head, rushed into battle, not without incurring the most imminent personal danger. Happily, at this time, we could perceive Blucher's force, who had fallen upon the enemy's right with his usual impetuosity. It was the decisive

so express himself — that his Grace never, after the failure of the first attack on Hougoumont, and the overthrow of the columns which advanced against his centre, entertained any serious apprehensions as to the final result of the battle. If the Prussians had not come up when they did, the French would still have retired, though doubtless in better order.]

moment for an advance; whereupon the Duke put himself at the head of the English Foot Guards, addressed to them a few words, which they answered with a *hurrah;* and taking off his hat, led them to encounter, with the bayonet, man to man, the Imperial Guard."*

A French author, M. de Beauchamp, has rendered equal justice to the Duke, by saying "that at every critical moment, amidst the heaviest fire, he showed himself to his men, and gave them fresh confidence by his presence."

The Duke, with that perfect fairness and noble generosity which are so conspicuous throughout the whole of his career, attributes, in his official report, his success in the battle of Waterloo, to "the cordial and timely assistance he received from Marshal Blucher and the Prussian army."†

Some historians have taken advantage of this acknowledgment to claim for Blucher all the honour of the victory. A regard for truth obliges us to protest against this act of injustice. No doubt, at the moment of Blucher's arrival the situation of Wellington was serious; but there is no reason whatever to speak of it as desperate. Hitherto his troops had been successful in every encounter. Fortune, it is true, is apt to change; and there were tokens that she might have declared against the Allies, had not Blucher debouched on the

* Alava's Letter, as quoted by Le Mayeur.

† Blucher was less generous. In his official report of the battle he exaggerates by stating that, at the moment of the arrival of the Prussians, Wellington's position was extremely critical. A great deal is said about the valour of the English troops, but not one word of the general who had handled them so admirably.

left of their position*; but after all, assuming that the Prussians arrived in time to render the victory decisive, that circumstance was owing more to Wellington than to any spontaneous act on the part of their general; for nobody doubts that the operations of the 18th were all concerted between the two marshals. This is clearly shown in Wellington's despatch, in which it is said, "after the battle of Ligny, the Honourable Alexander Gordon was sent, escorted by a squadron of the 10th Hussars, to communicate with the Prussian head-quarters about co-operating with the British army ordered to retire to the position in front of Waterloo." General Gneisenau, besides, affirms that Wellington, on the 17th, announced to Blucher his intention to accept a battle, in the event of the marshal being able to support him with two corps; and that the marshal replied by promising to come up with the whole of his army. It even appears that the Duke received an assurance that these succours would arrive between one and two o'clock; and that if they did not arrive at that hour, it was because Blucher, for some reasons, which have never been explained or are incapable of explanation, retained Ziethen and Pirch at Wavre till noon.

To refuse to Wellington, therefore, the title of Victor at Waterloo, seems to be impossible. It was he who arranged the combined movements of the 18th, who selected the field of battle, who directed, during seven

* Chateaubriand, who was then at Ghent with Louis XVIII., states, in his "Memoirs," "that in the morning of the 18th, before a shot was fired, the Duke of Wellington declared that he should be able to hold his ground till three in the afternoon, but that if Blucher failed to come up at that time he must inevitably be destroyed."

hours, the tactical operations, and gave orders for the decisive attack at the moment when the Prussians, in fulfilment of their promise, debouched upon the enemy's right. "Every unprejudiced person must allow," says a German historian, "that the honour of the day belongs to the Anglo-Netherlanders and to the measures adopted by their great general."* Besides, if any doubts existed as to the ascendancy of Wellington's genius in this campaign, they would be at once removed by comparing it with the campaign of 1814, in which Blucher played so important a part. How multitudinous were the mistakes committed in the latter,—how few can be pointed out in the former. At Montmirail the corps of Sacken, York, and Kleist, numbering in all 40,000 men, were assaulted, beaten, and driven back upon Monee, by 16,000 Frenchmen. Blucher, with 20,000 men, was at the same time paralysed by Marmont at the head of 4000; while Schwartzenborg's army, about 100,000 strong, was kept in check by the corps of Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gerard, the united strength of which scarcely reached 18,000. Napoleon has stated that it was the recollection of these victories which determined him, in 1815, to assume the initiative against the Allies, with an army greatly inferior to theirs.

It has been said that Wellington did not expect a victory, and that he was very much astonished at the result of the battle.† Those who have studied his

* Geschichte des Preussischen Staats, 1763—1815, Frankfort, 1820, t. iii. p. 374.

† The idea that Wellington gained the battle of Waterloo by accident, or that he was greatly surprised at his own success, is not uncommon in France. We remember to have seen a portrait of the English general with the subjoined verses appended to it, which set forth, sharply enough, this notion:—

character, and seen how careful he was to leave nothing to chance, will at once reject this decision. They will observe in the elaborate arrangements which he made, the pledge of a success which could astonish only his enemies. So far was it from his intention to rely upon the inspiration of the moment, and to close his career with a brilliant disaster, that, as well before the campaign opened as on the day which was to decide its issues, he expressed, in his correspondence with many different persons, a settled confidence of the result. Thus, writing to General Lord Stewart, on the 8th of May, he says, "I say nothing about our defensive operations, because I am inclined to believe that Blucher and I are so well united, and so strong, that the enemy cannot do us much mischief. I am at the advanced post of the whole; the greatest part of the enemy's force is in my front; and if I am satisfied, others need be under no apprehension." Two days afterwards he thus expresses himself to Prince Metternich:—"It appears to me impossible that, with common prudence, and assuming us to make the most ordinary dispositions, our military operations can fail." Again, on the morning

"D'où vient cet air d'étonnement
Sur ce visage où dut briller la gloire?
C'est que le peintre a, maladroitement,
Peint le héros le jour de sa victoire."

"Whence that look of blank surprise
Reflected from the hero's eyes,
The painter caught, luckless wight,
Limning him victor in the fight?"

[It is scarcely credible that such an opinion can be entertained by any sane man, in France or anywhere else, now that the Duke's despatches show how confident he was of success from the opening to the close of the campaign.]

of the 18th, when the Imperial army was organising its order of battle, he says, in a note addressed to Sir Charles Stuart, "Pray keep the English quiet, if you can. Let them all prepare to move, but neither be in a hurry or a fright, as all will yet turn out well." Finally, he despatched at the same time a letter to the Duc de Berri, which concludes with these words:—"I hope, indeed I have every reason to believe, that all will turn out well."*

These testimonies are invaluable. They not only refute the exaggerations of the Prussians, who attribute to Blucher the success of the day at Waterloo, but they bring conspicuously into light the clear judgment and impassible coolness of the English general. Confronted by the greatest captain that ever lived, and by an army admitted on all hands to have been superior to that of the Allies, he laboured under one apprehension only, and that by no means serious, which he expressed in two letters to the Duc de Berri, the fear of being turned by Hal.

Innumerable eye-witnesses have vouched for the fact, that during the whole course of the battle Wellington exhibited neither embarrassment nor hesitation.† Al-

* Napoleon seems to have been equally confident of success. In his carriage, which was taken at Genappes, there was found a proclamation, addressed to the people of Belgium and of the left bank of the Rhine, which he proposed to publish after the Allies should have been overthrown. It contained, among others, the following sentence:—"Napoleon is among you. You are worthy to be Frenchmen. Rise in a body, join my phalanxes, and exterminate the remains of the barbarians, who are your enemies as well as mine. Given at the Palace of Lacken, 17th June, 1815." General Gneisenau, moreover, states, in his official account of the battle, that at three o'clock Napoleon sent off a courier to announce his victory in Paris.

† The English general assigned to each regiment its place in the

most every individual in immediate attendance upon him was either killed or wounded; indeed, he was on one occasion obliged, in the absence of staff officers, to send an important order by M. De Salis, a young Piedmontese officer, who happened to be in the field as an amateur. After the decisive charge which brought the struggle to an end, he pushed forward in the thick of the skirmishers; and when remonstrated with, as exposing himself unnecessarily, he replied, "What does it matter? let them fire away; the battle is won, and my life is of no consequence now."

A temperament more quick and irritable would not allow Napoleon to preserve the same invaluable calmness. He showed himself at Waterloo less active, and less resolute, than his adversary. The French indeed go so far as to reproach him with having abandoned his army too soon; but impartial history will protest against so iniquitous a judgment. To the honour of that great man she will say, that he was one of the last to quit the field of battle, and that he was anxious to die in a manner worthy of himself in the midst of the single battalion which retained its order.

Before following the Allies on their march to Paris, it will be well if we stop for a moment to consider how the left wing of the French army had conducted itself.

Grouchy was again engaged on the 19th with Thielman's corps. He was preparing to follow up his success, when, with the announcement of the defeat at Waterloo, he received orders to march by the Ardennes

battle, and personally superintended the execution of details; yet there are writers who have the temerity to assert, that he was all day in the heart of a square of infantry.

upon Laon. Prince Jerome, who had collected 25,000 men in rear of Avesnes, was, in like manner, directed upon the same point, where the whole of the disposable forces of France were instructed to assemble.

The Emperor trusted that Wellington, apprehensive of getting entangled amid the fortresses, would advance cautiously towards the Somme; therefore he halted, to wait for Grouchy, who could not be expected to join him in less than eight days. On the 20th he held a council at Laon; his own opinion was, that they ought to stand fast, in order to rally the army, but it was not adopted; and the Emperor, in consequence, proceeded on the morrow to Paris, where matters of grave importance demanded his presence.

This determination has been blamed by some historians, and applauded by others. The fact is, that it disgusted the army, which, from that moment, believed itself to be abandoned — almost betrayed. On the other hand, the arrival of the Emperor in the capital did not produce the effect which he anticipated. Far from allaying men's passions, his presence, at such a moment, served only to inflame them. The contemplation of that gifted man, so often victorious over Europe, re-entering his capital alone, and leaving behind him his army in a state of complete disorganisation, awakened again, and filled with hope and energy, party animosities, ambitious schemes long restrained, and all the angry feelings, over which despotism had triumphed. Never, not even after the disasters of Moscow and Leipsic, had the Emperor appeared so fallen; so near his end. At the head of his army, on the other hand, he would have overawed his enemies and reassured his partisans. For even now some miracle might be expected from him

who had so often astonished the world by the unlooked-for resources of his military genius.

King Joseph, who had blamed his departure from Laon, affirms that Napoleon was decided in proceeding to the capital by the following note from the President of the Chamber of Deputies: — "The greatest reverses cannot affect the entire devotion of the members of the legislative body. It is at such a moment, above all, that the Emperor will perceive that the legislative body is made up of his passionate admirers and intrepid friends."*

The Emperor soon discovered that protestations such as these were not to be accepted as realities. The first glance at public affairs convinced him that all was changed in Paris, and that the hope of opposing a national resistance to the last efforts of the coalition must be at once abandoned. The French, who had forgiven him all, even to the loss of their liberties, even to his foolish wars, as ruinous as they were bloody, could not pardon his defeat. In the eyes of that fickle people success is everything. They offer sincere homage to Liberty triumphant; they are profoundly satisfied with despotism itself, if it only holds out to them the assurance of glory. With a larger amount of intelligence and generosity than any other nation, they are wonderfully deficient in consistency of thought and steadiness of principle. Legitimacy, with them, is coincident with success; it passes from them at once when they cease to be successful. Napoleon had experience of that weakness; he was its victim; it was inevitable.

* Memoirs of Joseph, t. x. p. 35. This letter, written on the arrival of the news of the victory of Ligny, reached the Emperor immediately after his defeat at Waterloo.

In 1808 the Emperor wrote to Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias: — "Your Highness will cease to have friends when you become unfortunate; the people take the first opportunity of avenging themselves for the homage which they render us." Seven years later, he was in a position to convince himself of the bitter truth of these words. The man of destiny fell as it was right that he should fall; victory raised him to the throne; defeat cast him down again. No power of recent growth can resist misfortune. The overthrow of the Empire presents a memorable example. That fierce nation, which Buonaparte believed that he had accustomed to the bridle, and which, in fact, had long sustained, by its enthusiastic acclamations, the dreams of the great captain, being now disabused and freed, took its revenge, but in the most discreditable manner.

Instead of supporting the hero, who might still have defended his country with 70,000 devoted arms, it rejected the assistance of his genius, and shamefully opened the gates of the capital to his triumphant enemies. The functionaries whom Napoleon had overwhelmed with favours, the agents whom his liberality had enriched, his senate, so complying and servile in the days of his power, his very marshals, who ought to have remained faithful to the last, were the most eager to betray him. "We might yet try our luck with the resources which France can supply," wrote Labedoyère, Carnot, and Davoust. "It is false," said Ney, still covered with the blood of Waterloo; "you deceive yourselves; Wellington is at Nivelle with 80,000 men; the Prussians are far from being beaten; in seven days the enemy will be at the gates of the capital; your only chance of safety lies in making proposals to him."

Unworthy language this in the mouth of him whom the army had surnamed "the bravest of the brave," and who by and by justified his right to the title in so conspicuous a manner. He, and others like him, proved at that crisis that military genius is not always united to the virtues of a good citizen.

It was not at Waterloo, it was in Paris, amidst people laden with favours, that the cry, "Sauve qui peut," was raised. The indignant Labedoyère had a right to say, casting a fiery glance over his colleagues in the senate: — "Woe to the base chiefs who perhaps meditate at this moment new treasons. For six years back nothing has been heard but the voice of adulation."

Undeceived, perhaps disgusted by such cruel duplicity, by the shameless intrigues which surged around him, Napoleon abdicated for the second time, in spite of the protest of some of his old enemies, who, in the hour of misfortune, had become his partisans. He hoped that they would have proclaimed his son; but the majority of the peers, unwilling to prejudge matters, nominated, in concert with the other Chamber, a government of five, consisting of the Duke of Vicenza, the Baron Quinette, the Duke of Otranto, General Carnot, and M. Grenier.

One of the first acts of this government was to send commissioners, with La Fayette at their head, to obtain from the allied sovereigns a suspension of arms, and to open a treaty of peace. But as these delegates were not admitted to an audience by the sovereigns, another commission was named, and was instructed to negotiate an armistice with the victorious generals.

We left the allied army pursuing the enemy's columns with all the vigour of which it was capable.

Contrary to Napoleon's expectations, it passed the French frontier on the 21st, at several points. This rapidity of action had two objects in view—one military, the other political. The military object was to take advantage of the dispersion of the French army, and of the confusion produced in the capital by the unlooked-for disaster of Waterloo; the political object, which was not avowed, but which the Russian and Austrian diplomatists were not slow in pointing out, was to assure, by a rapid march, to Prussia and England a dominant influence in the final settlement of affairs at Paris. At that moment, indeed, the Russians were still upon the Maine, near Frankfort, and the Austrians on the further side of the bridge at Basle. All might be settled before their arrival; and this it was which Wellington, with his usual penetration, fully understood.

On the 23rd, Blucher and the Duke had a conference at Chatillon. It was agreed, that passing by Compiègne they should march upon the capital along the right bank of the river, and send in the direction of Laon only a few bodies of cavalry. The consequence was, that Wellington detached Prince Frederick, with three brigades of foot and one of horse, to lay siege to Quesnoy, Valenciennes, and the places on the left bank of the Sambre. Blucher sent off Pirch's corps to reduce Landrecies, Maubeuge, Marienbourg, Philippeville, and Givet; while the troops of the Germanic confederation, stationed in Luxembourg, invested the fortresses on the Meuse beyond Givet. After making these detachments there remained to Wellington about 60,000 men, and to the Prussian marshal a force still more considerable. Blucher took possession of Avesne and

Guise, after which, in the course of the 25th, he blockaded La Fere. Meanwhile, Prince Augustus directed Pirch's corps, which was in the rear, to form the sieges indicated above.

Ever since the 23rd, the second Netherlands corps, under the orders of Prince Frederick, of the Low Countries, had made various demonstrations against Quesnoy. As no signs of a determined defence were apparent, a brisk cannonade was opened upon the town during the 27th, and two days afterwards Quesnoy surrendered.

The Dutch troops began at the same period their operations against Valenciennes. The place was cannonaded for three days without effect, after which the siege languished for want of *matériel*. It was continued in the form of a blockade up to the 20th of July, on which day Condé also acknowledged Louis XVIII. as king of France.

The English army took part in these operations, which the inadequacy of the garrisons, the bad condition of the matériel, and the absence of patriotism among the inhabitants, rendered by no means difficult.

On the 25th of June, Colville's division carried the citadel of Cambray by escalade. Next day Wellington's troops entered Peronne, after having stormed a horn-work which had been erected on the left bank of the Somme. Finally, on the 28th, Blucher took Villers-Cotterets by surprise.

Meanwhile, the French army had taken the road from Laon to Soissons. Grouchy marched from Rheims towards Nanteuil-sur-Marne, and Vandamme ascended the Meuse, endeavouring to reach Lagny by La Ferté-Milon and Meaux. On the 29th, the leading troops

established themselves in front of Paris, on the left bank of the Seine; and Marshal Davoust, by order of the commission of government, placed himself at their head. Between the 29th and 30th, Wellington's army passed the Oise. When they reached Gonesse, the Duke was obliged to calm down the warlike ardour of the Prussian marshal, who wished immediately to attack Paris. "It appears to me," he writes, "that with the force which you and I have under our command at present, the attack of Paris is a matter of great risk. * * * We must incur a severe loss, if it is necessary, in any case; but in this case it is not necessary. By the delay of a few days, we shall have here the army under Marshal Prince Wrede, and the allied sovereigns with it, who will decide upon the measures to be adopted. * * * It is true we shall not have the vain triumph of entering Paris at the head of our victorious troops; but, as I have already explained to your Highness, I doubt our having the means, at present, of succeeding in an attack upon Paris." *

While Wellington was addressing to his indignant colleague these sage counsels, the commission of government, by virtue of its plenary powers, sent agents to obtain an armistice, and to sound the dispositions of the allied sovereigns with regard to the future government of France. Representing the two Chambers, in which the Bourbons had few friends, these agents were instructed to enlarge upon this point, that the Napoleon dynasty might be maintained without risk of war, and that the return of the Bourbons was incompatible with the general repose of France and of Europe.

Wellington received the agents with great politeness,

* Letter of the 2nd of July.

and stated at the outset, that he was willing to conclude such an armistice as would save Paris from the danger which threatened it. On other points he was less explicit. The agents having explained to him the state of opinion in France, and the possibility of basing an equitable arrangement on the proclamation of Napoleon the Second*, Wellington replied, "that *as an individual*, he believed that under the regency of that prince, Europe could enjoy no security and France no repose." † He accordingly insisted, with the plenipotentiaries, but only in his private capacity, on the immediate and unconditional restoration of the legitimate king. MM. de Valence and Flaugergues, replied that since, in the opinion of the Allies, the return of the House of Bourbon appeared to be an essential condition to the restoration of order and peace, there was another prince of that family, the Duke of Orleans, who seemed to offer a stronger pledge of security for France than Louis XVIII. Wellington rejected that overture, by observing that the Duke of Orleans, if placed upon the throne, could be nothing more than a usurper; and besides that his royal highness would not accept the crown, or if he did

* The agents took their cue from Fouché, who, at the outset, seemed disposed to accept any king rather than Louis XVIII. M. de Beauchamp says, "That it was a question whether it should be the Duke of Orleans, the Prince of Saxony, or a prince of the House of Orange." (T. iv. pp. 390, 391.)

† Already, before the battle of Waterloo, says Capefigue, Fouché had forewarned Wellington upon that head; he was therefore aware that the English general would not accept either Napoleon, or a regency presided over by Marie Louise. (Les Cents Jours, t. ii. p. 2, 4, 5.) This statement must, however, be received with caution, because Wellington, in a letter written in 1815 to Dumouriez, affirms, "that he had no communication whatever with the Duke of Otranto previous to his arrival in Paris."

accept it for the moment, it would only be to hand it over to Louis. XVIII. "Therefore," continued he, "it is most important that you should recall the king without loss of time, as it will then appear that the measure has not been forced upon you by the Allies."*

This excellent advice would have saved France from much misfortune, if these agents had possessed good sense and patriotism enough to act upon it. Unfortunately the Chambers were not equal to the occasion. Previously to the departure of Napoleon for the army, and even while he was face to face with the enemy, they had wasted their time in useless and aimless discussion. Hence when the moment arrived for arming the country to resist a formidable aggression, the deputies busied themselves entirely in schemes for the setting up of a constitution, and for imposing certain restraints upon the exercise of supreme power. Their behaviour after the catastrophe was more contemptible still. Instead of frankly supporting the chief of the army, and even investing him with the authority of a dictator (the sole means left of saving the country from invasion), they abandoned the great captain in his misfortunes, and gave themselves over unconditionally to a provisional government, of which Fouché was the soul and the head. At a moment when it ought to have been bravely organising a system of national defence, the Chamber amused itself, says an historian, by inquiring philosophically whether Antoninus, Trajan, and Marcus Aurelius had abolished the law of confiscation; and considered that much had been done for public safety when the deputy's medallion was replaced by the tricoloured scarf.

The proclamation of Louis XVIII., had it been

* Wellington's letter to Lord Bathurst, 2nd of July, 1815.

issued spontaneously and at once, would have removed every difficulty, for the Allies made no secret of the fact, that the sole object which they had in view, was to overthrow the usurper, and restore the Bourbons. That object gained, there would have been no occasion for the march of their troops upon Paris, and it is quite possible that they might have been satisfied without leaving an army of occupation in France. But the Chamber, pusillanimous to the last, was afraid to raise the cry either of "Vive l'Empereur," or "Vive le Roi," while the deputies from the provisional government persisted in reporting to Wellington, "that any form of government, any dynasty, would be more acceptable to France than the elder branch of the House of Bourbon." Thus, after renouncing the only man who was capable of conducting the war, no one ventured to proclaim him through whom peace could be secured. The people alone showed themselves capable of reasoning for a moment, when they proposed to place Napoleon at the head of the armed sections, and to confer upon him the powers of a dictator, in terms consistent with revolutionary principles. But he whom they would have constituted the restorer of order in France, either dreaded the democracy too much, or believed it to be incapable of saving his crown. He preferred, therefore, to yield to his fate, and to fall alone.

On the 25th of June Napoleon withdrew, attended by a few faithful servants, to Malmaison. His spirit, less firm at that trying moment than it ought to have been, appeared to resign itself to any amount of sacrifice. But the Allied sovereigns were by no means satisfied that he who had so recently been master of Europe should now abide under the surveillance of

Fouché, in his own imperial residence. Wherefore Wellington, after consultation with Blucher, informed the commissioners, on the 29th of June, "that no armistice could be granted as long as Napoleon Buonaparte remained in Paris and at liberty."

Military operations were, accordingly, resumed, in spite of the anxious desire of the English general to save Paris from the horrors of an assault. Blucher, on the other hand, did his utmost to bring matters to a violent issue. At the very moment when his colleague was negotiating with the commissioners, he crossed the Seine at Pecq.* This rash movement, undertaken for the purpose of turning the works on the north of the capital, isolated the Prussian army; the advanced guard of which was fiercely attacked by General Excelmans, and suffered considerable loss.

Such a mistake on Blucher's part would have cost the Allies dear, scattered, as they then were, over a front of fifteen leagues, had an able officer placed himself, on the instant, at the head of the French troops concentrated in and about Paris. At any other time, Davoust would have been that officer. Under existing circumstances he was playing, too clearly, the game of the Allies, to think of profiting by their weakness.

* Thibaudeau, t. x. p. 436, and after him Colonel Charras, assert that this movement was concerted with Wellington at Gonesse. General Vaudencourt is of opinion that the movement was dictated by considerations of policy; that its object was to cut off the communications between Paris and half of the departments, and thus to compel the city to capitulate. He believes, however, that Wellington would not have advanced if he had not been aware that the commander of the French army intended to offer no resistance. This, also, is the view taken by Müffling (t. iv. p. 51), and by the author of the "Victories and Conquests."

Napoleon regarded the moment as favourable for avenging his late defeat, and proposed to the Provisional Government to resume the command, not as Emperor, but as general. He calculated on achieving such success as would facilitate the progress of negotiation, and enable the grand army to take its leave of France amid the renown of a victory. But this magnanimous proposal was thwarted by the low intrigues of Fouché. Carnot alone, early proscribed by Buonaparte, supported him amidst his misfortunes; and contended that the chances of battle ought to be tried again and again—that France ought to fight to the last.

This final effort having failed, there remained for the Emperor no alternative, except to become once more an exile. He therefore quitted Malmaison, on the 29th of June, at four in the afternoon. And he was scarcely gone—following the road to Rochefort—ere a party of Prussians broke into the palace. It is well known that these soldiers manifested the utmost fury at having failed to secure their illustrious victim, whom Blucher had sworn to hang at the head of his columns.*

The departure of the Emperor, thus cleverly arranged by Fouché, removed one great difficulty out of the way, and simplified the task undertaken by the commissioners and the Provisional Government.† As a condition preliminary to all others, Wellington required that the whole of the French troops should withdraw beyond the Loire. This point, as well as all the rest on which he insisted, was conceded; insomuch that, during the night between

* See Thibaudeau, t. x. p. 446; Capefigue, Hist. de la Restauration, t. ii. p. 552; and Vaudencourt, t. iv. p. 205.

† The original commissioners had by this time resigned, and were succeeded by others.

the 3rd and 4th of July, a convention was agreed upon, and received the signatures of Blucher, Wellington, and the Prince of Eckmuhl. It was to the effect that in three days the French army should evacuate the capital, and remove, within a week, with its stores, its artillery, its public baggage, and the private property belonging to the regiments, behind the Loire.

This was, to all intents and purposes, the title alone excepted, a capitulation. In order to obtain it, Davoust addressed himself in writing to General Ziethen, the commander of the Prussian advanced guard, from whom he received the following brief and humiliating reply:— "I dare not lay before Prince Blucher your demand for a capitulation; but if the city and the army be willing to surrender, I will grant them a suspension of hostilities."*

Fouché was more successful with Wellington, because the Duke was anxious to complete the arrangements previously to the arrival of the Russians and Austrians. His great object was to give an English bias to the new government, and to obtain for his own country the moral influence which in 1814 had been exercised by Alexander.

However humiliating to the French army this negotiation may have been, it would be unjust to hold either Davoust or Fouché individually responsible for it. Both had been adverse, at the outset, to the cause of the Bourbons; both latterly espoused it, and they undertook, in consequence, to render the maintenance of Paris impossible, and to create a general conviction of its impos-

* Letter of the 2nd July, 1815 (Vaudencourt, t. iv. p. 262). On the 3rd of June, Davoust had made a similar application to Wellington, which was refused, though in polite terms. Blucher's answer was in a rougher strain.

sibility. A council of defence, comprehending, among other members, Soult, Lefebvre, Grouchy, and Marmont, signed, at three o'clock in the morning of the 2nd of July, a notice, which shows to what a depth of degradation men's characters had universally fallen at that epoch.* How just is the reproach which has been cast upon the whole transaction! "In 1814, 45,000 Frenchmen held their ground against 150,000 foreigners, without entertaining any fear that they could penetrate into Paris; they capitulated sword in hand, covered with the blood of their enemies. In 1815, Davoust, with 71,000 Frenchmen — of whom 15,000 were cavalry — did not dare to encounter 100,000 Anglo-Prussians, and surrendered with his sword in its sheath. Posterity will acknowledge that such deep stains could not have been inflicted on the honour of France had Marshals Ney, Mortier, Grouchy, Massena, and Soult, been animated by the patriotism of simple soldiers, or of the workmen of the Faubourgs." †

The Allies established themselves on the 4th at Neuilly and St. Denis; they took possession of the barriers on the 5th. Next day Wellington and Blucher

* De Vaudencourt (t. iv. p. 239) gives some curious details of the proceedings of this Council of War; which was a sort of comedy, arranged for the occasion by Fouché and Davoust. Carnot was the only member of the Provisional Government who voted against the capitulation.

† Thibaudeau. It is but fair to observe, however, that no fresh act of heroism on the part of the army could have saved France; for 60,000 Bavarians and Germans were already on the Marne, and were followed, at an interval of five marches, by 200,000 Russians and 185,000 Austrians. There are, however, moments when armies are bound to fight, for the sole purpose of saving the national honour, and this was certainly not compromised by the Provisional Government of 1815.

entered the capital, where they were honoured with demonstrations very little creditable to the French character.

His Majesty Louis XVIII. arrived on the 6th. It was at the instance of Wellington, and contrary to Talleyrand's advice, that the king followed so close upon the steps of the victorious armies. That act of *imprudence*, as it was then called, produced all the effect which the Duke had anticipated from it. It scattered the adherents of Buonaparte, confirmed the loyalty of the friends of the Bourbons, and lastly, it decided the timid and the wavering to hold fast by the cause of legitimacy. We have shown how much more sound were, on other occasions, the views of the English general than those of statesmen whose reputation stood the highest. The result proved, that in the present case, he better understood the temper and feeling of France than even the subtle and too celebrated Prince of Benevento himself.

The importance of the part played by the Duke of Wellington at both restorations of the house of Bourbon has never been adequately described. It was by his army that in 1814 the cry of "Vive le Roi" was first raised; it was again he who, with the assistance of Fouché, prepared the way, in 1815, for the king's return. The difficulties which beset him in the accomplishment of the latter task were at once great and varied. It devolved upon him to separate the Emperor from the French army; to neutralise the action of the Chambers, hostile, to a man, to the Bourbons*; to guard

* On the 1st of July a decree of proscription against the Bourbons was made out and received with applause in the Chamber of Deputies.

against a rising of the people, who, as well as the troops, clamoured for the establishment of the imperial dynasty; to restrain the extreme royalist party, which would have compromised every thing by their intemperance; and, though last, not least, to overcome, if not the repugnance, at all events the indifference, which the allied sovereigns displayed towards Louis XVIII.*

With a view to overcome these difficulties, Wellington made his appeal to Fouché, with whom, for some time back, he had been in communication, through two secret agents, Macirone and General Tromeling. The Duke has been blamed for making choice of so dishonourable an instrument; but we cannot acknowledge the justice of the censure. In critical moments, and when great and useful objects are to be attained, it is not always possible to select either the men or the means. Fouché, no doubt, amid the intrigues which characterised that epoch, displayed little private honour or political probity, yet Wellington could neither ignore nor undervalue the great ability of such a man. No one so well as he understood how to work upon public opinion, and

* This is evident from the following letter of the Duke to Dumouriez. "I knew, on my arrival in Paris, that the Allies were by no means unanimous in the king's favour; that they did not particularly desire the restoration; that the army and the Chambers were opposed to it; that there were four provinces in a state of rebellion; and that the rest, including Paris, were perfectly indifferent. It was very evident to me that, unless I gained over Fouché to the cause of the restoration, his Majesty would be obliged to remain at St. Denis, at all events till the sovereigns should arrive, which must have been, in any case, hurtful to his authority and his dignity. I recommended his Majesty to take Fouché into his service; and I am perfectly certain that to this advice his Majesty is indebted for his quiet restoration."

render it favourable to the restoration of Louis XVIII. And this consideration alone would have induced the English general to lean greatly upon him. But Wellington knew also that Fouché's ideas were liberal and tolerant. He believed that the intervention of such a man would be required to counterbalance the influence of the king's ordinary advisers. And hence, and for no other reason, he urged Louis XVIII. to make Fouché his minister of police, to the exclusion of M. de Blacas, who, by his retrogressive policy, had done much disservice to the cause of legitimacy.

Fouché was not long installed in his new office before he addressed to the king an elaborate paper, in which he explained the system of tolerance and moderation on which he purposed to act. This system he had already explained to the Duke in the following terms *:—"It is absolutely necessary that the Anglo-Prussian army should hasten its march upon Paris; there must be no more blood shed. I will be answerable for Paris, and for its submission. If the king will only give guarantees — if he will only proclaim a system of comprehensive and constitutional government, the restoration shall be complete and spontaneous."

These views were in all important respects the same as those entertained by the English general, who not only approved of them, but did all in his power to ensure their acceptance elsewhere. "It is essential," he wrote to the king, "that your Majesty's arrival should be preceded by some act announcing your intention to forget and forgive, and pledging you to govern according to the letter and spirit of the charter." †

* See his letter of 24th June, 1815.

† Capefigue, Hist. de la Restauration, t. ii. p. 480.

All these circumstances distinctly prove, that to the Duke of Wellington Louis XVIII. was mainly indebted for his restoration to the throne. It is in reference to this fact that a French historian * says:—"The only head capable of dealing efficiently with the case was that of the Duke of Wellington. Fouché entertained the highest opinion of his Grace; he believed that it was his destiny to play a great part, and that he was more capable than anybody else of comprehending the real state of affairs."

True to his principles of order and moderation, the Duke behaved to the French people with the consideration that is due to honourable enemies on whom misfortune has fallen heavily. Before crossing the frontier, he had reminded the soldiers under his command "that their respective sovereigns were the allies of Louis XVIII., that France must, therefore, be treated as a friendly country." He positively prohibited them "from taking any thing without paying for it;" and to give additional solemnity to the prohibition, he made it known to the French people, in a proclamation dated at Malplaquet on the 22nd of June.†

In all the negotiations which were carried on at that period, the English general invariably threw the weight of his influence into the scale of moderation. As often as Blucher proposed to perpetrate some act of violence, Wellington strove to soothe him, or at least to gain time, by appealing to the propriety of waiting for the

* Capefigue, Les Cent Jours, t. ii. p. 306.

† He took every possible pains to enforce obedience to that order, as is shown by the severe terms in which he wrote, on the 27th of June, to a Netherlands general officer, complaining of the disorderly state of his corps, and their incorrigible disposition to plunder.

allied sovereigns, so that nothing might be done except by common consent. It was thus that he evaded the immediate levy of a contribution of 100,000,000 francs upon the city of Paris, and prevented the destruction of the column of Austerlitz, which his colleague, animated by a spirit of revenge, was eager to break down.* In the affair of the bridge of Jena, the Duke displayed as much of energy as of firmness. Blucher had already prepared his mines for blowing down its arches. Wellington used every means of conciliation to hinder the perpetration of such a barbarous act, and when these failed, and the fate of the bridge appeared imminent, he planted an English sentry at each approach to it, and declared that any attempt to force them would be treated as a rupture with Great Britain.†

The Duke entertained the greatest horror of acts of Vandalism. So far from exciting his troops to avenge upon the monuments in Paris the disasters which the Allies had suffered, he took the most stringent measures to prevent every thing like disorder and violence.‡ He would not permit the officers themselves to assume that air and tone of authority which the soldier naturally puts on

* See his letter of the 5th of July to General Müffling, and those of the same date and of the 9th to Prince Blucher. The Prince made no secret of his desire to avenge, by the destruction of the monument of Austerlitz, the removal of the column of Rosbach by the French; while the 100,000,000 francs he demanded, first for the maintenance of his troops, and next as repayment of the sum exacted from the city of Berlin by Napoleon.

† Alison, t. x. p. 482. Capefigue, Les Cent Jours, t. ii. p. 365.

‡ It was, doubtless, on this account that he caused his troops to encamp outside Paris, in the Champs Elysées, and the Bois de Boulogne. The Prussians, on the contrary, bivouacked in the public squares, and were very insolent in their manner.

when he enters an enemy's capital as a conqueror. Thus, on his arrival in Paris, he issued an order of the day complaining of trifling irregularities which would have escaped the notice of any other general. "Certain officers," he says, "have compelled the box-keepers of the theatres to admit them into private boxes; this is quite contrary to rule and to the good order which is so becoming in the English army, and of which it is the model."

By another order of the day, published at a time when the Prussians were conducting themselves in the most insolent manner, Wellington charged his officers to set an example of willing obedience to the laws, by quietly submitting to be examined at the barriers of Paris by the custom-house officers. He permitted the mayors, likewise, to invite his soldiers to assist the peasants in getting in the harvest. In a word, his respect for property was carried so far, that he peremptorily prohibited his officers, of all ranks, from shooting in France without leave from the landholders. It appears to us that details of this sort, which touch the very core of Wellington's character, are not unworthy of a place in history.

The generous nature of the Duke never yielded to those fits of anger and hatred which prevail in hearts that are subject to common passions.* He never,

* [The Duke's natural temper was irritable in the extreme, and it was only his high sense of right that enabled him to restrain it. He became calm, however, in proportion as difficulties and dangers accumulated round him. At Waterloo, and elsewhere, he gave his orders, in the most critical moments, without the slightest excitement, and in a tone of voice almost more than usually subdued.]

under any circumstances, gave way to a burst of indignation against his enemies. His conduct towards the natives of India and towards the French was that of a humane general and philosopher.

The capitulation of Paris was characterised by liberality and forbearance; it was thus, at least, that the allied sovereigns regarded it, because they took the greatest pains to make it known, on their arrival in Paris, that they were in no degree bound by it, that it was the personal act of Wellington and Blucher. That protest was followed by an act painful to France, though just in the main, namely, the restitution of the objects of art which Napoleon had removed from conquered states.*

The obstinacy of the Chambers in declining to proclaim Louis XVIII. originated, or served as a pretext for measures still more rigorous. As France continued to threaten the public peace by her revolutionary spirit and hostile attitude towards the legitimate king, the allied sovereigns considered themselves absolved from the obligation into which they had publicly entered to respect her territorial limits. They accordingly laid down the following conditions as the basis of a treaty:—

1. A war contribution.
2. The military occupation of the country.

* It is very unfair to blame Wellington for not preventing that act of spoliation, as they call it in France. Previously to the capitulation of Paris, Louis XVIII. had already promised to the King of the Netherlands and the King of Prussia the restitution of the objects of art which belonged to them. It was manifestly impossible for Wellington to oppose himself to engagements of this sort, and to show himself more of a Frenchman than the King of France himself.

3. A re-arrangement of the frontiers.

4. A line of fortresses, erected at the expense of France, to girdle her in on the side of Belgium.

Severe and disastrous conditions these, from which France perhaps might have escaped, if she had followed the advice given by Wellington to the commissioners of the Provisional Government.

Many conferences took place at this period, during which the bases described above were considered by the allied sovereigns. The moderation which the English general displayed in these conferences did him the greatest honour. But that which above all other things set forth the nobleness of his character and his great political capacity, was the resistance which he offered to the dismemberment of the French territory. The majority of the allied sovereigns, dreading a fresh outburst, were anxious to reduce the territorial and military importance of France; and they were the more anxious about it, that each found in it some means of filling up the measure of his own ambition. Austria insisted on the restitution of Alsace and Lorraine; Spain set up pretensions to the Basque Provinces; Prussia pointed out that her security would be incomplete without Mayence, Luxembourg, and all the districts contiguous to her border-line. The King of the Low Countries demanded back the fortresses in the north of France, and was supported in that claim by England, who, according to the testimony of Prince Hardenberg, saw at that time that the loss to France of these fortresses would be a gain to the Low Countries, by rendering that kingdom in some measure formidable to a nation of which, because of its vicinity, it would become the natural enemy. Wellington, who adopted

neither that opinion nor the opinion of the other princes who were interested in the partition, pointed out that it would be bad policy so to humiliate France as to drive her into a fresh insurrection. "In my opinion," he writes to Lord Castlereagh, "the Allies have no just right to make any material inroad on the treaty of Paris, although that treaty leaves France too strong in relation to other powers; but I think I can show that the real interests of the Allies would lead them to adopt the measures which justice in this instance requires from them. But my objection to the demand of a great cession from France on this occasion is, that it will defeat the object which the Allies have held out to themselves in the present and preceding wars. That which has been their object has been to put an end to the French revolution, to obtain peace for themselves and for their people, to have the power of reducing their overgrown military establishments, and the leisure to attend to the internal concerns of their several nations, and to improve the situation of their people." Now this object, according to Wellington's view of the case, could not be attained by measures calculated to exasperate the legitimate pride of the French nation and of its government. "In my opinion, then, we ought to continue to keep our great object — the genuine peace and tranquillity of the world — in our view, and shape our arrangements so as to provide for it. Revolutionary France is more likely to distress the world than France, however strong in her frontier, under a regular government; and that is the situation in which we ought to endeavour to place her."*

* Letter of the 31st of August, 1815, to Lord Castlereagh.

With respect to the cession of the northern fortresses, Wellington pointed out, "that it would not be enough to take away some valuable portions of the French monarchy; that it should be understood to whom they were to be given; that the new kingdom of the Low Countries was not in a state to occupy and defend, without inconvenience, such an extensive line; that the measure would furnish to France a plausible pretext for declaring war, and for supporting it with all the means which outraged national pride could supply. In a word, that the only mode of cutting short these difficulties and obtaining a judicious substitute for the cession of the greater part of these French fortresses would be to fortify certain towns along the boundary line of the Low Countries." *

As the Duke exercised, in other respects, great influence over the councils of the Allies, so his opinion prevailed on the present occasion. They requested him to select the positions of the new fortresses, and joined with him, for that purpose, certain English and Dutch engineers.

At the same time, while strongly opposed to the partition of France, Wellington insisted upon the military occupation of the country during a fixed term of years. That plan appeared to him immeasurably superior to all others, inasmuch as it would give to Louis XVIII. the strength and security that were required for the reorganisation of his own army and settling the groundwork of a new government; as it would introduce into France, after twenty-five years of war, habits of

* Capefigue, Histoire de la Restauration, vol. iii. p. 97.

order and of peace; as it would guarantee the Allies against the return of some new commotion, whether revolutionary or Bonapartist; as it would enable them, at the same time, to exact from France the payment of the contribution which they had determined to levy; and, lastly, as it would give them time to reconstruct the artificial boundaries of their respective states, to strengthen their governments, shaken by so many terrible blows, to better the condition of their people, and to consolidate their means of defence, by maturely considering the results which had been obtained during the late wars.

Wellington, supported by Talleyrand, Castlereagh, and Nesselrode, succeeded in carrying his point, and the Allies gave to him the command of the army of occupation.* It was a charge difficult and painful throughout, which exposed him to all the prejudices and anger of a people humiliated rather than conquered,—fretting rather than resigned under the yoke. Yet the Duke acquitted himself therein so as to irritate no one, not even the French themselves, whose interests and self-love he knew how to manage with as much of propriety as of talent. His numerous general orders testify to the kindness and gentleness which he displayed in the execution of the most rigorous of his duties; and it can be said with truth, that his name was not mixed up with any one of the reactionary measures which gave its character to the second restoration. Persons and property were the objects of his constant care; so that the slightest act of violence committed by an English

* The army consisted of 30,000 English, 30,000 Prussians, 30,000 Russians, 30,000 Austrians, and 30,000 men furnished by the smaller states of Germany.

soldier or functionary was treated by him with the greatest severity.

This line of conduct, well known to Alexander and appreciated by him, contributed greatly to alleviate the expenses and misfortunes of France. In 1817, the Czar wrote to his minister in Paris to propose the recall of a fifth part of the army of occupation; and the Duke of Wellington, when consulted, declared that the measure appeared to him to be useful in itself and conducive to the public interests. Upon his advice, the Foreign Ministers decided upon sending away 30,000 men on the 1st of April, 1817.

About the same time, Wellington, at the express desire of Alexander, undertook the chief management of negotiations on the subject of debts contracted by individuals, and the fairest mode of settling them according to some common plan. "You will appreciate," said the Czar, writing to him on this subject, "the importance of the grave considerations which turn upon a scheme of equitable conciliation. You will apply all the light of a truthful spirit, all the warmth of an elevated soul, to the consideration of circumstances on which depend, perhaps, the repose of France and the inviolability of the most sacred engagements."

Wellington was nominated President of the Commission of Diplomacy and Finance. The large powers which he exercised in that capacity enabled him to carry into effect the liberal views of Alexander, with which, indeed, his own entirely coincided.

By and by a still more important question occupied public attention, and enabled the Duke to render a signal service to France. We allude to the complete evacuation of the territory, with which great interests and

difficulties of the first magnitude were connected. We shall see, by and by, that it was the part taken by Wellington in this negotiation, happily terminated in 1818, which gave him the opportunity, at last, of enjoying in his own country the repose which his eminent services had so nobly earned.

Here ends the military career of the Duke of Wellington. It was the fate of that man, simple and laborious in his habits, to contribute, more than any other, to the overthrow of the French empire. Yet he never, except on one occasion, found himself in presence of the extraordinary genius who had raised it to the pinnacle of its glory. If the truth must be spoken, however, it was by no means that day which decided the fate of Napoleon. Already in 1808 Wellington had discovered the vulnerable point in the Colossus, the focus of European resistance. From that moment, busied as he was in effecting the deliverance of the Peninsula, he neglected no opportunity of reanimating the zeal and reawakening the hopes of nations far removed from the immediate scene of conflict.

It cannot be doubted that the campaign of 1810 against Massena in Portugal induced the Emperor Alexander to run all risks, and to break the hollow alliance of Tilsit. At all events, it must be allowed that the Russian generals, in 1812, followed exactly the system of warfare which Wellington had adopted after Busaco. They were no longer the fiery strategists of Austerlitz and Friedland, eager, at all hazards, to fight battles; they had become the methodical Englishmen of 1810, retiring across a devastated country, and showing themselves anxious only about the successful issue of the campaign.

When Alexander's generals halted to fight upon the field of Borodino, what was the appeal which they made to their army? That Napoleon had lost a great battle at Salamanca, and that the French empire shook to its base. And when they were abandoning Moscow, in what terms did they reanimate the courage of their soldiers? "The campaign is ended on the side of the enemy; with us it is only beginning; Madrid is taken." Why did the Russians continue to resist? Why did they not accept terms of peace? Because every courier brought them good tidings, and an encouragement to persevere.*

The battle of Vittoria determined Austria, still undecided, to take part in the coalition. On receiving intelligence of that action, the Emperor Francis is described as exclaiming, "My son-in-law appears to be as little successful in the south as in the north."

The successes obtained over Marshal Soult in the Pyrenees, led to the renewal of hostilities on the expiration of the armistice of Prague; and the first steps taken by the English general in the south of France called forth a legitimist reaction, which very many thoughtful men had considered to be impossible.

The effect of Wellington's victories was manifested even in the language of the English opposition. They no longer launched out, as heretofore, against the bellicose absurdities of the cabinet, and the useless valour of its general. Now the war must be pertinaciously continued; and they vied with each other in supplying money for that purpose. "The leading members of the opposition," says Alison, "might be even seen

* T. Maurel, p. 40.

covering the government with reproaches, because, in deference to their former arguments, it had neglected to prosecute hostilities with greater vigour."

Thus all things combined to prove that the glorious struggle maintained by Wellington in Spain was the starting point of that great coalition which overthrew the French empire. The Emperor himself testifies to this opinion when, seeking on the rock of St. Helena to account for his past glories and reverses, he exclaims: — "The war in Spain was my gnawing cancer."

Waterloo was, in truth, but an incident in the death-struggle; and the English general spoke wisely when, in answer to the declaration of the Commissioners of the Provisional Government, "the empire is at an end," he replied: — "I have long been aware of that fact."

APPENDIX.

Soon after the publication of General Clausewitz's Narrative, the volume was put by Colonel Gurwood into the hands of the Duke of Wellington, who read it carefully, and made his remarks upon it in an important paper, of which the following is a transcript:—

MEM. BY THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

"In discussing the battle of Waterloo, and the military movements previous thereto, it is necessary to advert to the state of Europe at the moment—to the military position of the Allies, on the one hand, and of Buonaparte and France on the other.

"The powers of Europe had, in 1814, made peace with France, governed by King Louis XVIII. A congress was assembled at Vienna, composed of ministers from the principal powers engaged in the previous war, and from his most Christian Majesty, to regulate and settle various points left unsettled by the treaties of peace, not only as between France and the powers engaged in the war, but questions affecting the relative interests of all, arising out of the long and extensive warfare, the consequence of the French revolution.

"Buonaparte having abdicated his power, and having retired to the island of Elba, under the sanction of a treaty, returned to France early in March, 1815, with a detachment of his Guards, which had attended him to the island of Elba, and arrived at Paris on the 20th of March, and overturned the government of King Louis XVIII., who fled to Lille, and subsequently to Ghent and the Netherlands; and Buonaparte usurped the government of France.

"Whatever we may think of the settlement of the government of France, of the state of possession of the different parts of Europe and of the world, as fixed by the treaties of peace and by the subsequent diplomatic transactions at Vienna, at that moment completed, they constituted, at that time, the public law of Europe, and the state of possession of the several powers under authority thereof. This must never be lost sight of in the consideration of this subject.

"From the moment in which Buonaparte drove Louis XVIII. from Paris, and usurped his throne, it was obvious that the war would be renewed; and the first thing that was done by the ministers of the Allies at Vienna, upon learning the invasion of France by Buonaparte, his march upon Paris, and his usurpation of the government, was to renew, and render applicable to the circumstances of the moment, their former treaty of alliance, concluded at Chaumont in the month of March, 1814.

"Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington, being the plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty at the Congress of Vienna at this period, having concluded and signed the treaty of alliance on the 25th March, and concluded all the arrangements connected with that instrument,

and having been appointed to command the allied army assembled in the Netherlands, set out from Vienna to join the same, and reached Brussels in the first days of April.

"The treaty of peace of 1814 had rendered necessary the occupation of the provinces commonly called the Belgian Provinces, by an army composed of British, Hanoverian, and Dutch troops, under the command of His Royal Highness the hereditary Prince of Orange; the German provinces, on the left bank of the Meuse, extending from the province of Lorraine to the junction of the Rhine with the Meuse, by Prussian troops; the Italian provinces, forming what had been called the kingdom of Italy, by the Austrian army; indeed, the Austrian army was, at about this time, engaged in the active operations of war with Murat, King of Naples; and the provinces in Poland forming the kingdom of Saxon Poland.

"Thus the armies of the Allies were distributed in different parts of Europe, while the greater part of that of England had been detached to North America; and notwithstanding that the treaty of peace had been concluded at Ghent on the 24th of December, 1814, between his Britannic Majesty and the United States, sufficient time had not elapsed to enable his Britannic Majesty's ministers to bring back the troops to Europe.

"On the other hand, Buonaparte found an army in France completely organised, consisting of not less than 250,000 men, with cannon and all that was required to make them efficient for the field. There were, besides, in the country many old soldiers available for the service who had been prisoners of war in England, in

Russia, and elsewhere, besides the men discharged from the corps of the Imperial Guards. It is obvious that the first measures which the generals commanding the army of the Allies could take, must have been defensive. Those in the Belgian provinces, and those on the left bank of the Rhine, must have been strictly and cautiously formed on these principles.

"Their forces were weak in comparison with the French force opposed to, or which might be brought against, them. The latter enjoyed other advantages in the nature and strength of their frontier.

"These allied troops were at the outposts; they were destined to protect the march of the other armies of the Allies, and the countries which were intended to be the basis of the operations to be carried on against the enemy, for which the treaty of the 25th of March had made provision.

"The army in the Belgian provinces, under the command of the Duke of Wellington, from the first days of April, had particular interests to attend to — as each of the other armies had, each in the districts under its charge — besides the general operations of the war.

"That army, composed of British, Dutch, and Hanoverian troops, had to preserve the communications with England, Holland, and Germany. It was connected with the Prussian army by its left, the communication of which with Germany was absolutely necessary.

"The Prince Sovereign, afterwards King of the Netherlands, to whom the Belgian provinces had been ceded by the Congress of Vienna, had fixed the seat of his government at Brussels; and the king, Louis XVIII. having found himself under the necessity of with-

drawing from France altogether, had fixed his residence at Ghent.

"Buonaparte had great advantages, whether for an offensive operation on the territory of the Allies or for the defence of his own, in the number, the position, and the strength of the fortresses on the north-eastern frontier of France.

"He might fix and organise his armies within these, out of sight, and almost without the knowledge of the allied generals, almost to the last moment previous to an attack, and it was impossible for the Allies to attempt to carry on an offensive operation against the French position which should not include the means of carrying on one or more sieges, possibly at the same moment.

"The inconveniences, difficulties, and disadvantages of this defensive system were aggravated by the uncertainty of the length of time during which it must last.

"That is to say, till the Austrian armies, having terminated their operations in Italy against Murat, should have reached the Upper Rhine, and there formed a junction with the armies of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, and the Russian armies should have retrograded from Poland, should have crossed Germany, and have formed upon the Rhine, the Maine, and the Moselle.

"It is complained of by the Prussian historian, Clausewitz, that he had never been able to obtain the sight of a return of the army under the command of the Duke of Wellington, made up in the form of what is called a line of battle.

"This at best is the complaint of the want of a return made up in a particular form, and it would not have

been noticed here, if it were not desirable to draw the attention of the reader to the general tone and temper of this history. The reputation of its army, and, above all, of the generals commanding the same, is an object of the greatest importance to all nations; and we find the historians of all nations, excepting, as we see, those of the British nation, too ready to criticise the acts and operations, not only of the generals and armies of the enemies of their nation, but likewise of the best friends and allies of their nation, and even of those acting in co-operation with the armies of their own nation. This observation must be borne in mind throughout the perusal of Clausewitz's history.

"In respect to the return mentioned, it is forgotten by General Clausewitz that the army under the command of the Duke of Wellington was not like that under the command of Marshal Prince Blucher, composed of the troops of all arms and establishments, of and belonging to one nation; that they belonged to several nations, the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in some cases, belonging each to different nations; that the several corps of troops, composing the allied army in question, were not of uniform strength of numbers, whether considered by nations, by battalions, by brigades, or by divisions; that the discipline and military qualities of the several corps of troops, and, above all, their efficiency and military experience in the field, were very various.

"The greatest part of some of the corps composing the army was composed of men lately recruited. The whole of the Hanoverian army was of militia, excepting some battalions of the Hanoverian Legion, which properly belonged to the British army, and had served

under the command of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington in Spain.

"It was necessary to organise these troops in brigades, divisions, and corps d'armée with those better disciplined and more accustomed to war, in order to derive from their numbers as much advantage as possible. But these arrangements in allied armies, formed as this one was, are not matters of course; the same national feeling respecting its armies, even in the least powerful nation, which has been already adverted to as having an influence over the critical morality of the historian, is not without its influence in the formation of such arrangements of organisation. No troops can be employed in an allied army, excepting each corps and detachment under the immediate command of its own national officer.

"The organisation and formation of corps to serve together, and under the command and superior direction of what officer, becomes, therefore, and became in this case, a matter which required great attention and labour, and of great difficulty.

"To these considerations was to be added, that some of the troops were fit only for garrison duties; while, on the other hand, the importance of the fortresses was so urgent as to require for these garrisons a proportion at least of the very best troops.

"This statement will serve to show that the formation of a return of the army under the command of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington, as a line of battle, was not very easy.

"The two allied armies,—the one in the Netherlands, the other in the provinces on the left bank of the

Rhine,—were, as has been already shown, necessarily on the defensive.

"They were waiting for the junction of other large armies, to attain, by their co-operation, a common object; but their defensive position and immediate objects did not necessarily preclude all idea or plan of attack upon the enemy.

"The enemy might have so placed his army as to render the attack thereof advisable, or even necessary: in that case, the allied generals must, and in all probability would, have taken the initiative; but, in the case existing in 1815, the enemy did not take such a position as is thus supposed; on the contrary, he took a position in which his numbers, his movements, and his designs could be concealed, protected, and supported by his formidable fortresses on the frontier, up to the last moment previous to their being carried into execution.

"The allied generals could not attack this position without being prepared to attack a superior army so posted; they could not, therefore, have the initiative in the way of attack.

"They had the option of taking the initiative in the way of defensive movement; but such defensive movement or alteration of the well-considered original position taken up by each of the allied armies, must have been founded upon a conviction that such positions were faulty and might be improved; or upon an hypothesis of the intended movements of attack by the enemy. There was no reason to believe that the first was the case; and it must never be lost sight of, that to found upon an hypothesis which might and probably would prove erroneous, considering what the advantages were of the position of the enemy on the frontier, the altera-

tion of the defensive position of the allied armies, might have occasioned what is commonly called a false movement; and it must be observed, that whatever may be thought of Buonaparte as a leader of troops in other respects, there certainly never existed a man in that situation in any times in whose presence it was so little safe to make what is called a false movement.

"The initiative then rested with the enemy; and the course to be pursued by the allied generals respectively was to be prepared to move in all directions, to wait till it should be seen in what direction the attack should be made, and then to assemble the armies as quickly as possible to resist the attack, or to attack the enemy with the largest force that could be collected.

"There is a good deal of discussion in the history by General Clausewitz, upon the expediency of the maintenance of the defensive positions taken up by the allied armies, particularly by that under the command of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington; and that even for the attainment of the object in view, for the position of the last mentioned as detailed above, it would have been best to occupy a position in the country, having for its sole object the early junction of the two allied armies, with a view to fight a great battle with the enemy under the command of Buonaparte.

"It is not difficult to criticise the particular positions occupied by any army; which positions, as in this case, were never the objects of actual attack: it is not so easy a task, first to define precisely a particular object for the operations of a defensive nature for any army, excluding from the consideration not only political objects and views, but likewise those of a merely technical and military nature, such as in this case, the preservation

of the communications of this army with England, with Holland, and with Germany; and next to define the positions to be occupied by two armies, in order to carry on such operations.

"Brussels, Ghent, the communications with England, Holland, and Germany were to be given up, and the armies were to unite, or to be prepared to unite, in order to fight a general battle with the enemy, as the best mode of securing all the objects of their respective defensive positions. But it is not stated or even hinted where each was to be posted, nor where they were to unite, nor where was to be the great field of battle on which the contest was to be decided.

"It is obvious that the historian could not indicate such positions: he was too wise to make the attempt.

"He cannot but be aware that when the Allies should have abandoned their defensive positions in the Netherlands, and should have left it in the power of the enemy to occupy with his hussars and light troops Brussels and Ghent, the communications with England and Holland through Antwerp, and with England through the towns on the Lysse and Ostend, they would not have been nearer the attainment of the object of fighting a general battle than while in the positions having for their objects to maintain and secure these advantages.

"The initiative for such general battle must still have been in the hands of Buonaparte. He might have avoided it only by remaining with his main body within the French frontier; while with his hussars and light troops, he could have possessed Brussels and Ghent, and the communications with England and Holland, and with Germany through Holland.

"The historian shows in more than one passage of

his history, that he is not insensible of the military and political value of good moral impressions, resulting from military operations. He is sensible of the advantage derived by the enemy from such impressions; but he cannot calculate the advantage on the one hand, or the disadvantage on the other, resulting from such impressions, in cases in which it is the object to blame the course of operations directed by a general, supposed to be a rival in reputation to one of the Prussian nation. He is aware of the object of Buonaparte to create throughout Europe, and even in England, a moral impression against the war, and to shake the power of the then existing administration in England. He is sensible of, and can contemplate, the effect of the moral impression upon the other armies of Europe, and upon the governments in whose service they were, resulting from the defeat, or even want of success, of the allied armies, under the command of the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blucher; but he is not sensible of, and cannot calculate upon, or even consider of, the effect of the moral impression resulting from the loss of Brussels and Ghent; the flight of the King of the Netherlands, and of the king, Louis XVIII., the creatures of the treaties of peace, and of the Congress of Vienna; and this, with the loss of the communications of the army under the Duke of Wellington, with England, Holland, and Germany, without making the smallest effort to save any of these objects.

"If this historian had inquired, however, whether in England or elsewhere, he would have found that the feeling upon such events would have been as strong as he admits it would in case of the want of success

of the operations of the allied armies, whose operations are under discussion.

"In England, in particular, these supposed events would have been severely felt.

"But let us consider whether the abandonment of all the objects which the Allies had in view, in maintaining any position in the Netherlands, would have enabled the generals of the allied armies the better to fight a great battle with the enemy.

"The enemy would have had the option whether to fight the battle or not, and the initiative of the movements preparatory to it, after having acquired all the advantages placed in his hands; and the allied generals must have given up those objects, the protection of which alone, in a political or even a military view, could justify their fighting a battle at all, at least, till they should be in a state of co-operation with the other armies of Europe.

"The enemy having the initiative, would have moved across the communications of the army under the Duke of Wellington. In possession of the great towns, of all the roads, and of the resources of the Belgian Provinces, he would have had to decide whether he would or not force the two allied armies to retire from the Meuse. But on the hypothesis that the enemy would fight a battle for such an object, why should the Allies? The Duke of Wellington would have lost all for which, as the commander of an army, he ought to desire to contend, and neither his position nor that of the army under Prince Blucher could have been improved by a great battle, even under the hypothesis that the result would have been a great victory. Such a one would not have restored to the Duke of Wellington the advantages

which he enjoyed in the state of preparation of the army under his command for the advance into France, in co-operation with the other allied armies, when they should have taken their stations, and should have been prepared to advance.

"The restoration of the communications with England, Holland, and Germany, which would have been the result of such successful battle, would not immediately have restored and replaced his magazines not located in fortresses, and which would have fallen into the enemy's hands by the supposed change of position with a view to fight this great battle. After all, the initiative of this battle must have rested with the enemy, and there could be no military reason for fighting it, or political reason, excepting the moral impression throughout the world of its successful result.

"*It* is useless to speculate upon supposed military movements which were never made, and operations which never took place, or the objects of the several chiefs or generals opposed to each other.

"But although it was not desirable that the Duke of Wellington should break up his defensive position in the Belgian Provinces, with a view to take one, with the army under his command, having solely in view the object of fighting a great battle in co-operation or conjunction with the Prussian army, it was still desirable that he should occupy this defensive position in such a manner, and take such precautionary measures, as would enable him to assemble, at the earliest period of time, the largest disposable force at his disposition; after providing for the defence and security of his military communications with England, Holland, and Germany, and of the objects intrusted to his care and

protection, under the treaty of peace, and by the acts of the allied ministers, assembled in conference at Vienna. He accordingly, from the moment at which he arrived in the Netherlands in the beginning of April, turned his attention to the strengthening of the posts on the frontier, and works were constructed at Ostend, at Nieuport, Ypres, Amiens, Courtrai, Audenarde, Tournay, Ath, Mons, Charleroi, and Namur. It is true these were field works, generally on the sites of the ancient works by which these towns were defended; the defence of which was aided by the ancient ditches and means of inundation.

"His orders at that time to the quartermaster-general and the general officers show what were his intentions in the various hypothetical cases therein stated.

"There are several great roads leading from the northern departments of France, and the great French fortresses therein situated, by each of which these provinces might have been invaded, and which it was necessary at least to observe. One from Lille upon Menin, Courtrai, and Ghent; one from Lille upon Tournay and Ghent, or upon Ath and Brussels; one from Condé upon Tournay, Ath, Enghein, and Brussels; one from Condé and Valenciennes upon Mons and Brussels. The last of these was a great paved road, upon which there was no obstacle of a defensive nature, excepting the field-works, of which it appeared that the Duke of Wellington had ordered the construction.

"The historian Clausewitz has detailed the position of the Prussian army, the distances of each post from the others, and the length of time which would elapse for the completion of the assembling of the whole. It cannot be stated that the allied army under the Duke of Wellington could have been assembled in an equally

short period of time; but if it is considered that the objects for the protection of the army under the command of the Duke of Wellington were extended over a tract of country of greater length than were those protected by the allied army under the command of Prince Blucher, it will be found that this part of the country, contiguous in its whole extent to the French frontier, and traversed in all parts by excellent paved roads, leading from some one or other of the French fortresses, required for its protection a system of occupation quite different from that adopted for the Prussian army under Field-Marshal Prince Blucher.

"But what follows will show, that notwithstanding the extension of the allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington, such was the celerity of communication with all parts of it, that in point of fact his orders reached all parts of the army in six hours after he had issued them, and that he was in line in person with a sufficient force to resist and keep in check the enemy's corps, which first attacked the Prussian corps under General Ziethen, at daylight on the 15th of June. Having received the intelligence of that attack only at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th, he was at Quatre-Bras before twenty-four hours on the 16th, with a sufficient force to engage the left of the French army.

"It is certainly true that he had known for some days of the augmentation of the enemy's force on the frontier, and even of the arrival of Buonaparte at the army; but he did not deem it expedient to make any movement, excepting for the assembly of the troops at their several alarm posts, till he should hear of the decided movement of the enemy.

"The first account received by the Duke of Wellington was from the Prince of Orange, who had come in from

the outposts of the army of the Netherlands to dine with the Duke at three in the afternoon. He reported that the enemy had attacked the Prussians at Thuin, that they had taken possession of, but had afterwards abandoned, Binch, that they had not yet touched the position of the army of the Netherlands. When the Prince was with the Duke, the staff-officer employed by Prince Blucher at the Duke's head-quarters, General Müffling, came to the Duke to inform him that he had just received intelligence of a movement of the French army, and their attack upon the Prussian troops at Thuin.

"It appears by the statement of the historian, that the posts of the Prussian corps of General Ziethen were attacked at Thuin at four o'clock on the morning of the 15th, and that General Ziethen himself, with a part of his corps, retired, and was at Charleroi at about ten o'clock on that day. Yet *the report thereof was not* received at Brussels till three o'clock in the afternoon. The Prussian cavalry of the corps of Ziethen was at Gosselies and Fleurus on the evening and night of the 15th. Orders were forthwith sent for the march of the whole army to its left. The whole moved on that evening, and in the night, each division and portion separately; the whole being protected on the march by the defensive works constructed at the different points referred to, and by their garrisons.

"The reserve which had been encamped in the neighbourhood, and cantoned in the town or in the neighbourhood of Brussels, were ordered to assemble in, and in the neighbourhood of, the Park at Brussels; which they did on that evening; and they marched in the morning of the 16th upon Quatre Bras, towards which post the march of all the troops, consisting of the left and

centre of the army, and of the cavalry in particular, was directed.

"The Duke went in person at daylight in the morning of the 16th to Quatre Bras, where he found some Netherlands troops, — cavalry, infantry, and artillery, which had been engaged with the enemy but lightly; and he went on from thence to the Prussian army, which was in sight, formed on the heights behind Ligny and St. Amand. He there communicated personally with Marshal Prince Blucher, and the head-quarters of the Prussian army.

"In the meantime the reserve of the allied army, under the command of the Duke of Wellington, arrived at Quatre Bras. The historian asserts that the Duke of Wellington had ordered these troops to halt at the point at which they quitted the Forêt de Soignes. He can have no proof of this fact, of which there is no evidence; and in point of fact the two armies were united about mid-day of the 16th of June on the left of the position of the allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington. These troops forming the reserve, and having arrived from Brussels, were soon joined by those of the 1st division of infantry, and the cavalry; and notwithstanding the criticism of the Prussian historian on the position occupied by the army under the command of the Duke of Wellington, and of the march of the troops to join with the Prussian army, it is a fact, appearing upon the face of the history, that the allied British and Netherlands army was in line at Quatre Bras, not only nearly twenty-four hours sooner than one whole corps of the Prussian army under General Bulow — which is attributed by the historian to an accidental mistake — but likewise before the whole of the

corps under General Ziethen, which had been the first attacked on the 14th, had taken its position in the line of the army assembled on the heights behind Ligny, and having on their left Sombreffe.

"It was perfectly true that the Duke did not at first give credit to the reports of the intention of the enemy to attack by the valleys of the Sambre and the Meuse.

"The enemy had destroyed the roads leading through these valleys, and he considered that Buonaparte might have made his attack upon the allied armies in the Netherlands, and upon the provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, by other lines, with more advantage; but it is obvious that when the attack was made he was not unprepared to assist in resisting it; and, in point of fact, did, in the afternoon and in the evening of the 16th of June, repulse the attack of Marshal Ney upon his position at Quatre Bras, which *had been commenced by* the aid of another corps d'armée under General Reille. These were the troops which had attacked on the 15th, at daylight, the Prussian corps under General Ziethen; which corps the allied troops under the Duke of Wellington relieved in resistance to the enemy.

"The Prussian army, after a contest of some hours' duration upon the heights behind Ligny, having been under the necessity of retiring, that part of the allied army under the Duke of Wellington which was engaged at Quatre Bras maintained its ground at Quatre Bras, and even gained ground upon the enemy.

"The fields of battle were in sight of each other, and a report was received. But although the exact result of the battle was not known, it was judged that it had not been successful to the Prussian army. Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington was informed of some of the

details at night. But still he considered that his own position being untouched, and the continued march of the troops under his command giving him an increase of strength at every moment, he felt the utmost confidence in the general result of the operations in progress.

"The Prussian army retreated towards Wavre. [N. B. — It must be observed in the historian's account of these battles, that the corps of Reille was, at the commencement of the battle of Quatre Bras, joined with the troops of Ney. In point of fact, it was seen in the field.]

"That corps was, during the battle, ordered, and did march to its right, towards the main body of the French army. It was then halted and counter-marched towards its original destination.

"The reasons for these eccentric movements are not known. Certain it is that the corps of Reille did not fire a shot after the commencement of the battle of Quatre Bras. That which it is reasonable to suppose is, that Marshal Ney had required that the corps of Reille should be sent back to him upon finding that he could make no impression upon the positions of the Duke of Wellington upon Quatre Bras, whose army was at every moment receiving reinforcements of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, from Nivelle and other places on its right.

"Shortly after daylight on the morning of the 17th, Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington's aide-de-camp, Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon, with two squadrons of hussars, drove in the enemy's vedettes upon the ground of the Prussian contest on the afternoon of the 16th June. These retired into the villages of Ligny and St. Amand, &c., on the stream.

"Colonel Gordon communicated with General Grethen at Sombreffe, and ascertained exactly the line of retreat of the army under Field Marshal Prince Blucher upon Wavre. As soon as the exact position of the Prussian army was ascertained, and the intentions of its general were known to the Duke of Wellington, he broke up from the position of Quatre Bras shortly before mid-day, in presence of the whole army of the enemy, without interruption or molestation, and ordered the march of the infantry of the army under his command, to the ground in front of Waterloo, with the exception of the light troops at the outposts, with which and the cavalry the Duke remained on the ground at Quatre Bras.

"The Duke saw throughout the day of the 17th the movements of the Prussian army upon the field of the battle of the preceding day. No pursuit was made of the Prussian army, or movement of any kind made by the French army, till a late hour in the afternoon of the 17th. And indeed the account given by Marshal Grouchy, in a pamphlet in his own defence published in the United States, shows that the account given in the history is as nearly as possible an accurate representation of what passed on the 17th. According to the reports in the allied army under the Duke of Wellington, the enemy did not move till between three and four o'clock in the afternoon*, at which hour large

* Would it not have been a fair conclusion for the historian to draw?—that the position occupied by the allied army under the Duke of Wellington at Quatre Bras, and the successful resistance of that army in the battle of the preceding day, might have had some effect in producing the unusual tranquillity of the French army throughout the day of the 17th,—the morrow of a successful attack upon the position of an enemy's army which had retired.

masses of troops appeared on the Prussian field of battle. One body marched in the direction of Namur, another in the direction of Wavre, which last is supposed to have been the corps under the command of Marshal Grouchy. The largest body and the great mass of the cavalry moved down the high road from Sombreffe to Quatre Bras, towards the left of the British troops of the army of the Duke of Wellington, which still remained on that ground.

"These were put in motion and retired as soon as their outposts were touched by the enemy; and joined the main body of the army at that time posted in front of Waterloo.

"Here all the troops composing the army under the Duke of Wellington were assembled, excepting a small corps de réserve, still remaining at Hal, on the high road from Brussels to Mons. All the remainder, whether engaged at Quatre Bras on the 16th, or who had joined in the evening of the 16th, or had been turned off from Nivelle to Waterloo; and the troops falling back from the position at Quatre Bras, were in the position at Waterloo on the 17th in the evening.

"The whole of the Prussian army was at the same time in the position of Wavre.

"The two allied armies communicated with each other throughout the night of the 17th June, and the cavalry of General Bulow's Prussian corps of Marshal Prince Blucher's army was on the ground in front of Ohain, through the defile between the positions of the two armies, at daylight on the morning of the 18th.

"Thus, then, it appears, by the report of this historian, that after the affairs at Ligny and Quatre Bras, the two allied armies were collected, each on its own

ground, in presence of the enemy, having a short and not difficult communication between them, each of them in presence of the enemy, and between the enemy and Brussels; all their communications with England, Holland, and Germany, and all the important political interests committed to their charge, being secure.

"It has already been stated and believed, that the cavalry of Bulow's corps was seen on the heights in front of Ohain, between the allied army, under the command of the Duke of Wellington, and the defile leading to Wavre, at an early hour on the morning of the 18th.

"It is a curious fact, in elucidation of the movements of the allied army under Marshal Prince Blucher, that Marshal Grouchy has published in his defence, printed in the United States of America, a letter from Marshal Soult, addressed to him, dated the 18th June, at ten o'clock P.M., in which Marshal Soult states, "*Nous apercevions la cavalerie Prussienne*," which was the very force seen by the Duke of Wellington, as stated, shortly after daybreak on the morning of that day. It is a curious circumstance that this cavalry should not have been observed in the French army at an earlier hour than at one o'clock in the afternoon. It must be acknowledged that at that hour no knowledge existed at head-quarters that other troops had passed the defile, or had been engaged with the enemy on the left of the army under the command of the Duke of Wellington.

"The first thing heard of the operations of Marshal Blucher's army was a report brought from the left of the army under the Duke of Wellington, at about six o'clock in the evening, that at that moment the smoke of the fire of artillery could be perceived at a great

distance beyond the right of the enemy's army, which firing was supposed at that time to be at Planchenoit.

"The report of the battle, made at the time by the Duke of Wellington, to the British and the allied governments of Europe, has long been before the public. In that report he does full justice to the exertions made by his colleague, the Prussian commander-in-chief, and by the general officers and troops to aid and support him, and to the effectual aid which they gave him. He states no details, excepting that the battle was terminated by an attack which he determined to make upon the enemy's position, in which he does not report that any Prussian troops joined, because, in point of fact, none were in that part of the field of battle. He states, however, that the enemy's troops retired from the last attack upon his position in great confusion; and that the march of General Bulow's corps, by Fischermont, upon Planchenoit and La Belle Alliance, had begun to take effect; and as he could perceive the fire of his cannon, and as Marshal Prince Blucher, with a corps of his army, had touched the left of our line by Ohain, he determined upon the attack, which succeeded in every point.

"He added that he continued the pursuit till long after dark; and then discontinued it on account of the fatigue of the troops, which had been engaged during twelve hours, and because he found himself on the same road with Marshal Blucher, who assured him of his intention to follow the enemy throughout the night. He then adds: — 'I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to Marshal Blucher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance received from

them. The operation of General Bulow on the enemy's flank was a most successful one. And even if I had not found myself in a situation to make the attack which produced the final result, it would have forced the enemy to retire if his attacks should have failed, and would have prevented him taking advantage of them if they should unfortunately have succeeded."

"When the two Field Marshals met on the same road it is well known that they embraced in the presence of their troops, and were cordial friends up to the day of the death of Prince Blucher. Surely the details of the battle might have been left as in the original official reports. Historians and commentators were not necessary. The battle, possibly the most important single military event of modern times, was attended by advantages sufficient for the glory of many such armies as the two great allied armies engaged. The enemy never rallied. Buonaparte lost his empire for ever. And the peace of Europe and of the world was settled on the basis on which it rests at this moment.

"It is impossible to close this paper without observing that Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington's letters published by Col. Gurwood, afford proofs that he was convinced that the enemy ought to have attacked by other lines, rather than by the valley of the Sambre and of the Meuse. And that even up to the last moment, previous to the attack of his position at Waterloo, he conceived that they would endeavour to turn it by a march upon Hal. He states this in letters to the Duc de Feltre on the 15th, and the Duc de Berri and King Louis XVIII., at half-past three A.M. on the 18th June. And there are orders to his patrols of

cavalry, on the nights of the 16th and 17th June, to observe particularly the enemy's movements towards Nivelle.

"It might be a nice question for military discussion, whether Bonaparte was right in endeavouring to force the position of Waterloo, — or the Duke right in thinking that from the evening of the 16th he would have taken a wiser course if he had moved to his left, reached the high road leading from Mons to Brussels, and turned the right of the position of the Allies by Hal.

"It is obvious that the Duke was prepared for such a movement."

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

LONDON
PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO.
NEW-STREET SQUARE

00103484

gitized with financial assistance from
Government of Maharashtra
on 15 March, 2016